Showing results 1 - 4 of 4
| Yiling Chen | Yang Liu
Learning to Incentivize: Eliciting Effort via Output Agreement. Yang Liu, Yiling Chen, April 19, 2016, Paper. "In crowdsourcing when there is a lack of verification for contributed answers, output agreement mechanisms are often used to incentivize participants to provide truthful answers when the correct answer is hold by the majority. In this paper, we focus on using output agreement mechanisms to elicit effort, in addition to eliciting…
| Yiling Chen
Market Manipulation with Outside Incentives. Yiling Chen, March 1, 2014, Paper. "Much evidence has shown that prediction markets can effectively aggregate dispersed information about uncertain future events and produce remarkably accurate forecasts. However, if the market prediction will be used for decision making, a strategic participant with a vested interest in the decision outcome may manipulate the market prediction to influence the…
| Yiling Chen
The Effects of Performance-Contingent Financial Incentives in Online Labor Markets. Yiling Chen, July 2013, Paper. "Online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) have emerged as platforms that facilitate the allocation of productive effort across global economies. Many of these markets compensate workers with monetary payments. We study the effects of performance-contingent financial rewards on work quality and worker effort in…
| Yiling Chen
What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets. Yiling Chen, June 2013, Paper. "The primary goal of a prediction market is to elicit and aggregate information about some future event of interest. How well this goal is achieved depends on the behavior of self-interested market participants, which are crucially influenced by not only their private information but also their knowledge of others' private…