Abstract
Powerful states should avoid using their power and international organisations they dominate to prescribe general measures to developing-economy states because we have not yet overcome our own obvious problems. Doing so also harms our position in the world. Good policies can speak for themselves. We can usefully try to describe our mistakes, problems, and what we think we have learned. There are important illustrations in the 2022-23 inflationary and banking problems. They are rooted in moral hazard within and across organs of the state, which are problems still largely ignored within political economy and science.
Citations
Tucker, Paul. 2025. Public Moral Hazard in Solutions to Private Moral Hazard, Illustrated by Macro-Financial Policy Regimes: Response to Hélène Rey. M-RCBG Associate Working Paper No. 266. Cambridge, MA: Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government, Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/2025-11/Final_AWP_266%20FINAL.pdf.
This paper was originally presented at a conference on a so-called London Consenus at the London School of Economics in 2023, and is published in Besley, T., Bucelli, I. and Velasco, A. (eds) (2025), The London Consensus: Economic Principles for the 21st Century. London: LSE Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.tlc.