Explaining Multilateral Prohibitions on Militarized Bargaining

Speaker: Anatoly Levshin, Postdoctoral Fellow, International Security Program/Technology & Geopolitics

It is a familiar observation that the possibility of war permeates relations among states under anarchy. It is less well appreciated that states deliberately and routinely regulate that possibility by treaty. Indeed, across the past two centuries alone, various groups of three or more states concluded over 97 legal instruments containing 121 distinct provisions variously circumscribing the right and ability of different states to engage in militarized bargaining. 

These provisions vary substantially in their geographical coverage (local, regional, or global), scope of membership (exclusive or inclusive), and rule of prohibition (neutralization of states, demilitarization of territory, or prohibition of aggressive war). In this seminar, Anatoly Levshin will present an institutionalist theory that explains states’ use of multilateral prohibitions on militarized bargaining, provides guidance on the use of neutralization, demilitarization, and non-aggression pacts as policy instruments, and fundamentally revises our understanding of the origins and historical significance of some of the most familiar multilateral prohibitions on militarized bargaining, including the non-aggression pacts embedded in the Covenant of the League of Nations and Charter of the United Nations.

Admittance is on a first come–first served basis. Tea and Coffee Provided.