Financial Stability Implications of a Sovereign Domestic Debt Restructuring: The Case of Jamaica (2010)

​Sovereign domestic debt restructurings possess a distinct feature that separates them from external debt restructurings. This feature—in essence a negative externality—is the direct (and often significant) costs imposed on the local financial system when domestic debt is restructured. These costs are due to the existence of a strong nexus between sovereign and domestic financial institutions, which during the episodes of sovereign stress could impact the balance sheet and income position of those institutions. Internalizing this externality reduces the (fiscal) savings of a debt exchange and makes domestic debt restructurings inherently more complex than external debt restructurings.

Using the experience of Jamaica in 2010, the study group will discuss the channels through which sovereign debt restructuring impact domestic banking system and the ways to contain potential financial stability risks. The discussion will feature former Director of Jamaica’s Debt Management Office, Pamella McLaren, and M-RCBG Senior Fellow Gregory Makoff as special guests.
 Suggested reading:  Grigorian, David A., Trevor Alleyne, and Alejandro Guerson, 2012. “Jamaica Debt Exchange,” IMF Working Paper 12/244, Washington, DC.

This study group / discussion is open only to HUID holders.
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