Pricing Rules for Electricity Auctions with Non-Convexities

Join us for an Energy Policy Seminar featuring Nicolas Stevens, a researcher at the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics and a visiting researcher at the Belfer Center. Stevens will compare different pricing approaches for dealing with non-convexities in electricity auctions.

Q&A to follow. Buffet-style lunch will be served.

Abstract

Since the liberalization of the power sector and the creation of wholesale electricity markets, the question of how to price the non-convexities that are present in the market has attracted the interest of both academics and practitioners. Over the years, US markets have adopted different and evolving pricing rules which are still vividly debated. Since the “Trilateral Market Coupling” (2006), the European day-ahead market has opted for a notably different pricing rule, and there is currently research undertaken by the EU stakeholders to reform it. Our work aims at contributing to the debate. We analyze six different pricing methods. We establish several mathematical properties for enabling their comparison. Our findings are illustrated on stylized examples and numerical simulations that are performed on realistic auction datasets. Both theoretical and numerical evidences that are gathered in our paper point towards the advantages of the so-called “convex hull pricing” approach.

Registration: RSVP required. A Harvard University ID is required for in-person attendance; all are welcome to attend via Zoom.

Recording: The seminar will be recorded and available to watch on the Belfer Center's YouTube channel. Those who register for this event will automatically receive a link to the recording as soon as it becomes available.

Accessibility: To request accommodations or who have questions about access, please contact Liz Hanlon (ehanlon@hks.harvard.edu) in advance of the session.