On Wednesday, the Supreme Court significantly weakened the 1965 Voting Rights Act through a landmark ruling in Louisiana v. Callais. The Court ruled that Louisiana’s 2024 congressional map, which created a second majority-Black district to remedy racial vote dilution, was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. We spoke with HKS Professor of Public Policy Maya Sen, a political scientist who has conducted research on the Supreme Court, and Harvard Kennedy School PhD in Public Policy and joint Harvard Law School candidate Jack Deschler, who studies voting rights, about this ruling.
Q: What exactly did the Supreme Court do to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais, and why is the ruling so significant?
Sen: The Voting Rights Act, which was enacted in 1965, has been a very important piece of legislation in the United States, and has had a tremendous impact in narrowing the gaps between minority voter turnout and White voter turnout. In the South, it has been hugely effective in bringing Black voter turnout to levels comparable to, or even exceeding, white voter turnout.
However, in this ruling, the Court has severely limited the use of an important element of the Voting Rights Act: Section 2.
Section 2 is the provision that allowed (and sometimes required) the creation of majority-minority districts, which is a key way that Black and Latino representatives have been elected to Congress and other political offices. By one count, around 140 House districts are majority-minority districts—so around one third of Congressional seats
After the Court’s ruling in Louisiana v. Callais, the creation of majority–minority districts will be extremely difficult. I think it's going to likely have repercussions throughout our political system, from the way in which districts are drawn to the number of minority representatives across tiers of government.
Deschler: In terms of the ruling, formally, the Court left the test from Thornburg v. Gingles that has governed Section 2 redistricting in place and only updated it. The old Gingles test required that plaintiffs to show that (1) it was possible draw an additional minority-majority district while respecting “traditional redistricting principles,” (2) the minority group was politically cohesive, and (3) that the majority voted as a bloc to a sufficient to degree to be able to block the minority from electing candidates of their choice. If plaintiffs could meet all those conditions and could show that the “totality of the circumstances,” it meant that minority voters had unequal access to the political process.
The Callais opinion changes this test in two ways. On the first condition, Justice Alito’s opinion makes clear that plaintiffs now must also show that a state redistricted based on race and not party. In a way, this is the same test, but with “partisan objectives” included in “traditional redistricting criteria.” Second, Justice Alito says that for the second and third conditions, which are often analyzed together, plaintiffs must somehow “control for party affiliation” and show that racial bloc voting “cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” Given the high correlation between party and race, especially in the American South, this will likely be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do. So, while formally the Section 2 Gingles test remains in place, it has been narrowed to a degree that makes it incredibly difficult to use.
Q: This ruling follows Shelby County v. Holder in 2013, which gutted the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirement. Is there anything left of the VRA as a meaningful enforcement tool?
Deschler: Not much! Another important ruling to mention is Brnovich v. DNC (2021), in which the Court significantly narrowed non-redistricting applications of Section 2. Time (and hopefully, some clever empirics) will tell if there is a way to still bring Section 2 claims under the narrower Gingles test (the Callais test, maybe we should call it at this point).
Sen: I think Jack is right here: there isn’t much functionally left beyond some basic protections against very obvious discriminatory practices. I’m sure there will be additional litigation to clarify the precise contours of the Court’s opinion, especially regarding the kind of evidence needed to satisfy Alito’s standard. That said, this ruling—and recent aggressive redistricting moves—will shift away our viewing of voting rights primarily through the lens of race-conscious policy, as the Voting Rights Act did, and toward thinking about solutions to the escalating problem of partisan gerrymandering.
Q: Reports suggest this ruling could give Republicans as many as 19 additional House seats compared to 2024 maps. How realistic is that estimate, and which states are most likely to see immediate redistricting efforts?
Sen: Given how close we are to the 2026 midterm elections, it may be difficult for states to quickly implement new redistricting maps. Some states have already held their primaries for this election cycle, while others, such as Texas and North Carolina, have already engaged in extensive redistricting to favor Republican candidates. Florida Governor Ron DeSantis has also announced a new, aggressively redrawn map. It seems unlikely that those states would redraw their maps again in light of this opinion.
However, that still leaves a number of states, such as Tennessee and South Carolina, that may try to move very quickly to redistrict on the basis of this ruling.
All of that said, this ruling is going to have enormous repercussions for 2028 and, certainly, for all the redistricting that will need to happen after the 2030 U.S. census.
“This opinion is entirely consistent with the Court’s recent trend line on race-conscious policymaking.”
Deschler: Louisiana will certainly try to redistrict—the governor has already indicated that he will call a special legislative session to do so. South Carolina is likely to as well, but the filing deadlines in both cases have already passed, and primary voting has already begun in Louisiana. There’s an interesting question about whether Circuit Court precedent will bar them from doing so this close to an election. For years, states have fought redistricting orders using the Purcell doctrine, which stays court orders that require redistricting too close to an election. Courts have applied this principle further and further out from an election, and the Fifth Circuit, which contains Louisiana, said that “two weeks before a filing deadline” was too close to the election to redistrict a county commission in 2023 (Petteway v. Galveston County, Tex.). It’s unclear if courts will apply this principle against states trying to redistrict, but it is conceivable.
Two other things: Alabama is under a court order that says they cannot redistrict before 2030. That may be litigated before 2028, but it’s likely too late before 2026. Indeed, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey indicated yesterday that they won’t try. Second, it's worth mentioning the vast consequences this decision could have for state legislatures as well, especially across the South.
Q: What does this mean for majority-minority districts specifically—and for Black and Latino representation in Congress?
Sen: This paints a bleak picture for the future of Black representation in elected offices, particularly in the South. Across the region, race is a very strong predictor of how people vote: Southern whites tend to be among the most conservative and Republican-leaning in the country, while Southern Blacks are among the most reliably Democratic.
As a result, Republican state legislators throughout the South will have a strong incentive to eliminate Congressional districts that currently elect Black representatives. After this ruling, they can simply justify those changes on partisan grounds, and for this Supreme Court, that will be enough. In fact, Justice Alito’s majority opinion effectively invites states to frame their decisions as driven by partisanship whenever possible, even in places where race almost perfectly predicts vote choice and party identification is deeply polarized along racial lines.
All means that the number of Black representatives elected to Congress will fall significantly over the next decade, especially in states where Republicans control redistricting and with deep party polarization along racial lines. We may also see declines elsewhere if Democrats adopt a tit-for-tat strategy and more aggressively redraw maps in blue states.
For Latino representation, the picture is less clear. Latinos moved toward the Republican Party in large numbers in 2024, and although there is some evidence that parts of this shift have been short-lived, Latino voters overall remain more Republican leaning than Black voters. That means Republican state legislatures will have less of an incentive to crack or pack Latino communities under claims of partisanship than they do Black ones.
Deschler: Maya makes a great point about Latino representation, and it's buttressed by the way that Justice Alito altered the Gingles test. Given his new requirement of controlling for party in a racially polarized voting analysis, it will also be easier to prove that racial considerations were at play and not partisan considerations when Latino voters exhibit less partisan polarization.
The point about Democrats responding where they control the redistricting process is also important but could even further harm minority representation. Democrats may be pressured to unpack Black-majority seats in Northern states to more efficiently distribute their voters and win more seats overall. If that’s the case, we could see a decrease in Black representation across the country, not just in the South.
Q: Justice Alito wrote that Section 2 “was designed to enforce the Constitution—not collide with it.” How do you assess that framing, and what does it tell us about how the current Court views the relationship between civil rights legislation and equal protection doctrine?
Deschler: This line of thinking basically puts voting rights claims in the same situation that equal protection claims have been facing since the 1990s. Over the last few decades, the 14th Amendment has been interpreted to bar affirmative action programs in federal and state contracting and in school admissions. Put simply, any use of race, even a remedial use meant to help adjust for the long history of discrimination in this country, has been constitutionally suspect. Justice Alito’s opinion indicates that voting rights claims will face the same hurdles.
Sen: That’s right. This opinion is entirely consistent with the Court’s recent trend line on race-conscious policymaking. Altogether, it paints a picture of a Court that is deeply skeptical of race-conscious policy across issue areas, even in areas where such policies are attempting to address previous injustices and constitutional harms—such as the denial of voting rights.
When you look at other cases in these areas, such as the ruling against the use of affirmative action in college and university admission in 2023, this ruling should come as no surprise.
Q: Given that the Court has now significantly weakened both the preclearance mechanism in the VRA and Section 2 challenges, what realistic paths remain for advocates and litigants trying to protect minority voting rights?
Deschler: The biggest thing that advocates can do right now, at least in Congress, is to pass a partisan gerrymandering ban. Justice Alito’s opinion basically says that if a state can point to partisan preferences, it doesn’t matter if their opinion is based on racial considerations. So, a partisan gerrymandering ban (which Congress could pass) would make it so states couldn’t point to partisan goals when challenged under Section 2. A truly motivated Congress could potentially pass a new Voting Rights Act, but given how Justice Alito views the 15th Amendment as coterminous with the 14th in terms of congressional power, that plan could run into real constitutional trouble.
You mentioned Shelby County earlier, and that case offers another potential way for Congress to step in. Shelby County didn’t strike down preclearance itself, but merely the formula that triggered preclearance for various jurisdictions. Justice Roberts was clear in his opinion: Congress could pass a new, updated formula to account for modern conditions, and then Sections 4 and 5 would be fully operative again. Would that opinion survive today? I’m not so sure. But, it’s still a tool a voting-rights-motivated Congress has in its toolkit.
Finally, advocates could turn to state level reforms. Various states have passed their own Voting Rights Acts, and various state constitutions have provisions that are more protective of the right to vote than the federal constitution. Advocating for and litigating under state legislation designed to protect voters will be a good place for voting rights advocates to turn their attention. Unfortunately, such legislation will be asymmetric, especially since Callais is likely to decimate minority representation in state legislatures, as well as Congress.
Sen: It’s important to remember that this ruling does not condone overt racial discrimination in voting practices. States still may not purposefully pack minority voters into a small number of districts, nor may they intentionally “crack” minority communities in ways that dilute their voting strength. The real problem, as Jack has pointed out, arises when race correlates with party, because Justice Alito’s opinion is very clear that partisan gerrymandering is perfectly acceptable. It basically invites states to use party identification as a proxy for race. That is why I think Jack’s suggestion that advocates focus on partisan gerrymandering is so important.
Where I am more skeptical than Jack is on the idea that this Court would also uphold a Congressional ban on partisan gerrymandering. Most legal experts, I think, do believe such a ban would be constitutionally permissible under Congress’s power via the Elections Clause of the Constitution.
As a political scientist who has studied partisan dynamics on the Court, however, I am slightly more cynical: I think a majority of the current justices will be skeptical of anything approximating a proportional-representation-style system, especially one implemented by Congressional statute on party lines rather than by Constitutional amendment.
That said, this conversation is just beginning, and there are many opportunities for advocates on both sides to shape the narrative.
—
Photograph by Claire Anderson/Unsplash
More from HKS
“Don’t wait for somebody to anoint you”: Remembering Reverend Jesse Jackson
The Reverend Jesse Jackson, the influential leader in civil rights, politics, and American life, passed away this month at the age of 84. Harvard Kennedy School Professor Cornell William Brooks, a former president and CEO of the NAACP, a civil rights attorney, and an ordained minister himself, spoke about the lessons he took from Jackson.
Featuring Cornell William Brooks
Employees of multi-state firms may benefit from paid sick leave policy spillover
Featuring Daniel Schneider
Employer-sponsored insurance is often out of reach for service-sector workers
Featuring Daniel Schneider