A European NATO?

Amid the growing transatlantic tensions created by the Trump administration, European countries once considered strong allies of America and partners in world peace are now grappling with their ability to defend themselves.  

To consider individual and collective defense and the future of NATO, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School and the Dublin European Law Institute at Dublin City University (DCU) hosted a panel discussion on how European countries can step up their own security efforts and what it means for the future of NATO.  

The program—hosted on the eve of Europe Day, May 9—was put together by Federico Fabbrini, professor of European law and founding director at the Brexit Institute and Dublin European Law Institute (DELI) at DCU. Fabbrini is at the Belfer Center for the spring term as a Fulbright Schuman Fellow in International Security. He is also the founder of a research and policy institute at DCU.

His new initiative at DCU, ALCIDE (Activating the Law Creatively to Integrate Defense in Europe), brings together thought leaders and scholars from across Europe to explore the options and constraints of integrating defense in Europe. This project inspired Fabbrini to assemble the panel discussion at HKS and he plans for more HKS discussions in the future.

“It made sense to have this discussion while I was at HKS as the Fulbright Fellow,” said Fabbrini. “Dublin City University is excited to explore this new institutional partnership by hosting more international conversations.”

“The project starts from awareness that we must find ways for Europe to play a greater role in the field of defense given the dramatic changes that are taking place in transatlantic relations,” said Fabbrini. The event was the first collaboration between DCU and Harvard, and Fabbrini hopes the two institutions continue to work together.  

Derek Hand, dean of faculty at Dublin City University, said in his opening remarks, “We live in interesting times. I think it is important for us to come together to discuss these issues and concerns. Universities are the place where this kind of activity can take place.”  

As a legal scholar, Fabbrini’s research focuses on European defense integration and transatlantic relations. His latest book, The EU Constitution in Time of War, discusses the legal responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  

“One proposal to discuss is that we go back to the basics,” said Fabbrini. “For the last 70 years, Europe has entirely forgotten about the issues of defense,” said Fabbrini.

In the immediate aftermath of WWII, there was one project, the European Defense Community, he said, that aimed to create a European army, fully integrated into NATO. “A full treaty was concluded in 1952 between six countries, the founding members of what we call today the European Union.”

Re-establishing the European Defense Community may not necessarily be the way to move forward but its framework does provide a suitable solution for problems which, Fabbrini noted, are ironically the same problems Europe faced in the early 1950s: how to deal with an aggressive Russia, how to deal with the United States, who back then was fighting Asia and today may be aligning with Asia or maybe the Middle East, and the issue of German rearmament. 

Fabbrini wanted the panel to tackle the idea that a European army is not out of the question now.

“A few years back people might have started laughing if we had a conversation about a European army,” he said. “It seemed so surreal and unnecessary, but definitely now there is greater realization that this might make sense as a policy option going forward. And in fact, it might be necessary given global changes.”

The global changes, he notes, might have come about because of the Trump administration’s stance on European participation in NATO and the threat of a U.S. withdrawal, but solutions will not depend on who is in the White House.

“There was large consensus among the panelists that the change is not dependent on Trump. There are Europeans who would like to have American back, but that view is in the minority,” said Fabbrini.  

The panel represented a variety of viewpoints and geographies. Below are excerpts from each panelist.
 

Brando Benifei

Chairman of the delegation on EU-US Relations, European Parliament

We need to look at a broader framework around the discussion on EU sovereignty. At a recent presentation in the European Parliament, polling research from nine European countries showed that 86% favored autonomy in the technology industries. I use this example because I think it is a strong movement that we see influencing sovereignty and autonomy of the EU on defense as well.  

I’ve been a member of the European Parliament for 12 years. A couple of years ago it was not possible to have this discussion on sovereignty and autonomy. I work with my constituents on trade and trade issues and the trade war with the Trump administration was never conceived as a breaking point.

I can tell you the breaking point was Greenland. The fact that the president of the United States was threatening an invasion, even if it never happened, totally changed the relationship.
 

Leonard Schuette

Postdoctoral fellow, International Security Program at HKS

In the mid 2000s, when it was clear that Germany was by far the most powerful country in Europe, it never rose to the occasion or played the role of the public goods provider. In literature, Germany was described as the “reluctant hegemon.” Even now, you have Poland’s foreign minister [Radosław Sikorski] saying he fears German inaction more than German action.

There are others that are worrying that German rearmament is not sufficiently embedded in European structures. If you look at German defense spending, it will probably be greater than the combined French and British spending by the end of this decade. And I think Germany still largely thinks of leadership in terms of money.

But in many ways, Germany hasn’t conceived of itself as a public goods provider. The idea that you lead beyond narrow self-interest in the name of Europe is the debate currently unfolding in Berlin, in Warsaw, in Paris and elsewhere.
 

Ivo Daalder

Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for International Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO under Obama

I am worried about three things. First, I am worried the U.S. will not encourage the process of a positive direction and, rather, will go in a negative direction. The transition from where we are today and where we need to be is years away.

From the beginning, NATO as an organization was formed with the United States as the skeleton, the DNA of the alliance. If you remove the DNA too quickly, the body dies. It needs to be regenerated in a different form. And that regeneration requires some form of cooperation between the U.S. and European allies.

Secondly, I am worried about Europeans thinking that because the United States is no longer a reliable ally, they can’t rely on NATO. Too many of my friends in the European Union feel they need to build an alliance separately, starting from scratch.  

An example I lived through was in 2011, when the French and British were pushing very hard for military interventions in Libya. They came to the U.S. and asked if we would participate. Under Obama, we said yes. And we were able to take out their air defense systems because only the U.S. had that capability. The suppression of enemy air defenses is something for which the U.S. is particularly well suited. The Brits and the French didn’t have the weapons; they didn’t have the skill set. You can’t really rebuild that outside of NATO.

Finally, I am worried that within the alliance, the United States has played a unique role, a unique leadership role, of driving decisions forward, and often even more so than the secretary-general.

Someone needs to lead, and if the U.S. isn’t going to do it—I wish the U.S. would do it—who is? Every time I go to the NATO headquarters, I say, you have to figure this out. You can’t rely on the United States to lead forever.
 

Nicholas Burns

Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at HKS, and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO

I was ambassador to NATO on 9/11 when we embarked on Article 5 (an armed attack on one NATO ally is considered an attack on all and triggers an obligation for each member to come to its assistance). I was there when we went to Afghanistan together, our first mission ever outside of Europe. I was there when we decided to go into Iraq. So, I’ve seen a lot of this alliance.

President Trump was right to force a change in how we pay for our collective defense because a lot of European countries have been free riders. Where I think he is making a historic mistake is to suggest that, somehow, we don’t need NATO.  

NATO is for Europe the most important alliance we’ve ever been a part of in American history. It is the most successful security alliance in modern times anywhere in the world.  

Our biggest problem in the next 10 years is Russian power. We need Poland as a frontline state. We need NATO to contain Putin and help Ukraine survive. We need a strategic relationship between NATO and Ukraine. You can argue that Ukraine right now is the greatest land fighting force in the world, the most experienced, more so than the U.S. in the last four years.  

I think Trump is making a terrible mistake pushing the NATO allies away. Threatening multiple times to invade Greenland breaks the bonds of trust. And when we are around the NATO table, it’s all about trust. However the political pendulum may swing—either to a non-Trump Republican or a Democrat. I think we’ll come back. But we will have a lot of making up to do. 

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Photograph by Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto/Getty Images