The 2024 U.K. general election proved a watershed contest, with a stunning rejection of the Conservative government after 14 years in power. The Conservative’s share of the vote (24%) was its worst ever. In contrast, Keir Starmer’s Labour Party made a historic leap, winning almost two-thirds of all seats in Parliament—doubling their numbers to 412—despite securing only one-third of the vote. Why did the Labour Party achieve such a substantial victory, especially since their success seems to buck the trend for the flagging electoral fortunes of center-left Social Democratic parties across Europe and, potentially, America? We asked Pippa Norris, the Paul F. McGuire Lecturer on Comparative Politics, to help us understand the election.
Q: Why did the Conservatives Lose?
Many blamed the Conservative defeat on an anti-incumbency vibe and ‘time-for-a-change’. Fourteen years of Conservative rule saw multiple leadership contests, five prime ministers playing musical chairs, the headline ‘-gates’ over sexual misconduct and corruption, and policy failures from the cost-of-living crisis to austerity cuts in public services. In particular, the public became widely disillusioned with Brexit when former Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s sunny upland populist promises about the benefits of leaving the European Union confronted the reality of falling living standards, growing inflation, and rising net migration. Under the Conservatives, Britain had sluggish productivity growth and high inequality. The aftermath of the 2007-8 financial crisis fueled an anti-incumbency mood in the U.K., austerity cuts in public services, and damaged the Conservative’s reputation for prudent fiscal management.
Similarly, as the incumbent regional government, the Scottish Nationalist Party also suffered severely in the election, decimated to 9 lawmakers in Westminster after hemorrhaging 39 seats. Like the Tories, the reputation of the SNP had also been damaged by a series of scandals around senior party figures, creating leadership turmoil. The anti-incumbency mood is reinforced by negative partisanship and ideological polarization. Dealignment has eroded habitual loyalty anchoring support for the major political parties, and feelings of animosity towards opponents have intensified.
Q: Why did Labour win?
The anti-incumbency mood helps to explain the historic loss of Conservative support. Why Labour won, however, needs to focus on the workings of the U.K.’s ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system [where a candidate with a plurality of votes in a constituency is elected] and patterns of multiparty competition.
There are many ways to summarize the proportionality of any electoral system. The simplest is to divide the proportion of votes into seats. The plurality electoral system for Westminster resulted in a seats-to-votes ratio of 1.88 for Labour, the largest ‘winners’ bonus’ for any party in first place during the post-war era. The overall share of the vote and its geographic concentration are essential for winning seats under this system. Minor parties and independent candidates can be elected if they focus campaign resources strategically in constituencies where their support is most concentrated, for example, in seats with high proportions of Muslim and young people for the five pro-Palestinian independent candidates returned to parliament. However, if minor parties like the Green and Reform parties try to campaign across the whole country, they may increase their overall share of the nationwide vote but still fail to win proportional seats.
“The way that parties compete strategically within the rules of the electoral game is critical for understanding the outcome in each country.”
Pippa Norris
Party competition is also critical. In the run-up to the 2019 contest, Nigel Farage, the leader of the Brexit Party, announced that his party would not contest Conservative seats. Instead, it would compete in opposition-held constituencies, where they failed to gain a single MP. This strategic decision allowed Boris Johnson to consolidate support among pro-Brexit voters, contributing towards his 80-seat majority.
By contrast, in the 2024 General Election, Farage decided to field 609 candidates of his rebranded party, Reform UK. The party won 14.3% of the vote share, or over four million votes, the third-highest popular vote of any party. For the first time, Farage was elected along with four other MPs, a critical breakthrough for the party, although the highly disproportional result is due to the ‘first-past-the-post system.’ By splitting the right-wing vote, however, the net effect of the Reform strategy was essentially to steal support from the Conservatives, to allow Labour and the Liberal Democrats to gain seats where they were in second place against the Conservatives, and thereby to throw open the door of No. 10 to Kier Starmer.
Q: How applicable are the lessons from the U.K.’s election to other countries?
‘Throw-the rascals-out’ forces and negative partisanship make reelection challenging for all governing incumbents. Western governments face similar pressures from inflation, migration, cultural change, and international security, providing opportunities for minor parties to gain votes and seats. However, as I’ve argued elsewhere, the way that parties compete strategically within the rules of the electoral game is critical for understanding the outcome in each country, including the fortune of authoritarian populist parties.
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Banner photo by Leon Neal/Getty Images