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God, guns, and gays:

Religion and Politics in the US and Western Europe

Pippa Norris (Harvard University) and Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan)

Pippa Norris
McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu
www.pippanorris.com

Ronald Inglehart
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor,
Michigan, 48106-1248
RFI@umich.edu
www.worldvaluessurvey.org

Synopsis: This paper seeks to explain the continuing strength of religious values and the vitality of spiritual life in the United States compared with many other rich nations. *Part I* documents these patterns using a wealth of survey evidence and *Part II* then considers three alternative explanations of these differences. *Religious market theory* postulates that intense competition between rival denominations generates a ferment of activity explaining the vitality of churchgoing. *Functionalist* explanations focus on the shrinking social role of religious institutions, following the growth of the welfare state and the public sector. We compare evidence supporting these accounts with the theory of *secure secularization*, based on societal modernization, human development, and economic inequality, that lies at the heart of this study. This study draws on a massive base of new evidence generated by the four waves of the World Values Survey executed from 1981 to 2001. This includes representative national surveys in almost eighty societies, covering all of the world's major faiths. We also examine other evidence concerning religiosity from multiple sources, including Gallup International polls, the International Social Survey Program, and Eurobarometer surveys. The conclusions consider the broader implications of the findings for the role of faith in politics, for patterns of secularization worldwide, and for growing cultural divisions between Europe and the United States.

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Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, and their aftermath in Afghanistan and Iraq, public interest in cultural and religious differences around the world has grown tremendously, and the debate about secularization theory and its recent critiques has seemed become increasingly relevant to contemporary concerns. The idea of secularization has a long and distinguished history in the social sciences with many seminal thinkers arguing that religiosity was declining throughout Western societies. The seminal social thinkers of the nineteenth century -- Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud -- all believed that religion would gradually fade in importance and cease to be significant with the advent of industrial society¹. They were far from alone; ever since the Age of the Enlightenment, leading figures in philosophy, anthropology, and psychology have postulated that theological superstitions, symbolic liturgical rituals, and sacred practices are the product of the past that will be outgrown in the modern era. The death of religion was the conventional wisdom in the social sciences during most of the twentieth century; indeed it has been regarded as *the* master model of sociological inquiry, where secularization was ranked with bureaucratization, rationalization, and urbanization as the key historical revolutions transforming medieval agrarian societies into modern industrial nations. As C. Wright Mills summarized this process: "*Once the world was filled with the sacred – in thought, practice, and institutional form. After the Reformation and the Renaissance, the forces of modernization swept across the globe and secularization, a corollary historical process, loosened the dominance of the sacred. In due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether except, possibly, in the private realm.*"²

During the last decade, however, this thesis of the slow and steady death of religion has come under growing criticism; indeed secularization theory is currently experiencing the most sustained challenge in its long history. Critics point to multiple indicators of religious health and vitality today, ranging from the continued popularity of churchgoing in the United States to the emergence of New Age spirituality in Western Europe, the growth in fundamentalist movements and religious parties in the Muslim world, the evangelical revival sweeping through Latin America, and the upsurge of ethno-religious conflict in international affairs³. After reviewing these developments, Peter L. Berger, one of the foremost advocates of secularization during the 1960s, recanted his earlier claims: "*The world today, with some exceptions...is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labeled 'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken.*"⁴ In a fierce and sustained critique, Rodney Stark and Roger Finke suggest it is time to bury the secularization thesis: "*After nearly three centuries of utterly failed prophecies and misrepresentations of both present and past, it seems time to carry the secularization doctrine to the graveyard of failed theories, and there to whisper 'requiescat in pace.'*"⁵

Were Comte, Durkheim, Weber and Marx completely misled in their beliefs about religious decline in industrialized societies? Was the predominant sociological view during the twentieth century totally misguided? Has the debate been settled? We think not. Talk of burying the secularization theory is premature. The critique relies too heavily on selected anomalies and focuses too heavily on the United States (which happens to be a striking deviant case) rather than comparing systematic evidence across a broad range of rich and poor societies⁶. We need to move beyond studies of Catholic and Protestant church attendance in Europe (where attendance is falling) and the United States (where attendance remains stable) if we are to understand broader trends in religious vitality in churches, mosques, shrines, synagogues, and temples around the globe.

There is no question that the traditional secularization thesis needs updating. It is obvious that religion has not disappeared from the world, nor does it seem likely to do so. Nevertheless, the concept of secularization captures an important part of what is going on. This study develops a revised version of secularization theory that emphasizes the extent to which people have a sense of existential security—that is, the feeling that survival is secure enough that it can be taken for granted. We build on key elements of traditional sociological accounts while revising others. We believe that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks.

We argue that feelings of vulnerability to physical, societal and personal risks are a key factor driving religiosity and we demonstrate that the process of secularization -- a systematic erosion of religious practices, values and beliefs -- has occurred most clearly among the most prosperous social sectors living in affluent and secure post-industrial nations.

Secularization is a tendency, not an iron law. One can easily think of striking exceptions, such as Osama bin Laden who is (or was) extremely rich and fanatically religious. But when we go beyond anecdotal evidence such as this, we find that the overwhelming bulk of evidence points in the opposite direction: people who experience ego-tropic risks during their formative years (posing direct threats to themselves and their families) or socio-tropic risks (threatening their community) tend to be far more religious than those who grow up under safer, comfortable, and more predictable conditions. In relatively secure societies, the remnants of religion have not died away; in surveys most Europeans still express formal belief in God, or identify themselves as Protestants or Catholics on official forms. But in these societies the importance and vitality of religion, its ever-present influence on how people live their daily lives, has gradually eroded.

The most persuasive evidence about secularization in rich nations concerns values and behavior: the critical test is what people say is important to their lives and what they actually *do*. During the twentieth century in nearly all post-industrial nations -- ranging from Canada and Sweden to France, Britain and Australia -- official church records report that where once the public flocked to Sabbath worship services, the pews are now almost deserted. The surveys monitoring European churchgoing during the last fifty years confirm this phenomenon. The United States remains exceptional in this regard. The strongest challenge to secularization theory arises from American observers who commonly point out that claims of steadily diminishing congregations in Western Europe are sharply at odds with US trends, at least until the early 1990s⁷.

This study, drawn from a larger project⁸, focuses upon how we can best explain 'American exceptionalism'. *Part I* describes systematic and consistent evidence establishing the variations in religiosity among postindustrial nations, in particular contrasts between America and Western Europe. This paper focuses upon similar postindustrial nations, all affluent countries and established democracies, most (but not all) sharing a cultural heritage of Christendom, although obviously there remains the critical cleavage dividing Catholic and Protestant Europe. All these are service-sector knowledge economies with broadly similar levels of education and affluence, as well as established and stable democratic states⁹. This framework helps to control for many of the factors that might be expected to shape patterns of religiosity, allowing us to compare like with like. This process facilitates the 'most-similar' comparative framework, thereby narrowing down, or even eliminating, some the multiple factors that could be causing variations in religious behavior. This paper examines whether the United States is indeed 'exceptional' among rich nations in the vitality of its spiritual life, as the conventional wisdom has long suggested, or whether, as Berger proposes, Western Europe is 'exceptional' in its secularization¹⁰. On this basis, *Part II* then considers evidence to test alternative explanations of American exceptionalism, based on religious market, functionalist, and security theories of secularization. *Religious market theory* postulates that intense competition between rival denominations generates a ferment of activity explaining the vitality of churchgoing. *Functionalist* explanations focus on the shrinking social role of religious institutions, following the growth of the welfare state and the public sector. We compare evidence supporting these accounts with the theory of *secure secularization*, based on societal modernization, human development, and economic inequality, that lies at the heart of this study. The conclusions consider the broader implications for the role of faith in politics, and for divisions in the predominant cultures found in Europe and the United States.

I: Comparing religiosity in postindustrial nations

We can start by considering the cross-national evidence for how the indicators of religiosity apply to postindustrial nations. Figure 1 shows the basic pattern of religious behavior, highlighting the substantial contrasts between the cluster of countries which prove by far the most religious in this comparison, including the United States, Ireland and Italy. At the other extreme, the most secular nations include France, Denmark and Britain. There is a fairly similar pattern

across both indicators of religious behavior, suggesting that both collective and individual forms of participation are fairly consistent in each society. Therefore although religion in the United States is distinctive among rich nations, it would still be misleading to refer to American 'exceptionalism', as so many emphasize, as though it were a deviant case from *all* other postindustrial nations, as we can observe similarities with both Ireland and Italy.

[Figures 1 and 2 about here]

The marked contrasts within Europe are illustrated further in Figure 2, mapping secular Northern Europe compared with the persistence of more regular churchgoing habits in Southern Europe, as well as differences within Central and Eastern Europe explored fully elsewhere. The 'North-South' religious gap within the European Union is, admittedly, a puzzle that cannot be explained by the process of societal development alone, since these are all rich nations. More plausible explanations include the contemporary strength of religiosity in Protestant and Catholic cultures, as well as societal differences in economic equality. These contrasts are important and certainly deserve scrutiny.

Trends in Secularization in Western Europe

One reason for these cross-national variations could be that most postindustrial societies have experienced a significant erosion of religiosity during the post-war era, but that these trends have occurred from different starting points, in a path-dependent fashion, due to the historic legacy of the religious institutions and cultures within each country. Where the church ends up today could depend in large part upon where they start out.

We will demonstrate that the existing evidence in Western Europe consistently and unequivocally shows two things: traditional religious beliefs and involvement in institutionalized religion (i) vary considerably from one country to another; and, (ii) have steadily declined throughout Western Europe, particularly since the 1960s. Studies have often reported that many Western Europeans have ceased to be regular churchgoers today outside of special occasions such as Christmas and Easter, weddings and funerals, a pattern especially evident among the young¹¹. Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere, for example, compared the proportion of regular (weekly) churchgoers in seven European countries from 1970 to 1991, based on the Eurobarometer surveys, and documented a dramatic fall in congregations during this period in the Catholic states under comparison (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany). Overall levels of church disengagement had advanced furthest in France, Britain and the Netherlands: *"Although the timing and pace differ from one country to the next,"* the authors conclude, *"the general tendency is quite stable: in the long run, the percentage of unaffiliated is increasing."*¹² Numerous studies provide a wealth of evidence confirming similar patterns of declining religiosity found in many other postindustrial nations¹³.

Trends in recent decades illustrate the consistency of the secularization process irrespective of the particular indicator or survey that is selected. Figure 3 illustrates the erosion of regular church-attendance that has occurred throughout Western Europe since the early 1970s. The fall is steepest and most significant in many Catholic societies, notably Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain¹⁴. To conclude, as Greeley does, that religion is "still relatively unchanged" in the traditional Catholic nations of Europe seems a triumph of hope over experience, and sharply at odds with the evidence¹⁵. Marked contrasts in the strength of churchgoing habits remain clear, say between contemporary rates of religious participation in Ireland and Denmark. Nevertheless all the trends point consistently downwards. Moreover the erosion of religiosity is not exclusive to Western European nations; regular churchgoing also dropped during the last two decades in affluent Anglo-American nations such as Canada and Australia¹⁶.

[Figure 3 about here]

Another interpretation of these patterns is offered by those who emphasize that trends in churchgoing are interesting but also out-of-date, if religiosity has evolved and reinvented itself today as diverse forms of personal 'spirituality'. Observers such as Wade Clark Roof suggest that collective engagement with religion in public life has eroded in America among the younger

generation. Reasons for this are thought to include the declining status and authority of traditional church institutions and clergy, the individualization of the quest for spirituality, and the rise of multiple 'New Age' movements concerned with 'lived religion'¹⁷. These developments are exemplified by a revival of alternative spiritual practices such as astrology, meditation, and alternative therapies, involving a diverse bricolage of personal beliefs. If similar developments are also evident in Europe, as a result public engagement with churches could have been replaced by a 'private' or 'personal' search for spirituality and meaning in life, making the practices, beliefs and symbols of religiosity less visible.¹⁸ Moreover, beyond patterns of churchgoing, the trends in European religiosity can be regarded as complex; Greeley, for example, proposes that indicators of subjective beliefs in Europe, exemplified by faith in God or in life after death, display a mixed picture during the last two decades, rather than a simple uniform decline: *"In some countries, religion has increased (most notably the former communist countries and especially Russia) in others it has declined (most notably Britain, the Netherlands, and France) and in still other countries it is relatively unchanged (the traditional Catholic countries), and in yet other countries (some of the social democratic countries) it has both declined and increased."*¹⁹ Given such divergence, Greeley suggests that simple attempts to discover secularization should be abandoned, and instead attention should focus on explaining persistent and well-established cross-national patterns, for example, why people in Ireland and Italy are consistently more religious than those living in France and Sweden.

[Table 1 and 2 about here]

Yet we find that, far from divergent patterns, one reason for the decline in religious participation during the late twentieth century lies in the fact that during these years many common spiritual beliefs have indeed suffered considerable erosion in postindustrial societies. There is, in fact, a consistent link between the 'public' and 'private' dimensions of religiosity. The Greeley results are based primarily upon analysis of the International Social Survey Program, which conducted opinion polls on religion in 1991 and 1998. Unfortunately this provides too limited a time-period to detect longitudinal change. Instead, here we monitor trends in religious beliefs in God and in life after death during from the last fifty years by matching survey data in the Gallup polls starting in 1947 to the more recent data where the same questions were replicated in the World Values Surveys.

Table 1 shows that in 1947, eight out of ten people believed in God, with the highest levels of belief expressed in Australia, Canada, the United States, and Brazil. The regression models show a fall in faith in God occurred across all but two nations (the United States and Brazil). The decline proved sharpest in the Scandinavian nations, the Netherlands, Australia and Britain. The regression models show a negative slope across the series but given the limited series of time points (7 at most) not surprisingly the fall only proved statistically significant in six countries. Table 2 illustrates very similar patterns for belief in life after death, where again an erosion of subjective religiosity occurs in 13 of the 19 countries where evidence is available. The greatest falls during the last fifty years are registered in Northern Europe, Canada and Brazil, and the only exceptions to this pattern, where there is a revival of religious faith, is in the United States, along with Japan and Italy.

Trends in religiosity in the United States

In the light of these European patterns, many have regarded the United States as an outlier, although in fact the evidence remains somewhat ambiguous. At least until the late 1980s, analysis of trends in church attendance derived from historical records and from representative surveys commonly reported that the size of congregations in the United States had remained stable over decades. For example, studies published during the 1980s indicated that Protestant church attendance had not declined significantly in America; and, while it fell rapidly among Catholics from 1968 to 1975, it did not erode further in subsequent years²⁰. The first benchmark the Gallup organization measuring religiosity found that in March 1939, 40% of American adults reported attending church the previous week, exactly the same figure given by Gallup more than sixty years later (in March 2003)²¹.

Yet there are serious difficulties encountered in obtaining reliable estimates of churchgoing from survey data. Woodberry and others compared aggregate data on levels of church attendance in America derived from counting participants at services against the available estimates of self-reported church-attendance derived from social surveys. They concluded that the self-reported figures are subject to systematic and consistent exaggeration, due to a social desirability bias concerning churchgoing in American culture²².

Studies suggest that the Gallup organization's procedures may systematically exaggerate attendance due to a lack of social desirability filters in the measurement of churchgoing (thereby unintentionally 'cueing' respondents) and also unrepresentative sample completion rates based on a limited number of random digit dialing callbacks and respondent substitution²³. Other data suggests that these estimates may be inflated; for example the American National Election Survey (NES), conducted every two years since the late-1950s, suggests that weekly church attendance never rises much about 25% in the United States. Moreover when the NES modified the question sequence to assure the social desirability of not attending, the proportion reporting that they never attended church jumped from 12% to 33% and has stayed at that level in subsequent surveys²⁴. The US General Social Survey, conducted annually by NORC during the last three decades, also indicates that weekly church attendance in America hovers around the 25-30% region, with a significant fall in church attendance occurring during the last decade. According to the GSS, the proportion of Americans reporting that they attended church at least weekly fell to one quarter in the most recent estimate, while at the same time the proportion saying that they never attended church doubled to one fifth of all Americans (see Figure 4)²⁵.

[Figure 4 about here]

Other indicators also suggest that traditional religious participation may have eroded in the United States, parallel to the long-term trends experienced throughout Europe. For example Gallup polls registered a modest decline in the proportion of Americans who are *members* of a church or synagogue, down from about three-quarters (73%) of the population in 1937 to about two-thirds (65%) in 2001. The US General Social Survey (GSS) has monitored religious identities in annual studies during the last three decades. They found that the proportion of Americans who are secularists, reporting that they have *no* religious preference or identity, climbed steadily during the 1990s (see Figure 5). During this decade, the main erosion occurred among American Protestants, while the proportion of Catholics in the population remained fairly steady, in part fuelled by a substantial influx of Hispanic immigrants with large families. At the same time, changes have occurred among denominations within the religious population in the United States; for example many studies report that congregations for newer evangelical churches have expanded their membership at the expense of 'mainline' Protestant denominations such as the United Methodist Church, Presbyterians and Episcopalians, in part due to changes in the American population and also patterns of immigration from Latin America and Asia²⁶. Moreover even where we have reliable estimates of churchgoing, Brian Wilson emphasizes that little relationship may exist between these practices and spirituality, for example if church-going in America fulfils a need for social networking within local communities, and if U.S. churches have become more secular in orientation²⁷.

[Figure 5 about here]

Despite the overall popularity of religion in the United States, it would also be a gross exaggeration to claim that all Americans feel the same way, as important social and regional disparities exist. Secularists, for example, are far more likely to live in urban cities on the Pacific coast or in the north east, as well as to have a college degree, and to be single and male. By contrast committed evangelicals are far more likely to live in small towns or rural areas, especially in the south and mid-west, as well as being female and married. These regional divisions proved important for politics: in the 2000 U.S. Presidential election for example, religion was by far the strongest predictor of who voted for George W. Bush and who voted for Al Gore.²⁸ The election result reflected strongly entrenched divisions in public opinion and values between social conservatives and liberals on issues such as approval of the use of the death penalty, reproductive rights, and homosexuality. The regional patterns of religiosity are important and may

even have led to two distinctive cultures within the United States, for example Himmelfarb argues that one culture in America is religious, puritanical, family-centered, patriotic, and conformist. The other is secular, tolerant, hedonistic, and multicultural. These cultures, she argues, coexist and tolerate each other, in part because they inhabit different worlds²⁹.

We can conclude that the United States remains one of the most religious in the club of rich countries, alongside Ireland and Italy, and indeed as observed earlier this makes America one of the most religious countries in the world. The pervasive importance of these values is apparent in many American practices, especially in public life (even prior to the Bush administration and 9/11), despite the strict division of Church and state. In the same way, American cultural values are more individualistic, more patriotic, more moralistic, and more culturally conservative than Europe. Nevertheless there are some indicators that secular tendencies may have strengthened in America, at least during the last decade, which may bring the United States slightly closer to public opinion in Western Europe.

II: Explaining variations in religiosity: The religious market model

Given the existence of important and consistent cross-national variations in religiosity, what best explains these patterns? Religious market theory provides the most critical and sustained challenge to the traditional secularization thesis. This account suggests that supply-side factors, notably denominational competition and state regulation of religious institutions, shape levels of religious participation in the United States and Europe. As discussed earlier in the introduction, during the last decade many American commentators have enthusiastically advanced this account, and the principle proponents include Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, Lawrence R. Iannaccone, William Sims Bainbridge, and R. Stephen Warner, although it has also encountered sustained criticism³⁰. Market-based theories in the sociology of religion assume that the demand for religious products is relatively constant, based on the otherworldly rewards of life after death promised by most (although not all) faiths³¹. Dissimilar levels of spiritual behavior evident in various countries are believed to result less from 'bottom up' demand than from variance in 'top down' religious supply. Religious groups compete for congregations with different degrees of vigor. Established churches are thought to be complacent monopolies taking their congregations for granted, with a fixed market share due to state regulation and subsidy for one particular faith that enjoys special status and privileges. By contrast, where a free religious marketplace exists, energetic competition between churches expands the supply of religious 'products', thereby mobilizing religious activism among the public.

The theory claims to be a universal generalization applicable to all faiths although the evidence to support this argument is drawn largely from the United States and Western Europe. The proliferation of diverse churches in the United States, such as Methodists, Lutherans, Presbyterians and Episcopalian mainline churches, as well as Southern Baptist Convention, the Assemblies of God, the Pentecostal and Holiness churches among conservative denominations, is believed to have maximized choice and competition among faiths, thereby mobilizing the American public. American churches are subject to market forces: depending upon their ability to attract clergy and volunteers, as well as the financial resources that flow from their membership. Competition is thought to generate certain benefits, producing diversity, stimulating innovation, and compelling churches to actively recruit congregations by responding to public demands. For example, the National Congregations Study found that American churches commonly seek to attract new adherents by offering multiple social activities (or 'products') beyond services of worship, including religious education, cultural and arts groups, engagement in community politics, and welfare services such as soup kitchens and baby-sitting cooperatives³². By contrast, Starke and Finke emphasize that most European nations sustain what they term "a *socialized* religious economy", with state subsidies for established churches. Religious monopolies are believed to be less innovative, responsive and efficient. Where clergy enjoy secure incomes and tenure regardless of their performance, such as in Germany and Sweden, then it is thought that priests will grow complacent, slothful, and lax: "when people have little need or motive to work, they tend not to work, and..Subsidized churches will therefore be lazy."³³ Finke and Stark believe that if the 'supply' of churches was expanded in Europe through disestablishment (deregulated), and if churches just made more effort, this would probably lead to a resurgence of religious

behavior among the public (“Faced with American-style churches, Europeans would respond as Americans do”)³⁴. In short, they conclude, “To the extent that organizations work harder, they are more successful. What could be more obvious?”³⁵

What indeed? Yet, after considerable debate during the last decade, the evidence that religious competition provides a plausible explanation of religious participation remains controversial³⁶. Criticisms have been both theoretical and empirical. Conceptually Bryant has questioned the appropriateness of the cost-benefit model, and the use of metaphors such as “markets”, “products”, “commodities” and “capital”, in the analysis of religion³⁷. In terms of the evidence, commentators have noted serious flaws with the measures commonly used to gauge the degree of religious competition. Most studies have employed the Herfindahl Index. This is derived from economics where the Herfindahl index is a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the industry and an indicator of the amount of competition among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can range from 0 to 1, moving from numerous very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. In economics, decreases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a loss of the ability of firms to control prices and an increase in competition, whereas increases imply the opposite. To gauge religious fractionalization or pluralism, the Herfindahl Index is computed along similar lines as one minus the sum of the squares of the percentage share of the church-going population held by each denomination within a particular universe (whether the unit of analysis is a local community, city, region, or country)³⁸. The religious pluralism index represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different denominations³⁹. It is analogous to the Pedersen index of party competition⁴⁰. Stark and Finke emphasize two points about the characteristics of this index: (i) ‘ceiling’ effects are commonly evident, and (ii) the impact of pluralism on participation is essentially curvilinear, so that the first shift from single church religious monopolies to greater competition with two or more churches has a substantial impact upon church attendance, whereas the effects become saturated at later levels of pluralism. Multiple studies using different datasets and specifications have compared the correlation between the religious pluralism index and religious participation within specific geographic areas (usually communities in the United States), and a positive regression coefficient has been interpreted as providing support for the religious market theory.

Yet although commonly used in the literature, there are many difficulties concerning the operationalization of the concept of religious competition, and these problems are exacerbated in cross-national research. Chaves and Gorski conducted a thorough meta-review of the literature by examining the results of 193 tests of the evidence, drawn from different geographical and historical settings, from a series of 26 articles published on this subject. They concluded that the theory lacked consistent support, as some studies found a significant correlation between religious pluralism and religious participation while others failed to confirm any linkage⁴¹. The most critical study by Voas, Olson and Crockett concluded that any observed relationships are spurious and a purely mathematical association between the pluralism index and religious participation rates can explain any positive or negative correlations. The study concludes that there is no compelling evidence from *any* of the existing studies that religious pluralism, measured by the Herfindahl index, influences church participation rates⁴².

The appropriate geographic unit of analysis is also problematic. The original supply-side theory conceived of religious competition as rivalry between different churches within a particular local community, typified by the role of Baptists, Episcopalians, and Catholic churches in the United States. Once we extend the comparison more broadly cross-nationally, however, it becomes unclear how competition should be gauged, for example whether the key comparison should be competition among different denominations and sects, or whether we should focus on rivalry between and among multiple churches, temples, mosques, synagogues and shrines representing all the major world religions.

What evidence supports the argument that greater religious competition leads to more churchgoing in the United States than in Western Europe? Finke and Starke provide numerous examples of specific limitations experienced by particular denominations and faiths in Western European countries. This includes quoting incidents of limited religious freedoms, such as

harassment experienced by Jehovah's Witnesses in Portugal, Germany and France, and legal regulations such as tax-free status with provide positive fiscal benefits for established churches⁴³. Yet this approach is unsystematic and a systematic bias may arise from the particular selection of cases. It is true that the United States displays a diverse range of churches and temples in many communities, and relatively high rates of churchgoing and subjective religiosity, fitting the theory. But clear anomalies to this relationship also exist, notably high levels of churchgoing evident in Ireland, Italy, Poland, and the Philippines, despite the fact that the Catholic Church predominates as a virtual monopoly in these nations⁴⁴.

More systematic cross-national evidence is provided in a study by Iannaccone comparing church attendance in eight West European nations (excluding six predominant Catholic cultures) plus four Anglo-American democracies. Regression analysis found a significant and very strong relationship between the degree of denominational pluralism in these countries (measured by the Herfindahl Index) and levels of religious participation (rates of weekly church attendance)⁴⁵. It remains unclear, however, why the six predominant Catholic cultures in Southern and Western Europe are excluded from this comparison, as they challenge the model. Smith, Sawkins and Seaman compared 18 societies based on the 1991 ISSP religion survey and reported that religious pluralism was significantly related to regular religious participation⁴⁶. Yet the literature remains divided about this issue as other cross-national studies have reported results inconsistent with the supply-side thesis. For example, Verweij, Ester, and Nauta conducted a cross-national comparison using the 1990 European Values Survey in 16 countries. They found that irrespective of the model specification, religious pluralism in any particular country, measured by the Herfindahl index, was an insignificant predictor of levels of religious participation, whether measured against rates of church attendance or church membership. By contrast, the degree of state regulation was important, along with the predominant religious culture and the overall level of societal modernization⁴⁷. Research by Bruce, comparing religiosity in the Nordic and Baltic states, also concluded that trends in religious observance contradicted a number of core supply-side propositions⁴⁸. The empirical evidence supporting the supply-side thesis has come under serious attack, as the conclusions of most of the studies by Stark and Finke were contaminated by a coding error; there was a negative 1 in the formula rather than a positive 1. The use of the Herfindahl index in this particular situation generated a methodological artifact that leads to all of the supply-side conclusions in the United States data⁴⁹. Nevertheless despite these critical flaws in the empirical evidence, the supply-side theory provides an alternative perspective which is open to testing with indicators that avoid these problems.

Leaving aside the strong normative thrust of the supply-side argument and concepts, derived from free market economics, what specific propositions flow from this account that are open to systematic cross-national testing with empirical evidence? We can compare four separate indicators to test the religious markets model, with the results summarized in Table 4. Again any one indicator may be flawed, due to the limitations of data or measurement error, but if all results from the independent measures point in a generally consistent direction then this lends greater confidence to the results.

[Table 4 about here]

Religious pluralism

If the supply-side theory is correct, then religious pluralism and state regulation of religion should both be important in predicting rates of churchgoing in postindustrial societies: in particular, countries with great competition among multiple pluralist religious churches, denominations, and faiths should have the highest religious participation⁵⁰. Religious pluralism is gauged here by the Herfindahl index using the data on the major religious populations derived from the *Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year 2001*, discussed earlier, compiled by Alesina and colleagues⁵¹. The religious pluralism index is calculated as the standard Herfindahl indicator for each country, monitoring fractionalization in each society, ranging from zero to one. This is the standard measure used by supply-side theorists, and so appropriate for testing their claims. One important qualification, however, concerns the unit of comparison, since this study measures religious pluralism among the major world faiths at societal level, which is necessary for cross-

national research. Nevertheless this means that we cannot gauge competition among religious organizations representing diverse denominations and sects at local or regional levels, and in the US context, competition is understood to reflect the propensity of rival churches within a community – whether Baptist, Episcopalian, Lutheran or Methodists - to attract congregations.

[Figure 6 about here]

Contrary to the predictions of supply-side theory, the correlation between religious pluralism and religious behavior all prove insignificant in postindustrial societies, with the distribution illustrated in Figure 6. The results *lend no support to the claim of a significant link between religious pluralism and participation*, and this is true irrespective of whether the comparison is focuses on frequency of attendance at services of worship or the frequency of prayer⁵². Among postindustrial societies, the United States is exception in its combination of high rates of religious pluralism *and* participation: the theory does indeed fit the American case, but the problem is that it fails to work elsewhere. The scatter gram shows that other English-speaking nations share similar levels of religious pluralism, however in these countries far fewer people regularly attend church. Moreover, in Catholic postindustrial societies the relationship is actually *reversed*, with the highest participation evident in Ireland and Italy where the Church enjoys a virtual religious monopoly, compared with more pluralist Netherlands and France, where churchgoing habits are far weaker. Nor is this merely due to the comparison of post-industrial societies: the global comparison in all nations confirms that there is no significant relationship between participation and pluralism across the broader distribution of societies worldwide.

[Figure 6 about here]

Of course the account could always be retrieved by arguing that what matters is less competition among the major faiths, since people rarely convert directly, but rather competition among or within specific denominations, since people are more likely to switch particular churches within closely-related families. This proposition would require testing at community level with other forms of data, at a finer level of denominational detail than is available in most social surveys, and indeed even in most census data. Nevertheless, if the claims of the original theory were modified, this would greatly limit its applicability for cross-national research. Irrespective of the extensive literature advocating the supply-side theory, based on the measure of pluralism of faiths and religious participation used in this study, no empirical support is found here for this account.

State Regulation and Freedom of Religion

An alternative version of religious market theory predicts that participation will also be maximized where there is a strong constitutional division between church and state, protecting religious freedom of worship and toleration of different denominations, without hindrance to particular sects and faiths. This is one of the explanations for American exceptionalism advanced by Lipset, who argues that the long-standing separation of church and state in the United States has given the churches greater autonomy and allowed varied opportunities for people to participation in religion⁵³. Three indicators are available to analyze this relationship

(i) *The state regulation of religion* was measured by Mark Chaves and David E. Cann in 18 postindustrial nations. The six-point scale was classified using data provided by the *World Christian Encyclopedia* (1982) based on whether or not each country had the following characteristics:

- There is a single, officially designated state church;
- There is official state recognition of some denominations but not others;
- The state appoints or approves the appointment of church leaders;
- The state directly pays church personnel salaries;
- There is a system of ecclesiastical tax collection;

- The state directly subsidizes, beyond mere tax breaks, the operation, maintenance or capital expenses for churches.⁵⁴

(ii) These results can be cross-checked against the *Freedom of Religion index*. This index was constructed by coding the twenty indicators such as the role of the state in subsidizing churches, state ownership of church property, registration requirements for religious organizations, constitutional recognition of freedom of religion, and restrictions of certain denominations, cults or sects. The 20-item scale was standardized to 100-points, for ease of interpretation, and then coded so that a higher score represented greater religious freedom.

(iii) Lastly we can also compare the results of the summary analysis of religious freedom generated every year by Freedom House⁵⁵. The survey criteria used by this organization develop a 7-point scale based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, the European Convention on Human Rights. The annual survey defines religious freedom in terms of three major components. First, it refers to the freedoms of particular bodies, houses of worship, humanitarian organizations, educational institutions, and so forth. Second, it refers to freedom for particular individual religious practices, such as prayer, worship, dress, proclamation, and diet. Lastly, it refers to human rights in general, in so far as they involve particular religious bodies, individuals, and activities.

Yet, contrary to the supply-side theory, the results of the simple correlations in Table 4.4 suggest that no significant relationship exists between any of these indicators of religious freedom and levels of religious behavior. Moreover this pattern was found both within the comparison of post-industrial nations and also in the global comparison of all countries where data was available. There are many reasons why one might imagine that the spread of greater tolerance and freedom of worship, facilitating competition among religious institutions, might prove conducive to greater religious activity among the public. But so far the range of evidence using multiple indicators fails to support the supply-side claims.

Functional theories and the social role of religious institutions

As discussed earlier, the alternative classic functionalist account derives originally from Emile Durkheim's seminal sociology of religion. For functionalists, the public gradually deserted churches as societies industrialized due to the process of functional differentiation and specialization, where the church's comprehensive role for education, health and welfare was gradually displaced by other institutions offering an extensive series of public services. During the medieval era, for example, the seminaries trained priests, hospices and apothecaries cared for the sick, and almshouses provided refuge for the poor. Through disestablishment and the growth of state-funded schools, churches lost their educational monopoly and thereby their ability to mould, inculcate, and socialize young minds into religious habits and beliefs. Churches continue to run schools and orphanages, but their staff became trained, certified, and accountable to professional bodies and state regulators located outside the church's control. Universities became the home of scientific knowledge, technical skills, and professional training. In health care, medieval beliefs in magical cures, homeopathic remedies, and spiritual healers were gradually displaced by reliance upon modern hospitals, surgical intervention, drug-based medicine subject to testing by random experiments and certified by professional regulators, and trained medical staff. Even the important residual functions of the church to provide social and communication networks within local communities, to reinforce social sanctions, and to maintain the institutions of marriage and the family, were eroded by the proliferation of channels of mass communication, as well as by changes in the mores governing traditional relationships in the family, marriage, and childcare. The growing separation of church and state across Europe meant that the legitimacy and power of spiritual authorities in the medieval era was challenged by the rise of legal-bureaucratic states in industrialized societies, and eventually by democratically elected governments⁵⁶. As a result of institutional differentiation, where alternative organizations have developed an extensive range of functions for schooling, health-care and care of dependents, then although a residual spiritual or moral role for the church may persist, although the social role of religious institutions is believed to have diminished in people's lives.

If this argument were correct, then religious participation should have weakened most in post-industrial societies where the social welfare role of religious institutions have been displaced most fully by public services for health, education and social security provided by the state sector, and indeed there is some evidence supporting this argument⁵⁷. To examine evidence here we can compare public perceptions of the different functions and competencies of religious authorities. The World Values Survey asked people to agree or disagree with the following statements: “*Generally speaking, do you think that the religious authorities in your country are giving adequate answers to...*

- *The moral problems and needs of the individual.*
- *The problems of family life.*
- *People’s spiritual needs.*
- *The social problems facing our country today.”*

This is an imperfect measure of the perceived role of the church, since responses may relate more strongly to the performance and competency of the clergy, rather than reflecting attitudes towards the legitimate role of religious institutions per se. Competency and legitimacy can remain distinct, for example there are well-established patterns in how far the American public dislikes Congress as an institution, and yet how far they often approve of the particular elected representative from their own district. Nevertheless if, as functionalists suggests, the institutional role of the church has been displaced in advanced industrialized societies by the process of institutional differentiation and the rise of the welfare state, then we would expect that perceptions of the *social* role of religious authorities would have been eroded most by this process, while leaving their spiritual and moral role intact. We can analyze the evidence by comparing how far agrarian, industrial and postindustrial societies differed in perceptions of the moral, spiritual, family, and social roles of religious authorities.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 confirms that the perceived role of religious authorities was indeed strongest, as expected, in agrarian societies, where about three-quarters or more of the public felt that religious authorities played an important moral, spiritual, family, and social role. In post-industrial societies, by contrast, between one third and one half of the public agreed with the important moral, spiritual and family role of the church. Yet at the same time stronger support was expressed in postindustrial societies for the role of religious authorities in dealing with “*the social problems facing our country today*” (supported by 58%) rather than in their capacity to deal with “*people’s spiritual needs*” (supported by only 34%). This is the reverse of what would have been expected if the church’s role in philanthropy, education and healthcare has been eroded most sharply by societal modernization, as the functionalist argument claims. More direct measures would be needed, evaluating the perceived legitimacy of the role of religious authorities compared with many other types of leaders, to explore this issue in greater depth. But the available data used here does not appear to give any direct support to the functionalist argument.

[Table 3 about here]

The role of security and economic inequality

The explanations that we have considered, including both supply-side religious markets and the traditional functional arguments, have therefore provided only limited insights into the diversity of religious participation found in rich nations. To summarize, in postindustrial nations no empirical support that we examined could explain the puzzle why some rich nations are far more religious than others, and the study failed to establish a significant link between patterns of religious behavior and the indicators of religious pluralism, religious freedom, and the perceived functions of the church. But, of course, this still leaves us with the question that we considered at the start of the paper: why are some societies such as the United States and Ireland persistently more religious in their habits and beliefs than comparable Western nations sharing a Christian cultural heritage?

Our answer rests on the same arguments that we have already developed at length to explain cross-national variations worldwide, namely patterns of human security and, in particular, conditions of socioeconomic inequality. What matters for societal vulnerability, insecurity, and risk, that we believe drives religiosity, are not simply levels of national economic resources, but their distribution as well. The growth of the welfare state in industrialized nations insures large sectors of the public against the worst risks of ill health and old age, penury and destitution, while private insurance schemes, the work of non-profit charitable foundations, and access to financial resources have transformed security in postindustrial nations, and also reduced the vital role of religion in people's lives. Even relatively affluent nations have multiple pockets of long-term poverty, whether afflicting unemployed African-Americans living in the inner-cities of Los Angeles and Detroit, farm laborers in Sicily, or Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Indian émigrés in Leicester and Birmingham. Populations typically most at risk in industrialized nations, capable of falling through the welfare safety-net, include the elderly and children, single-parent female-headed households, the long-term disabled, homeless and unemployed, and ethnic minorities. If we are correct that feelings of vulnerability are driving religiosity, even in rich nations, then this should be evident by comparing levels of economic inequality across societies, as well as by looking at how far religiosity is strongest among the poorer sectors of society.

We can analyze the distribution of economic resources in postindustrial societies by comparing the GINI coefficient, estimated in the latest available year by the World Bank, which measures the extent to which the distribution of income among households within a society deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The GINI coefficient ranges from perfect equality (0) to perfect inequality (100). Table 4 indicates that the Human Development Index fails to predict variations in levels of religious behavior within postindustrial nations, not surprisingly since all these countries are highly developed. Yet the level of economic inequality measured by the GINI coefficient proves strongly and significantly related to both forms of religious behavior, but especially to the propensity to engage in individual religiosity through prayer. Figure 8 illustrates this relationship; the United States is exceptionally high in religiosity in large part, we believe, because it is also one of the most unequal postindustrial societies under comparison. Exceptionally high levels of economic insecurity are experienced by many sectors of U.S. society, despite American affluence, due to the cultural emphasis on the values of personal responsibility, individual achievement, and mistrust of big government, limiting the role of public services and the welfare state for basic matters such as healthcare covering all the working population. Despite private affluence for the well-off, many American families, even in the professional middle classes, face serious risks of loss of paid work by the main breadwinner, the dangers of sudden ill-health without adequate private medical insurance, vulnerability to becoming a victim of crime, as well as the problems of paying for long-term care of the elderly. Americans face greater anxieties than citizens in other advanced industrialized countries about whether they will be covered by medical insurance, whether they will be fired arbitrarily, or whether they will be forced to choose between losing their job and devoting themselves to their newborn child⁵⁸. The entrepreneurial culture and the emphasis on personal responsibility has generated conditions of individual freedom and delivered considerable societal affluence, and yet one trade-off is that the United States has greater income inequality than any other advanced industrial democracy⁵⁹. By comparison, despite recent pressures on restructuring, the secular Scandinavian and West European states remain some of the most egalitarian societies, with relatively high levels of personal taxation, but also an expansive array of welfare services in the public sector, including comprehensive healthcare, social services, and pensions⁶⁰.

If this argument rested only on the cross-national comparisons then, of course, it would be too limited, as multiple other characteristics distinguish Western Europe and the United States. But evidence can also be examined at individual-level by looking at how far the distribution of income relates to religious behavior. The patterns in Figure 9 show that religiosity is systematically related at individual-level to the distribution of income groups in post-industrial societies: *the poor are almost twice as religious as the rich*. Similar patterns can be found in the United States, (see Figure 10); for example two-thirds (66%) of the least well-off income group pray daily, compared with 47% of the highest income group.

[Figures 9 and 10 about here]

Conclusions and Implications

No single indicator is ever sufficient by itself to confirm or refute the secularization thesis, since the specific choice of measures and concepts always remain open to question, studies use alternative time-periods and cross-national comparative frameworks, and often we lack the long-term evidence that would be more persuasive. Yet the range of evidence presented here in postindustrial societies serves to confirm the broader pattern established elsewhere. Secularization is not a deterministic process but it is still one that is largely predictable, based on knowing just a few facts about levels of human development and socioeconomic equality in each country. Despite all the numerous possible explanatory factors that could be brought into the picture, from institutional structures, state restrictions on freedom of worship, the historical role of church-state relations, and patterns of denominational and church competition, the levels of societal and individual security in any society seems to provide the most persuasive and parsimonious explanation.

Our argument holds that the conditions that people experience in their formative years have a profound impact upon their cultural values. Growing up in societies in which survival is uncertain, is conducive to a strong emphasis on religion; conversely, experiencing high levels of existential security throughout one's formative years, reduces the subjective importance of religion in people's lives. This hypothesis diverges sharply from the religious market assumption that demand for religion is constant. On the contrary, our interpretation implies that the demand for religion should be far stronger among low-income nations than among rich ones; and among the less secure strata of society than among the affluent. We hypothesized that as a society moves past the early stages of industrialization, and life becomes less nasty, less brutish and longer, people tend to become more secular in their orientations. The most crucial explanatory variables are those that differentiate between vulnerable societies, and societies in which survival is so secure that people take it for granted during their formative years.

Our theory hypothesizes that, although rising levels of existential security are conducive to secularization, cultural change is path-dependent: the historically predominant religious tradition of a given society tends to leave a lasting impact on religious beliefs and other social norms, ranging from approval of divorce, to gender roles, tolerance of homosexuality, and work orientations. Where a society started from, continues to influence where it is at later points in time, so that the citizens of historically Protestant societies continue to show values that are distinct from those prevailing in historically Catholic or Hindu or Orthodox or Confucian societies. These cross-national differences do not reflect the influence of the religious authorities today—they persist even in societies where the vast majority no longer attends church. They reflect historical influences that shaped given national cultures, and today affect the entire population; thus, within The Netherlands, Catholics, Protestants and those who have left the church, all tend to share a common national value system that is very distinctive in global perspective.

A society's historical heritage leaves a lasting imprint, but the process of secularization tends to bring systematic cultural changes the move in a predictable direction, diminishing the importance of religion in people's lives and weakening allegiance to traditional cultural norms, making people more tolerant of divorce, abortion, homosexuality and cultural change in general. It may seem paradoxical to claim that economic development brings systematic changes *and* that a society's cultural heritage continues to influence it, but it is not: if every society in the world were moving in the same direction, at the same rate of speed, they would remain as far apart as ever, and would never converge.

The reality is not that simple, of course: secularization started earliest and has moved farthest in the most economically developed countries; and little or no secularization has taken place in the low-income countries. But this means that the cultural differences linked with economic development not only are not shrinking, they are growing *larger*. Secularization and the persistence of cultural differences are perfectly compatible.

Nevertheless, despite trends in secularization occurring in rich nations, this does not mean that the world as a whole has become less religious. As demonstrated elsewhere:

1. The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless,
2. The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before-- and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population.

Though these two propositions may initially seem contradictory, they are not. In fact the first proposition is true helps account for the second—because secularization and human development have a powerful negative impact on human fertility rates. Practically all of the countries in which secularization is most advanced, show fertility rates far below the replacement level—while societies with traditional religious orientations have fertility rates that are two or three times the replacement level. They contain a growing share of the world's population. The expanding gap between sacred and secular around the globe has important consequences for cultural change, for society, and for world politics.

Table 1: Belief in God, 1947-2001

<i>Nation</i>	<i>1947</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1981</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>Change</i>	<i>b.</i>	<i>Sig. (P)</i>
Sweden	80	60		52	38	48	46	-33.6	-.675	**
Netherlands	80	79		64	61		58	-22.0	-.463	*
Australia	95		80	79		75	75	-19.9	-.379	**
Norway	84	73		68	58	65		-18.9	-.473	**
Denmark	80			53	59		62	-17.9	-.387	*
Britain		77	76	73	72		61	-16.5	-.461	*
Greece		96					84	-12.3	-.364	-
West Germany		81	72	68	63	71	69	-12.0	-.305	N/s
Belgium			78	76	65		67	-11.2	-.487	N/s
Finland	83	83			61	73	72	-10.8	-.296	N/s
France	66	73	72	59	57		56	-10.1	-.263	N/s
Canada	95		89	91	85		88	-7.2	-.387	N/s
Switzerland		84			77	77		-7.2	-.277	N/s
India			98		93	94		-4.0	-.231	N/s
Japan			38	39	37	44	35	-3.0	-.016	N/s
Austria		85			78		83	-1.9	-.097	N/s
Italy			88	82	82		88	-0.1	.039	N/s
United States	94	98	94	96	93	94	94	0.4	-.027	N/s
Brazil	96				98	99		3.0	.056	N/s
ALL 10 1947-2001	85						72	-13.5	-.315	**

Notes: The proportion of the public who express belief in God (%'Yes') in 19 societies. 'Change' is the change in the proportion from the first to the last observation in the series. In the OLS regression models year is regressed on the series. The unstandardized beta (b) summarizes the slope of the line and the statistical significance of the change in the time-series (P). *ALL-10* are the average means for the 10 nations with observations in both 1947 and 2001.

1947 *Gallup Opinion Index* "Do you, personally, believe in God?" Yes/No/Don't Know. 1968 *Gallup Opinion Index* "Do you believe in God?" Yes/No/Don't Know. 1975 *Gallup Opinion Index* "Do you believe in God or a universal spirit?" Yes/No/Don't Know. 1981-2001 *World Values Survey/European Values Survey* "Do you believe in God?" Yes/No/Don't Know.

Source for Gallup polls: Lee Sigelman. 1977. 'Review of the Polls: Multination Surveys of Religious Beliefs.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 16(3): 289-294.

Table 2: Belief in life after death, 1947-2001

	1947	1961	1968	1975	1981	1990	1995	2001	Change
Norway	71	71	54		41	36	43		-28
Finland	69		55			44	50	44	-25
Denmark	55				25	29		32	-23
Netherlands	68	63	50		41	39		47	-22
France	58		35	39	35	38		39	-20
Canada	78	68		54	61	61		67	-11
Brazil	78					70	67		-11
Sweden	49		38		28	31	40	39	-10
Greece			57					47	-10
Belgium				48	36	37		40	-8
Australia	63			48	49		56		-7
Britain	49	56	38	43	46	44		45	-4
Switzerland		55	50			52	52		-3
West Germany		38	41	33	36	38	50	38	0
US	68	74	73	69	70	70	73	76	8
Japan				18	33	30	33	32	14
Italy				46	46	53		61	15
ALL 8 1947-2001	68							46	-22

Notes: The proportion of the public who express belief in life after death (%‘Yes’) in 19 societies. ‘Change’ is the change in the proportion from the first to the last observation in the series. The Adjusted R² summarizes the fit of the regression trend-line across each series, where year is regressed on the series. The beta (B) summarizes the slope of the line and the statistical significance (P). *Series*: Starting and ending dates. *Obs*: Number of observations in the series. *ALL-8* are the average means for the 8 nations with observations in both 1947 and 2001.

Data sources:

1947-1975 *Gallup Opinion Index* “Do you believe in life after death?” Yes/No/Don’t Know.

1981-2001 *World Values Survey/European Values Survey* “Do you believe in life after death?” Yes/No/Don’t Know.

Source for Gallup polls: Lee Sigelman. 1977. ‘Review of the Polls: Multination Surveys of Religious Beliefs.’ *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 16(3): 289-294.

Table 3: The perceived functions of religious authorities

Type of Society	Moral role % Agree	Spiritual role % Agree	Family role % Agree	Social role % Agree	Total function scale
Postindustrial	39	34	39	58	1.6
Industrial	59	53	59	76	2.4
Agrarian	75	72	75	80	3.0
<i>Total</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>57</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>2.3</i>

Note: “Generally speaking, do you think that the religious authorities in your country are giving adequate answers to...

- *The moral problems and needs of the individual.*
- *The problems of family life.*
- *People’s spiritual needs.*
- *The social problems facing our country today.”*

(Yes/No) Percentage who agree.

Source: WVS pooled data 1981-2001.

Table 4: Human security, religious markets, and religiosity in post-industrial societies

Indicators	Religious participation		How often pray?		N. of nation
	R	Sig.	R	Sig.	
RELIGIOUS MARKETS					
Religious pluralism	.018	N/s	.119	N/s	21
Religious Freedom index	.367	N/s	.477	N/s	21
State regulation of religion	.427	N/s	.423	N/s	18
Freedom House religious freedom scale	-.314	N/s	-.550	N/s	13
HUMAN SECURITY					
Human Development Index	-.249	N/s	.077	N/s	21
Economic inequality (GINI coefficient)	.496	*	.614	*	18

Note: Pearson simple correlations (R) without prior controls and their significance. * 0.05 level ** 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Religious pluralism: the Herfindahl Index (see text for the construction and data) (Alesina 2002)

The state regulation of religion: Scale measured by Mark Chaves and David E. Cann (1992).


Religious Freedom Index: See Appendix C for details of the construction of this scale.

Freedom House religious freedom scale, 2001. www.freedomhouse.org

Human Development Index, 2001: United National Development Program. 2003. *World Development Report*. New York: UNDP/Oxford University Press. www.undp.org

Economic inequality GINI coefficient: WDI: *World Development Indicators* World Bank 2002 Washington DC. www.worldbank.org

Figure 1: Religious behavior in post-industrial societies




Notes:

Religious participation: Q185 “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special hold days, once a year, less often, never or practically never.” Mean frequency of attendance at religious services.

Frequency of prayer? Q199: “How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? Would you say...Every day (7), more than once a week (6), once a week (5), at least once a month (4), several times a year (3), less often (2), never (1).” Mean frequency per society.

Source: World Values Survey pooled 1981-2001.


Figure 2: Religious participation in Europe



Religious participation: Q185 “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special hold days, once a year, less often, never or practically never.” Mean frequency of attendance at religious services.

Source: World Values Survey pooled 1981-2001.


Figure 3: Religious participation in Western Europe, 1970-2000



Note: The percentage of the population who said they attended a religious service 'at least once a week' and the regression line of the trend.

Source: The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-1999


Figure 4: Religious participation in the United States, 1972-2002



Note: Q: "How often do you attend religious services?" Never/ At least once a week or more often.

Source: US General Social Survey 1972-2002 N.43,204


Figure 5: Religious identities in the United States, 1972-2002



Note: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?" The graph excludes religious identities adhered to by less than 3% of Americans.

Source: US General Social Survey 1972-2002 N. 43,532

Figure 6: Religiosity and pluralism




Notes:

Religious pluralism index (Alesina 2002).

Religious participation: Q185 “*Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special hold days, once a year, less often, never or practically never.*” Mean frequency of attendance at religious services.

Source: World Values Survey pooled 1981-2001.

Figure 7: Religiosity and economic inequality




Note:

How often pray? Q199: "How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? Would you say...Every day (7), more than once a week (6), once a week (5), at least once a month (4), several times a year (3), less often (2), never (1)." Mean frequency per society.

Economic inequality is gauged by the GINI coefficient. Latest year. World Bank 2002.

Source: World Values Survey pooled 1981-2001.


Figure 8: Religiosity by income in postindustrial societies



Note: The percentage of the public who pray daily and who regard religion as very important by decile household income group (counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes, before taxes and other deduction) in postindustrial societies.

Source: World Values Study, pooled 1981-2001

Figure 9: Religiosity by income in the United States



Note: Linear trends in the percentage of the American public who pray daily and who regard religion as very important by decile household income group (counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes, before taxes and other deduction).

Source: World Values Study, pooled 1981-2001

¹ For a discussion see Steve Bruce. Ed. 1992. *Religion and Modernization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 170-94; Alan Aldridge. 2000. *Religion in the Contemporary World*. Cambridge: Polity Press. Chapter 4.

² C. Wright Mills 1959. pp.32-33. *The Sociological Imagination*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

³ It should be noted that in this study the term 'fundamentalist' is used in a neutral way to refer to those with an absolute conviction in the fundamental principles of their faith, to the extent that they will not accept the validity of any other beliefs.

⁴ See, for example, Peter L. Berger. Ed. 1999. *The Desecularization of the World*. Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center. P. 2. Compare this statement with the arguments in Peter L. Berger. 1967. *The Sacred Canopy*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

⁵ Rodney Stark and Roger Finke. 2000. *Acts of Faith*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. P.79. See also Rodney Stark. 1999. 'Secularization, RIP.' *Sociology of Religion*. 60(3): 270.

⁶ For example Roger Finke claims: "The vibrancy and growth of American religious institutions presents the most open defiance of the secularization model." Roger Finke. 1992. 'An Unsecular America.' In *Religion and Modernization*. Steve Bruce. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press: 148.

⁷ Peter L. Berger. Ed. 1999. *The Desecularization of the World*. Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center; Andrew M. Greeley. 2003. *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

⁸ Most of this paper is drawn from chapter 4 in Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. September 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

⁹ Postindustrial nation-states are defined as those estimated by the UN Development Report with a Human Development Index score over .900. These countries have a mean per capita GDP of \$29,585. In this ranking Malta, the other nation in Figure 3.1 with high religious participation, is classified an 'industrial' state

¹⁰ Peter L. Berger. Ed. 1999. *The Desecularization of the World*. Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center. See also discussions of American cultural exceptionalism in Louis Hartz. 1955. *The Liberal Tradition in America*. New York: Harcourt, Brace; Seymour Martin Lipset. 1990. *Continental divide: The values and institutions of Canada and the United States*. New York: Routledge; Edward A. Tiryakian. 1993. 'American religious exceptionalism: A reconsideration.' *The Annals* 527: 40-54; Graham K. Wilson. 1998. *Only in America? The politics of the United States in comparative perspective*. Chatham House, NJ: Chatham House.

¹¹ R. Currie, A.D. Gilbert and L.Horsley. 1977. *Churches and Churchgoers: Patterns of Church Growth in the British Isles since 1700*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sabino Samele Acquaviva. 1979. *The decline of the sacred in industrial society*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Steve Bruce. 1996. *Religion in the Modern World: From Cathedrals to Cults*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Sheena Ashford and Noel Timms. 1992. *What Europe Thinks: A Study of Western European Values*. Aldershot: Dartmouth; Wolfgang Jagodzinski and Karel Dobbelaere. 1995. 'Secularization and Church Religiosity.' In *The Impact of Values*. Eds. Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. Oxford: Oxford University Press; L. Voye. 1999. 'Secularization in a context of advanced modernity.' *Sociology of Religion*. 60(3): 275-288; Höllinger F. 1996. *Volksreligion und Herrschaftskirche. Die Wurzeln Religiösen Verhaltens in Westlichen Gesellschaften*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich. For a challenge to this view, however, see Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge. 1985. 'A supply-side reinterpretation of the 'secularization' of Europe.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 33: 230-52.

¹² Wolfgang Jagodzinski and Karel Dobbelaere. 1995. 'Secularization and Church Religiosity.' In *The Impact of Values*. Eds. Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P.105.

¹³ Steve Bruce. 2002. *God is Dead*. Oxford: Blackwell. Chapter 3; G. Gustafsson. 1994. 'Religious change in the five Scandinavian countries, 1930-1980' and also I. Riis. 'Patterns of secularization in Sandinavia.' Both in *Scandinavian Values: Religion and Morality in the Nordic Countries*. Eds. T. Pettersson and O. Riis. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Also T. Pettersson and E.M. Hamberg. 1997. 'Denominational pluralism and church membership in contemporary Sweden: a longitudinal study of the period, 1974-1995.' *Journal of Empirical Theology*. 10:61-78. For a summary see Table 1 in Steve Bruce. 2000. 'The supply-side model of religion: The Nordic and Baltic states.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 39(1): 32-46; V. Cesareo, et al. 1995. *La Religiosità in Italia*. Milan: A. Mondadori. 2nd ed; Reginald W. Bibby. 1979. 'The state of collective religiosity in Canada: An empirical analysis.' *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*. 16(1): 105-116; Alain Baril and George A. Mori. 1991. 'Leaving the fold: Declining church attendance.' *Canadian Social Trends* Autumn: 21-24; Peter Beyer. 1997. 'Religious vitality in Canada: The complementarity of religious market and secularization perspectives.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 36(2): 272-288; G. Michelat, et al. 1991. *Les Français, Sont-ils Encore Catholiques?: Analyse d'un Sondage d'Opinion*. Paris: Editions du Cerf; G. Dekker, J. de Hart and J. Peters. 1997. *God in Nederland 1966-1996*. Amsterdam: Anthos; F.J. Lechner. 1996. 'Secularization in the Netherlands?' *Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion* 35:252-64.

¹⁴ As noted in Table 3.5, using regression analysis, the only European countries where the fall was not statistically significant (at the .10 level) were Italy (due to a slight recovery in the early 1990s). At the .05 level, Britain, Northern Ireland, and Greece also emerged as not significant. See also Anthony M. Abela. 1993. 'Post-secularisation: The social significance of religious values in four Catholic European countries.' *Melita Theologica* XLIV: 39-58.

¹⁵ Andrew M. Greeley. 2003. *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. P.xi.

¹⁶ Reginald W. Bibby. 1979. 'The state of collective religiosity in Canada: An empirical analysis.' *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*. 16(1): 105-116. Table III shows that in Canada church attendance fell from 67% in 1946 to 35% in 1978; Hans Mol. 1985. *The Faith of Australians*. Sydney: George, Allen, & Unwin; Ian McAllister. 1988. 'Religious Change and Secularization: The Transmission of Religious Values In Australia.' *Sociological Analysis* 49 (3): 249-263.

¹⁷ Wade Clark Roof. 2001. *Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. See also Robert C. Fuller. 2002. *Spiritual, but Not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America*. New York: Oxford University Press.

¹⁸ Grace Davie. 1994. *Religion in Britain since 1945: Believing without Belonging*. Oxford: Blackwell; D. Hervieu-Leger. 2003. 'The case for a sociology of "multiple religious modernities": A different approach to the "invisible religion" of European societies.' *Social Compass* 50 (3): 287-295.

¹⁹ Andrew M. Greeley. 2003. *Religion in Europe at the End of the Second Millennium*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

²⁰ Andrew M. Greeley. 1980. *Religious change in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; Andrew M. Greeley. 1985. *Unsecular Man: The Persistence of Religion*. New York, Schocken Books; M. Hout and Andrew M. Greeley 1998. 'What church officials' reports don't show: Another look at church attendance data.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 113-119; M. Hout and Andrew M. Greeley 1987. 'The Center Doesn't Hold: Church Attendance in the United States, 1940-1984.' *American Sociological Review* 52 (3): 325-345.

²¹ March 1939 GALLUP POLL--A.I.P.O. "Did you happen to go to church last Sunday?" 40% yes, 60% no. / March 14, 2003, Gallup-C.N.N./U.S.A. Today Poll. "How often do you attend church or

synagogue—at least once a week (31%), almost every week (9%), about once a month (16%), seldom (28%), or never (16%)?” Hadaway points out that self-reported church attendance figures may well contain systematic bias towards over-reporting, compared with records of the actual size of congregations. C. Kirk Hadaway and P. L. Marler. 1998. 'Did You Really Go To Church This Week? Behind the Poll Data.' *Christian Century* May 6: 472-475; C. Kirk Hadaway, P. L. Marler, et al. 1993. 'What the Polls Don't Show: A Closer Look at Church Attendance.' *American Sociological Review* 58 (6): 741-752. See also S. Presser, S. and L. Stinson 1998. 'Data collection mode and social desirability bias in self-reported religious attendance.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 137-145. Although we accept this argument, this cannot explain the apparent discrepancy between reported churchgoing in the United States and Western Europe, unless some sort of 'spiral of silence' claims about the social acceptability of churchgoing in America are brought into the argument. Other evidence based on cohort and period analysis of the General Social Survey suggests that the apparent long-term stability of the aggregate levels of churchgoing in the United States in fact disguises two simultaneous changes occurring since the early 1970s: a negative cohort effect *and* a positive period effect. Mark Chaves. 1989. 'Secularization and religious revival: Evidence from U.S. church attendance rates, 1972-1986.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 28(4): 464-477. For more details about the Gallup organization time-series tracking religion in America see D. Michael Lindsay. 2000. *Surveying the Religious Landscape: Trends in U.S. Beliefs*. New York: Moorhouse Publishing.

²² R.D. Woodberry. 1996. 'The Missing Fifty Percent: Accounting for the Gap Between Survey Estimates and Head-Counts of Church Attendance.' *Society for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Nashville; R.D. Woodberry. 1998. 'When surveys lie and people tell the truth: How surveys oversample church attenders.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 119-122; S. Presser and L. Stinson 1998. 'Data collection mode and social desirability bias in self-reported religious attendance.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 137-145.

²³ Robert D. Woodberry. 1998. 'When surveys lie and people tell the truth: How surveys oversample church attenders.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 119-122; C. Kirk Hadaway, P.L. Marler, and Mark Chaves. 1998. 'Overreporting church attendance in America: Evidence that demands the same verdict.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 122-130; B. Steensland, J.Z.Park, M.D. Regnerus, L.D. Robinson, W.B. Wilcox, Robert D.Woodberry. 2000. 'The measure of American religion: Toward improving the state of the art.' *Social Forces* 79 (1): 291-318.

²⁴ See details of the NES series at www.umich.edu/~NES

²⁵ See also C. Kirk Hadaway, P.L. Marler and Mark Chaves. 1998. 'Over-reporting church attendance in America: Evidence that demands the same verdict.' *American Sociological Review* 63 (1): 122-130.

²⁶ Robert Wuthnow. 1988. *The Restructuring of American Religion*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press; Tom Smith. 1992. 'Are conservative churches really growing?' *Review of Religious Research*. 33:305-29; Michael Hout, Andrew M. Greeley, and Melissa J. Wilde. 2001. 'The demographic imperative in religious change in the United States.' *American Journal of Sociology* 107 (2): 468-500.

²⁷ Brian R. Wilson. 1969. *Religion in Secular Society*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England, Penguin Books, Ltd.

²⁸ Pippa Norris. 2000. 'US Campaign 2000: Of Pregnant Chads, Butterfly Ballots and Partisan Vitriol.' *Government and Opposition*; VNS Exit Polls in 'Who Voted' *New York Times* November 12 2000; Andrew Kohut, John C. Green, Scott Keeter and Robert C. Toth. 2000. *The Diminishing Divide: Religion's Changing Role in American Politics*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

²⁹ Gertrude Himmelfarb. 1999. *One Nation: Two Cultures*. New York: Random House.

³⁰ Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge. 1985. 'A supply-side reinterpretation of the 'secularization' of Europe.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 33: 230-52; Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge . 1987. *A Theory of Religion*. New York: Peter Lang; Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. 1992. *The Churching of America*. New Brunswick, NJ: The University of Rutgers Press; Roger Finke and Lawrence R. Iannaccone. 1993. 'The illusion of shifting demand: Supply-side explanations for trends and change in the American religious market place.' *Annals of the American Association of Political and Social Science*. 527: 27-39; R. S. Warner. 1993. 'Work in Progress Toward a New Paradigm in the Sociology of Religion.' *American Journal of Sociology* 98 (5): 1044-1093; Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. 2000. *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.

³¹ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. 2000. *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press. P.88. It should be noted that the assumed universal rationality in the supply-side theory has been criticized as inapplicable to religions, such as Confucianism and Judaism, that do not believe that behavior in this life generates otherworldly rewards in any after life. See Mark Chaves and P.S. Gorski. 2001. 'Religious pluralism and religious participation.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 261-281; S. Sharot. 2002. 'Beyond Christianity: A critique of the rational choice theory of religion from a Weberian and comparative religions perspective.' *Sociology of Religion*. 63(4): 427-454.

³² Mark Chaves. 1999. 'The National Congregations Study: Background, Methods and Selected Results.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 38(4): 458-476.

³³ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. 2000. *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.p230.

³⁴ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. 2000. *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press. P.237-238.

³⁵ Roger Finke and Rodney Stark. 2000. *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion*. Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press. P.257.

³⁶ Mark Chaves and P.S. Gorski. 2001. 'Religious pluralism and religious participation.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 261-281.

³⁷ J.M. Bryant. 2000. 'Cost-benefit accounting and the piety business: Is *homo religious*, at bottom, a *homo economicus*?' *Methods and Theory in the Study of Religion*. 12: 520-48. It should be noted that other popular commentators have gone even further with this analogy than Finke and Stark; for example Cimino and Lattin argue that the US consumer-driven culture has led Americans to go 'shopping' for spiritual experiences. See Richard Cimino and Don Lattin. 2002. *Shopping for Faith: American Religion in the New Millennium*. New York Jossey-Bass.

³⁸ For example, the Herfindahl Index for religious fractionalization is computed as following:

	Community A		Community B		Community C	
	High pluralism		Moderate pluralism		Limited pluralism	
	%	Squares	%	Squares	%	Squares
Anglican	.20	.0400	.30	.0900	90	.0810
Catholic	.20	.0400	.25	.0625	5	.0025
Methodist	.15	.0225	.20	.0400	3	.0090
Baptist	.09	.0081	.13	.0169	2	.0040
Mormons	.09	.0081	.05	.0025	0	.0000
Muslims	.09	.0081	.02	.0040	0	.0000
Jewish	.09	.0081	.02	.0040	0	.0000
Other	.09	.0081	.03	.0090	0	.0000
Total %	100	0.1430	100	0.2136	100	0.8138

Index	(1 - 0.1430) =0.857	(1 - 0.2136) =0.786	(1 - 0.8138) =0.186
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³⁹ The ethno-religious fractionalization variable is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethno-linguistic group shares, representing the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population belonged to different religious faiths. For a discussion see Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. 'Fractionalization.' *Journal of Economic Growth*. 82: 219-258. The dataset is available at www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html

The index is calculated as follows:

$$FRACT_j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^N s_{ij}^2$$

where s_{ij} is the share of group i ($i = 1 \dots N$) in country j .

⁴⁰ Morgens Pedersen. 1979. 'The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility.' *European Journal of Political Research* 7: 1-27.

⁴¹ Mark Chaves and P.S. Gorski. 2001. 'Religious pluralism and religious participation.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 261-281.

⁴² In particular, irrespective of the effect of pluralism upon participation, non-zero correlations will occur that depend mathematically only upon the size distributions of the denominations in the dataset across geographical units. David Voas, Daviel V.A. Olson and Alasdair Crockett. 2002. 'Religious pluralism and participation: Why previous research is wrong.' *American Sociological Review* 67 (2): 212-230.

⁴³ See also Rodney Stark and Lawrence Iannaccone. 1994 'A supply-side reinterpretation of the 'secularization' of Europe.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 33: 230-52.

⁴⁴ For an attempt to explain the Italian case as the result of internal competition within Catholicism see L. Diotallevi. 2002. 'Internal competition in a national religious monopoly: The Catholic effect and the Italian case.' *Sociology of Religion* 63 (2): 137-155.

⁴⁵ Lawrence R. Iannaccone. 1991. 'The consequences of religious market structure.' *Rationality and Society*. 3: 156-177.

⁴⁶ Ian Smith, John W. Sawkins and Paul T. Seaman. 1998. 'The economics of religious participation: A cross-country study.' *Kyklos*. 51(1): 25-43.

⁴⁷ Johan Verweij, Peter Ester, and Rein Nauta. 1997. 'Secularization as an economic and cultural phenomenon: A cross-national analysis.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (2): 309-324.

⁴⁸ Steve Bruce. 2000. 'The supply-side model of religion: The Nordic and Baltic states.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 39(1): 32-46. See also Beyer's related argument that the privatization of religion in Canada led towards greater secularization. Peter Beyer. 1997. 'Religious vitality in Canada: The complementarity of religious market and secularization perspectives.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. 36(2): 272-288.

⁴⁹ Mark Chaves and Philip S. Gorski. 2001. 'Religious pluralism and religious participation.' *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 261-281; David Voas, Daniel V. A. Olson, and Alasdair Crockett. 2002. 'Religious pluralism and participation: Why previous research is wrong.' *American Sociological Review* 67 (2): 212-230.

⁵⁰ This argument finds parallels in the debate about the relative importance of changes in the mass political culture and in society, or in the strength of party organizations, for explaining

patterns of social and partisan dealignment. See the discussion in Pippa Norris. 2003. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁵¹ Alberto Alesina, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. 'Fractionalization.' *Journal of Economic Growth*. 82: 219-258. The dataset is available at www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html

⁵² It should be noted that the proportion of adherents to the majority religion in each country was also compared as an alternative measure of religious diversity or homogeneity, but this measure also proved an insignificant predictor of religious participation, whether the comparison was restricted to postindustrial societies or to all nations worldwide.

⁵³ Seymour Martin Lipset. 1990. *Continental divide: The values and institutions of Canada and the United States*. New York: Routledge.

⁵⁴ Mark Chaves and David E. Cann. 1992. 'Regulation, pluralism and religious market structure.' *Rationality and Society*. 4: 272-290. The scale is reversed in this study, for ease of presentation, so that a low score represents greater regulation.

⁵⁵ Paul Marshall. *Religious Freedom in the World*. www.freedomhouse.org

⁵⁶ F. Lechner. 1991. 'The case against secularization: a rebuttal.' *Social Forces* 69: 1103-19

⁵⁷ See J. Verweij, Peter Ester, and R. Nauta. 1997. 'Secularization as an economic and cultural phenomenon: A cross-national analysis.' *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 36 (2): 309-324. The comparative study of 16 nations, based on the 1990 European Values Survey, found that religiosity was significantly related to the percentage of GNP spent on social security in 1990, even controlling for per capita GNP

⁵⁸ For a discussion of the comparative evidence see, for example, Derek Bok. 1996. *The State of the Nation: Government and the Quest for a Better Society*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

⁵⁹ For example a recent detailed study comparing the levels of household income after government redistribution through tax and welfare transfers, based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) database, found that the GINI coefficient for income inequality was greatest in the United States compared with 13 other advanced industrial democracies. See David Bradley, Evelyn Huber, Stephanie Moller, Francois Nielsen and John D. Stephens. 2003. 'Distribution and redistribution in postindustrial democracies.' *World Politics* 55 (1): 193-228.

⁶⁰ Katherine McFate, Roger Lawson and William Julius Wilson. Eds. 1995. *Poverty, Inequality, and the Future of Social Policy: Western States in the New World Order*. New York: Russell Sage; Alexander Hicks. 1999. *Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Policies*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Gosta Esping-Andersen. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.