Federal Budget Policy for the Next Administration

Presentation to the Commercial Club of Boston
February 10, 2016

Thank you, Marty, for that generous introduction. I’m delighted to be here and to be rejoining the Boston community.

Tonight I want to offer my recommendations about the federal budget. The recommendations reflect what I think the economic evidence implies about the best approach, not what the political evidence implies about the most easily enacted approach. After I finish, I’m happy to talk about my substantive recommendations about the budget, the political environment for budget decisions, the economy, the Kennedy School, or anything else you would like.

Let me summarize my recommendations for the budget, and then I will go through the elements piece by piece. For the next decade, I think we should allow federal debt to rise as a percentage of GDP in line with what would happen with current law, but I would shift the composition of the budget by increasing federal investment above what would occur with current law and paying for that increase with cuts in benefits for higher-income retirees and hikes in tax revenue. I also would enact larger cuts in benefits and increases in taxes to be phased in later so that debt declines gradually relative to GDP in the long term. Let me explain the logic of those views.

The first part of those recommendations is to allow the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise for the next decade but enact policy changes now that will reduce it thereafter.

Under current law, federal debt is projected by CBO to rise from 75% currently to 85% by the end of the decade and more than 100% 25 years from now. For comparison, debt averaged 38% of GDP over the past 50 years and was 35% in 2007 before the financial crisis.

Federal debt cannot increase indefinitely relative to the size of the economy, so current law regarding federal spending and revenues is not sustainable. Moreover, even if debt stops rising at some point, allowing debt to stay so high would have significant costs. In particular, federal debt can crowd out private capital investment. And high debt reduces the “fiscal space” for responding to unexpected developments. For example, if we hit another financial crisis or severe recession with debt at 75% or 85% of GDP rather than 35%, our options will be more constrained. Those points argue, all else equal, for reducing federal debt by a lot and for doing so quickly.

However, all else is not equal: Interest rates on Treasury securities are very low by historical standards and will probably remain low for a prolonged period. The yield on 10-year Treasury notes was 8% at the end of 1990, 5% at the end of 2000, and 2% at the end of 2015—with CBO and some other analysts now predicting that the 10-year yield will rise only to about 4% in the coming years, and many financial-market participants expecting it to remain below that. There is a wide range of possible explanations for why rates may remain much lower than historical norms, and different explanations have different implications for the optimal amount of federal debt. This is a complicated and underexplored topic in economics. A co-author and I released a paper last week that examines alternative explanations for low Treasury rates and the implications of each for budget policy. We found that most explanations imply that we should have a higher debt-to-GDP ratio than we would otherwise. We also found that most explanations imply that federal investment should be higher than otherwise, and I’ll come back to that later. The intuition for these results is that interest rates show the direct cost to the Treasury of its borrowing and provide information about the indirect cost to the economy of Treasury borrowing, and if costs will be persistently much lower than we are accustomed to, then more borrowing passes a cost-benefit test.

To be sure, interest-rate projections are very uncertain, and policymaking should be mindful of the risk that rates will rise above current expectations—especially because many large changes in fiscal policy are best made slowly. But we should not ignore a good deal of evidence that rates will probably be much lower than in the past.

So, the competing considerations are these: On one hand, high and rising debt generally has significant costs; on the other hand, those costs will probably be much lower for an extended period than they used to be. Economists don’t have a good way to balance those considerations. My own judgment is that we should let debt rise over the coming decade in line with what would happen under current law, from 75% of GDP to 85%, because the costs of doing so appear quite small and the benefits of not cutting certain kinds of spending would be considerable. However, I think we should enact policy changes now that will reduce debt relative to GDP in the long run so that the changes can be phased in gradually and with a lot of advance notice.

How about the composition of the budget? The second part of my recommendations is to increase federal investment. The traditional categories of federal investment are infrastructure, education and training, and R&D. Under the current caps on annual appropriations, federal nondefense investments of those sorts soon will be smaller relative to GDP than at any time in at least 50 years.

That is not forward-looking, growth-oriented budget policy. Spending for infrastructure like roads and airports decreases the cost of moving people and delivering good and services; spending for education and training enhances the skills of our workforce; and spending for research and development promotes innovation. Cutting those federal investments will reduce total output and income relative to what they would otherwise be. Moreover, cutting federal investment in education and training will reduce the incomes of lower- and middle-income people who are dependent on government help to have a real opportunity to advance. In addition, with low Treasury interest rates, we should be doing more federal investment than otherwise. Therefore, we should raise the caps on nondefense appropriations substantially, in order to maintain federal investment as a share of GDP.

We should also work to increase the return on federal investments. Sometimes we build critical transportation links, and sometimes we build bridges to nowhere; sometimes education funding supports a breakthrough in a person’s life, and sometimes it is dissipated. We can do better. For example, we should increase the role of careful cost-benefit analysis in deciding which specific investments to undertake.

It is also important to understand that some federal spending outside those traditional categories represents an investment in future income, especially for lower-income people. There is a growing body of evidence that certain health-care benefits, housing subsidies, education subsidies, and other means-tested benefits raise future incomes of some young people. We should protect those investments as well by not cutting means-tested benefits, and let me turn to that now.

The third piece of my recommendations is that we should reduce benefits for higher-income retirees but not for lower- and middle-income people. I come to that view based on two sets of facts and one value judgment.

One set of facts is about the evolution of the federal budget under current law. If we look ahead 25 years, spending for Social Security and Medicare will continue to increase relative to GDP, mostly because of the aging of the population: By the time the last baby boomers become eligible for Social Security and Medicare, there will be more than 75 million beneficiaries of those programs, two-thirds more than the number just before the first boomers became eligible for early retirement benefits. Those beneficiaries will be more than one-fifth of the U.S. population. Meanwhile, defense spending is declining relative to GDP and in a few years will be a smaller percentage of GDP than anyone can remember. All other noninterest spending taken together is about the same share of GDP now that it was 25 years ago, and in CBO’s current-law projections, it is about the same share 25 years from now. Of course, there have been important shifts within this very broad category. But the key point is that the rise in federal spending does not stem from general growth in the federal government relative to the size of the economy but instead from a dramatic increase in spending for Social Security and Medicare, with a rising amount of interest payments as well.

The other set of facts is about the evolution of the income distribution. During the past few decades, the incomes of people across most of the distribution have risen quite slowly, while incomes at the high end of the distribution have risen very rapidly. According to estimates by CBO, between 1979 and 2011, market incomes—that is, incomes before taking account of taxes and transfers—rose 16 percent in the bottom quintile of the distribution, 9 percent in the middle quintile, about 60 percent in the top quintile apart from the top 1 percent, and 174 percent in the top 1 percent of the distribution. We should not put too much weight on those specific numbers because measuring income growth is difficult, and even though CBO’s methodology resolves some of the problems in other time series, measurement issues remain. Still, it is clear that most people in the country have gained very little directly from the growth of total output and national income in the past few decades.

The value judgment I make is that federal policies should be focused on raising incomes for people of modest means. If we narrowed the gap between federal revenues and spending through significant across-the-board cuts in Social Security and Medicare, we would significantly reduce total retirement income for many lower-income and middle-income people. If, instead, we narrowed the gap between revenues and spending through significant cuts in means-tested programs, we would significantly reduce income for many lower-income people. Those changes would be wrong, in my view, because they would impose a large burden on the people who have been experiencing the slowest income growth.

The benefits that I think we should cut are Social Security and Medicare benefits for high-income beneficiaries. That approach does not offer a free lunch. Making Social Security and Medicare more progressive would weaken the connection between an individual’s taxes and benefits, which could undermine the earned-benefit character of the systems if taken too far. Also, because people with higher incomes would face lower benefits, their incentives to work and save would be reduced. But I think this approach is the best of the available alternatives for restraining federal debt without unduly burdening those Americans who have fared the worst in economic terms in recent years.

I want to comment here about the Affordable Care Act, which is the biggest expansion of federal means-tested programs in decades. The ACA is significantly increasing the share of Americans who have health insurance, and doing so at a cost of thousands of subsidy dollars per newly insured person and a collection of significant changes in insurance rules. That dollar cost is substantial, but not surprising given the high cost of health care. For context, the ACA subsidies will be only about 10 percent of total federal subsidies for health insurance over the next decade, with much larger subsidies provided through Medicare, Medicaid apart from the ACA, and tax subsidies for employer-provided health insurance.

Of course, there are alternative policies regarding health insurance that we could adopt. But there are no policies that would achieve the substantial increase in insurance coverage occurring under the ACA without subsidies and rules similar to those of the ACA—or an even larger federal role. That is an analytic result. Then there’s a value judgment about whether the increase in insurance coverage is worth those costs. My judgment is yes, largely because of my concern about the slow income growth at the lower end of the distribution, but others could reach different judgments.

The fourth part of my recommendations is to raise tax revenue above what will be collected under current law.

There is no realistic way to ever reduce debt as a percentage of GDP that does not involve more revenue. Over the next 25 years, spending for Social Security and Medicare is projected to increase by 3½ percent of GDP, which would represent, for current GDP, more than $600 billion a year. That increase is driven primarily by the retirement of the baby boomers. Costs per beneficiary in Social Security are projected to rise roughly with real wages, as they have in the past few decades; costs per beneficiary in Medicare are projected to rise much more slowly than they have in the past few decades because of a combination of slow growth in payments per procedure under current law, ongoing changes in the health care system, and other factors. As a result, there are few ways to reduce spending that would not be felt directly by beneficiaries, and those beneficiaries generally like those programs a lot. I think we can reduce benefits to some extent, as I mentioned earlier, but not by nearly enough to offset the increase in costs from the growing number of beneficiaries.

Meanwhile, the projections under current law show defense spending falling as a percentage of GDP. Just maintaining the current level of defense spending with adjustments for inflation would require $450 billion more during the coming decade than is built into the current-law projections. All other federal spending apart from interest is projected to be the same share of GDP in 25 years that it is today, which is about the same share as it was 25 years ago. At an abstract level, many people want government spending to be cut, but when one drills down to the level of individual programs within that broad category, cutting becomes much more difficult. People want highways repaired, medical research conducted, the borders secured, veterans cared for, food and drugs inspected, and so on.

Clearly the desired level of federal spending for those purposes varies between people, but there is no evidence that most people wants cuts in spending of the magnitude that would be needed to avoid any revenue increases. For example, the Republicans have controlled the House of Representatives for more than 5 years, and the number of bills they have approved that would cut spending substantially—apart from repeal of the Affordable Care Act and the caps on annual appropriations enacted a few years ago—is zero. They’ve approved budget resolutions that envision, at an abstract level, large cuts in spending, but they’ve approved no sizable cuts in specific programs apart from those two examples I just mentioned.

To raise revenues, the natural places to start are: one, to tax carbon emissions; and two, to reduce the deductions and exemptions that narrow the tax base and thereby lower the revenue collected for any given tax rate. That two-part focus echoes some advice of Marty’s.

Experts on the climate agree overwhelmingly that we should reduce carbon emissions substantially. Experts on the economy agree overwhelmingly that putting a price on carbon emissions is the most efficient way to reduce emissions. Putting a price on carbon can be achieved through a carbon tax or through a cap-and-trade system, and we should establish one or the other.

Economists also agree overwhelmingly that reducing the deductions and exemptions that narrow the tax base would be the most efficient way to increase revenue from the personal income tax, the payroll tax, and the corporate profits tax. Those deductions, exemptions, and related features of the tax code are known as “tax expenditures” because they resemble federal spending in the sense of providing financial assistance for particular activities or to particular entities or groups of people. The revenue lost from all tax expenditures taken together is nearly as large as total revenue from the personal income tax, so considerable revenue could be raised by trimming them. And because those tax provisions can distort individuals’ and businesses’ decisionmaking, reducing the scope or scale of the provisions can improve efficiency.

The fifth part of my recommendations is to build stronger automatic stabilizers into the federal budget and prepare to use discretionary countercyclical fiscal policy. When the economy falls into recession and unemployment rises, the economic and social costs of the lost output and lost jobs can be very large. Between 2008 and 2015, output was below the potential output of the economy—the amount we could product if we had maintained nearly full employment—by trillions of dollars cumulatively, and millions of additional people were unemployed each year relative to what would have occurred without the recession. To fight recessions, of course, we rely on a combination of monetary policy and fiscal policy.

In each of the past three recessions, the Federal Reserve has cut the federal funds rate by 5 or more percentage points. However, most current projections of the federal funds rate imply that the rate will stay below 5 percent in the years ahead. For example, both CBO and the FOMC expect that the funds rate will rise only to 3½ percent, and participants in financial markets are anticipating a lower funds rate than that. If those expectations are accurate, the Federal Reserve will be unable to ease monetary policy nearly as much in the next recession as it did in each of the three previous recessions.

The Federal Reserve could respond to this problem in a number of ways: It could employ greater amounts of quantitative easing during future downturns, it could explore institutional changes that would relax the effective lower bound on interest rates for future downturns, and it could raise inflation and thereby raise equilibrium interest rates before the next recession hits. My judgment is that any responses along those lines will probably not be sufficient to eliminate the problem of the Federal Reserve being limited in its countercyclical policy. Therefore, I think we will need countercyclical fiscal policy to be more powerful.

That means that, relative to what we have had in the past, we will need larger deficits during downturns and smaller deficits or surpluses during booms. Variability in the federal budget can be costly, and those costs should be considered in deciding what components of spending and taxes should vary most. For example, variation in tax rates and in the federal share of Medicaid spending would probably have smaller costs than variation in infrastructure investment. But the general point is that we should build automatic fiscal stabilizers that are more powerful than existing stabilizers and respond very rapidly, and we should develop plans for discretionary fiscal policies that can be enacted when needed.

Let me conclude. Without changes in laws regarding federal spending or taxes, federal debt would rise indefinitely as a percentage of GDP. That is unsustainable, so changes will be needed. But the likely persistence of low Treasury borrowing rates means that the need to reduce debt is less urgent and that additional federal investment would be appropriate. Therefore, I think we should increase federal investment during the next decade and pay for that increase with higher taxes and lower benefits for better-off retirees, but allow debt to continue to rise. In the long run, though, we will need larger increases in taxes and reductions in benefits in order to put federal debt on a downward path, and we should enact those changes soon so that people have plenty of warning before they take effect. Thank you.