Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Summer Workshop, Stanford
August 13-15, 2009
Abstract
We exploit experimental variation in repayment meeting frequency across microfinance groups
to show that more frequent interaction among group members builds social capital and im-
proves their financial outcomes. One year after the end of their first loan cycle, clients in groups
which met more frequently exhibit greater cooperation when offered the choice of adding other
group members in a lottery and thereby lowering own expected lottery payoff while increasing
expected group payoff. We provide evidence that this reflects higher expectations of reciprocal
behavior due to an improved ability to monitor each others' actions. In parallel with this, we
also find that clients who met more frequently are less likely to default.
Citation
Feigenberg, Benjamin, Erica Field, and Rohini Pande. "Building Social Capital through Microfinance." Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Summer Workshop, Stanford, August 13-15, 2009.