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HKS Authors

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Abstract

Deterrence is a generic situation, where player 2 threatens to bash player 1, should he harm her. Typical player 1’s are bomb builders, market invaders, or computer hackers. 2’s decision whether to bash will depend on a noisy signal. 1 may have the ability to disrupt the signal. The game has a unique equilibrium. If it involves mixed strategies, signal reliability benefits both players. Signal disruption hurts 2 for sure and only benefits 1 if 2 believes he is unlikely to possess it.

Citation

Ma, Siyu, Yair Tauman, and Richard Zeckhauser. "Deterrence Games and the Disruption of Information." HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP20-026, August 2020.