HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series
HKS Working Paper No. RWP15-050
August 2015
Abstract
Why are judicial nominees allowed to refuse to answer questions about important issues
that could come before the courts? We address this question by examining the
information environment surrounding judicial nominations. Using the Supreme Court
as our example, we formulate a model that departs from the existing literature by incorporating
the fact that the Senate often does not know what type of candidate the
President is trying to appoint. Our model shows when the President and Senate are
ideologically divergent, low information about nominees’ views results in the Senate
occasionally rejecting acceptable nominees. However, when the President and Senate
are ideologically close, the President benefits from leaving the process opaque—that is,
allowing his nominees to avoid answering tough questions. Thus, even though low information
can be costly to both parties, keeping the process nontransparent shields the
President from being penalized for selecting more like-minded (and possibly extreme)
judges.
Citation
Sen, Maya, and William Spaniel. "How Uncertainty about Judicial Nominees Can Distort the Confirmation Process." HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series RWP15-050, August 2015.