Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School
May 2011
Abstract
The diffusion of enrichment and reprocessing (E&R) technologies can increase the risk of the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in several ways. First, enrichment and reprocessing facilities can
produce nuclear materials – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium—that are
directly usable in nuclear weapons. With such materials, a state could abrogate its nonprolifera
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tion commitments and produce a nuclear weapon within a short period of time. Given the legal
ability of a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to acquire
enrichment and reprocessing facilities, produce weapon-usable materials and then withdraw from
the Treaty after giving notice of its withdrawal three months in advance, a state would be free to
develop nuclear weapons without, strictly speaking, violating the NPT.
Citation
McGoldrick, Fred, with contributions by Matthew Bunn, Martin Malin, and William H. Tobey. "Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology: Issues, Constraints, Options." Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2011.