Program on Education Policy and Governance
Conference Papers Series

Who Leaves? Interdistrict Magnet School Openings and Enrollment Dynamics in Nearby Schools

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PEPG 26-19

This paper was presented at the School Choice Impacts on Participants, Non-Participants, Educators, and Entrepreneurs conference held at the Harvard Kennedy School, May 7-8, 2026

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Who Leaves? Interdistrict Magnet School Openings and Enrollment Dynamics in Nearby Schools[*]

Yerin Yoon[†]

Abstract

Connecticut expanded interdistrict magnet schools (IMS) intending to reduce racial and socioeconomic segregation across districts, yet the potential unintended effects on student composition in nearby schools remains unclear. Leveraging the staggered rollout of IMS openings, this study finds that IMS openings reduce enrollment by about 5 percent in nearby private K8 and traditional public high schools (TPHS). In private K8, the share of White students declines by 3.5 percent, reducing White exposure for remaining Black and Hispanic students, with effects driven by Catholic schools. In TPHS, the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch increases by 18 percent, suggesting that higher-income students are more likely to exit, with larger effects in a region under court-ordered desegregation. These findings suggest that policies designed to reduce segregation across districts may have unintended socioeconomic and racial compositional consequences for the students left behind in nearby schools.

Keywords: Interdistrict Magnet School, School Choice, Enrollment, Racial Composition

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[*] This project is generously supported by the Catholic Education Research Initiative (CERI) at Boston College. I am deeply grateful for the guidance of my advisor, Shaun M. Dougherty, and my committee members, Joshua Goodman, Henry Braun, and Emily Gates. I also appreciate the thoughtful feedback received from participants at the 2024 Association for Education Finance and Policy (AEFP), the 2024 Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness (SREE), and the 2024 Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM) annual conferences, and 2026 Program on Education Policy and Governance (PEPG) School Choice Conference at Harvard University. Any remaining errors, opinions, or conclusions are solely my own.

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1. Introduction

In the United States, magnet schools emerged in the late 1960s as a strategy to promote voluntary racial and socioeconomic integration by attracting students across traditional attendance boundaries through specialized academic curriculums or themes (George & Darling-Hammond, 2021). As of 2016, approximately 4,340 public elementary and secondary magnet schools served nearly 3.5 million students nationwide (Bifulco, 2025; Magnet Schools of America, 2017). Connecticut's interdistrict magnet schools represent one of the most notable examples of this approach, developed in response to Sheff v. O'Neill (1989) to reduce racial and economic isolation between Hartford (i.e., Sheff region)—one of the most segregated and economically disadvantaged cities in the United States—and its surrounding suburban districts. Unlike the more common within-district magnet schools, which promote integration among students who share the same local tax base and governance structure, Connecticut's interdistrict model was designed to bridge district boundaries entirely, reflecting the cross-district nature of Hartford's segregation.

While the policy's primary goal is to foster racial and socioeconomic desegregation across district lines, the expansion of interdistrict magnet schools may also reshape local schooling dynamics. When a new magnet school opens nearby, families may adjust their choices, affecting the demographic and enrollment composition of surrounding public and private schools, as shown in studies of charter school expansion (Alcaino & Jennings, 2020; Dougherty et al., 2025; Slungaard-Mumma, 2022; Hicks & Lens, 2022; Winters, 2012). Yet most evaluations of magnet schools have focused on their success in promoting integration or academic achievement, primarily in within-district magnet school settings (Bush et al., 2001; Gersti-Pepin, 2002; Sohoni & Saporito, 2009; Saporito, 2003; Yon et al., 1998), and to a lesser

extent, in interdistrict magnet contexts (Bifulco et al., 2009a; Bifulco et al., 2009b). Far less attention has been paid to the unintended local effects of magnet school expansion—particularly for nearby elementary and secondary schools, where students typically enroll close to home and thus might be most immediately affected by new public school choice options.

This paper addresses this gap by providing the first known causal evidence on how interdistrict magnet school openings affect enrollment dynamics in nearby traditional public and private schools. Connecticut offers a unique setting for this analysis, as participation in interdistrict magnet schools is entirely voluntary and students' race is not used as an admissions criterion. Consequently, local enrollment patterns may reflect parental preferences, geographic accessibility, and the availability of nearby schooling options.

Leveraging the staggered rollout of interdistrict magnet school openings in Connecticut between 1998 and 2020, this study employs a difference-in-differences (Callaway & Sant' Anna, 2021) and event-study design to address three research questions:

1. What is the impact of interdistrict magnet school openings on total enrollment in proximal traditional public and private schools? [1]
2. What is the impact of interdistrict magnet school openings on the share of low-income students and racial composition in proximal traditional public and private schools?
3. Do these impacts vary by whether a school is located in the Sheff region, and by religious affiliation among private schools (Catholic versus non-Catholic)?

This study uses the National Longitudinal School Database (NLSD)—which includes annual enrollment, demographic, and geographic data for public schools and biannual data for

[1] For public schools, I focus on traditional public schools, excluding other types of magnet schools and charter schools. Although these schools may serve student populations who already in the public school system and actively engaged in school choice, their numbers in Connecticut are too limited to provide reliable estimates of treatment effects, as shown in Figure 1.

private schools nationwide—and merges it with the full list of interdistrict magnet schools in Connecticut, compiled from the Comprehensive Statewide Interdistrict Magnet School Plan (Connecticut State Department of Education, 2016). To more precisely capture enrollment shifts among schools serving overlapping grades, I estimate effects separately for K8 and high schools (Slungaard-Mumma, 2022; Dougherty et al., 2025).

On average, interdistrict magnet school openings reduce enrollment in nearby private K8 schools by 12.5 students (6.1 percent relative to the baseline of 203.51 students) and in traditional public high schools by 64.5 students (5.3 percent relative to the baseline of 1214.38 students). In contrast, I find no statistically significant enrollment changes in nearby traditional public K8 schools and private high schools, suggesting that patterns of student exit vary by school level and type.

In private K8 schools, the share of White students declines by 2.2 percentage points (3.5 percent relative to the baseline of 62 percent), reducing exposure to White peers for remaining Black and Hispanic students. However, I find no evidence that openings affect the share of low-income students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. Heterogeneity analyses show that these exits of White students are largely driven by Catholic schools. In non-Catholic private K8 schools—which, on average, are more expensive than Catholic schools—two years after exposure to a new interdistrict magnet school, the shares of Black and Hispanic students decline by 2.5 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively, while the share of White students increases.

In traditional public high schools, the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch increases by about 7.7 percentage points (18.3 percent relative to the baseline of 42 percent) following nearby magnet school openings, with no significant change in racial composition. This suggests that relatively higher-income students are more likely to exit

traditional public high schools when new choice options become available, a pattern more pronounced in schools located within the Sheff region (Hartford County).

These main findings are robust to a series of supplementary analyses, including alternative staggered difference-in-differences estimators, alternative distance thresholds, additional time-variant county-level covariates, and full set of pre- and post-treatment periods. Importantly, a placebo test estimating the effects of interdistrict magnet high school openings on nearby K8 schools (and vice versa) yields null effects, confirming that enrollment responses are concentrated among schools serving overlapping grade ranges and are not driven by broader shocks affecting all nearby schools. This placebo design addresses a core concern about whether the estimated effects reflect grade-specific competitive dynamics, rather than general neighborhood-level trends.

Together, by highlighting who exits, who remains, and how students re-sort in response to the expansion of interdistrict magnet schools, this study suggests that policies designed to reduce segregation across districts may have unintended socioeconomic and racial compositional consequences for the students left behind in nearby schools.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides detailed context of Connecticut's interdistrict magnet school policy, including its origins in the Sheff v. O'Neill mandate and key institutional features that shape the competitive dynamics examined in this study. Section 3 reviews previous studies examining the relationship between magnet schools and socioeconomic desegregation, as well as the effects of public school choice expansion on local enrollment dynamics. Section 4 outlines the study's data and explains how the main sample is constructed, and Section 5 describes how I define the treatment and outcome measures and provides descriptive statistics. I then present my empirical strategy in Section 6, followed by the

results of the main analysis, heterogeneity analyses, and robustness checks in Section 7. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications for policy and future research.

2. Interdistrict Magnet Schools in Connecticut

2.1. Sheff v. O'Neill and Interdistrict Desegregation

Connecticut's interdistrict magnet school policy is a central component of the state's long-term strategy to reduce racial and socioeconomic segregation in public education. The program originated in response to Sheff v. O'Neill (1989), a landmark civil rights lawsuit in which the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in 1996 that the state had failed to provide Hartford students with equal educational opportunities, due in large part to racial and economic isolation. Hartford is the fourth poorest city in the United States with over 100,000 residents (World Population Review, 2025) and 34.4 percent of its population lives below the poverty line. In contrast, the surrounding suburban counties—largely affluent and predominantly white—have a combined poverty rate of just 12.1 percent (Quick, 2016). Subsequent settlement agreements, spanning from 2003 through 2017, therefore outlined state responsibilities to expand access to integrated educational environments, particularly for Hartford-resident students (Connecticut State Department of Education, 2016).

A key feature of Connecticut's policy response is its choice to pursue "interdistrict" rather than "within-district" desegregation. Within-district magnet schools, the more common form nationally (Bifulco, 2025), draw students across attendance boundaries within a single school district, promoting desegregation among students who share the same local tax base and governance structure. Interdistrict magnet schools, by contrast, are explicitly designed to attract

students across district lines, creating voluntary enrollment pathways between communities that would otherwise have no formal connection. This distinction is critical: because Hartford's segregation was fundamentally tied to district boundary lines rather than within-district attendance zones, within-district solutions might be insufficient to address the structural disparities identified in Sheff. Connecticut's commitment to the interdistrict approach is reflected in the scale of its program: as of the 2022–23 school year, the state operated 88 interdistrict magnet schools enrolling 37,983 students, compared to 39 intradistrict magnet schools enrolling 16,486 students—making interdistrict magnets the dominant form of magnet school choice in the state (School and State Finance Project, 2023).

2.2. Policy Structure and Key Features

To comply with the Sheff mandates, Connecticut has built a robust system of public school choice programs, among which interdistrict magnet schools have emerged as a widely scaled intervention. These schools are publicly funded and operated by local or regional school districts, regional education service centers (RESCs), or through partnerships with higher education institutions (School and State Finance Project, 2023). Each school is organized around a distinctive curricular theme—such as STEM, global studies, the arts, or early college—and is designed to attract voluntary enrollment from racially and geographically diverse student populations. Most interdistrict magnet schools operate as standalone institutions with their own facilities and leadership, though approximately 5 percent of programs are housed within another school facility.[2] Admission is application-based and, when oversubscribed, determined by lottery. Critically, students' race is not used as an admissions criterion; instead, the state imposes

[2] In 2014-15 school year, 5 of 89 schools (about 5.6 percent) are located within another school facility (Connecticut State Department of Education, 2016).

explicit reduced-isolation standards to ensure meaningful diversity. In the Sheff region, no more than 75 percent of enrolled students may identify as Black or Hispanic, and at least 25 percent must identify as White, Asian, or another non-minority group. Non-Sheff schools face a similar statutory requirement, with racial minorities comprising between 25 and 75 percent of enrollment (Connecticut State Department of Education, 2016).

The state provides substantial support for the development and operation of interdistrict magnet schools, especially for the schools located in the Sheff region. This includes grants for planning, capital construction, and enhanced per-pupil operating and transportation funding. For example, interdistrict magnet schools located in the Sheff region may receive up to 95 percent reimbursement for eligible capital expenses, compared to approximately 80 percent for interdistrict magnet schools located outside the region. While interdistrict magnet schools are free to enrolled families, RESC-operated schools and select non-Sheff programs charge tuition to sending districts, creating financial considerations for districts whose students opt into these programs.

Over the past two decades, Connecticut's interdistrict magnet schools have expanded steadily—not only in the number of schools but also in total enrollment—reflecting the state's sustained commitment to desegregation through school choice. In the 1998–1999 school year, 16 interdistrict magnet schools received state funding. By 2015–2016, the number had grown to 89, including 84 full-time and 5 half-time programs.[3] As of 2015–2016, among the full-time interdistrict magnet schools, 26 served high school students, 47 served pre-kindergarten through grade 8, 6 served both K8 and high school grades, and 3 served only pre-kindergarten to kindergarten students. Nearly half of these schools were located in the Sheff region (Hartford

[3] In Table A1, I report the list of 84 full-time interdistrict magnet schools captured in this study. It includes school name, whether a school is in the Sheff region, lowest and highest offered grade, and curricular theme.

County), with broad geographic distribution across urban and suburban communities. These full-time interdistrict magnet schools enrolled 38,365 students statewide, accounting for approximately 7 percent of Connecticut's total public school enrollment. The scale of participation is particularly striking in Hartford itself: approximately 38 percent of Hartford resident students were enrolled in interdistrict magnet schools, underscoring the program's centrality to the city's educational landscape (Connecticut State Department of Education, 2016).

A defining feature of Connecticut's interdistrict magnet school policy is the enrollment cap on students from any single district. Initially, schools operating prior to July 1, 2005, were required to limit enrollment from one district to no more than 80 percent of total students. For new interdistrict magnet schools established after that date, the threshold was reduced to 75 percent. Beginning with the 2017–2018 school year, this 75 percent cap became mandatory for all interdistrict magnet schools statewide as a condition of receiving state operating grants (Connecticut General Statutes § 10-264l, 2024). While intended to ensure racially and geographically diverse student bodies, this policy also highlights that as many as three-quarters of students may still come from the resident district—meaning these schools may function in practice more like within-district choice programs for a significant share of their enrolled students. For this study, this feature has two key implications. First, it underscores the importance of examining enrollment dynamics in proximal schools, where resident-district families represent the most plausible pool of enrollees. Second, it suggests that the competitive effects of magnet openings on nearby schools are likely driven primarily by within-district rather than cross-district student movements—even in a policy explicitly designed to foster interdistrict integration. Understanding these localized dynamics is therefore essential for a complete evaluation of the policy's unintended consequences.

3. Literature Review

3.1. Magnet Schools and Racial and Socioeconomic Desegregation

Early studies find that magnet schools enrolled more racially diverse student bodies than other public schools, increasing interracial exposure among students (Goldring & Smrekar, 2000; Harris, 2022; Steel & Levine, 1994). For interdistrict magnet schools specifically, Bifulco et al. (2009a) show that interdistrict magnet schools in Connecticut (the same setting as this study) allowed students of color from the state's most segregated cities to attend substantially less isolated schools.

Yet, as Bifulco (2025) synthesizes in a recent review of the magnet school literature, greater diversity within magnets may come at the expense of increased segregation in surrounding schools. This concern has been documented primarily in within-district magnet settings. Using application data from within-district magnet high schools in Philadelphia, Saporito (2003) finds that White students from schools with higher shares of non-White students and higher-income students from high-poverty schools were the most likely to apply. In Tennessee and North Carolina, Kho et al. (2022) similarly show that within-district magnet schools provide the most evidence of cream skimming, attracting high-performing students from traditional public schools who are more likely to be white and not economically disadvantaged. Similar concerns have been raised for magnets housed within regular schools, where the students participating in the magnet-school programs, who are more likely to be White and nonpoor, may be largely separated from students attending from the neighborhood attendance zone (Yon et al., 1998; Bush et al., 2001; Gersti-Pepin, 2002). More recent comparisons of school segregation patterns across large districts show that, even when within-district magnets are included, schools

remain substantially more segregated than their geographic attendance zones would predict (Sohoni & Saporito, 2009; Bifulco, Ladd, & Ross, 2009).

Together, this evidence—drawn almost exclusively from within-district magnet settings—suggests that while magnet schools promote diversity within participating schools, their ability to reduce systemwide segregation is limited. Importantly, however, interdistrict magnet schools operate under a fundamentally different model: as established in Section 2, they are explicitly designed to attract students across district lines, serve geographically diverse populations, and operate under enrollment caps intended to prevent any single district from dominating enrollment. Whether these institutional differences translate into different patterns of local enrollment and demographic change remains an open question. This study addresses this gap by providing the first known causal evidence on how interdistrict magnet school openings affect the racial and socioeconomic composition of nearby traditional public and private schools.

3.2. Public School Choice Expansion and Local Enrollment Dynamics

Prior studies examining how public school choice expansion affects local enrollment and segregation have concentrated on charter school settings. Much of this work investigates how charter growth influences nearby traditional public schools. Studies in diverse contexts—including North Carolina and Massachusetts (Slungaard-Mumma, 2022), Los Angeles (Hicks & Lens, 2022), and New York City (Winters, 2012)—consistently find that charter openings reduce enrollment in local traditional public schools. Earlier studies similarly report negative impacts on overall district-level public school enrollment (Bettinger, 2005; Garcia, 2008).

Findings on racial segregation, however, are more mixed. Several studies suggest that charter growth intensifies segregation across districts, counties, or even classrooms within a school (Crema, 2026). Alcaino and Jennings (2020) provide evidence that the expansion of

charter school enrollment has increased racial and socioeconomic segregation at the county-level across the United States. Monarrez et al. (2022) similarly find that charter schools contribute modestly to school segregation, decreasing the likelihood that Black and Hispanic students are exposed to peers from other racial or ethnic groups. However, they also show that charters can reduce segregation between districts in metropolitan areas. Ritter et al. (2016) likewise find that student transfers from traditional public to charter schools often improve racial integration in the schools students leave behind.

Charter expansion also affects private education markets. Using Michigan elementary school data, Chakrabarti and Roy (2016) find no causal evidence that charter expansion reduces private school enrollment. In contrast, Waddington (2012)—drawing on data from ten large U.S. cities in the Great Lakes and Rust Belt regions—shows that charter schools located near Catholic schools accelerate declines in Catholic school enrollment and closures, particularly in elementary grades. Buddin (2012) supports this view using national data, finding that students entering charter schools often come from private schools across grade levels. More recently, Dougherty et al. (2025) find that nearby charter school openings reduce Catholic school enrollment and increase the likelihood of school closure across the U.S., with effects especially pronounced at the K8 level. Alcaino and Jennings (2020) similarly report that charter enrollment growth exerts a significant negative effect on private school enrollment overall.

Collectively, these studies demonstrate that charter expansion generates substantial enrollment shifts across both public and private education sectors. Despite these insights, causal evidence on magnet schools remains remarkably limited—even though magnets serve roughly seven percent of U.S. public school students and pursue fundamentally different policy goals. Unlike charters, magnet schools are explicitly designed to promote diversity and desegregation

through specialized curricula, innovative themes, and high-quality college preparatory programs that often attract high-achieving students. Although both charter and magnet schools provide free public choice options, their distinct missions and student populations may produce divergent patterns of local enrollment and demographic change.

4. Data and Sample

4.1. Data

This study uses school-by-year level data from the National Longitudinal School Database (NLSD), which includes information on public schools from the Common Core Data (CCD) and private schools from the Private School Survey (PSS) from the 1998–1999 through 2019–2020 school years (Carroll et al., 2023). This dataset provides annual information on each school's type, grade range, total enrollment, racial composition, geographic location, urbanicity, the share of free or reduced-price lunch eligible students, Title I eligibility, and religious affiliation.[4] From their national sample, I use only schools located in Connecticut. To control potential changes in racial composition at county-level, I also merge Census 2000 and 2010 data.

Note that location data for private schools in PSS is available only from the 2005–2006 school year. Following recent studies using the same dataset (Dougherty et al., 2025), I backfill missing location information for private schools using geocoded longitude and latitude data extracted from physical addresses in the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) Elementary and Secondary Information System. To identify the complete list of interdistrict

[4] Information on free or reduced-price lunch eligibility and Title I status is available only for public schools, whereas data on religious affiliation is available only for private schools. Note that the PSS covers approximately 88 percent of private schools in Connecticut, consistent with the national coverage rate of 89.1 percent reported in NCES documentation. This suggests that the private school sample is broadly representative of the state's private school population.

magnet schools in Connecticut, I manually compile data from the Comprehensive Statewide Interdistrict Magnet School Plan published by the Connecticut State Department of Education (2016). I identify 84 full-time interdistrict magnet schools, which are merged into the main dataset using NCES school identifiers.

This study constructs four main analytic datasets, disaggregated by school type and grade level: traditional public K8 schools, private K8 schools, traditional public high schools, and private high schools. Splitting the sample by grade band enables more precise identification of enrollment shifts in response to new interdistrict magnet school openings, as only school with overlapping grade levels are plausibly affected (Slungaard-Mumma, 2022; Dougherty et al., 2025). It also accounts for variation in the availability of school choice options and the curricular focus of magnet schools across grade levels. As shown in Figure 1, K8 and high schools differ substantially in the density of nearby choice options, including charter schools and Catholic private schools. Table A1 further indicates that interdistrict magnet high schools are primarily focused on STEM or college preparatory themes, whereas K8 schools offer a more diverse set of curricula, including International Baccalaureate (IB), Arts, and Montessori. Tuition levels also vary sharply between private K8 and high schools, which is likely to influence families' propensity to exit when free public school alternatives become available.[5]

4.2. Sample Restriction

This study applies a series of sample restrictions to ensure comparability across school types and validity of identification. Table A2.1 summarizes the sequential steps used to construct the final analytic sample. Beginning with the full set of traditional public and private schools in

[5] In 2025, the average annual tuition for private elementary schools in Connecticut is $24,573, and for private high schools, it is $39,586. Compared to the national averages of $13,939 for elementary schools and $17,826 for high schools, Connecticut has the highest average tuition of any state in the U.S (Private School Review, 2025).

Connecticut from the 1997–1998 through 2019–2020 school years, I first exclude schools with missing enrollment data. These cases primarily consist of schools that were either closed or had not yet begun enrolling students. I then exclude non-regular school types, including alternative schools, career and technical schools, special education schools, early childhood programs, and Montessori schools. Next, schools whose highest grade offered is pre-kindergarten or kindergarten are dropped, as these schools fall outside the scope of enrollment responses relevant to interdistrict magnet school competition. To support spatial linkage with nearby interdistrict magnet school openings, I also exclude schools that ultimately lack valid latitude and longitude data, even after the backfilling process described in the previous section. Additionally, this study removes the 1997–1998 school year, which is used only to impute private school enrollment in 1998–1999. The resulting sample includes 949 traditional public K8 schools, 454 traditional public high schools, 278 private K8 schools, and 128 private high schools.

Figure 1 displays the geographic distribution of traditional public (gray) and private (orange for Catholic and black for non-Catholic) schools in the sample alongside interdistrict magnet schools (red) as of 2019. The figure shows that interdistrict magnet schools are distributed across multiple counties in Connecticut rather than concentrated in a single area, and that nearby traditional public and private schools are similarly dispersed. Among these schools, my treatment group of interest consists of those located within close proximity to a newly opened interdistrict magnet schools.

To estimate causal effects of such magnet school openings, I restrict the analytic sample to schools observed within an event-time window of six years before to five years after their first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school. In event study designs with staggered adoption, estimates at distant event times (e.g., $t = +8$) are identified only from schools treated early in

the study period, making those estimates unrepresentative of the broader sample. Restricting to a ± 5 window ensures that each event-time estimate draws on a sufficient and comparable set of treated schools across the full window, rather than reflecting the experiences of a small number of early or late adopters.[6] To assess whether this restriction affects the main conclusions, I also present results using the full set of pre- and post-treatment periods without this window restriction in Section 7.5.

5. Measures

5.1. Treatment: Interdistrict Magnet School Opening

My treatment of interest is the opening of the first interdistrict magnet school within a defined radius of nearby traditional public and private school locations. I measure linear distance between schools using latitude and longitude and define proximity following recent literature on school openings, particularly studies of charter school expansion (Hicks & Lens, 2022; Slungaard-Mumma, 2022; Dougherty et al., 2025). The preferred threshold is 2.5 miles, consistent with the median distance to school reported in the 2017 National Household Travel Survey. Kontou et al. (2020) report a median of 2.7 miles overall, with variation by school level: 2.1 miles for elementary, 3.2 miles for middle, and 3.6 miles for high school students.

As shown in Table A3, 15.6 percent of K8 traditional public schools in Connecticut are eventually treated with a magnet school opening within 2.5 miles. 18.7 percent are always treated from the beginning of this study's observation window, while 65.8 percent are never treated. The distribution is similar among K8 private schools, with 16.2 percent eventually

[6] As shown in Appendix Table A2.2, the analytic sample closely mirrors the full population and target sample across key characteristics, including enrollment size, racial composition, urbanicity, and location in the Sheff region, suggesting that the sequential sample restrictions do not introduce meaningful selection bias.

treated. For high schools—where schools are more geographically dispersed—treatment rates are lower among traditional public schools, with only 6.6 percent eventually treated, compared to 18 percent among private high schools. Across school sectors and grade levels, eventually treated schools tend to have larger enrollments, serve higher shares of Black or Hispanic students, and are more likely to be located in the Sheff region, relative to never-treated schools.

In this study, the majority of eventually treated schools are located in urban or suburban areas. Among K8 traditional public schools, 41 percent are located in urban areas and 56 percent in suburban areas, while only 3 percent are located in rural or town settings. This geographic distribution is consistent with prior studies conducted in similar urban and suburban contexts, including Bettinger (2005) in Michigan, Hicks and Lens (2022) in Los Angeles, and Slungaard-Mumma (2022) in Massachusetts and North Carolina, which use comparable distance thresholds. I test the sensitivity of results using alternative distance thresholds of 1, 4, and 5 miles (see Section 7.5).[7]

5.2. Outcomes

This study focuses on three main outcomes: total enrollment, the share of low-income students, and racial composition. As shown in Table 1 and Table A3, traditional public schools in Connecticut have substantially larger enrollment sizes than private schools. On average, K8 traditional public schools enroll 465 students compared to approximately 200 students in private K8 schools. Similarly, traditional public high schools enroll an average of 923 students, while private high schools enroll about 345. For reference, interdistrict magnet K8 and high schools enroll an average of approximately 418 and 476 students, respectively.

[7] Lidbe et al. (2020) also find that urban students typically travel shorter distances to school—ranging from 3 to 5 miles—while rural students often commute more than 6 miles.

I use the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) as a proxy for the share of low-income students. Although this measure has limitations—particularly following the introduction of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP) in 2014, which allowed some schools to report 100 percent eligibility regardless of individual student income—it remains the most consistently available indicator of student socioeconomic status across the full study period. As shown in Table A4, approximately 80 percent of magnet school openings in my sample occurred prior to 2014, before widespread CEP adoption. To mitigate potential bias from CEP-related measurement error, I also conduct robustness checks using a restricted sample of pre-CEP years (1998–1999 through 2013–2014) and results remain consistent.[8]

For racial composition, this study focuses on three major racial or ethnic groups: White, Black, and Hispanic. The CCD and PSS data provides student counts by race/ethnicity for each school year, from which the NLSD constructs proportions using total school enrollment as the denominator. I use these proportions as outcome variables.

6. Empirical Strategy

6.1. Staggered Difference-in-Differences and Event study

To estimate the impact of interdistrict magnet school openings on the enrollment composition of nearby schools, this study leverages the staggered rollout of such school openings across Connecticut. Specifically, I compare changes in outcomes among eventually treated schools to changes among schools that have not yet been treated at a given point in time.

[8] Upon examining the prevalence of 100 percent CEP participation reporting in the analytic sample, I find that only 5 unique schools—accounting for 6 school-year observations, all in the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school year—report 100 percent CEP participation.

I restrict the comparison group to not-yet-treated schools, excluding never-treated schools due to concerns about the non-random placement of interdistrict magnet schools, echoing similar concerns in studies of charter school openings (Bifulco & Buerger, 2015; Chakrabarti & Roy, 2016; Glomm et al., 2005; Henig & MacDonald, 2002; Singleton, 2019; Slungaard-Mumma, 2022).[9] As discussed earlier, my descriptive statistics also show that eventually treated schools (i.e., those located near a new interdistrict magnet school) differ systematically from never-treated schools in observable characteristics, supporting this decision.

An additional threat to identification arises from possible selection in treatment timing: schools treated earlier may differ from those treated later in ways that also affect enrollment trends. This undermines the validity of traditional two-way fixed effects (TWFE) models, which assume that all units can serve as valid controls for one another across time. To address this, I employ the estimator proposed by Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021), which is better suited for staggered adoption settings where treatment timing may be non-random. Their approach estimates group-time average treatment effects, $ATT(g,t)$, defined as the average treatment effect for the group of units first treated in period g, at time period t:

$$ATT(g,t) = \mathrm{E}[Y_t(g) - Y_t(0) | G_g = 1] \quad (1)$$

Each $ATT(g,t)$ is estimated by comparing outcomes among units in treated cohort g, $Y_t(g)$, to outcomes among not-yet-treated units at time t, $Y_t(0)$. The aggregate post-treatment average treatment effect (post-ATT) reported in Table 1 is then obtained by averaging $ATT(g,t)$ across all cohorts g and post-treatment periods t, weighted by cohort size. This structure makes the estimator more robust to selection bias in treatment timing and allows for treatment effect heterogeneity across cohorts and over time. While it does not eliminate all concerns about

[9] This study uses the *notyet* option in the *csdid* command in STATA 19.0 (Rios-Avila et al., 2023).

endogeneity—particularly if unobserved factors affect both treatment timing and outcomes—it is less sensitive to these biases than traditional TWFE models and is therefore the preferred specification in this study. To assess the robustness of the main estimation, I also report results using alternative DID specifications, including the approach proposed by Sun and Abraham (2021) and traditional TWFE (see Section 7.5).

It is worth noting that the main analysis focuses on the first interdistrict magnet school opening within the defined radius, as subsequent openings may be endogenous to the enrollment dynamics already set in motion by the initial treatment. To assess whether this focus on first exposure masks meaningful variation in treatment intensity from multiple magnet openings, I also implement a continuous treatment difference-in-differences specification, in which the coefficient represents the estimated change in outcomes associated with one additional nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles (see Section 7.5).[10]

To assess the parallel trends assumption and explore dynamic treatment effects, I also implement an event study framework. This approach allows this study to test whether treated and comparison schools exhibited similar trends in outcomes prior to treatment and would have continued on parallel trajectories in the absence of the intervention. Main event study specification is as follows[11]:

$$Y_{st} = \emptyset_n \sum_{n=-5}^{5} (EventTime_{st} = n) + \delta_s + \lambda_t + \rho_{st} \quad (2)$$

[10] Among eventually treated schools, the majority face exposure to only one nearby interdistrict magnet school opening over the study period—67.5 percent of treated schools across all school types experience a maximum of one nearby magnet school within 2.5 miles. However, a non-trivial share face multiple openings: approximately 13 percent experience two nearby openings, and about 20 percent experience three or more. This pattern is more pronounced among traditional public high schools, where 40 percent of treated schools face exposure to two or more magnet school openings, reflecting their greater concentration in urban areas.

[11] While Equation (2) takes the form of a standard TWFE event study specification, the coefficients $\emptyset_n$ are estimated using the Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) estimator, restricting the comparison group to not-yet-treated units at each relative time period.

where Y_{st} is outcome of interest for school *s* and year *t*, including total enrollment and the shares of low-income, White, Black, and Hispanic students. δ_s is the fixed effect for school, capturing time-invariant school characteristics, and λ_t is the fixed effect for year, controlling for common shocks in each time period. ρ_{st} is the error term, clustered at the school level. $EventTime_{st}$ is a relative time indicator for the number of years since the opening of the first nearby interdistrict magnet school. Negative values represent pre-treatment years, and zero or positive values represent post-treatment years. The coefficients $\emptyset_n$ capture the average treatment effect at each relative time point, enabling this study to trace dynamic impacts of first magnet school opening on the student composition of nearby traditional public and private schools.

6.2. Heterogeneity

To explore potential heterogeneity in the effects of interdistrict magnet school openings, this study conducts subgroup analyses based on (1) whether the treated school is located within the Sheff region, and (2) whether the treated private school is Catholic or non-Catholic.

The first source of heterogeneity—Sheff versus non-Sheff regions—reflects whether the policy's intended target area responded differently to the introduction of new school choice options. As mentioned earlier, the Sheff v. O'Neill case specifically addressed racial and socioeconomic segregation in the Hartford area, prompting the additional support for interdistrict magnet schools in this region. Given its distinct demographic and economic composition compared to surrounding counties, it is important to assess whether schools in the Sheff region experienced different patterns of enrollment shifts. This analysis allows me to examine whether students in historically underserved and policy-targeted communities were more likely to exit into newly available magnet school options.

The second source of heterogeneity focuses on differences between Catholic and non-Catholic private schools. These school types differ not only in terms of student demographics and religious affiliation, but also in tuition levels—a potential factor influencing family decisions about whether to transfer to a free public school alternative. As of 2025, there are 174 religiously affiliated private schools in Connecticut serving 32,752 students, accounting for 41 percent of all private schools. Among these, Catholic schools are the most prevalent (Private School Review, 2025). As shown in Table A5, Catholic schools in Connecticut tend to serve more White students, are more likely to be in urban or suburban areas and located near interdistrict magnet schools—19.6 percent are eventually treated, compared to 12.0 percent of non-Catholic private schools. Tuition levels further highlight the differences between these groups. As of 2025, the average tuition for Catholic K8 schools is $10,132, substantially lower than the state average for all private elementary schools, which stands at $24,573 (Private School Review, 2025).[12] This tuition difference supports that Catholic schools serve relatively more low- to middle-income families and may therefore be more sensitive to the introduction of free public school alternatives such as interdistrict magnet schools. Given that Catholic schools are more commonly K8 institutions and that tuition disparities are most pronounced at the elementary level, I restrict this heterogeneity analysis to K8 private schools.

7. Results

7.1. Impacts on Total Enrollment

[12] Note that these figures reflect current tuition levels and are likely higher than those during the study period (1998–2020); however, the substantial gap between Catholic and non-Catholic private school tuition is unlikely to have changed meaningfully over time, as it reflects long-standing structural differences in the missions and funding models of these school types.

The opening of interdistrict magnet schools leads to enrollment declines in nearby private K8 schools and traditional public high schools. As shown in rows (a) of Table 1 and Figure 2, private K8 schools experience an average decline of 12.5 students following the opening of the first nearby K8 interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles, compared to not-yet treated schools. This represents a 6.1 percent decrease relative to the baseline enrollment of 203.5 students. The decline becomes statistically significant two years after exposure and intensifies through five years post-treatment (see point estimates in Table A6). In contrast, no significant enrollment change is observed among traditional public K8 schools. For high schools, the pattern reverses. Traditional public high schools experience a substantial decline of 64.5 students on average—a 5.3 percent reduction relative to the baseline enrollment of 1,214.3 students—following the opening of the first nearby interdistrict magnet high school. Private high schools, however, show no significant enrollment change.[13]

7.2. Impacts on the Share of Low-income Students

Who is leaving these schools? Rows (b) of Table 1 and Figure 3 suggests that relatively higher-income students are more likely to exit traditional public high schools after the opening of a nearby interdistrict magnet school. Specifically, the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) increases by 7.7 percentage points in treated traditional public high schools—an 18.3 percent increase relative to the baseline FRPL rate of 42 percent—compared to

[13] To provide additional context for interpreting this finding, Appendix Figure A9 plots total enrollment trends for IMS and treated TPS and private schools over the study period. While these aggregate trends should not be interpreted causally, as they reflect multiple concurrent factors including broader demographic changes in Connecticut, the directional patterns are broadly consistent with the main findings. At the K8 level, IMS enrollment growth accounts for approximately 70 percent of the combined enrollment decline in treated TPS and private schools over the study period. At the high school level, IMS enrollment growth exceeds the combined decline in treated schools, which is expected given that high school students typically travel longer distances to school than elementary students and are therefore more likely to draw from a broader geographic catchment area beyond the 2.5-mile radius used in this study (Kontou et al., 2020; Lidbe et al., 2020). Together, these patterns lend face validity to the causal estimates reported above.

not-yet-treated schools. This shift in composition occurs alongside a decline in total enrollment, implying that students not eligible for FRPL (i.e., relatively higher-income students) are disproportionately exiting, thereby reducing cross-income exposure for lower-income students. By contrast, traditional public K8 schools, which do not experience significant changes in total enrollment post-treatment, also show no evidence of compositional shifts by student income status. As mentioned earlier, this study could not examine this outcome for private schools due to data limitations.

7.3. Impacts on Racial Composition

In private K8 schools—where enrollment declines are observed—nearby interdistrict magnet school openings induce a decrease in the share of White students and increases in the shares of Black and Hispanic students. Rows (c) through (e) of Table 1 and Figure 4 show that the White student share declines by approximately 2.2 percentage points (3.5 percent reduction relative to the baseline of 62 percent), while the Hispanic share increases by 1.8 percentage points. The Black share increases by 0.9 percentage points, although this change is not statistically significant. These patterns suggest that White students are more likely to exit private K8 schools following the introduction of a new interdistrict magnet school, thereby reducing White exposure for remaining Black and Hispanic students.[14]

The pattern differs in traditional public K8 schools, where no significant enrollment decline is observed. Although some changes in racial composition occur, the decline in the White

[14] Consistent with these share-based findings, Appendix Table A18 reports count-based estimates showing that the absolute number of White students in private K8 schools declines by approximately 9.1 students on average (about 6.9 percent relative to the baseline of 139.98 students) following nearby IMS openings, while changes in the absolute number of Black and Hispanic students are small and insignificant. In traditional public high schools, the number of White students declines by approximately 46.6 students on average (about 8.6 percent relative to the baseline of 540.91 students). Notably, these percent declines in the absolute number of White students are larger than the share-based changes reported in Table 1, suggesting that the overall enrollment decline may partially dilute the compositional signal.

student share (0.7 percentage points) is not statistically significant. The Black student share decreases by 0.5 percentage points (statistically significant), while the Hispanic share increases by about 1.0 percentage point. These patterns suggest that if any demographic group is more likely to exit, it may be Black students, though this should be interpreted with caution.

In traditional public high schools, changes in racial composition are less pronounced than changes in total enrollment or the share of low-income students. Results suggest that exits may include White students, with modest declines in their shares (1.1 percentage points; not statistically significant). The decline appears to be offset by a 1.8 percentage point increase in the Hispanic student share. Private high schools show no statistically significant changes in racial composition, consistent with the lack of enrollment effects. Interestingly, however, the Black student share declines by 1.3 percentage points, while the White and Hispanic shares increase slightly by 0.8 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively.

7.4. Heterogeneity

7.4.1. Sheff vs. Non-Sheff Regions

This study also finds heterogeneous effects by whether a school is located in the Sheff (i.e., Hartford County) or non-Sheff region. Although the differences between the two regions are not statistically significant in all cases, Table 2 suggest meaningful variation. As shown in Panel (c) of Figure 5, enrollment declines in traditional public high schools are larger in the Sheff region—85.2 students (statistically significant) in Sheff whereas 42.2 students (not significant) in non-Sheff schools.

Notably, in Panel (d), private high schools in the Sheff region show a statistically significant enrollment increase of approximately 29.3 students. However, this gain is smaller than the decline observed in Sheff traditional public high schools, suggesting that some students

exiting public schools may be transferring to private schools in response to new competition from magnet school openings.

Consistent with these enrollment shifts, the increase in the share of low-income students in traditional public high schools is also more pronounced in the Sheff region: 10.8 percentage points compared to a statistically insignificant 5.4 percentage points in the non-Sheff region (see Rows (b) of Table 2 and Figure A2). This pattern suggests that even within the Sheff region, relatively higher-income students in traditional public high schools are more likely to exit following nearby interdistrict magnet school openings. The absence of significant enrollment or economic compositional change in non-Sheff traditional public high schools further supports the robustness of this interpretation.

While racial composition shifts in Sheff traditional public high schools are less pronounced than the observed enrollment and economic status-based changes, they still show modest declines in the share of White students and increases in the share of Hispanic students (Table A9 and Figure A3). By contrast, racial composition changes in Sheff private high schools—which experienced enrollment gains—suggest that the increase may be concentrated among White students. Panels (d) through (f) in Figure A1 indicate that the White student share increases by about 2.2 percentage points, while the Black and Hispanic shares decrease by 1.9 and 0.8 percentage points, respectively. However, none of these changes are statistically significant.

In private K8 schools located in the non-Sheff region—where enrollment declines are pronounced—the decrease in the White student share is also more substantial (2.9 percentage points), alongside increases of 1.3 percentage points for Black students and 1.5 percentage points for Hispanic students (Table A10 and Figure A4). These results reinforce the earlier finding that

White students are more likely to exit private K8 schools following the proximal interdistrict magnet school opening, and suggest that this pattern is particularly concentrated in the non-Sheff region.

7.4.2. Catholic vs. Non-Catholic K8 Private schools

Table 3 and Figure 6 show that enrollment composition changes in private K8 schools also vary by religious affiliation—specifically, whether a school is Catholic or non-Catholic. While the overall enrollment decline is slightly more pronounced in non-Catholic private K8 schools (an average drop of 14.3 students, or 6.8 percent relative to the baseline) compared to Catholic schools (a decline of 9.4 students, or 4.6 percent), the racial composition shifts differ notably across the two groups.

In Catholic schools, the enrollment decline is accompanied by clear evidence of White student exit. On average, the White student share decreases by 3.9 percentage points, while the shares of Black and Hispanic students increase by 2.1 and 2.8 percentage points, respectively. In contrast, the enrollment decline in non-Catholic private K8 schools is not concentrated among White students. Rather, it is primarily driven by decreases in the shares of Black and Hispanic students. On average, the Black student share declines by 1.3 percentage points, with the most pronounced decreases occurring one to two years after exposure to a new interdistrict magnet school—1.9 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively. During the same period, the Hispanic student share also declines by 0.4 to 1.8 percentage points, while the White student share increases by approximately 2.4 to 3.9 percentage points.

This divergent pattern between Catholic and non-Catholic private schools could reflect differences in their baseline racial composition. For example, across all K8 private schools, Catholic schools have a White student share approximately 11 percentage points higher than that

of non-Catholic schools (80 percent in Catholic and 69 percent in non-Catholic; see Table A5). However, among the eventually treated schools—that is, those located near a newly opened interdistrict magnet school—this gap is notably smaller, at just 4 percentage points (64 percent in Catholic and 50 percent in non-Catholic). This suggests that the observed divergence in response is unlikely to be driven solely by initial differences in racial composition.

7.5. Robustness

To ensure the robustness of the main findings, I conduct six supplementary analyses: (a) a placebo test using proximal schools without overlapping grade levels, (b) alternative DID specifications, (c) alternative distance thresholds, (d) additional covariates of racial composition change at county-level, (e) a continuous treatment difference-in-differences specification, and (f) full set of pre- and post-treatment periods.

First, as a placebo test, I estimate the effects of interdistrict magnet high school openings on nearby K8 schools, and vice versa. This test is based on the assumption that new interdistrict magnet schools serving non-overlapping grade levels are unlikely to influence short-term enrollment dynamics in proximal schools. To isolate this mechanism, interdistrict magnet schools serving both K8 and high school grades are excluded from the analysis. The results, presented in Table A12, show null or modest effects, supporting the identifying assumption and reinforcing the robustness of the main findings—that the opening of new interdistrict magnet schools reshapes enrollment patterns among nearby public and private schools that serve overlapping grade levels.

Second, Figures A5–A8 demonstrate that the main results obtained using Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) remain robust under alternative DID estimators, including Sun and Abraham (2021) and the traditional two-way fixed effects (TWFE) specifications.

Third, Tables A13–A16 present results using alternative distance thresholds of 1, 4, and 5 miles. Overall, the patterns remain consistent with the main findings. As expected, changing the distance threshold also alters the number of treated and comparison schools, thereby influencing the precision of the estimates. This issue is particularly evident among private schools and high schools, where the number of treated schools becomes very small within a 1-mile radius, and the number of not-yet-treated schools (comparison group) diminishes at larger distances. These shifts result in wider confidence intervals and greater sampling variability, although the overall patterns remain directionally consistent.

Despite these broadly consistent results, a noteworthy pattern emerges at closer distances for K8 traditional public schools, which retain a sufficiently large number of treated schools for estimation. Within a 1-mile radius, total enrollment effects remain insignificant, and the decline in the share of Black students persists—consistent with the baseline 2.5-mile results. However, the share of low-income students decreases, and the share of White students increases, while both outcomes show null effects in the baseline analysis. These findings suggest that although the overall patterns are robust, closer proximity reveals an additional layer of demographic change, indicating that not only Black students but also low-income students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch may be more likely to exit K8 traditional public schools following the opening of a new interdistrict magnet school.

Fourth, Table A17 presents results that include additional covariates—the changes in the shares of White, Black, and Hispanic populations at the county level. I calculated the percentage-point changes in each racial composition between 2000 and 2010 and incorporated them into the main models to account for potential enrollment dynamics driven by local demographic changes. Although some estimates are less precise, the overall pattern of findings remains consistent, and

the magnitude of the enrollment decline in proximal K8 private and traditional public high schools is even larger when county-level demographic changes are controlled for.

Next, Table A19 presents results from a continuous treatment difference-in-differences specification using the number of nearby interdistrict magnet schools within 2.5 miles as the treatment variable. Unlike the binary treatment specification in the main analysis, this approach incorporates variation in treatment intensity from multiple magnet school openings, where each coefficient represents the estimated change in outcomes associated with one additional nearby magnet school. The results are broadly consistent with the main findings: each additional nearby magnet school opening is associated with a 40-student enrollment decline in nearby traditional public high schools and a 2.1 percentage point increase in the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, directionally consistent with the binary treatment estimates in Table 1. Enrollment effects in K8 private schools are directionally consistent but smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant, suggesting that the marginal effect of each additional interdistrict magnet school on private K8 enrollment is more muted—likely because the largest enrollment response occurs upon first exposure, with subsequent openings generating smaller incremental effects among schools that have already begun to adjust their enrollment in response to nearby magnet competition.

Finally, Appendix Tables A20 and A21 present results using the full set of pre- and post-treatment periods, removing the ±5 event-time window restriction imposed in the main analysis. The results are broadly consistent with the main findings across all school types and outcomes. Notably, enrollment declines in nearby private K8 schools and traditional public high schools persist and grow in magnitude over longer post-treatment horizons, suggesting that the competitive effects of first interdistrict magnet school openings may accumulate over time. The

pre-ATT estimates remain small and largely insignificant across most specifications, further supporting the parallel trends assumption.

8. Discussion and Conclusion

Leveraging the staggered roll-out of interdistrict magnet schools in Connecticut, this study estimates their impact on total enrollment and student composition in nearby traditional public and private schools. The findings provide causal evidence on the unintended consequences of equity-driven magnet school expansion on racial and economic student sorting within local education markets.

A key question emerging from the main findings is why enrollment declined in private K8 schools and traditional public high schools but was more muted or less precise in traditional public K8 schools and private high schools. First, this pattern may reflect structural differences between private K8 and high schools. Private K8 schools, which charge relatively modest tuition compared to private high schools and serve a broader range of families across the income spectrum, might be more likely to be perceived as substitutable with free public alternatives like interdistrict magnet schools. In contrast, a large subset of Connecticut's private high school sector consists of elite boarding and college-preparatory institutions—Connecticut has the second highest concentration of boarding schools in the U.S. with 23 schools, following Massachusetts with 30 (Boarding School Review, 2026). As of 2026, overall private high schools in Connecticut also charge tuition averaging $39,417 annually, more than twice the national average of $17,941, and have an average acceptance rate of 65 percent compared to national average of 80 percent (Private School Review, 2026). These patterns suggest that they might serve more higher-income families with strong preferences for selective peer

environments and established college-preparatory reputations. Such families might be less likely to perceive interdistrict magnet schools as close substitutes regardless of their tuition-free status.

At the same time, because there are generally more choice options available at the K8 level than at the high school level, families already seeking distinctive academic or value-based programs may have previously opted into private or charter K8 schools, which often market similar specialized curricula. Consequently, the introduction of magnet K8 schools may have generated greater choice appeal for families already participating in the local choice market, rather than for those remaining in traditional public schools. A notable pattern in these findings is that enrollment declines in private K8 schools suggest that some families may be choosing to return to the public sector when a tuition-free magnet option becomes available nearby. The dynamics differ in high school settings, where switching into interdistrict magnet schools presents clearer academic and instrumental benefits for students enrolled in traditional public schools. Many interdistrict magnet high schools emphasize college-preparatory, STEM, or early college programs that directly enhance students' postsecondary opportunities (Connecticut Department of Education, 2016). Such programs—less commonly offered in nearby traditional public high schools—provide tangible advantages that may outweigh the costs of longer commutes or school transitions, making high school students and families more likely to switch.

This study also extends prior evidence that White and higher-income students are more likely to transfer into new magnet schools (Yon et al., 1998; Bush et al., 2001; Gersti-Pepin, 2002; Saporito, 2003), reducing cross-racial and cross-income exposure for students left behind in nearby schools.[15] While prior research has primarily been descriptive, correlational, or case-

[15] Appendix Figure A10 provides additional context relevant to interpreting the inequality implications of these findings. Interdistrict magnet schools enroll substantially more racially diverse student bodies—with White student shares averaging approximately 28 percent compared to 62 percent in nearby private K8 schools and 44 percent in

based, this study provides causal evidence of such dynamics at scale. Moreover, the results reveal that White flight is concentrated in Catholic K8 schools, whereas higher-income flight is concentrated in traditional public high schools. Importantly, the effects are strongest among traditional public high schools located within the Sheff region, where educational opportunities were already constrained. In these settings, relatively higher-income students within low-income communities may have been better informed about new school options and more able to absorb the costs of changing schools, making them more likely to transfer to magnet high schools and leaving behind peers who were already more disadvantaged. Thus, this pattern suggests that, even as magnet schools expand opportunities for interdistrict integration, their localized market effects may inadvertently deepen inequality among those who remain, particularly within low-income areas.

Taken together, this study has two key implications for policy and future research. First, given that magnet school expansion may have unintended socioeconomic and racial compositional consequences for the students left behind in nearby schools, policymakers designing or scaling choice-based integration strategies should anticipate these distributional consequences and incorporate systematic evaluation of market spillovers into future planning and accountability frameworks. Doing so would help ensure that magnet school policy remains aligned with its founding purpose: expanding opportunity and integration rather than unintentionally reinforcing existing disparities or segregation.

nearby traditional public high schools—suggesting that students exiting nearby schools are, in aggregate, moving into more racially integrated settings. This contextualizes the inequality claims made in this study: while the compositional changes documented here reflect unintended consequences for the students left behind in nearby schools, students who exit may be experiencing improved cross-racial exposure in magnet schools. Assessing the net effect on system-wide segregation would require individual-level transfer data not available in this study, and I note this as an important direction for future research.

Second, although magnet schools serve roughly 4.9 percent of K–12 students nationwide—slightly fewer than charter schools, which enroll 6.6 percent as of 2024—they have received far less policy and research attention (Ritter, 2024). Policymakers and scholars have tended to focus on vouchers and charters when discussing school choice, overlooking the fact that magnets represent one of the oldest and most widespread forms of public school choice in the United States (Polikoff & Hardaway, 2017). However, the findings of this study underscore the need for sustained scholarly and policy attention to magnet schools when we aim to maximize the benefits of choice-based reforms, minimize their unintended consequences, and ensure that school choice truly advances—rather than undermines—the broader goal of equity in education.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1. School Choice Options in Connecticut



Notes: This figure shows the geographical distribution of school choice options in Connecticut in 2019, disaggregated by school level (K8 and high school). In each panel, light gray lines indicate county boundaries, and the bold black line marks Hartford County, which corresponds to the Sheff region.

Table 1. Impacts of First Exposure to Nearby Interdistrict Magnet School Opening

	(1) K8 TPS	(2) K8 Private	(3) High TPS	(4) High Private
(a) Total Enrollment				
Pre-ATT	1.217	1.737	-3.210	1.466
	(1.364)	(2.039)	(6.611)	(4.071)
Post-ATT	10.387	-12.550**	-64.468*	7.057
	(7.323)	(4.354)	(30.859)	(7.903)
Baseline (Mean)	499.92	203.51	1214.38	377.38
N	13,106	2,790	2,862	1,428
(b) Share of Low-income Students				
Pre-ATT	-0.004*		-0.014	
	(0.002)		(0.009)	
Post-ATT	-0.004		0.077**	
	(0.005)		(0.029)	
Baseline (Mean)	0.41		0.42	
N	11,704		2,555	
(c) White Share				
Pre-ATT	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.003	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.007)
Post-ATT	-0.007	-0.022*	-0.011	0.008
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.014)
Baseline (Mean)	0.49	0.62	0.44	0.75
N	13,106	2,790	2,862	1,428
(d) Black Share				
Pre-ATT	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Post-ATT	-0.005*	0.009	-0.006	-0.013
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Baseline (Mean)	0.17	0.18	0.26	0.14
N	13,039	2,790	2,858	1,428
(e) Hispanic Share				
Pre-ATT	0.002**	0.004	0.003	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Post-ATT	0.010***	0.018*	0.018**	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Baseline (Mean)	0.27	0.14	0.25	0.07
N	13,106	2,790	2,860	1,428

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles. For each outcome, I report the aggregated average treatment effect for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), the baseline mean of each outcome among eventually treated schools (see Table A3 for full descriptive statistics), and the number of observations. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Free or reduced-price lunch eligibility data are not available for private schools. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 2. Impacts on Total Enrollment



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on total enrollment: panel (a) for traditional public K8 schools, (b) for private K8 schools, (c) for traditional public high schools, and (d) for private high schools. In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A6 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment periods.

Figure 3. Impacts on Share of Low-income Students



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch: panel (a) for traditional public K8 schools, and (b) for traditional public high schools. In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A6 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment periods.

Figure 4. Impacts on Racial Composition: K8 TPS & Private Schools



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on racial composition of nearby K8 schools: panels (a) and (d) for White student share, (b) and (e) for Black student share, and (c) and (f) for Hispanic student share. In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A7 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Results for high schools are presented in Figure A1.

Table 2. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impacts on Total Enrollment & Share of Low-income Students

	K8 TPS		K8 Private		High TPS		High Private	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff
(a) Total Enrollment								
Pre-ATT	-2.708	2.666	6.796	-0.227	-11.752	-0.409	8.101	-2.513
	(2.201)	(1.696)	(4.895)	(1.888)	(9.172)	(9.827)	(7.580)	(4.015)
Post-ATT	6.308	11.906	-9.908	-11.348*	-85.181*	-42.190	29.301*	-2.602
	(10.137)	(10.037)	(7.215)	(5.458)	(38.288)	(49.585)	(13.571)	(10.662)
Baseline (Mean)	487.51	458.62	174.12	171.87	1039.10	889.71	273.11	364.70
N	2,828	10,279	645	2,137	585	2,274	309	1,114
(b) Share of Low-income								
Pre-ATT	-0.006	-0.003			-0.026	-0.006		
	(0.003)	(0.002)			(0.017)	(0.009)		
Post-ATT	-0.004	-0.006			0.108*	0.054		
	(0.008)	(0.007)			(0.044)	(0.038)		
Baseline (Mean)	0.29	0.25			0.28	0.23		
N	2,527	9,174			511	2,042		

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. For each outcome, I report the aggregated average treatment effect for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), the baseline mean of each outcome among eventually treated, and the number of observations. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Free or reduced-price lunch eligibility data are not available for private schools. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 5. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impacts on Total Enrollment



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on total enrollment, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. In each panel, black markers with confidence intervals represent schools in the Sheff region, while light gray markers represent schools in non-Sheff regions. Estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A8 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Results for share of low-income students are presented in Figure A2 and those for racial composition are presented in Figures A3–A4 and Tables A9–A10.

Table 3. Heterogeneity between K8 Catholic and Non-Catholic Schools

	K8 Private	
	(1) Catholic	(2) Non-Catholic
(a) Total Enrollment		
Pre-ATT	0.644	4.464
	(1.473)	(4.776)
Post-ATT	-9.350	-14.306*
	(5.573)	(5.765)
Baseline (Mean)	200.40	209.46
N	1,599	1,171
(b) White Share		
Pre-ATT	-0.002	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.010)
Post-ATT	-0.039**	0.010
	(0.013)	(0.015)
Baseline (Mean)	0.64	0.60
N	1,599	1,171
(c) Black Share		
Pre-ATT	0.001	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Post-ATT	0.021	-0.013
	(0.011)	(0.009)
Baseline (Mean)	0.16	0.22
N	1,599	1,171
(d) Hispanic Share		
Pre-ATT	0.001	0.009
	(0.005)	(0.007)
Post-ATT	0.028*	-0.001
	(0.012)	(0.008)
Baseline (Mean)	0.16	0.10
N	1,599	1,171

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, disaggregated by whether a K8 private school is Catholic or not. For each outcome, I report the aggregated average treatment effect for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), the baseline mean of each outcome among eventually treated, and the number of observations. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Free or reduced-price lunch eligibility data are not available for private schools. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure 6. Heterogeneity between K8 Catholic and Non-Catholic Schools



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on total enrollment and racial composition, disaggregated by whether a K8 private school is Catholic or not. In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A11 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period.

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Table A1. List of Full-time Interdistrict Magnet Schools in Comprehensive Statewide Interdistrict Magnet School Plan (Connecticut DOE, 2016)

	School Name	Sheff	IMS Operator	Offered Grade		K8/ High	Magnet Themes
				Low	High		
1	Aerospace/Hydrospace Engineering and Physical Sciences HS	0	Bridgeport	9	12	High	Aerospace/Hydrospace Engineering and Physical Sciences and STEM
2	Biotechnology Research & Zoological Studies Magnet HS	0	Bridgeport	9	12	High	Biotechnology Research and Zoological Sciences
3	Information Technology & Software Engineering Magnet HS	0	Bridgeport	9	12	High	Information Technology and Software Engineering
4	Arts At the Capitol Theater Magnet School (Act)	0	East Conn	9	12	High	Arts
5	Quinebaug Valley Middle College High School	0	East Conn	9	12	High	Early College Preparatory
6	Marine Science Magnet High School	0	LEARN	9	12	High	Marine Science
7	Three Rivers Middle College Magnet School	0	LEARN	11	12	High	Early College Preparatory
8	Cooperative High School - Inter-District Magnet	0	New Haven	9	12	High	Visual And Performing Arts
9	Engineering - Science University Magnet School	0	New Haven	9	12	High	Science And Engineering
10	High School in the Community	0	New Haven	9	12	High	Law And Social Justice
11	Hill Regional Career High School	0	New Haven	9	12	High	Business, Technology, Health, And Science
12	Metropolitan Business Academy	0	New Haven	9	12	High	Business
13	New Haven Academy	0	New Haven	9	12	High	Facing History
14	Center For Global Studies	0	Norwalk	9	12	High	Global Studies
15	The Academy of Information Technology & Engineering	0	Stamford	9	12	High	Information Technology
16	Waterbury Arts Magnet School (High)	0	Waterbury	9	12	High	Arts
17	Greater Hartford Academy of the Art	1	CREC	9	12	High	Arts
18	Two Rivers Magnet High School	1	CREC	9	12	High	Science And Technology
19	Connecticut IB Academy	1	East Hartford	9	12	High	International Baccalaureate
20	Connecticut River Academy	1	Goodwin	9	12	High	Early College Preparatory
21	Capital Community College Magnet Academy	1	Hartford	11	12	High	College Preparatory
22	Great Path Academy at MCC	1	Hartford	9	12	High	College Preparatory
23	Great Path Academy at MCC	1	Hartford	9	12	High	College Preparatory
24	Journalism And Media Academy Magnet School	1	Hartford	9	11	High	Journalism And Media
25	Pathways Academy of Technology and Design	1	Hartford	9	12	High	Technology
26	University High School of Science and Engineering	1	Hartford	9	12	High	Science And Engineering
27	Thomas Edison Magnet Middle School	0	ACES	6	8	K8	STEM
28	Wintergreen Interdistrict Magnet School	0	ACES	K	8	K8	Liberal Arts
29	Interdistrict Discovery Magnet School	0	Bridgeport	PK3	8	K8	Science, Technology and Math
30	Six-Six Magnet School	0	CES	PK4	8	K8	STEM
31	Western Ct Academy of International	0	Danbury	K	5	K8	International Studies
32	Dual Language & Arts Magnet Middle School	0	LEARN	6	8	K8	Dual Language
33	Regional Multicultural Magnet School	0	LEARN	K	5	K8	Multicultural Education
34	Barnard Environmental Magnet School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	Environmental Sciences
35	Beecher School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	Project Based Learning/Paideia Method
36	Benjamin Jepson Magnet School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	Multi-Age Based Learning
37	Betsy Ross Arts Magnet School	0	New Haven	5	8	K8	Visual And Performing Arts
38	Davis 21st Century Magnet Elementary School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	Arts And Academics
39	John C. Daniels	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	International Communication/ Dual Language
40	King/Robinson Magnet School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	International Baccalaureate
41	Mauro-Sheridan Magnet School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	Science, Technology, And Communications
42	Ross/Woodward School	0	New Haven	PK3	8	K8	Classical Studies/ Paideia Method

43	West Rock Authors Academy	0	New Haven	PK4	8	K8	Reading And Writing
44	Nathan Hale Arts Magnet School	0	New London	K	5	K8	Arts
45	New London Visual and Performing Arts Magnet School	0	New London	6	7	K8	Arts
46	Winthrop Elementary Magnet STEM School	0	New London	K	5	K8	STEM
47	Rogers International School	0	Stamford	K	8	K8	International Baccalaureate
48	Strawberry Hill An Ext. of Rogers International	0	Stamford	K	1	K8	International Baccalaureate
49	Maloney Interdistrict Magnet School	0	Waterbury	PK4	5	K8	Multicultural Education
50	Rotella Interdistrict Magnet School	0	Waterbury	PK4	4	K8	Arts
51	Waterbury Arts Magnet School (Middle)	0	Waterbury	6	8	K8	Arts
52	Charles H Barrows STEM Academy	0	Windham	K	8	K8	STEM
53	Academy of Aerospace & Engineering Elementary	1	CREC	PK3	2	K8	Aerospace And Engineering
54	Ana Grace Academy of the Arts Elementary School	1	CREC	PK3	3	K8	Arts
55	Discovery Academy	1	CREC	PK3	4	K8	5E Inquiry Based Learning
56	Glastonbury/East Hartford Magnet School	1	CREC	PK3	5	K8	STEM
57	Greater Hartford Academy of the Arts Magnet Middle	1	CREC	6	8	K8	Arts
58	International Magnet School for Global Citizenship	1	CREC	PK3	5	K8	International Baccalaureate
59	Montessori Magnet School	1	CREC	PK3	6	K8	Montessori
60	Museum Academy	1	CREC	PK3	5	K8	5E Inquiry Based Learning
61	Reggio Magnet School of the Arts	1	CREC	PK3	5	K8	Arts
62	Two Rivers Magnet Middle School	1	CREC	6	8	K8	Science And Technology
63	University of Hartford Magnet	1	CREC	PK3	5	K8	Multiple Intelligences
64	Goodwin College Early Childhood Interdistrict Magnet School	1	Goodwin	PK3	2	K8	Early Childhood Education
65	Betances Learning Lab Magnet School	1	Hartford	PK3	3	K8	Early Literacy and STEAM
66	Breakthrough II	1	Hartford	PK3	8	K8	Character Education
67	Breakthrough Magnet School	1	Hartford	PK3	8	K8	Character Education
68	Capital Preparatory Magnet School	1	Hartford	PK3	5	K8	Gifted And Talented
69	Environmental Sciences Magnet at Hooker School	1	Hartford	PK	8	K8	Environmental Sciences
70	Montessori Magnet at Moylan School	1	Hartford	PK3	5	K8	Montessori
71	Montessori Magnet School at Annie Fisher	1	Hartford	PK3	8	K8	Montessori
72	Noah Webster Micro Society School	1	Hartford	PK3	8	K8	Microsociety
73	STEM Magnet at Annie Fisher School	1	Hartford	K	8	K8	STEM
74	Science and Technology Magnet School of Southeastern Connect	0	New London	6	12	K8/High	STEM
75	Global Experience Magnet School	1	Bloomfield	6	12	K8/High	International Studies and College Preparatory
76	Academy of Aerospace and Engineering	1	CREC	6	12	K8/High	Aerospace And Engineering
77	Metropolitan Learning Center	1	CREC	6	12	K8/High	International Studies and International Baccalaureate
78	Public Safety Academy	1	CREC	6	12	K8/High	Public Safety
79	Classical Magnet School	1	Hartford	6	12	K8/High	Classical Studies
80	Hartford Magnet Trinity College Academy	1	Hartford	6	12	K8/High	Early College Preparatory
81	Kinsella Magnet School of Performing Arts	1	Hartford	PK4	12	K8/High	Arts
82	The Friendship School	0	LEARN	PK3	K	PreK-K	Early Childhood Education
83	Wintonbury Early Childhood Magnet School	1	Bloomfield	PK3	K	PreK-K	Early Childhood Education
84	Hartford Prekindergarten Magnet School	1	Hartford	PK3	PK4	PreK-K	Early Childhood Education

Notes: As part of the sample restriction process, schools in rows 82 to 84 whose highest grade level is pre-kindergarten or kindergarten are excluded from the analytic sample.

Table A2.1. Sample Restriction

	Traditional Public		Private	
	N	Schools	N	Schools
Total population (SY 1997–1998 to 2019–2020)	25,310	1,761	3,101	368
Drop schools without enrollment data	23,600	1,556	2,909	368
Drop non-regular schools	21,663	1,173	2,738	364
Drop schools where the highest grade offered is pre-k or k	21,011	1,095	2,729	362
Drop schools without latitude and longitude	21,007	1,092	2,640	328
Drop SY 1997–1998	20,065	1,087	2,414	328
[Target Sample]				
K8 schools	17,065	949	2,008 [3,927]	278
High schools	3,589	454	884 [1,715]	128
[Analytic Sample]: Drop outside of $t \in [-6,5]$				
K8 schools	14,040	949	[3,112]	278
High schools	3,248	454	[1,489]	128

Note: This table shows the number of observations and schools that remain after applying sequential sample restrictions. The full population of traditional public and private schools in Connecticut from the NLSD dataset is shown in the first row. Non-regular schools, listed in the third row, include alternative schools, career and technical high schools, special education schools, early childhood programs, and Montessori schools. To estimate and fill in private school enrollment for the 1998–1999 school year, I include observations from the 1997–1998 school year as part of the initial sample. Specifically, enrollment in 1998–1999 is imputed as the average of the 1997–1998 and 1999–2000 values, since the Private School Survey (PSS) only reports enrollment in odd-numbered years. The number of observations in brackets includes even-numbered years that are backfilled using this approach. Given the timing of Connecticut's interdistrict magnet school expansion, I define my analytic sample as observations from the 1998–1999 through 2019–2020 school years.

For the event study and difference-in-differences analysis, I further drop the schools that were observed outside the window from six years before to five years after their first exposure to a nearby magnet school (i.e., $t \in [-6,5]$). This restriction ensures that treatment effects are estimated using the most commonly observed event times, which have adequate support across treated and comparison units.

Observations outside this window (e.g., very early adopters or late adopters) are sparse and may yield unstable or unrepresentative estimates. By focusing on the $t \in [-6,5]$ window which enables me to present treatment effects for $t \pm 5$, I strike a balance between maximizing sample size and ensuring generalizability of estimated treatment effects across cohorts. Including $t = -6$ allows me to identify effects at $t = -5$, thereby enabling consistent estimation across the full $t \pm 5$ range. This approach strikes a balance between maximizing sample size and ensuring the generalizability and comparability of treatment effects across cohorts.

Table A2.2. Descriptive Statistics Across Samples

	(1) Traditional Public Schools					(2) Private Schools				
	Total	Target Sample		Analytic Sample		Total	Target Sample		Analytic Sample	
	Population	K8	High	K8	High	Population	K8	High	K8	High
Total Enrollment	494.05	468.55	944.34	464.96	923.33	225.51	199.32	350.98	198.85	344.87
White Share	0.66	0.65	0.71	0.71	0.74	0.73	0.72	0.73	0.75	0.74
Black Share	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10
Hispanic Share	0.17	0.17	0.13	0.14	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.06
FRPL	0.31	0.32	0.26	0.26	0.24					
Title-I Eligible Schools	0.45	0.57	0.23	0.55	0.23					
Urban	0.25	0.25	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.33	0.33	0.24	0.27	0.21
Suburban	0.54	0.55	0.53	0.57	0.55	0.51	0.55	0.50	0.59	0.50
Rural/Town	0.21	0.20	0.26	0.24	0.28	0.15	0.12	0.25	0.15	0.29
Located in Sheff	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.22
Catholic						0.52	0.58	0.27	0.57	0.26
Other religious						0.24	0.24	0.32	0.25	0.32
Nonsectarian						0.24	0.18	0.42	0.18	0.43
N: Observations	25,310	17,065	3,589	14,040	3,248	3,101	3,927	1,715	3,112	1,489
N: Schools	1,761	949	454	949	454	368	278	128	278	128

Note: This table compares descriptive statistics across three samples for each school type: (1) the full population of traditional public and private schools in Connecticut (row 1 of Table A2), (2) the target sample after initial restrictions (row 7), and (3) the analytic sample used in the main analysis (row 12).

Table A3. Summary Statistics

	Traditional Public Schools: K8				Private Schools: K8				IMS: K8
	Total	Never	Eventually	Always	Total	Never	Eventually	Always	Total
Total Enrollment	464.96	460.38	499.92	464.32	198.85	200.31	203.51	181.17	476.47
White Share	0.71	0.78	0.49	0.30	0.75	0.80	0.62	0.55	0.28
Black Share	0.09	0.06	0.17	0.37	0.10	0.07	0.18	0.25	0.34
Hispanic Share	0.14	0.11	0.27	0.30	0.08	0.06	0.14	0.15	0.30
FRPL	0.26	0.22	0.41	0.60					0.53
Title-I Eligible	0.55	0.53	0.64	0.63					0.71
Urban	0.19	0.13	0.41	0.67	0.27	0.18	0.45	0.69	0.71
Suburban	0.57	0.59	0.56	0.32	0.59	0.64	0.51	0.28	0.24
Rural/Town	0.24	0.29	0.03	0.01	0.15	0.18	0.04	0.03	0.05
Located in Sheff	0.22	0.20	0.36	0.28	0.23	0.21	0.35	0.19	0.48
Catholic					0.57	0.56	0.66	0.53	
Other religious					0.25	0.25	0.20	0.32	
Nonsectarian					0.18	0.19	0.14	0.15	
Number of IMS	0.18	0.00	0.67	1.65	0.29	0.00	0.60	2.14	
N: Observations	14,040	11,611	1,536	893	3,112	2,377	426	309	706
N: Schools (%)	949 (100.0)	624 (65.8)	148 (15.6)	177 (18.7)	278 (100.0)	171 (61.5)	45 (16.2)	62 (22.3)	55 (100.0)
	Traditional Public Schools: High				Private Schools: High				IMS: High
	Total	Never	Total	Always	Total	Never	Eventually	Always	Total
Total Enrollment	923.33	913.26	1214.38	547.12	344.87	343.63	377.38	229.07	417.57
White Share	0.74	0.80	0.44	0.19	0.74	0.73	0.75	0.79	0.30
Black Share	0.10	0.06	0.26	0.41	0.10	0.09	0.14	0.16	0.35
Hispanic Share	0.12	0.09	0.25	0.36	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.28
FRPL	0.24	0.20	0.42	0.67					0.51
Title-I Eligible	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.59					0.52
Urban	0.17	0.11	0.48	0.75	0.21	0.15	0.41	0.63	0.69
Suburban	0.55	0.58	0.40	0.25	0.50	0.49	0.59	0.37	0.19
Rural/Town	0.28	0.31	0.11	0.01	0.29	0.35	0.00	0.00	0.13
Located in Sheff	0.23	0.18	0.47	0.59	0.22	0.19	0.38	0.14	0.51
Catholic					0.26	0.25	0.38	0.00	
Other religious					0.32	0.29	0.37	0.69	
Nonsectarian					0.43	0.46	0.26	0.31	
Number of IMS	0.23	0.00	0.63	3.81	0.16	0.00	0.59	2.20	
N: Observations	3,248	2,807	291	150	1,489	1,219	221	49	375
N: Schools (%)	454 (100.0)	362 (79.7)	30 (6.6)	62 (13.7)	128 (100.0)	91 (71.1)	23 (18.0)	14 (10.9)	36 (100.0)

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the analytic sample, disaggregated by school level, school type, and treatment status. In line with the 2.5-mile threshold used in my main specification, "eventually treated" indicates schools that were exposed to a first interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles within study period. FRPL denotes the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch. "Number of IMS" shows the average number of interdistrict magnet schools within 2.5 miles (including zero).

Table A4. Distribution of Schools Across Treatment Years

	TPS						Private					
		K8			High			K8			High	
	Never	Eventually	Always	Never	Eventually	Always	Never	Eventually	Always	Never	Eventually	Always
Never Treated	624			362			171			91		
Treated Year												
1998		0	126		0	3		0	35		0	3
1999		3	0		0	0		1	0		0	0
2000		17	2		0	0		4	0		0	0
2001		12	0		2	0		5	1		2	0
2002		11	2		1	1		4	0		2	0
2003		9	5		5	0		4	2		6	1
2004		3	7		3	2		0	0		4	0
2005		0	5		2	35		0	1		2	1
2006		1	2		0	2		1	0		0	0
2007		6	0		1	1		5	1		0	0
2008		6	2		2	1		1	0		0	0
2009		4	4		0	8		1	8		1	5
2010		0	4		1	1		0	0		0	0
2011		19	2		1	0		6	2		1	0
2012		19	6		1	4		4	0		0	0
2013		1	2		0	1		0	4		0	1
2014		11	2		3	1		1	0		1	0
2015		3	4		0	0		4	2		1	2
2016		18	0		7	1		3	0		2	0
2017		0	1		0	0		0	2		0	0
2018		5	0		0	0		1	0		1	0
2019		0	1		1	1		0	4		0	1
Total	624	148	177	362	30	62	171	45	62	91	23	14

Notes: This table presents the distribution of schools across treatment years, defined as the year in which each school is first exposed to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles. The "Always Treated" group refers to schools that were already exposed to an interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles at the beginning of the study period or at the first year they appear in the CCD dataset.

Table A5. Summary Statistics: K8 Private Schools by Religious Affiliation

2.5 miles	K8 Private							
	Catholic				Non-Catholic			
	Total	Never	Eventually	Always	Total	Never	Eventually	Always
Total Enrollment	202.21	199.58	200.40	226.69	194.22	201.22	209.46	129.63
White Share	0.80	0.86	0.64	0.60	0.69	0.73	0.60	0.50
Black Share	0.08	0.04	0.16	0.21	0.14	0.11	0.22	0.30
Hispanic Share	0.08	0.05	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.06	0.10	0.13
Urban	0.28	0.18	0.48	0.75	0.26	0.19	0.38	0.61
Suburban	0.63	0.70	0.48	0.25	0.53	0.55	0.58	0.33
Rural/Town	0.09	0.12	0.04	0.00	0.21	0.26	0.03	0.05
Located in Sheff	0.24	0.23	0.34	0.12	0.22	0.19	0.37	0.26
Catholic	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00				
Other religious					0.57	0.56	0.58	0.67
Nonsectarian					0.43	0.44	0.42	0.33
N: Obs	1,775	1,331	280	164	1,341	1,047	146	148
N: Schools (%)	148 (100.0)	87 (58.8)	29 (19.6)	32 (21.6)	133 (100.0)	85 (63.9)	16 (12.0)	32 (24.1)

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the analytic sample of K8 private schools, disaggregated by their religious affiliation (Catholic or not). In line with the 2.5-mile threshold used in my main specification, "eventually treated" indicates schools that were exposed to a first interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles within study period.

Table A6. Impact on Total Enrollment & Share of Low-income Students

	Total Enrollment				Share of Low-income Students	
	K8		High		K8	High
	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	TPS
Pre-ATT	1.217	1.737	-3.210	1.466	-0.004*	-0.014
	(1.364)	(2.039)	(6.611)	(4.071)	(0.002)	(0.009)
Post-ATT	10.387	-12.550**	-64.468*	7.057	-0.004	0.077**
	(7.323)	(4.354)	(30.859)	(7.903)	(0.005)	(0.029)
Tm5	3.399	-0.575	-14.294	5.239	0.001	-0.015
	(3.563)	(2.581)	(12.759)	(5.672)	(0.006)	(0.027)
Tm4	1.159	0.072	17.910	-3.415	-0.025*	-0.028
	(2.693)	(1.981)	(12.100)	(4.944)	(0.011)	(0.027)
Tm3	3.071	4.856	-4.862	5.556	0.009	-0.021
	(3.369)	(4.259)	(14.155)	(8.537)	(0.010)	(0.027)
Tm2	0.685	5.419	-12.756	5.185	0.001	-0.003
	(3.258)	(3.835)	(13.712)	(7.473)	(0.006)	(0.021)
Tm1	-2.229	-1.089	-2.049	-5.237	-0.009	-0.005
	(2.795)	(2.093)	(11.437)	(3.781)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Tp0	7.411	-1.528	-33.950*	-0.269	0.007*	0.035*
	(4.689)	(1.826)	(17.290)	(2.348)	(0.003)	(0.015)
Tp1	12.931*	-2.229	-34.545	1.877	-0.003	0.058**
	(6.469)	(2.770)	(18.703)	(4.533)	(0.005)	(0.019)
Tp2	12.066	-7.398	-75.530**	7.904	-0.000	0.068
	(7.554)	(4.046)	(28.882)	(7.610)	(0.007)	(0.038)
Tp3	12.497	-10.570*	-57.600*	14.027	0.009	0.072*
	(10.024)	(5.306)	(28.761)	(9.171)	(0.007)	(0.034)
Tp4	12.740	-19.476**	-85.377	12.177	-0.010	0.111*
	(9.837)	(6.985)	(43.894)	(12.590)	(0.009)	(0.046)
Tp5	4.676	-34.098***	-99.809	6.626	-0.030	0.120**
	(10.333)	(9.109)	(84.482)	(15.302)	(0.015)	(0.046)
N	13,106	2,790	2,862	1,428	11,704	2,555

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Free or reduced-price lunch eligibility data are not available for private schools. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A1. Impacts on Racial Composition: High TPS & Private Schools



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on racial composition of nearby high schools: panels (a) and (d) for White student share, (b) and (e) for Black student share, and (c) and (f) for Hispanic student share. In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A7 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment periods. Figure 4 presents the results for K8 schools.

Table A7. Impact on Racial Composition

	White Share				Black Share				Hispanic Share			
	K8		High		K8		High		K8		High	
	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private
Pre-ATT	-0.003*	-0.002	-0.003	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	0.001	0.001	0.002**	0.004	0.003	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Post-ATT	-0.007	-0.022*	-0.011	0.008	-0.005*	0.009	-0.006	-0.013	0.010***	0.018*	0.018**	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Tm5	-0.001	0.011	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.006	-0.003	-0.005	0.001	-0.005
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Tm4	-0.001	-0.014	0.002	-0.031	-0.002	0.005	0.004	0.010	0.002	0.016	-0.005	0.022
	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.022)
Tm3	0.001	-0.013	-0.014	0.010	-0.003	-0.007	-0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.010	0.016	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Tm2	-0.006**	-0.001	0.002	0.004	0.001	-0.003	0.003	-0.000	0.004*	-0.001	-0.006	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Tm1	-0.005*	0.009	-0.005	0.012	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.010	0.007***	-0.002	0.008	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tp0	-0.005*	0.007	-0.009	0.013	0.001	-0.002	-0.004	-0.009	0.003	-0.001	0.008	-0.000
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Tp1	-0.000	0.005	-0.003	0.005	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.012	0.001	-0.000	0.004	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Tp2	-0.005	-0.009	-0.001	0.001	-0.006*	0.002	-0.005	-0.018	0.009**	0.010	0.013*	0.014
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.014)
Tp3	-0.010*	-0.030*	-0.012	0.017	-0.006*	0.011	-0.004	-0.022	0.014***	0.027*	0.021**	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Tp4	-0.010	-0.043*	-0.022*	0.009	-0.008**	0.014	-0.009	-0.011	0.017***	0.035**	0.031**	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Tp5	-0.011	-0.065***	-0.022	0.004	-0.010***	0.029*	-0.010	-0.006	0.019***	0.036*	0.029**	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.005)
N	13,106	2,790	2,862	1,428	13,039	2,790	2,858	1,428	13,106	2,790	2,860	1,428

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A8. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impact on Total Enrollment & Share of Low-income Students

	Total Enrollment								Share of Low-income Students			
	K8				High				K8		High	
	TPS		Private		TPS		Private		TPS		TPS	
	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff
Pre-ATT	-2.708	2.666	6.796	-0.227	-11.752	-0.409	8.101	-2.513	-0.006	-0.003	-0.026	-0.006
	(2.201)	(1.696)	(4.895)	(1.888)	(9.172)	(9.827)	(7.580)	(4.015)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.017)	(0.009)
Post-ATT	6.308	11.906	-9.908	-11.348*	-85.181*	-42.190	29.301*	-2.602	-0.004	-0.006	0.108*	0.054
	(10.137)	(10.037)	(7.215)	(5.458)	(38.288)	(49.585)	(13.571)	(10.662)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.044)	(0.038)
Tm5	5.093	2.152	1.459	-0.710	-7.696	-20.251	-0.392	7.079	0.004	-0.001	-0.056	0.007
	(4.506)	(4.860)	(4.530)	(3.244)	(26.834)	(12.002)	(4.952)	(6.940)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.070)	(0.010)
Tm4	-1.347	1.530	6.218	-1.962	-0.231	18.404	-3.850	-2.683	-0.000	-0.036*	-0.055	-0.005
	(5.030)	(3.208)	(3.718)	(2.538)	(18.721)	(15.562)	(4.649)	(6.412)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.056)	(0.017)
Tm3	-2.859	5.543	14.532	0.376	2.705	-11.032	21.544	-2.775	0.005	0.010	0.005	-0.039
	(6.263)	(3.986)	(11.200)	(2.890)	(11.831)	(22.349)	(23.334)	(4.936)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.044)
Tm2	-6.910	4.124	11.315	3.234	-22.705	-13.458	22.424	-5.251	-0.010	0.007	-0.025	0.017
	(5.396)	(4.004)	(10.567)	(2.727)	(20.493)	(16.350)	(14.082)	(6.891)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.040)	(0.017)
Tm1	-7.519	-0.021	0.457	-2.076	-30.835**	24.289	0.778	-8.934	-0.030*	0.004	0.003	-0.008
	(5.190)	(3.234)	(2.719)	(2.978)	(11.147)	(16.801)	(5.907)	(5.433)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Tp0	7.110	7.623	-0.458	-1.856	-37.874	-31.392	6.285	-3.023	0.007	0.007	0.020	0.041
	(7.912)	(5.816)	(2.477)	(2.545)	(23.004)	(25.937)	(5.567)	(2.346)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Tp1	13.718	12.299	-1.192	-1.905	-43.953*	-22.702	12.205	-1.738	0.013	-0.011	0.070*	0.051*
	(8.905)	(8.897)	(4.398)	(3.524)	(21.976)	(28.276)	(10.124)	(5.361)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Tp2	15.596	10.017	-9.179	-4.946	-91.121**	-51.309	31.872*	0.251	-0.002	-0.000	0.100**	0.048
	(10.880)	(10.193)	(5.602)	(5.330)	(30.152)	(47.339)	(13.424)	(10.019)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.059)
Tp3	10.809	12.495	-6.947	-8.173	-83.085**	-34.828	43.134**	4.615	0.004	0.010	0.126**	0.032
	(13.058)	(13.960)	(8.043)	(6.870)	(29.154)	(50.288)	(14.959)	(12.497)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.048)	(0.045)
Tp4	4.348	16.532	-9.298	-20.207*	-112.840*	-50.922	39.580	0.988	-0.017	-0.006	0.167*	0.068
	(13.533)	(13.574)	(11.251)	(9.075)	(45.058)	(80.437)	(20.691)	(18.192)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.074)	(0.052)
Tp5	-13.736	12.470	-32.372	-31.001**	-142.210	-61.988	42.727	-16.703	-0.027	-0.034	0.163*	0.081
	(15.054)	(13.928)	(17.015)	(10.581)	(134.853)	(94.364)	(22.427)	(21.621)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.075)	(0.056)
N	2,828	10,279	645	2,137	585	2,274	309	1,114	2,527	9,174	511	2,042

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A2. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impact on Share of Low-income Students



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. In each panel, black markers with confidence intervals represent schools in the Sheff region, while light gray markers represent schools in non-Sheff regions. Estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A8 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period.

Table A9. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impact on Racial Composition (High)

	White Share				Black Share				Hispanic Share			
	TPS		Private		TPS		Private		TPS		Private	
	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff
Pre-ATT	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005	0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Post-ATT	-0.005	-0.014	0.022	0.003	0.001	-0.013	-0.019	-0.009	0.009	0.025**	-0.008	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Tm5	0.000	0.003	0.011*	0.004	0.002	-0.001	-0.006	0.010	0.006	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Tm4	-0.000	0.003	-0.003	-0.041	0.004	0.004	0.003	0.013	-0.003	-0.007	0.001	0.029
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.034)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.030)
Tm3	-0.001	-0.023	-0.004	0.018	0.002	-0.007	-0.006	-0.003	0.002	0.027	0.009	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.020)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Tm2	-0.009	0.013	-0.024*	0.016	0.003	0.003	0.010	-0.006	0.006	-0.016	0.010*	-0.005
	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Tm1	-0.002	-0.008	-0.007	0.020	-0.000	-0.003	-0.000	-0.015	0.002	0.013	0.006	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Tp0	-0.002	-0.014	0.012	0.015	-0.003	-0.005	-0.010*	-0.009	0.009	0.008	0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Tp1	-0.002	-0.003	0.028	-0.002	0.004	-0.009	-0.019*	-0.010	0.003	0.004	-0.010	0.009
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Tp2	-0.004	0.006	0.071***	-0.028	0.005	-0.016	-0.046*	-0.008	0.008	0.018	-0.014	0.025
	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.022)
Tp3	-0.005	-0.016	0.051	-0.001	0.000	-0.007	-0.046	-0.008	0.015	0.026*	-0.001	0.004
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Tp4	-0.008	-0.031*	-0.012	0.020	-0.002	-0.017	0.001	-0.014	0.013	0.048**	-0.008	0.005
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Tp5	-0.009	-0.026	-0.022	0.014	0.001	-0.024	0.007	-0.005	0.010	0.047**	-0.016	0.000
	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.007)
N	585	2,274	309	1,114	585	2,270	309	1,114	585	2,272	309	1,114

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A3. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impact on Racial Composition (High TPS & Private)



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on racial composition, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. In each panel, black markers with confidence intervals represent schools in the Sheff region, while light gray markers represent schools in non-Sheff regions. Estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A9 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period.

Table A10. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impact on Racial Composition (K8)

	White Share				Black Share				Hispanic Share			
	TPS		Private		TPS		Private		TPS		Private	
	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff	Sheff	Non-Sheff
Pre-ATT	-0.004	-0.002	0.008	-0.006	0.000	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	0.002*	0.002	-0.002	0.006
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Post-ATT	-0.002	-0.007	-0.012	-0.029*	-0.004	-0.007**	0.001	0.013	-0.001	0.017***	0.021	0.015
	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Tm5	-0.006	0.002	0.021	0.006	0.001	0.004	0.012*	0.002	0.001	-0.006	-0.010	-0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Tm4	-0.002	0.000	0.035	-0.039	0.002	-0.004	0.005	0.004	-0.001	0.004	-0.011	0.029
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.022)
Tm3	0.002	0.001	-0.007	-0.015	-0.000	-0.004	-0.014*	-0.003	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.014
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.010)
Tm2	-0.008*	-0.006	-0.007	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.013*	0.002	0.004	0.004	0.003	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tm1	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	0.017*	-0.003	-0.003	0.003	-0.005	0.005*	0.007**	0.005	-0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Tp0	-0.001	-0.006**	-0.001	0.012	0.002	0.000	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0.006**	0.005	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Tp1	0.010	-0.005	0.000	0.007	0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.001	-0.015*	0.010**	0.009	-0.006
	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Tp2	-0.003	-0.005	-0.008	-0.011	-0.004	-0.007*	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.014***	0.021	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.015)
Tp3	-0.008	-0.009	-0.011	-0.039*	-0.005	-0.008*	-0.002	0.017	0.004	0.019***	0.029	0.022
	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.020)	(0.014)
Tp4	-0.006	-0.009	-0.010	-0.063**	-0.009	-0.009**	-0.008	0.025	0.005	0.023***	0.032	0.036*
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.018)
Tp5	-0.001	-0.011	-0.045	-0.078***	-0.006	-0.015***	0.013	0.037*	0.000	0.030***	0.032	0.039*
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.031)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.024)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.025)	(0.019)
N	2,825	10,279	645	2,137	2,825	10,212	645	2,137	2,825	10,279	645	2,137

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A4. Heterogeneity by Sheff Region: Impact on Racial Composition (K8 TPS & Private)



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on racial composition, disaggregated by whether a school is located in the Sheff region (Hartford County) or outside it. In each panel, black markers with confidence intervals represent schools in the Sheff region, while light gray markers represent schools in non-Sheff regions. Estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level. Table A10 reports the point estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period.

Table A11. Impact on Total Enrollment & Racial Composition: K8 Catholic and Non-Catholic Schools

	Total Enrollment		White Share		Black Share		Hispanic Share	
	Cath	Non-Cath	Cath	Non-Cath	Cath	Non-Cath	Cath	Non-Cath
Pre-ATT	0.644	4.464	-0.002	0.001	0.001	-0.003	0.001	0.009
	(1.473)	(4.776)	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Post-ATT	-9.350	-14.306*	-0.039**	0.010	0.021	-0.013	0.028*	-0.001
	(5.573)	(5.765)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Tm5	-0.545	-0.184	0.011	0.009	-0.000	0.011	-0.013	0.007
	(2.791)	(4.984)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)
Tm4	1.330	-0.873	-0.004	-0.031	0.001	0.014	0.003	0.038
	(1.959)	(4.349)	(0.017)	(0.042)	(0.005)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.033)
Tm3	0.392	12.877	-0.020	0.001	-0.002	-0.015*	0.018	-0.004
	(2.144)	(9.756)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Tm2	2.140	12.369	-0.004	0.002	0.001	-0.012	0.000	-0.001
	(2.376)	(9.593)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Tm1	-0.096	-1.871	0.004	0.023*	0.004	-0.014	-0.005	0.004
	(2.589)	(3.093)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)
Tp0	0.003	-4.014	0.006	0.012	-0.000	-0.010	-0.003	0.003
	(2.237)	(3.061)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Tp1	0.677	-3.385	-0.003	0.024*	0.006	-0.019**	0.003	-0.004
	(3.203)	(4.644)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.004)
Tp2	-4.509	-6.134	-0.030*	0.039*	0.016	-0.025**	0.024	-0.018**
	(4.598)	(6.395)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.006)
Tp3	-9.691	-10.547	-0.061***	0.021	0.029*	-0.020	0.047**	-0.004
	(6.532)	(7.187)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.009)
Tp4	-19.164*	-18.174*	-0.070**	-0.000	0.037*	-0.020	0.050**	0.015
	(9.148)	(8.781)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Tp5	-23.418*	-43.580**	-0.075***	-0.035	0.035	0.017	0.045*	0.005
	(11.523)	(13.847)	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.022)
N	1,599	1,171	1,599	1,171	1,599	1,171	1,599	1,171

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, disaggregated by whether a K8 private school is Catholic or not. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A12. Placebo Test: Impact on Schools Without Overlapping Grades

		High IMS on Proximal K8		K8 IMS on Proximal High	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
		TPS	Private	TPS	Private
(a) Total Enrollment	Pre-ATT	-0.435	0.511	13.191	1.650
		(1.466)	(1.848)	(7.867)	(5.124)
	Post-ATT	-11.716	4.405	11.737	-12.727*
		(6.800)	(4.676)	(27.372)	(5.179)
	N	14,888	3,260	2,638	1,307
(b) Share of Low-income Students	Pre-ATT	-0.002		-0.002	
		(0.003)		(0.006)	
	Post-ATT	-0.006		0.027	
		(0.010)		(0.024)	
	N	13,327		2,376	
(c) White Share	Pre-ATT	-0.001	-0.007*	-0.003	-0.000
		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
	Post-ATT	-0.001	-0.005	-0.003	0.011
		(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.012)
	N	14,888	3,260	2,638	1,307
(d) Black Share	Pre-ATT	-0.002*	0.003	-0.003	-0.006
		(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
	Post-ATT	-0.006	0.002	0.000	-0.011
		(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.010)
	N	14,822	3,260	2,634	1,307
(e) Hispanic Share	Pre-ATT	0.003**	0.005	0.005	0.002
		(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
	Post-ATT	0.007*	0.002	0.004	0.012
		(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
	N	14,888	3,260	2,636	1,307

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the placebo test: (a) impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet high school opening within 2.5 miles on proximal K8 schools; and (b) impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet K8 school openings within 2.5 miles on proximal high schools. For each outcome, I report the aggregated average treatment effect for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and the number of observations. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Free or reduced-price lunch eligibility data are not available for private schools. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A5. Alternative DID Specifications: Impact on Total Enrollment



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on total enrollment, using three different DID specifications: (1) Callaway & Sant' Anna (black triangles), (2) traditional two-way fixed effects (TWFE; dark-gray circles), and (3) Sun & Abraham (light-gray diamonds). In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level.

Figure A6. Alternative DID Specifications: Impact on Share of Low-income Students



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, using three different DID specifications: (1) Callaway & Sant' Anna (black triangles), (2) traditional two-way fixed effects (TWFE; dark-gray circles), and (3) Sun & Abraham (light-gray diamonds). In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level.

Figure A7. Alternative DID Specifications: Impact on Racial Composition (K8 TPS & Private)



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on racial composition: (1) Callaway & Sant' Anna (black triangles), (2) traditional two-way fixed effects (TWFE; dark-gray circles), and (3) Sun & Abraham (light-gray diamonds). In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level.

Figure A8. Alternative DID Specifications: Impact on Racial Composition (High TPS & Private)



Notes: This set of figures presents event study estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school within 2.5 miles on racial composition: (1) Callaway & Sant' Anna (black triangles), (2) traditional two-way fixed effects (TWFE; dark-gray circles), and (3) Sun & Abraham (light-gray diamonds). In each panel, estimates for negative values correspond to pre-treatment periods, while values at 0 and above correspond to post-treatment periods. Standard errors for the 95% confidence intervals are clustered at the school level.

Table A13. Alternative Distances: K8 TPS

	Total Enrollment			Share of Low-income Students			White Share			Black Share			Hispanic Share		
	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles
Pre-ATT	-3.426	2.918*	2.906**	-0.001	-0.003*	-0.002	0.004*	-0.003**	-0.002**	-0.005***	-0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.002***	0.002**
	(2.535)	(1.151)	(1.120)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Post-ATT	11.569	16.006**	12.319**	-0.026*	-0.000	0.002	0.015**	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.012**	-0.003	-0.002	0.003	0.012***	0.011***
	(12.620)	(5.044)	(4.073)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Tm5	-9.712	3.557	2.871	0.002	-0.002	-0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.002	-0.009**	-0.001	-0.000	0.005	-0.001	0.000
	(4.999)	(2.735)	(3.113)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tm4	-1.638	3.031	5.986*	-0.015	-0.042***	-0.043***	0.010	-0.003	0.000	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.006	0.005*	0.001
	(5.394)	(2.898)	(2.549)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tm3	1.363	4.278	2.540	0.020	0.025*	0.029**	0.004	-0.000	-0.003	-0.006	-0.001	-0.000	0.005	0.000	0.002
	(5.403)	(2.790)	(2.378)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Tm2	0.092	1.332	3.027	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.001	-0.006**	-0.003*	-0.004	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.003*	0.002
	(6.194)	(3.462)	(3.145)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Tm1	-7.237	2.393	0.106	-0.020*	-0.002	-0.001	0.005*	-0.005*	-0.003*	-0.005**	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.004*	0.003*
	(4.643)	(2.453)	(2.579)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Tp0	6.442	7.622*	3.348	-0.046**	-0.001	0.001	0.007	-0.005**	-0.004*	-0.004	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.005***	0.003*
	(7.660)	(3.637)	(2.758)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Tp1	4.532	12.753**	8.097*	-0.037*	-0.010*	-0.007	0.011**	-0.007**	-0.006**	-0.007*	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.006**	0.005**
	(12.694)	(4.510)	(3.740)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Tp2	8.340	16.128**	9.805*	-0.020	-0.004	-0.002	0.015**	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.011*	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.010***	0.010***
	(12.305)	(5.369)	(4.384)	(0.016)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tp3	15.752	19.857***	17.123***	-0.001	0.008	0.007	0.010	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.004	-0.002	0.001	0.013***	0.013***
	(15.359)	(6.018)	(5.154)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tp4	7.872	22.201**	18.862**	-0.013	0.002	0.000	0.023**	-0.016***	-0.018***	-0.018*	-0.005*	-0.002	0.007	0.017***	0.014***
	(21.368)	(6.856)	(5.804)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tp5	26.476	17.477*	16.677**	-0.037	0.003	0.010	0.026***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.025**	-0.007**	-0.004	0.010	0.020***	0.018***
	(17.995)	(7.758)	(6.370)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.004)
N	15,564	11,048	9,706	13,989	9,861	8,629	15,564	11,048	9,706	15,496	10,984	9,644	15,564	11,048	9,706

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening, using three different alternative distance thresholds: (a) 1 mile, (b) 4 miles, and (c) 5 miles. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A14. Alternative Distances: K8 Private

	Total Enrollment			White Share			Black Share			Hispanic Share		
	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles
Pre-ATT	-1.832	-0.024	-0.753	-0.008	0.002	-0.001	0.007	-0.003	-0.003	0.003	0.003	0.005
	(1.246)	(1.494)	(1.621)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Post-ATT	-3.062	-9.195	-3.612	-0.003	-0.023	-0.017	-0.001	0.011	0.016*	0.008	0.012	-0.002
	(6.985)	(4.947)	(5.201)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Tm5	0.375	-2.781	-4.325	-0.013	0.002	0.003	0.020***	-0.001	-0.006	-0.008	0.002	0.005
	(2.293)	(2.624)	(3.260)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Tm4	-1.156	-2.913	-3.656	-0.009	0.005	-0.025	0.009	-0.006	0.011	0.005	0.005	0.014*
	(1.641)	(2.257)	(2.302)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Tm3	-3.808*	0.429	-0.605	0.002	0.012	-0.018	-0.002	-0.016**	0.007	0.004	0.006	0.009
	(1.932)	(2.040)	(2.143)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Tm2	-4.628*	3.471	3.214	-0.015	0.001	0.020	0.004	0.000	-0.015	0.008	-0.001	-0.003
	(2.076)	(2.175)	(1.986)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tm1	0.056	1.675	1.605	-0.007	-0.009	0.013	0.004	0.007	-0.013	0.005	0.004	0.000
	(2.211)	(2.494)	(2.913)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tp0	-0.338	-2.909	-0.143	0.008	-0.002	-0.003	-0.006	0.001	0.005	-0.001	0.005	0.002
	(1.848)	(2.355)	(2.490)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Tp1	-1.973	-5.777	0.413	0.011	-0.007	-0.004	-0.010	-0.002	0.009	-0.002	0.011	-0.001
	(3.794)	(3.959)	(3.617)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.009)
Tp2	-2.352	-7.091	-0.900	0.000	-0.016	-0.010	-0.006	-0.000	0.010	0.009	0.014	-0.003
	(5.865)	(4.725)	(4.906)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.009)
Tp3	-1.228	-10.137	-3.206	-0.011	-0.037*	-0.021	0.003	0.015	0.019*	0.023	0.022	0.000
	(7.406)	(5.861)	(6.177)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.009)
Tp4	0.232	-13.815	-9.970	0.001	-0.039	-0.030	-0.001	0.025	0.025*	0.010	0.010	-0.005
	(10.799)	(7.551)	(8.144)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Tp5	-12.711	-15.442	-7.863	-0.027	-0.038	-0.032	0.015	0.026	0.028*	0.005	0.011	-0.007
	(16.242)	(8.999)	(8.895)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.011)
N	3,473	2,266	1,997	3,473	2,266	1,997	3,473	2,266	1,997	3,473	2,266	1,997

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening, using three different alternative distance thresholds: (a) 1 mile, (b) 4 miles, and (c) 5 miles. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A15. Alternative Distances: High TPS

	Total Enrollment			Share of Low-income Students			White Share			Black Share			Hispanic Share		
	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles
Pre-ATT	-3.949	2.727	1.530	0.011	-0.005	-0.001	0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.012	0.001	0.001	0.012**	0.003*	0.002
	(13.389)	(5.746)	(5.239)	(0.039)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Post-ATT	-66.357	-36.283	-46.814**	0.109	0.028	0.022	-0.009	-0.008	-0.010*	-0.019	-0.005	-0.004	0.026*	0.015***	0.013***
	(66.384)	(20.546)	(15.988)	(0.056)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tm5	16.921	-5.791	-4.782	-0.137	-0.003	-0.002	0.010	-0.002	-0.005	-0.010*	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.000	0.001
	(23.105)	(8.977)	(10.312)	(0.095)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tm4	41.588*	18.216*	15.812*	-0.053	-0.013	0.007	0.010	-0.003	-0.005	-0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.007	0.002	0.002
	(20.327)	(9.096)	(7.896)	(0.055)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Tm3	-21.233	-6.483	-13.192	0.123	0.001	-0.000	-0.018	-0.006	-0.005	-0.037	-0.002	-0.002	0.056*	0.007	0.006
	(18.112)	(12.052)	(10.694)	(0.117)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.026)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Tm2	-11.695	14.962	9.601	0.114*	-0.017	-0.024	0.010	0.006	0.003	-0.008	0.005	0.005	-0.004	-0.009	-0.008*
	(30.778)	(8.931)	(7.224)	(0.053)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Tm1	-45.324	-7.268	0.212	0.007	0.009	0.012	-0.006	-0.010	-0.006	-0.006	-0.002	-0.002	0.015	0.012**	0.008*
	(30.650)	(11.190)	(9.931)	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tp0	7.186	-32.952**	-20.727*	0.071**	0.023*	0.014	-0.009	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.006	-0.003	0.004	0.007	0.002
	(33.689)	(10.930)	(8.432)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Tp1	-28.610	-21.544	-30.880*	0.089*	0.042**	0.031**	-0.004	-0.000	-0.004	-0.012	-0.005	-0.003	0.008	0.005	0.004
	(33.283)	(17.626)	(13.259)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.011)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tp2	6.603	-38.922	-56.543**	0.074	0.005	0.002	0.007	-0.001	-0.007	-0.018	-0.003	-0.003	0.023	0.009	0.009
	(60.351)	(25.449)	(19.184)	(0.069)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Tp3	-10.085	-45.954	-55.641**	0.106	0.011	0.008	-0.011	-0.012*	-0.014**	-0.026	-0.004	-0.003	0.043*	0.020***	0.016**
	(66.124)	(26.372)	(20.166)	(0.072)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Tp4	-112.566	-32.066	-57.895*	0.196*	0.048	0.053	-0.016	-0.016*	-0.016*	-0.012	-0.006	-0.005	0.027	0.024***	0.021***
	(120.778)	(28.759)	(23.452)	(0.081)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Tp5	-260.667*	-46.260	-59.197*	0.116	0.039	0.022	-0.023	-0.018*	-0.018*	-0.045**	-0.008	-0.007	0.050*	0.027***	0.024***
	(119.267)	(35.799)	(26.216)	(0.092)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.007)	(0.006)
N	3,073	2,661	2,496	2,757	2,356	2,201	3,071	2,661	2,496	3,071	2,657	2,494	3,073	2,659	2,496

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening, using three different alternative distance thresholds: (a) 1 mile, (b) 4 miles, and (c) 5 miles. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A16. Alternative Distances: High Private

	Total Enrollment			White Share			Black Share			Hispanic Share		
	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles	1 mile	4 miles	5 miles
Pre-ATT	-1.126	-3.098	-0.994	-0.008	0.005	0.003	0.005	0.001	0.003	0.004	-0.001	-0.002
	(3.040)	(3.295)	(3.712)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Post-ATT	-4.341	7.621	10.368	0.036**	-0.002	-0.005	-0.010	-0.010	-0.004	-0.017**	0.006	0.005
	(14.591)	(8.421)	(8.789)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Tm5	4.067*	-2.298	8.221	-0.008	0.001	-0.009	0.006	0.006	0.011	0.003	-0.005	-0.004
	(1.912)	(6.473)	(10.189)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tm4	-5.954	-9.995*	-3.879	-0.006	0.005	0.003	0.002	0.004	0.009	0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(5.864)	(3.991)	(7.679)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tm3	-2.837	0.280	-4.862	-0.004	0.005	0.009	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.008	-0.004	-0.005
	(5.222)	(7.186)	(3.992)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Tm2	-0.622	1.660	-3.619	-0.018	0.006	0.007	0.016	-0.001	0.000	0.005	0.000	-0.002
	(2.464)	(6.546)	(4.068)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Tm1	-0.286	-5.137	-0.831	-0.002	0.007	0.004	0.002	-0.008	-0.006	0.000	0.004	0.003
	(2.795)	(3.619)	(5.698)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.017)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tp0	-4.491	-1.472	4.482	0.024***	-0.004	0.001	-0.016	-0.003	-0.004	-0.006	0.000	0.000
	(3.160)	(3.835)	(5.209)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Tp1	-9.276	5.390	7.371	0.043***	-0.003	-0.007	-0.033	-0.002	0.000	-0.013*	0.000	0.000
	(6.600)	(6.336)	(7.391)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Tp2	-7.554	9.882	11.962	0.032*	-0.003	-0.011	-0.013	-0.006	-0.000	-0.020***	0.007	0.006
	(13.318)	(9.101)	(9.413)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Tp3	-0.198	11.734	13.070	0.034*	0.007	-0.003	0.001	-0.017	0.011	-0.021**	0.009	0.007
	(17.128)	(10.323)	(10.332)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Tp4	-0.176	12.346	13.646	0.040	-0.005	-0.008	0.003	-0.014	-0.013	-0.022*	0.011	0.009
	(26.572)	(11.839)	(11.622)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Tp5	-4.351	7.845	11.675	0.041	-0.005	-0.004	0.000	-0.018	-0.018	-0.022	0.010	0.010
	(26.389)	(13.085)	(13.441)	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
N	1,546	1,267	1,190	1,546	1,267	1,190	1,546	1,267	1,190	1,546	1,267	1,190

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening, using three different alternative distance thresholds: (a) 1 mile, (b) 4 miles, and (c) 5 miles. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and event-study estimates for each pre- and post-treatment period. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A17. Additional Covariates of Racial Composition Change at County-level

		K8		High	
		(1) TPS	(2) Private	(3) TPS	(4) Private
(a) Total Enrollment	Pre-ATT	-0.102	5.394	-51.833*	3.700
		(2.209)	(8.452)	(21.752)	(9.726)
	Post-ATT	38.135***	-61.057	-194.475	76.166*
		(10.759)	(35.942)	(221.476)	(38.642)
	N	12,706	2,672	2,831	1,340
(b) Share of Low-income Students	Pre-ATT	0.000		-0.068*	
		(0.002)		(0.034)	
	Post-ATT	-0.006		0.342	
		(0.010)		(0.217)	
	N	11,496		2,524	
(c) White Share	Pre-ATT	-0.002	-0.024	-0.023	0.056
		(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.063)
	Post-ATT	-0.008	-0.062	-0.142	0.075
		(0.010)	(0.047)	(0.093)	(0.052)
	N	12,706	2,672	2,831	1,340
(d) Black Share	Pre-ATT	-0.002	-0.009	-0.000	0.020
		(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.016)
	Post-ATT	-0.012**	-0.015	0.005	-0.037
		(0.004)	(0.026)	(0.053)	(0.028)
	N	12,639	2,672	2,827	1,340
(e) Hispanic Share	Pre-ATT	0.003	0.025	0.025	-0.049
		(0.002)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.041)
	Post-ATT	0.020**	0.084*	0.135	-0.041*
		(0.007)	(0.042)	(0.073)	(0.020)
	N	12,706	2,672	2,829	1,340

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, with additional county-level covariates: the changes in the shares of White, Black, and Hispanic populations. I calculated the percentage-point changes in each racial composition between 2000 and 2010 and incorporated them into the main models to account for potential enrollment dynamics driven by local demographic changes. For each outcome, I report the aggregated average treatment effect for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), and the number of observations. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A9. Total Enrollment Trends Across School Types



Notes: This figure plots total enrollment trends for interdistrict magnet schools (IMS), and "treated" traditional public (TPS) and private schools over the study period, disaggregated by school level. Treated schools are defined as those located within 2.5 miles of at least one interdistrict magnet school opening during the study period (including both eventually treated and always treated groups). The figure is intended to provide descriptive context for the main findings and does not represent causal estimates.

Table A18. Impacts on Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity

		K8		High	
		(1) TPS	(2) Private	(3) TPS	(4) Private
(a) Number of White Students	Pre-ATT	0.928	1.033	-9.046*	-0.271
		(0.948)	(1.726)	(4.419)	(3.684)
	Post-ATT	3.488	-9.098*	-46.554*	9.103
		(4.950)	(3.807)	(20.868)	(9.003)
	Baseline (Mean)	242.49	139.98	540.91	308.80
	N	13,106	2,790	2,862	1,428
(b) Number of Black Students	Pre-ATT	-1.127	0.374	0.103	0.969
		(0.593)	(0.578)	(2.204)	(0.968)
	Post-ATT	-1.923	-1.321	-18.439	-0.905
		(2.688)	(1.393)	(15.148)	(1.644)
	Baseline (Mean)	83.99	29.04	318.24	32.99
	N	13,039	2,790	2,858	1,428
(c) Number of Hispanic Students	Pre-ATT	1.063	0.338	6.391	1.266
		(0.734)	(0.728)	(3.268)	(0.955)
	Post-ATT	6.028*	0.347	2.578	0.643
		(2.821)	(1.592)	(16.837)	(1.561)
	Baseline (Mean)	136.28	23.19	297.20	21.09
	N	13,106	2,790	2,860	1,428

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles. For each outcome, I report the aggregated average treatment effect for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT), the baseline mean of each outcome among eventually treated schools, and the number of observations. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A19. Robustness Check: Continuous Treatment Difference-in-Differences Estimates

	(1) K8 TPS	(2) K8 Private	(3) High TPS	(4) High Private
(a) Total Enrollment				
Post-ATT	-4.247	-0.806	-40.030	-4.660
	(2.518)	(2.611)	(25.816)	(3.989)
Baseline (Mean)	499.92	203.51	1214.38	377.38
N	17065	3927	3589	1715
(b) Share of Low-income Students				
Post-ATT	-0.001		0.021**	
	(0.001)		(0.007)	
Baseline (Mean)	0.41		0.42	
N	15370		3270	
(c) White Share				
Post-ATT	0.009***	-0.005	0.001	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Baseline (Mean)	0.49	0.62	0.44	0.75
N	17064	3927	3588	1715
(d) Black Share				
Post-ATT	-0.009***	-0.003	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Baseline (Mean)	0.17	0.18	0.26	0.14
N	16997	3927	3586	1715
(e) Hispanic Share				
Post-ATT	0.002	0.004	0.007	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)
Baseline (Mean)	0.27	0.14	0.25	0.07
N	17065	3927	3588	1715

Notes: This table presents estimates from a continuous treatment difference-in-differences specification using xtdidregress (Stata), treating the number of interdistrict magnet schools within 2.5 miles as a continuous treatment variable. Unlike the main analysis, which uses a binary indicator for first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening, this specification exploits variation in the number of nearby magnet schools over time, allowing each additional magnet school opening to contribute to the identification of treatment effects. Each coefficient represents the estimated change in the outcome associated with one additional nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, holding school and year fixed effects constant. Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. This specification assumes homogeneous treatment effects across cohorts and over time and should therefore be interpreted as a robustness check complementing the main Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) estimates reported in Table 1, which relax this assumption. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A20. Full Pre- & Post-Treatment Periods: Impact on Total Enrollment & Share of Low-income Students

	Total Enrollment				Share of Low-income Students	
	K8		High		K8	High
	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	TPS
Pre-ATT	1.725	-1.025	2.341	0.801	-0.010*	0.008
	(1.307)	(1.162)	(3.300)	(1.746)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Post-ATT	3.272	-19.781	-173.641**	-19.757	0.022	0.099***
	(12.287)	(12.297)	(55.118)	(16.599)	(0.014)	(0.029)
Tp0	7.380	-1.929	-34.419*	1.680	0.007*	0.033*
	(4.686)	(2.739)	(17.365)	(4.417)	(0.003)	(0.015)
Tp1	12.876*	-6.826	-34.688	7.722	-0.003	0.056**
	(6.468)	(3.977)	(18.640)	(7.493)	(0.005)	(0.019)
Tp2	12.038	-9.518	-75.925**	14.021	-0.001	0.065
	(7.553)	(5.189)	(28.879)	(9.067)	(0.007)	(0.037)
Tp3	12.518	-18.481**	-57.784*	12.447	0.009	0.070*
	(10.025)	(6.863)	(28.634)	(12.438)	(0.007)	(0.034)
Tp4	12.640	-33.390***	-84.956	7.150	-0.011	0.109*
	(9.830)	(9.048)	(43.676)	(15.134)	(0.009)	(0.045)
Tp5	4.606	-35.077**	-98.036	-3.010	-0.030	0.118*
	(10.377)	(12.087)	(84.732)	(16.428)	(0.015)	(0.046)
Tp6	11.480	-33.637**	-138.445	-10.763	-0.021	0.106**
	(11.980)	(12.929)	(93.634)	(18.514)	(0.018)	(0.036)
Tp7	16.764	-31.788*	-162.574	-22.161	0.034*	0.110**
	(12.016)	(15.216)	(98.485)	(21.087)	(0.017)	(0.035)
Tp8	6.835	-29.140	-218.331	-32.604	0.027	0.104**
	(14.253)	(19.195)	(125.303)	(25.731)	(0.021)	(0.039)
Tp9	4.026	-20.565	-341.287**	-33.107	0.070***	0.132**
	(15.942)	(17.990)	(113.539)	(27.916)	(0.018)	(0.044)
Tp10	16.495	-25.906	-272.405**	-44.903	0.069***	0.105**
	(15.272)	(16.802)	(105.332)	(30.375)	(0.020)	(0.035)
N	14,594	3,138	3,120	1,606	12,799	2,759

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, using the full set of pre- and post-treatment periods without the ±5 event-time window restriction imposed in the main analysis. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT; Tm19 through Tm1) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT; Tp0 through Tp20), along with event-study estimates for each post-treatment period (Tp0 through Tp10; additional periods omitted for brevity). Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. Free or reduced-price lunch eligibility data are not available for private schools. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A21. Full Pre- & Post-Treatment Periods: Impact on Racial Composition

	White Share				Black Share				Hispanic Share			
	K8		High		K8		High		K8		High	
	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private	TPS	Private
Pre-ATT	-0.002	-0.004	-0.004**	-0.005	-0.001	0.005	0.003**	0.009	0.001*	-0.000	0.002*	-0.000
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Post-ATT	-0.006	-0.042	-0.020	0.026	-0.022***	0.005	-0.019	-0.021	0.032***	0.019	0.039***	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Tm5	-0.004*	0.005	-0.008	0.007	0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.015	0.003	0.000	0.008	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Tm4	-0.000	-0.009	-0.003	0.002	-0.001	0.002	-0.003	-0.019	0.001	0.010	0.004	0.014
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.014)
Tm3	-0.005	-0.029*	-0.000	0.018	-0.005*	0.011	-0.005	-0.024	0.009**	0.026*	0.013*	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Tm2	-0.010*	-0.040*	-0.011	0.012	-0.006*	0.011	-0.004	-0.017	0.013***	0.035**	0.021**	0.002
	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Tm1	-0.010	-0.061***	-0.020	0.008	-0.008**	0.025	-0.011	-0.013	0.016***	0.035*	0.031**	-0.004
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.011)	(0.023)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Tp0	-0.010	-0.069***	-0.020	0.024	-0.010**	0.023	-0.011	-0.021	0.019***	0.041*	0.028**	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.020)	(0.003)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.006)
Tp1	-0.008	-0.061**	-0.029*	0.028	-0.013***	-0.005	-0.011	-0.023	0.024***	0.043*	0.024	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.006)	(0.021)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Tp2	-0.004	-0.058	-0.019	0.032	-0.013**	-0.012	-0.009	-0.019	0.022**	0.038	0.020	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.007)	(0.027)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Tp3	-0.005	-0.037	-0.031	0.045*	-0.017**	-0.019	-0.011	-0.026	0.028***	0.020	0.039**	-0.010
	(0.010)	(0.032)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.030)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Tp4	-0.016	-0.032	-0.033	0.027	-0.020**	-0.011	-0.010	-0.024	0.042***	0.015	0.045*	-0.010
	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.007)
Tp5	-0.009	-0.024	-0.044	0.040	-0.028***	-0.001	-0.007	-0.032	0.036**	0.023	0.055*	-0.012
	(0.012)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.007)
N	14,594	3,138	3,120	1,606	14,527	3,138	3,116	1,606	14,594	3,138	3,120	1,606

Notes: This table presents Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) staggered difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of first exposure to a nearby interdistrict magnet school opening within 2.5 miles, using the full set of pre- and post-treatment periods without the ±5 event-time window restriction imposed in the main analysis. For each outcome and school type, I report aggregated average treatment effects for pre-treatment periods (Pre-ATT; Tm19 through Tm1) and post-treatment periods (Post-ATT; Tp0 through Tp20), along with event-study estimates for each post-treatment period (Tp0 through Tp10; additional periods omitted for brevity). Standard errors clustered at the school level are in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Figure A10. Enrollment and Composition Trends in Interdistrict Magnet Schools



Notes: This figure presents annual trends in average enrollment size per school, total enrollment in Connecticut, and student composition of interdistrict magnet schools (IMS), disaggregated by school level (K8 and high school). Panel (a) shows average enrollment size per school, panel (b) shows total enrollment across all IMS in Connecticut, panels (c) through (e) show the shares of White, Black, and Hispanic students, and panel (f) shows the share of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL).