Bringing Corporate Governance Down to Earth: From Culmination Outcomes to Comprehensive Outcomes in Shareholder and Stakeholder Capitalism

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April 2020 | Working Paper No. 72

A Working Paper of the Corporate Responsibility Initiative
BRINGING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DOWN TO EARTH: FROM CULMINATION OUTCOMES TO COMPREHENSIVE OUTCOMES IN SHAREHOLDER AND STAKEHOLDER CAPITALISM

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ABSTRACT

A battle rages between the partisans of shareholder and stakeholder capitalism; the very heart and soul of corporate governance is at stake. This paper advances the scholarly debate by mapping Amartya Sen’s distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive outcomes onto shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory. It provides foundational reasons to move away from the untenable idealism of value maximization, characterized here as a culmination outcome-oriented approach, towards a stakeholder-oriented approach that is concerned with broader comprehensive outcomes. It argues that the stakeholder approach more accurately reflects how business decision makers actually make choices; as compared to the shareholder primacy approach, which proposes that decision makers are able to seek (and should seek) to maximize a single-valued culmination score. It is argued that the value maximization approach is flawed because no decision-making space exists where a “maximal” allocation is available in its merely technical sense, free of the taint of politics or constraints of ethics. The stakeholder approach is a more realistic account of what decision-makers are actually able to do in discharging their managerial responsibilities; and thus, it provides a richer account of what they ought to do and how. While imperfect in its own way, the stakeholder approach is a more down-to-earth theory of reasoned and purposive business decision-making for addressing today’s critical problems of people and planet.

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Introduction

As battle rages between the partisans of shareholder and stakeholder capitalism, the very heart and soul of corporate governance is at stake. This paper charts a way out of the quagmire by drawing on Amartya Sen’s foundational distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive outcomes in moral and economic reasoning. It provides foundational reasons to move away from the untenable idealism of value maximization, characterized herein as a culmination outcome-oriented approach, towards a stakeholder-
oriented approach that is concerned with broader comprehensive outcomes. Though imperfect in its own way, the stakeholder-oriented ‘family’ of corporate governance models more accurately reflects how business decision making actually occurs; it also reflects a more down-to-earth account of reasoned and purposive business decision-making in the world today.

In 2019, during the hottest month ever recorded on the planet,¹ the U.S. Business Roundtable released an earthshaking revisionary “Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation.”² In its press release, the organization indicated that the revised statement “moves away from shareholder primacy” and includes a "fundamental a Commitment to All Stakeholders.”³ The 300-word statement, signed by 181 CEOs of many the largest firms in the United States, concluded with a pledge to, “deliver value to all [stakeholders], for the future success of our companies, our communities and our country.” Despite a deluge of criticism that followed instantly,⁴ the stakeholder approach gained even more ground months later in a ‘manifesto’ issued at Davos that called on companies to treat people “with dignity and respect.”⁵ In a letter issued to CEOs in

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¹ See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), July 2019 Was Hottest Month on Record for the Planet, August 15, 2019.
² See Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Redefines Purpose of a Corporation to Promote An Economy That Serves All Americans, August 19, 2019.
³ Ibid.
⁴ One business commentator suggested that, “CEOs have thought it over and decided that shareholders are annoying.” See Matt Levine, Maybe CEOs Are Fed Up With Shareholders, BLOOMBERG, August 19, 2019. For their part, the U.S. Council of Institutional Investors (CII) warned that, “[t]he statement undercuts notions of managerial accountability to shareholders...”. See Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Purpose, August 19, 2019.
January 2020, BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink declared that “the importance of serving stakeholders and embracing purpose is becoming increasingly central to the way that companies understand their role in society.” Responding to this seismic shift in the landscape, shareholder primacy’s most venerable proponent, Lucian Bebchuk and his co-author Roberto Tallarita issued a blistering counter-attack, claiming that ‘stakeholderism’ hurts the people that it is trying to help. They too raised the specter of managerial slack and re-iterated arguments about the economic inefficiency that they believe will follow from adopting the stakeholder approach. Moreover, they cautioned that ‘stakeholderism’ will have the unintended and very detrimental consequence of chilling important regulatory reforms that would benefit stakeholders. To face down Bebchuk’s offensive, Martin Lipton, shareholder primacy’s most formidable opponent, brought out the big guns. Referring to a string of memos that he and others released online from April 2017 to January 2020, he pronounced that a wholesale paradigm shift towards the stakeholder approach is taking place. Calling on business leaders to embrace “the new paradigm,” he and his co-authors declared that, “[a]s this new paradigm of corporate governance continues to take root and shape the gestalt of the business world, corporations will be better positioned to create sustainable, long-term value and avoid heavy-handed

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8 Bebchuk and Tallarita claim that, “[b]y raising illusory expectations about its ability to remedy corporate externalities, stakeholderism would impede, limit, or delay policy reforms that could offer effective protection to stakeholders.” Id. at 52.  
9 See Martin Lipton, Professor Bebchuk’s Errant Attack on Stakeholder Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (March 4, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/03/04/professor-bebchuk-s-errant-attack-on-stakeholder-governance/
legislative initiatives.”10 The battle lines are clearly drawn, and yet the terrain remains murky. Rather than focusing on doctrinal arguments over what the law apparently requires or should require, this paper seeks to clarify the terrain of debate by showing how the two approaches differ in terms of their analytic and normative foundations.

For detractors and supporters alike, the Business Roundtable’s summer intervention marked a turning point. Indeed, just a few years earlier, The Economist predicted that “shareholder value—properly defined—will remain the governing principle of firms.”11 In 2017, Bower and Paine claimed in no uncertain terms that, “most CEOs and boards [erroneously] believe their main duty is to maximize shareholder value.”12 Obligation or otherwise, the goal of maximizing shareholder value had apparently stood for years as the lodestone for business decision-makers in today’s globalizing “corporate system.”13 So, what changed?


12 See THE ASPEN INSTITUTE BUSINESS AND SOCIETY PROGRAM, UNPACKING CORPORATE PURPOSE 4 (May 2014).

13 See Joseph L. Bower and Lynn S. Paine, The Error at the Heart of Corporate Leadership, 95(4) HARV. BUS. REV. 51 (2017).

14 In their 1932 treatise, Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner C. Means proclaimed the arrival of the “corporate system” in the world:
What accounts for this sudden shift in *gestalt*, to use Lipton’s words? Some commentators and academics speculated that populism’s rise in the United States led business leaders to pre-emptively cast themselves in a more favorable light as a way to avoid more stringent regulation.\(^{15}\) For their part, Bebchuk and Tallarita suggested that, “\(i\)t might not be a coincidence that support for stakeholderism among some management advisors and corporate leaders has been growing in recent years in which [accountability enhancing] hedge fund activism has intensified.”\(^{16}\) Much of the critique of rising ‘stakeholderism’ impugns the motives of those who preach it: the fact that the most wealthy and powerful business leaders in America are calling for a more humane form of capitalism appears to some commentators as disingenuous, and reasonably so. Much of the critique focuses largely on deconstructing the motives and political postures of CEOs and their advisors. In this paper, I take a very different approach. I use this opportunity to add to our understanding about just how the stakeholder and shareholder approaches differ in their analytical, epistemic and normative foundations. The reason for the endless-seeming war between the advocates of shareholder and stakeholder capitalism, I argue, is that the two approaches rest on foundationally distinct conceptions about what managers *are able to do* and what they *ought to do* in making business decisions.

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The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a *means of organizing economic life*. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a “corporate system” —as there was once a feudal system—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social institution…

*See* ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 10 (1933).


\(^{16}\) Bebchuk, *supra* note 7, at 50.
Shareholder value maximization, I claim, is grounded in untenable idealism about how flesh-and-blood decision-makers are able to operate in the world (except in the narrowest of circumstances); whereas stakeholder theory, though imperfect and incomplete, is a more realistic way to characterize how business decisions are able to be made and ought to be made.

The analysis provided in this paper is concerned with both the descriptive question of how corporate decisions are actually made (and able to be made), and the normative question of how decisions ought to be made. Indeed, the descriptive and normative aspects of decision making are inextricably linked. After all, it makes no sense to ask someone to do something that the person is logically unable to do. Here, Immanuel Kant’s familiar aphorism, ought implies can applies very straightforwardly. Shareholder primacy is untenable as an overarching ‘rule’ for decision-making because it makes unreasonable, indeed, impossible to fulfil demands on flesh-and-blood corporate decision-makers as ethical beings whose personal agency is never entirely severed from their professional agency. Managers are not maximizing automatons; more to the point: they are unable to be maximizing automatons. As corporate governance creed, maximization demands a single-dimensional way of thinking that is impossible to actualize in the multidimensional complexity of real world business decision making, except in the narrowest of circumstances. The decision-making ‘space’ that allows for choosing for ‘maximal’ outcomes occurs so rarely that a maximizing ‘rule’ is not

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17 Kant’s insight was that if a person is obliged to do something, then logically-speaking, that person must be able to actually do it. In Critique of Pure Reason, he writes that, “the action to which the ‘ought’ applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.” See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 1781.at 473.
functionally generalizable.\textsuperscript{18} As a ‘rule’ that cannot be followed generally, it should not be followed, except only in the very narrow circumstances when it can be.

This paper is structured in four parts. The first part of the paper provides the necessary background: I critically evaluate the value maximization credo and the welfarist normative justification that is given for it. In the second part; I explain and adopt Sen’s distinction between \textit{culmination} outcomes and \textit{comprehensive} outcomes and I map these concepts onto the debate over shareholder and stakeholder capitalism. In the third part, I address value maximization’s missing moral floor and show how the ‘fix’ that is given for this problem begs the question. And in the fourth part, I give historical and present examples of how the comprehensive stakeholder-oriented approach is reflected in actual behavior. I make out the case in a series of argument steps: i) I examine what the shareholder primacy approach purports to maximize and how; ii) I consider just what \textit{efficiency} represents within the value maximization approach and I explain this concept’s inadequacies in global context; iii) I problematize the idea that a fixed set of unwritten basic customs or ‘moral ground floor’ conditions can be fully satisfied prior to running computational cost-benefit analysis in the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency approach; iv) I reject Michael Jensen’s restrictive conditions for ‘rational and purposive’ decision making and endorse Amartya Sen’s pluralistic and comprehensive approach. The main take-away from this examination is that the value-maximization approach is unworkable in practice,

\textsuperscript{18} Such circumstances might be present in the decision-making space sometimes referred to as the \textit{Revlon} zone; and yet, it is not always crystal clear whether a decision-maker is actually in the ‘zone’ or not. In \textit{Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.}, 506 A.2d 173 (Del.,1986), the court held that, “the [fiduciary] duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.” [at 182].
except in extremely rare circumstances; this finding, I contend, goes a long way to understanding just why CEO Jamie Dimon regards the stakeholder approach as “more accurately” reflecting how business managers make decisions.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, I move from the descriptive and conceptual analysis to a normative one, proposing that today’s managers should consult a \textit{comprehensive}-outcome oriented “dashboard of indicators” and not just a \textit{culmination}-outcome oriented speedometer.

\textbf{Part I – What is Value Maximization’s Purpose?}

Is the call on managers to \textit{maximize} a form of ‘loose talk’ or does it refer to something quite specific? The answer, it turns out, is much contested.

\textbf{A. Just What is to be ‘Maximized’?}

Opinions differ widely about what criterion is to be maximized, whether shareholder value, profit, wealth, welfare,\textsuperscript{20} or something else.\textsuperscript{21} What lies in common in all

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\footnotesize\textsuperscript{19} Upon introducing the Business Roundtable’s statement, Chairman Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co., noted enigmatically that the stakeholder approach, “more accurately reflects how our CEOs and their companies operate.” See Wall Street Journal, “The Business Roundtable’s Model of Capitalism Does Pay Off.” Rick Wartzman and Kelly Tang, October 27, 2019.

\textsuperscript{20} Hart and Zingales argue that the criteria to be maximized should be shareholder welfare. See Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, \textit{Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not Market Value} (ECGI Finance Working Paper N° 521/2017, August 2017).

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approaches is that maximization is generally regarded to be a *technical* objective—a “scorecard” for making rational choices.\(^2\) In the United States, the received wisdom was reflected for many years in a law school casebook edited by a trio of prominent legal scholars. Professors Allen, Kraakman, and Subramanian declared in 2012 that, “the goal of the business corporation is to maximize long term shareholder wealth.”\(^23\) This goal, they suggested, was embedded in corporate law itself: “[t]he objective of *maximizing* shareholder welfare runs so deeply through the relevant statutory and case law that it is rarely questioned or even stated, except when the conflict between the interests of shareholders and those of other corporate constituencies grows too acute to ignore” [emphasis added].\(^24\) The noted exceptions turn out to have growing importance today, and we shall consider below how they arise and what they might imply legally and otherwise. In a 2009 textbook, Stephen Bainbridge asserted plainly that, “[i]t is well-settled that directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”\(^25\) Bainbridge’s assertion was strikingly at odds with Einer Elhague’s seminal argument just a few years earlier that shareholder primacy is a deeply entrenched *social norm*\(^26\) rather than a legal

\(^{22}\) Jensen argues that value maximization, “gives management a way to assess the tradeoffs that must be made among competing constituencies, and that it allows for *principled decision making independent of the personal preferences* of managers and directors” [emphasis added]. Value maximization, he argues, comprises “an objective yardstick against which [management’s] performance can be evaluated.” See Michael C. Jensen, *Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function*, 22(1) JOUR. OF APPL. CORP. FIN. 17 (2001). Jensen’s articles have been cited over ten thousand times a year, tracking over 200,000 citations in 2018 (according to Google Scholar).

\(^{23}\) See William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman, and Guhan Subramanian, *COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS* 2 (2012). Note that the authors use the term “wealth” rather than “value.”

\(^{24}\) Here the authors use the term “welfare” as opposed to “wealth.” The other corporate constituencies they refer to include creditors and employees. *Ibid.*


\(^{26}\) Regarding *social norms*, one must be cautious not to assume that a particular social norm is inherently desirable, many social norms work against legal norms or reflect the political goals of a certain constituency. For instance, anti-unionism might be regarded as a powerful social norm in some contexts.
standard. Along similar lines, David Millon spoke in 2011 of the worldwide prevalence of corporate “social norms” which, “encourage concentration on quarterly earnings as the relevant metric by which management is to be evaluated” [emphasis added].

Fast-forwarding to 2017, Robert Rhee found evidence of growing use by U.S. judges of the term “maximization” in the corporate law context. And then came the Business Roundtable’s endorsement of the stakeholder approach in 2019. Immediately after that, Martin Lipton and his colleagues released a memorandum on “Stakeholder Governance and the Fiduciary Duties of Directors” in which they asserted that, “Delaware law does not enshrine a principle of shareholder primacy or preclude a board of directors from considering the interests of other stakeholders. Nor does the law of any other state.”

And yet, even with Lipton’s unequivocal statement of legal opinion, controversy over the normative and legal status of shareholder primacy persists, with scholars and practitioners digging in their heels on either side. While the war rages, credible anecdotes suggest that many of today’s business executives may still believe (rightly or wrongly) that they have

27 Elhauge rejects the idea that what he calls “pure” profit maximization is either a legal or social norm. See Einer Elhauge, Corporate Managers’ Operational Discretion to Sacrifice Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 60 (Bruce L. Hay, Robert N. Stavins, and Richard H.K. Vietor, eds., 2005). Elhauge argues that no duty to maximize profit exists in law and that the absence of such a legal duty demonstrates a “revealed preference of society for allowing social and moral sanctions to operate” in corporate decision-making. He concludes that, “current law correctly finds no special rationale to impose such a special duty to profit-maximize on corporate managers.” Rather, he concludes that, “two important special features of corporations--shareholders relative insulation from social and moral sanctions, and collective-action problems in acting on any social and moral impulses they have--make it particularly important to preserve managerial discretion to respond to social and moral considerations.” Id. at 23. On shareholder value maximization as a learned (and taught) social norm, see Craig N. Smith & David Rönnegard, Shareholder Primacy, Corporate Social Responsibility, and the Role of Business Schools, 134(3) JOUR. OF BUS. ETHICS 554 (2016).


a legal duty to maximize shareholder value. Just five years ago, corporate law scholar John Coffee observed in his interactions with faculty at the Harvard Business School that, “all the business professors assumed that the law requires shareholder wealth maximization.” Even so, we might have lingering doubts about the practical potency of the value maximization norm. In the real world, we might say, the truly salient challenges that managers’ face include competition, disruption by innovative upstarts, activist hedge funds, takeover bids, and many other sundry challenges. Such sentiment, as we shall see, is fully consistent with a comprehensive outcome oriented approach rather than value maximization.

B. Conviction and Ambivalence about Value-Maximization

How do we account for the concurrence of both ambivalence and conviction over something that appears so vital as the shareholder value maximization norm? Various theories have been offered up over the decades to explain this awkward concurrence. In 2011, Millon theorized that business school teachers, “apparently misapprehending the law, preach this ethos (shareholder primacy) at the expense of a richer, more complex conception of responsibility.” At the same time that Elhauge argued, quite convincingly, that maximization was a “social norm” rather than a legal norm, John

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32 Millon, supra note 28, at 529. See also Smith & Rönnegard, supra note 27.
Donohue asserted that the pervasive belief that managers “have an obligation to maximize” is an optimal one because it avoids “all of the problematic litigation that would result if they really did have such a legal obligation” while benefiting society as a whole.\(^\text{33}\) Though erroneous, he opined, the belief was useful because it supported efficient outcomes. At the time, Elhauge noted that even if there is no enforceable legal duty to maximize (as he believed), this “does nothing to prevent shareholders from choosing to adopt profit maximization as the goal they choose to monitor in exercising their voting or investment rights” [emphasis added].\(^\text{34}\) In other words, shareholder value maximization applied as a \textit{de facto} standard rather than a legal one—the underlying theory being that shareholders will tend to support well-performing stocks, which in turn, will reward managers who pursue shareholder value maximization single-mindedly.\(^\text{35}\) Today, we see this theory turned on its head, with prominent business leaders, scholars, and corporate lawyers (such as Lipton), believing that the value maximization approach puts the cart before the horse.\(^\text{36}\)

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\(^{34}\) Elhauge, \textit{supra} note 27, at 37. Here, Elhauge is speaking of profit maximization.

\(^{35}\) To use Eugene Fama’s language, a firm’s stock price (as a proxy for shareholder value) might be described as a monitoring “device.” Fama writes that, “[t]he firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. In addition, individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside of the firm.” See Eugene F. Fama, \textit{Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm}, 88(2) \textit{JOUR. OF POL. ECON.} 288-307, 289 (1980).

\(^{36}\) See e.g., BlackRock CEO Larry Fink’s 2019 annual letter to shareholders:

Purpose is not a mere tagline or marketing campaign; it is a company’s fundamental reason for being – what it does every day to create value for its stakeholders. Purpose is not the sole pursuit of profits but the animating force for achieving them… Profits are in no way inconsistent with purpose – in fact, profits and purpose are inextricably linked… Purpose unifies management, employees, and communities. Similarly, when a company truly understands and expresses its purpose, it functions with the focus and strategic discipline that drive long-term profitability.
How did the value-maximization norm come to occupy such a vaunted position over several decades in spite of the uncertainty that surrounded it? We can begin to answer this question by considering the highly persuasive arguments that were given by one of its most renowned proponents, finance theorist Michael Jensen. Jensen argued in 2001 that a “theory of action” for managers and Boards of Directors must tell them, first and foremost, “how to choose among multiple competing and inconsistent constituent interests.”

In sorting out priorities, he advocated for a razor-sharp technical approach, calling on managers to pursue what he called a “single-valued objective function,” which, he said, ought to be “value maximization.”

One reason that managers ought to do this, he contended, was that overall “social welfare is maximized when all firms in an economy attempt to maximize their own total firm value,” and that, “profit maximization leads to an efficient social outcome” [emphasis added]. In other words, Jensen adverted to the well-worn notion that when everyone strives to maximize their own self-interest in a market economy, we are all better off. By this consequentialist and welfarist mode of

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37 Jensen, supra note 22, at 13. Later, we shall see how Jensen’s notion of “multiple competing and inconsistent constituent interests” can be reframed using Amartya Sen’s language of decision making relating to distinct concerns in the comprehensive outcome approach. Whereas Sen calls for exercising non-computational judgment between distinct concerns, Jensen calls on managers to compute the value of alternative courses of action solely in terms of their ranked scores.

38 Jensen writes that, “value maximization states that managers should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of a firm.” His use of the term “value maximization” is a close variant of “shareholder value maximization” and “shareholder wealth maximization.” While they have distinct technical meanings, these terms are often used almost interchangeably. See Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12(2) BUS. ETHICS Q. 234-256, 236 (2002). Note that Jensen published two articles by the same name in 2002 (cited in this note) and in 2001 (cited in note 22). They are largely identical in content, but some important differences are notable; therefore, I refer to specific publication accordingly.

39 In his definition of “total long run market value of the firm” Jensen includes “equity, debt, preferred stock and warrants.” Id. at 236 and 240.

40 By this view, value maximization is a pragmatic approach that recognizes that business managers do not have the capacity or powers to contend with all of the world’s imperfections. They will argue that, after all, in striving to maximize shareholder value, the manager simultaneously improves
reasoning, firms and their decision makers ought to strive to maximize shareholder value because of the socially desirable consequences that flow from such efforts.41 The second reason he gave implied a style of compliance obligation for managers: value maximization is a rational and purposeful approach to management, while its main contender, stakeholder theory, is not. Stakeholder theory, he argued, “politicizes the corporation” and “violates the proposition that any organization must have a single-valued objective as a precursor to purposeful or rational behavior.”42 So far as Jensen was concerned, value maximization was defensible as a rational and technical approach (even scientific), whereas stakeholder theory was a political one. As political, rather than scientific, the stakeholder approach, he contended, was a very undesirable one.

In rejecting stakeholder theory on the grounds of rationality, Jensen asserted that, “it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension” and that, “purposeful behavior requires a single valued objective function” [emphasis added].43 We shall consider a contrary perspective on the demands of rationality in later sections below. The critical point to consider here is that Jensen argued that long run firm value was the only

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41 Pettit defines consequentialism as, “the theory that the way to tell whether a particular choice is the right choice for an agent to have made is to look at the relevant consequences of the decision; to look at the relevant effects of the decision on the world.” See Philip Pettit, Consequentialism (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993) p. xiii. Welfarism, as described by Amartya Sen, “insists that states of affairs must be judged exclusively by the utility information (such as happiness or desire fulfillment) related to the respective states—no matter what the other features of the consequent state of affairs may be, such as the performance of particular acts (however nasty), or the violation of other people’s liberties (however personal).” See Amartya K. Sen, “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason”, Journal of Philosophy, 2000, at 478.

42 Jensen, supra note 38, at 237.

43 Id. at 237-238.
criterion that managers should seek to maximize—this he said, was a “true (single dimensional) score.”\textsuperscript{44} By Jensens’ logic, all other criteria that might be considered in managerial decision-making are only relevant insofar as they affect the ultimate score. Jensen’s extremely influential prescription exuded the flavor of a compliance obligation for managers because, as he argued, the contending alternative would lead them to act irrationally or without purpose. Needless to say, irrational action would be unjustifiable, legally or otherwise.\textsuperscript{45}

Jensen’s arguments have had enormous impact, with papers on this topic tracking many thousands of citations over the last two decades. And yet, as we saw earlier, the battle over shareholder primacy and the stakeholder approach flares up perennially. In Part II of this paper, I will show how Sen’s analytical distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive outcomes helps to clarify the epistemological and conceptual underpinnings of Jensen’s shareholder approach and its main contender. As we shall see in Part III, it is difficult to reconcile a myopic “single dimensional” focus on shareholder value with approaches that include concern for other desirable values such as respect for human rights and dignity for workers and communities.

\textsuperscript{44} Id. at 235.

\textsuperscript{45} In corporate law, a manager’s broad discretion to make business decisions is protected under the business judgment rule as long as the decision maker acts honestly and there is some rational basis for the decision. The contemporary approach to the legal appraisal of business judgment was articulated in \textit{Aronson v Lewis}, 473 A.2.d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) in which the Court stated that, “to invoke the rule’s protection directors have a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.” [at s. IV a)]
C. What is “Good” about Shareholder Value Maximization?

Like Jensen, corporate law theorists in the Anglo-American “law and economics” tradition give two principal normative reasons for adopting value maximization. First, they give a consequentialist style of argument (i.e. a welfarist justification), which holds that the shareholder primacy norm promotes economic efficiency. Second, they provide a species of deontological argument, in which shareholders are regarded as the property rights-holding “shareowners” (or “principals”) of the corporation. In the consequentialist argument, the pursuit of value maximization by individual firms is regarded to be an appropriate proxy objective for the broader goal of increasing overall social welfare. In the deontological mode, the manager’s obligation to maximize

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46 Some might call it a constitutional norm. Berle and Means conclude their 1932 treatise by speculating that, “[t]he law of corporations… might well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state…” [emphasis added]. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 14, at 357.  
47 In the preceding subsection, we saw how Jensen articulates this argument. In THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW, Reinier Kraakman et al. opine that the, “most appropriate” interpretation of the shareholder value maximization norm reflects the view that, “focusing principally on the maximization of shareholder returns is, in general, the best means by which corporate law can serve the broader goal of advancing overall social welfare.” See Reinier Kraakman, et al., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 23 (2017). The authors describe the “goal” of corporate law as follows:  
As a normative matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as of any branch of law—is presumed to serve the interests of society as a whole. More particularly, the appropriate goal of corporate law is to advance the aggregate welfare of all who are affected by a firm’s activities, including the firm’s shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers, as well as third parties such as local communities and beneficiaries of the natural environment…  

…  
What we are suggesting here might be put more precisely in the language of welfare economics as pursuing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency within acceptable patterns of distribution. [at 22-23]  
48 Allen et al. adopt the welfarist paradigm in their law school textbook: “It goes without saying that the fundamental objective of enterprise law—indeed of all law—is to increase social welfare… good law [is] efficient…it maximizes the size of the economic pie.” A central premise in their overall approach to the analysis of corporate law is that, “we believe that shareholder/investor welfare is a workable if imperfect proxy for social welfare in most situations… Once shareholder/investor welfare is identified as the principal objective of enterprise law, it follows easily that economic efficiency is the logical criterion for evaluating enterprise law” [emphasis added]. See Allen et al., supra note 23, at 2. Lewis Kornhauser is skeptical of this approach, stating that, “wealth maximization only provides an appropriate proxy for well-being under special conditions [which may not hold generally in the
shareholder value is believed to flow from the consent relationship between the putative shareowners (or “principals”) of the corporation and the people who consent to manage it. This hierarchical structure of “owner” and manager underlies the widely adopted, though also much contested, principal-agent theory of corporate governance. The principal-agent approach is, I believe, overly mechanistic in its approach to organizational behavior; it is also flawed because it rests on the erroneous contention that shareholders are the “owners” of the corporation—they are not. While the debate over

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49 Principal-agent theory (also known as agency theory) regards the shareholders as the “owners” and therefore the principals of the corporation (sometimes the blended term “shareowners” is used). Principals are regarded, in effect, as the corporation’s masters. The managers, in turn, are treated as the subordinate agents of the shareholders—they are, in effect, the shareholders’ servants. In subordinating managers to shareholders in this way, principal-agent theory posits a world of agent-managers whose role is to serve a cadre of principal-owners in the manner of loyal technocrat-servants. With this, any notion of the corporation as a “social entity” that might pursue a public interest other than increasing “culmination outcomes” in terms of utility, wealth or social welfare recedes entirely. Agency theory aligns very closely with the consequentialist normative argument for shareholder primacy insofar as both arrive at the same prescriptive conclusion for managerial action: maximizing shareholder value ought to be the lodestone. But, as Eugene Fama argues: “Dispelling the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders is important because it is a first step toward understanding that control over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily the province of security holders.” See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88(2) JOUR. OF POL. ECON. 288-307, 290 (1980). While the principal-agent theory of the corporation dominates much of corporate governance scholarship, its detractors argue that corporate directors are not the agents of the shareholders; rather, they are agents of the corporation itself. See e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 594 (1986). Also in this vein of critique, corporate theorist Katsuhito Iwai argues that, “it is the law that endows [Directors] with the powers to act as the corporation rather than merely to represent the corporation as its agents under some superior authority.” See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47(4) AM. JOURNAL OF COMP. LAW, 583-632, 621 (1999). As I discuss later in this article, there is some tension between the main preoccupation of the principal-agent theory of the corporation (reducing agency costs in service of shareholder value maximization) and the motivational question about why business decision makers should take steps to pursue sustainable development and/or embed “respect for human rights” as a policy commitment in the companies that they manage. On debates over principal-agent theory, see generally Richard J. Zeckhauser, PRINCIPLES AND AGENTS (John W. Pratt ed., 1991).

50 The main problem for the principal-agent approach is the much-lamented separation of ownership and control. See Berle & Means, supra note 14. For a clear statement on how shareholders are not the owners of the corporation, see Fama, Ibid..
principal-agent theory is a rich and interesting one, it is not the focus of this paper. Here, I focus on the consequentialist argument for value-maximization, rather than the property-rights claim, though the two are often linked.\footnote{Edward R. Freeman argues that, “[s]tories which depict the firm as either (1) the private property of owners; (2) the necessary arrangements if we are to maximize the greatest good for the greatest number; or, (3) the result of a voluntary contracting process, all appeal to the Separation Thesis to rule out certain effects of the firm on other stakeholders.” His “separation thesis” holds that, “[t]he discourse of business and the discourse of ethics can be separated so that sentences like, ‘x is a business decision’ have no moral content, and ‘x is a moral decision’ have no business content.” Freeman observes that, “…it is ingrained in all that we do in business schools to separate the discourse of business from the discourse of ethics.” \textit{See} Edward R. Freeman, \textit{The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions}, BUS. ETHICS Q. 409-421, 412, 415 (1994).}

In assessing the soundness and normative adequacy of the consequentialist arguments given for shareholder value maximization, much turns on how we construe efficiency. Maximization’s proponents define efficiency as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.\footnote{In a footnote to the introduction of their corporate law casebook, Allen et al. explain that, “by ‘efficiency’ we mean ‘Kaldor-Hicks efficiency’.” \textit{See} Allen et al. \textit{supra} note 23, at 2. \textit{See also} Kraakman, R. et al. \textit{supra} note 47.} This particular brand of efficiency is distinguished from Pareto efficiency. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion is regarded to be less demanding than the Pareto efficiency; and consequently, the proponents of value maximization regard the former as a more workable yardstick for appraising whether corporate law rules are efficient. I shall explain what the words “less demanding” imply in a moment.

In a shareholder value maximizing-world, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is obtained if the overall gains to social welfare are great enough such that anyone who might be made worse off in that state of affairs could be compensated \textit{hypothetically} from those gains,
while still leaving an overall increase in social welfare. What matters is that enough is gained in the new state of affairs that there remains an overall gain even if those left worse off are compensated for their loss. Importantly though, the people who are left worse off in the chosen state of affairs off need not actually be compensated for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to obtain. For this reason, we speak of Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation, rather than actual compensation. A Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome has no bearing on how social welfare (or wealth) gains are actually distributed in the society—it may very well be the case that even large numbers of people are left worse off (this would not be a desirable outcome, but it does not negate Kaldor-Hicks efficiency). Moreover, for its proponents, the actual or even hypothetical mechanisms for implementing potential compensation need not be known, as distributional outcomes are considered to be a matter for political resolution. By this account, settling on the desirable distributive outcomes for a state of affairs is left up to legislators. The proponents of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are largely satisfied with this style of potential compensation because their approach is coupled with the assertion that governments have the power and political authority to make distributions according to the politically determined

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53 In discussions about shareholder primacy and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the gains are variously described in terms of “social welfare,” “social wealth,” “wealth,” and “value.” As a matter of logic, if the term shareholder wealth maximization is used as the predicate, then Kaldor-Hicks efficiency would obtain with respect to overall wealth. On the use of “shareholder/investor welfare” as a proxy for social welfare in efficiency-oriented evaluations of corporate law, see Allen et al., supra note 48.  
55 Kornhauser paraphrases arguments by law and economics theorists in this way: “the redistributive aims of law ought to be accomplished through legal institutions that are distinct from institutions that maximize the general level of well-being” See Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 88 [referring to Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why The Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23(2) JOUR. OF L. STUD. 667-681, (1994)].
priorities of the day. Whether or not governments actually desire to make such distributions, or are even capable of fulfilling this role is regarded, tautologically, also to be a political problem and not a problem for setting Kaldor-Hicks efficient corporate law. Nonetheless, whether or not a pathway for potential compensation is at all conceivable for “all those who suffer” in a political community turns out to matter greatly, as we shall consider in more detail below.

D. Compensating “All Those Who Suffer”?

If it is not the business manager’s job to sort out how to compensate “all those who suffer” (to use Nicholas Kaldor’s words) in the world, then whose job is it? For the efficiency theorist, the tax and transfer powers of government are engaged to compensate those who might be harmed (e.g. employees who lose their jobs because workers at a factory located elsewhere are able to do the job more efficiently, i.e. at lower cost to the firm). Government compensation schemes, so the thinking goes, promise an actual state of affairs in which overall social welfare is increased while no individual remains worse off—representing a Pareto-efficient outcome.56 A less state-driven alternative to ‘tax and transfer’ is captured in the aphorism, ‘a rising tide lifts all boats.’ Here, the rising tide stands in for the gradual growth in overall social welfare that arises from repeated Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocations in the economy. The growing aggregate effect of such

56 Pareto efficiency of outcomes is not required for a Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocation; rather, hypothetical ex-post pareto-optimal outcomes can be engineered through government action such that anyone who is made worse off is compensated (e.g. the person could be made worse off because of a loss of livelihood or forced displacement to make way for a mining project, dam, oil pipeline, etc.) See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, eds., 2007).
allocations presumptively leads to new opportunities for those who would be left worse off in particular instances, thereby putting the ‘losers’ in at least as good a position as they were at the outset. By this approach, Pareto-efficient outcomes are potentially realized over time.\(^{57}\) In the vernacular, the pie gets bigger, and so, hypothetically, there’s more desert to go around. We shall return to consider the size of the social welfare “pie” in a moment. It’s worth repeating that for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to obtain in a projected state of affairs, equalization of outcomes need not occur in fact. The distribution-sensitive Pareto-efficient outcomes that are implied in the two pathways to compensation just described are realized in idealized and hypothetical potential compensation scenarios, not in factual ones.\(^{58}\) In this respect, a Kaldor-Hicks efficient state of affairs is fully consistent with an actual state of affairs in which some people end up worse off as a result of overall welfare-enhancing allocations, though hopefully not destitute!

Mixing well-worn metaphors, we might say that as the proverbial tide of social welfare rises in the background, people who lose one match on a level playing field are regarded as free to prepare for another round of play—it is hoped that they capture a bigger piece of the pie next time around. But in the real world that lies far from the imagined place where such ubiquitous metaphors apply, the prospect of potential compensation (the possibility of capturing some of the general gains in social welfare) might never be

\(^{57}\) This approach is referred to as “log rolling” in Michelman, infra note 84. For a critique of the widely adopted though unproven hypothesis that repeated applications of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion will lead to long run balanced distributional outcomes, see Brad Hackinen, DOES REPEATED APPLICATION OF THE KALDOR-HICKS CRITERION GENERATE PARETO IMPROVEMENTS? 9-10 University of Victoria, 2012 (unpublished manuscript).

\(^{58}\) For this reason, Kornhauser argues that, “it is unclear that Kaldor-Hicks superiority is an ethically significant relation” [emphasis added]. See Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 101.
realized. Why not? Because the incidental matter of whether compensation is actually made out over time is contingent on the actual political state of affairs. In the welfarist framework, such politically determined distributional outcomes are viewed as standing apart from the matter of raw economic growth. In vulgar terms: there might be enough money in the system, but the political conditions for its fair distribution may be lacking.\(^{59}\)

This is an all too familiar-sounding state of affairs in the world today. To wit, one should not regard the invocation of the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation criterion by the proponents of value maximization as expressing an underlying egalitarian ethos.\(^{60}\) It is egalitarian only insofar as the free enterprise system gives “all those who suffer” equal opportunity to try to do better in the next round of play (hypothetically, at least).

In the real world, forever tainted by politics and ethics, normative concerns about distributive outcomes are never left out of the drama entirely; indeed, such concerns take center stage. I contend that there is a sense even when speaking formally about potential compensation that actually helping those who are left worse off in the community is desirable. This sense lingers even if, technically-speaking, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is regarded to be agnostic about fairness. The dangling prospect of potential compensation for those left worse off (the essence of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency) implicitly acknowledges

\(^{59}\) Though beyond the scope of this article, we might consider supplementing the notion of Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation with the notion of a prospect of compensation, thereby adding a probability dimension (wherby “prospect” is defined as “the possibility or likelihood of some future event occurring”), such that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency cannot obtain where no conceivable pathway for compensation exists.

\(^{60}\) On the apparent distributional agnosticism of economic science, Kaldor writes: “And short of complete equality, how can the economist decide precisely how much inequality is desirable-i.e. how much secures the maximum total satisfaction? All that economics can, and should, do in this field, is to show, given the pattern of income-distribution desired, which is the most convenient way of bringing it about.” See Kaldor, supra note 54, at 551-552.
broader societal concern about very skewed distributional outcomes. This sentiment, I contend, is reflected in Nicholas Kaldor’s own words:

> There is no need for the economist to prove--as indeed he never could prove--that as a result of the adoption of a certain measure nobody in the community is going to suffer. In order to establish his case, it is quite sufficient for him to show that even if all those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the rest of the community will still be better off than before.\(^6^1\)

In Kaldor’s hypothetical compensation test, *all those who suffer* must be fully compensated for their loss while still leaving gains for the *rest of the community*. While couched in artfully simple terms, the conditions of Kaldor’s test are markedly strict. It’s not enough that a majority of those who suffer are compensated, or even two thirds. Kaldor’s test implies that one person’s loss matters as much as any other’s loss, tragic or trivial. In this respect, he treats all individuals in the community as having equal desert. The suffering of each of those left worse off appears to matter enough that the economist might imagine societal concern (if not legislative) for their collective and individual wellbeing, even if the actual outcomes diverge significantly from what is desired. Here the division of technical-economic and political labor is most discernable: the economist evaluates the potential outcome of courses of action in terms of individual and overall utility, treating all those in the community with equal measure; while the politician evaluates the outcomes in terms of political value and makes policy accordingly.

With all this in mind, it is extremely significant that when speaking about the overall goal of corporate law, Professor Kraakman and his colleagues call for “pursuing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency within acceptable patterns of distribution” [emphasis added].\(^6^2\) Distribution

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\(^6^1\) Id. at 550.
matters. However, as we have just seen, what is considered *acceptable* to the efficiency-seeking corporate lawmaker remains a largely unanswered question. For the proponents of shareholder value maximization, the clamor for justice that rings out in the real world is difficult to shut out. Recognizing such difficulties, we are given the “less demanding” yardstick of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency for appraising efficient corporate law, rather than the “too demanding” standard of Pareto efficiency. There is a logically circular aspect to using overall pie-maximizing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency as the consequentialist’s yardstick for evaluating shareholder value maximization. Shareholder primacy is regarded as “good” (or desirable) because it is the maximally efficient approach in a world where growing shareholder value is seen to be a “reasonable proxy” for improving overall social welfare. This concern about circularity will be taken up further below.

**E. Keeping Externalities Outside**

The proponents of value maximization fully acknowledge that the problem of externalities is a critical one; nonetheless, they contend that the value maximization norm is part of the solution to this problem, not its source. We might imagine some world where negative externalities are simply unknown (In Pan’s Arcadia, perhaps?). In the world where we reside, negative externalities and regulatory failures (sometimes called ‘governance gaps’) make a great mess of things. Kraakman and his co-authors make clear that the pursuit of shareholder value maximization will only tend to advance overall social welfare if appropriate regulatory measures are in place. Similarly, in their critique of ‘stakeholderism,’ Bebchuk and Tallarita insist that they remain as concerned as anyone else about the need for externality regulation, declaring that, “we take stakeholder
interests seriously and believe that some of the adverse effects that companies impose on stakeholders raise serious policy concerns and warrant legal and regulatory intervention.”

On both sides of the trenches, regulations are thought to act as a “brake” on companies that would otherwise generate unacceptable externalities. Here, one is reminded of Adam Smith’s invocation of the “well-governed society” as a necessary background for realizing “universal opulence” within a market system. And yet, while acknowledging that such rules of the game are needed as pre-conditions for expanding overall efficiency, Kraakman et al. caution against conflating failures in the regulatory braking system with a failure of corporate law. To this point, they lament that the “perceived limitations” of regulatory frameworks for addressing inequality, environmental protection, and human rights lead critics “to focus on the structure of corporate law itself.”

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63 Bebchuk and Tallarita, surpra note 7, at 5.
64 Adam Smith recognized that a “well-governed society” was a necessary background condition for realizing the “universal opulence” of the division of labor in a free market. In his canonical discussion on the division of labor in a pin factory, he surmises that, “[i]t is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” [emphasis added]. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 12 (1776).
65 Kraakman et al. argue that the, “protection of interests extraneous to the firm” should come from other areas of the law, not from corporate law:

The crucial question is not whether the corporation’s non-contractual stakeholders deserve legal protection of some sort—they clearly do—but whether corporate law is the proper channel through which to deliver this. A simple answer is that protection of interests extraneous to the firm should come from other areas of law, such as environmental law, human rights law, antitrust law, or financial regulation. Indeed, the use of legal rules and standards—the constraints strategy—to promote interests extraneous to the corporate form is, almost by definition, not corporate law, but the application to corporations—as legal persons—of norms from other fields of law.

Kraakman et al. supra note 47, at 93.
66 They argue that:

One broadly accepted view... is that corporate law should seek to maximize shareholder value, because this ordinarily tends to serve the broader goal of advancing social welfare. Yet for this to be true, regulatory measures must be used to impose the social costs of corporate activities onto the firm’s bottom line where affected parties cannot bargain with the firm... The perceived limitations of existing regulatory regimes in dealing with
allude to, much ire is directed at the concept of shareholder value maximization, notwithstanding its contested status as a legal norm or social norm. For their part, Bebchuk and Tallarita advise that, “it would be a mistake to focus on reforming corporate governance” (i.e. it would be a mistake to adopt ‘stakeholderism’) as a way to address the deficiencies in externality regulation that are a concern to all.

In concurrence with Kaldor’s separation of political and economic labor, Kraakman and Bebchuk believe that a strict separation ought to be maintained between the structure of efficiency-promoting organizational law (i.e. corporate law rules and shareholder primacy governance) and public regulatory policy and law. By this way of thinking, political choices about background rules, regulatory frameworks, and wider distributional outcomes should be made in the political arena, while managers ought to focus only on running their businesses as efficiently (and as profitably) as possible. Here we begin to

issues such as human rights, inequality, and environmental protection have likewise led activists to focus on the structure of corporate law itself. [emphasis added]

Id. at 271.

67 See e.g., Bower & Paine, supra note 13, at 58; Denning, supra note 11; Lynn A. Stout, Why we should stop teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VIR. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).

68 Bebchuk and Tallarita, supra note 7.

69 See Kaldor supra note 60. On the separation of “economic” and “political” questions, see Kaldor, supra note 54, at 550-552. Elhauge argues that this separation (cast as a public-private division of labor) assumes that, “the public interest was or could be fully taken into account by the law.” He asserts (and I concur) that, “this belief in the perfection or even perfectibility of law is misplaced,” and that, “…even the most efficient and socially optimal legal rules will fail to cover much undesirable conduct.” Elhauge, supra note 27, at 52.

70 Jensen’s view is that, “[r]esolving externality and monopoly problems is the legitimate domain of the government in its rule-setting function. Those who care about resolving monopoly and externality issues will not succeed if they look to firms to resolve these issues voluntarily. Firms that try to do so either will be eliminated by competitors who choose not to be so civic minded, or will survive only by consuming their economic rents in this manner.” See Jensen, supra note 38, at 246. Jensen’s approach is represented clearly in a 2018 report commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers on political, social and environmental shareholder resolutions. In their report, the authors conclude that political, social, and environmental shareholder resolutions are an “ineffectual” substitute for legislative action:

Effectively dealing with such [issues as global climate change] will require that wise
see just how value maximization represents a *culmination* outcome-oriented approach to normative economic reasoning, as I will explain in detail in the next section.

Good corporate law, so we have heard, is *efficient* corporate law. The shareholder value maximization norm is thought to be a “good” basis for rule-making because, when taken as a reasonable proxy for social welfare, it is efficient. The proponents of shareholder value maximization feel that one ought not to tinker with the “structure of corporate law itself” when the roots of the aforementioned environmental and social problems lie in failed public action. Thus, while distributional outcomes may, at times, appear to be grossly unfair, and externality regulation may appear to be distressingly ineffectual, the putatively efficient shareholder value maximization norm remains unassailable to its most trenchant advocates. By this logic, shareholder value maximization has been elevated to the status of *constitutional principle* for efficient corporate law as well as for business decision-makers day to day.

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public policy measures be taken across a wide swath of the world’s nations. While frustration with slow progress on this front is understandably accompanied by the desire to “do something”, doing something effective is the task of our political institutions, and shareholder resolutions targeted at prominent corporations is an ineffectual substitute for policy making via the political institutions of democracy.


71 In a 2017 speech, the Chair of the International Accounting Standards Board, Hans Hoogervorst, drew attention to the urgent need for governments to address externalities through taxation:

To address the big environmental questions of our time it is urgent that the damaging external effects of economic activities are fully translated into their price through taxation. Proper pricing will reduce such activities and encourage development of cleaner alternatives… Proper pricing of externalities would also mean that regular financial reporting would become more reflective of sustainable business activities.

As a constitutional principle, the shareholder value maximization norm is projected globally today. But in a world rife with negative externalities, in a world so unequal, so far apart from the unspoiled realm of Pan’s Arcadia, the specter of catastrophically failing regulatory brakes is magnified. And so we face the question: in today’s interdependent global community that is beset with “problems without passports,” do the directors of global corporate enterprises have a role to play beyond the single-minded pursuit of maximizing value for shareholders? While Martin Lipton, Colin Mayer, the Business Roundtable, and their allies call on managers to adopt a “new paradigm” to emancipate managerial discretion for addressing critical problems of “people and planet,” their detractors, including Bebchuk and Tallarita, insist that, by doing so, they are hurting the people they are trying to help.

F. Shareholder Value Travels the Globe / Tax and Transfer Stays Home

Today’s corporate system is a global one; and yet, there is no global regulator. In this section, I consider the debate over value maximization and stakeholder theory as it

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72 See Kofi A. Annan, K.A., Problems Without Passports, 132 FOREIGN POLICY 30-31(2002). [My thanks to Professor Ruggie for bringing this expression to my attention.] Recall that in Kaldor’s compensation test, the relevant state of affairs was the “community.” See supra, note 61.

73 Bebchuk and Tallarita, supra note 7, at 49.

74 In 1933, Adolf A. Berle Jr. and Gardiner C. Means observed the emergence of a “corporate system” in America:

> The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there may be said to have evolved a “corporate system”—as there was once a feudal system—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major social institution…

See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 10 (1933). Many thanks to John G. Ruggie for pointing out to me the straightforward notion that there is ‘no global regulator.’
applies to a global arena of agile multinational enterprises and globally mobile shareholders.\textsuperscript{75} I broaden Kaldor’s concern for the welfare of “the rest of the community” to encompass concerns at the global level; in other words, I consider overall outcomes for a “global community,” not only a local one.\textsuperscript{76} Does seeking maximum value for globally dispersed shareholders help or harm “all those who suffer” at the local level? The answer to this question is decidedly unclear.

Let us consider the viability of \textit{tax and transfer} as a direct mechanism for \textit{potential compensation} in a global corporate system that functions in a global community domain.\textsuperscript{77} While permissive national laws allow shareholder value to travel the globe,\textsuperscript{78} the tax and transfer function of government remains idiosyncratic and locally rooted. No effective coordinated global tax and transfer mechanism exists (I am agnostic here about whether one ought to exist). In the absence of such a mechanism, we must ask whether the prospect of compensation given by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is enough to sustain the

\textsuperscript{75} In corporate groups, many of the separately incorporated legal entities that comprise the group are themselves shareholders.

\textsuperscript{76} See Kaldor \textit{supra} note 61.

\textsuperscript{77} In a separate article, I have discussed the inadequacies of local tort law as a direct compensation mechanism in a transnational corporate system. See Malcolm Rogge, \textit{What is ‘Transnational’ about Corporate Responsibility Today?}, in \textit{CORPORATE CITIZEN}, (Oonagh Fitzgerald, Ed.) CIGI-McGill-Queen’s University Publications, 2020.

\textsuperscript{78} The motivation for having such permissive rules is articulated clearly in this speech given by the Ghanaian Finance Minister to an investor audience at a conference in the United States in the 1980s: Ghana will actively encourage direct foreign investment and ensure that while safeguarding the interest of the economy and the honour of the people, investors will not be frustrated when the time comes to transfer their profits and dividends to their shareholders overseas... Investors would be particularly welcome in such priority areas as petroleum exploration and production, mining and mineral processing, timber logging and wood processing, quarrying, deep-sea fishing, food processing and local resource-based manufacturing industries... [emphasis added]

See Nelson Oppong, \textit{Political Settlement and the Unsettling Politics of Oil in Ghana} (citing Ahiakpor, 1985)(March 12, 2019)(unpublished manuscript)(on file with author), at 17. My thanks to Kwabena Oteng Acheampong for bringing this example to my attention.
consequentialist’s normative argument for shareholder value maximization. If it is does not, then what more is needed? For some, the answer to this problem lies in repeated application of Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocations over the long run; an approach that some scholars refer to as “log-rolling.”79 If long-run economic growth spurred by maximizing value at the individual firm level is intended to provide the requisite indirect compensation over time (as captured in the temporal phrase ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’), how long do all those who suffer expect to wait for the rising tide to lift them? Ten years? Thirty?80 No one really knows the answer. To sharpen our view of the problem, let us consider briefly how we might apply the consequentialist efficiency argument for value maximization to multinational firms that operate in a global economy.

To its proponents, value maximization is taken to be a universal approach: all firms, wherever they operate, large and small, ought to govern themselves by this criterion. And yet, in applying the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion in a world of multinational corporate enterprises, a troubling inconsistency arises over how we might count and

79 See Michelman on “log-rolling,” infra note 84.
80 Beyond direct tax and transfer, a wide range of compensation implementation mechanisms come to mind (some direct, others indirect) including: i) tort remedies (as direct compensation to address specific harms when they occur and to act as a deterrent); ii) the proverbial “rising tide” of growth and development (we considered this indirect mode earlier in the national context); iii) global equalization efforts (national and supranational aid programs and policies, including development bank loans); iv) corporate and non-profit philanthropy (including some forms of CSR), v) foreign direct investment; vi) State-led development initiatives (e.g. infrastructure development, investment in public health etc.); and vii) remittances. Penz and Drydyk argue that in circumstances where a project requires that local residents be resettled elsewhere (e.g. where forced displacement/eviction of a community to make way for an extractive project is regarded as a social cost), “the design of options (according to cost-benefit analysis) should be concerned with minimizing displacement while maximizing benefits, whether in the form of electricity, cheaper transportation costs, reduced congestion, increased irrigation, easier access to household water, and so on... The minimization of displacement costs is in a trade-off relationship with other variables to be maximized (when positive) and minimized (when negative). In the end, it is the overall net benefits which count.” See PETER PENZ ET AL., DISPLACEMENT BY DEVELOPMENT: ETHICS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 70 (2011).
subtract the theorized benefits and costs. Some might say that such arithmetic simply cannot be done—that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion is not workable for a global domain that includes multinational enterprises playing multiple games on multiple fields of play (each field with different rules). The problem arises in trying to define the boundaries of the overall domain for counting benefits for shareholders and setting off costs for “all those who suffer.” For its proponents, shareholder value maximization is regarded as an adequate ‘proxy’ for maximizing social welfare in the overall economy—the approach involves aggregating shareholder gains as they are maximized by individual firms. It stands to reason that the gains arising out of a global company’s success would be counted (by this approach) at the level of the parent company. In other words, the value to be maximized at each firm level is the value that is accrued to the parent company’s shareholders. One might also include the gains made by minority shareholders—those who invest in subsidiaries that are controlled but not wholly owned by the parent. By this approach, the proxy measure for the gain in social welfare is reflected in the gains realized by those who own stock in the controlling parent company and its subsidiaries. Today, such gains are distributed among global shareholders (the individual shareholders or “ultimate investors” might be based anywhere in the world). At the same time, though, “all those who suffer” are potentially compensated by tax and transfer at the local-national level, according to the vagaries of local politics. The

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81 The Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation test is, in effect, cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
82 See e.g., Kraakman et al., supra note 47 (on the “appropriate proxy”).
83 On the accounting practice of aggregating income at the parent company level and with regards to reporting standards for multinational enterprises, see INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING, May 2015, Chapter 3.11 – 3.21 [The Reporting Entity].
troubling inconsistency here is that the shareholder value gains accrue globally, while the myriad losses are hypothetically compensated (or not) locally.

The measurement problems for counting and setting-off benefits and costs that arise from the inconsistency just described appear to be insurmountable, at least to this author. At best, for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to obtain in this context (albeit loosely), an elaborate auxiliary theory must be introduced whereby all of “those who suffer” are potentially compensated over the long run through broad economic transformation at the global and local-national level. Hypothetically, such transformation might include growing employment opportunities, improved public health and education, infrastructure development, multiplier effects of foreign direct investment, the gains that flow from comparative advantage in trade, etc. Indeed, it may or may not be the case that “all those who suffer” today can be hypothetically compensated by a global program for long run development. Nonetheless, it seems (at least to this author) that such multifaceted programs for economic development have little to do with a single manager’s laser-focused pursuit of shareholder value maximization today—I leave debate on this issue for future consideration. For the present argument, the point is this: while businesses

84 Frank Michelman describes the long run case for repeated application of cost-benefit analysis as a “log-rolling” approach, which holds that, “when the effects of all measures are summed from time to time, no one will have been hurt while some will have benefited through the overall collective enterprise.” Here, the “collective enterprise” is public policy and State action for economic development. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. R. 1165, 1177 (1966).

85 Bradley Hackinen notes that, “...surprisingly little research has been performed on what happens when the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is applied to many decisions over a long period of time. [what Michelman refers to as “log-rolling” see Ibid.] One hypothesis [proposed by Hotelling in 1938 and by Hicks in 1941] is that, in the absence of transfers, benefits and costs will average out in a way that makes everyone better off in the long run.” Ultimately, Hackinen rejects this hypothesis, suggesting that Hicks and Hotelling did not provide a rigorous proof of the assertion (even while the hypothesis has been taken up widely); to the contrary, Hackinen finds that repeated application of the Kaldor-
globalize and their managers pursue shareholder value, no matching globalized or local redistributive mechanism exists which might implement the full compensation that is contemplated in Kaldor’s test, except in a most indirect, heterogeneous and uncoordinated manner. With such uncertainty in the background, we might ask whether the belief that shareholder value maximization is a socially “efficient” credo for multinational corporate governance is meaningful at all—efficient for whom, we ought to ask?

Without a global regulator (which we do not have), the purported social efficiency of shareholder value maximization does not scale very well, if at all. It bears reminding that when Kaldor spoke in 1939 of fully compensating “all those who suffer,” he was referring to a hypothetical scenario in which those who end up “better off” and “all those who suffer” are part of the same political community. In contrast, the multinational enterprises of today inhabit multiple, unequal, and disjoined political communities simultaneously while their shareholders are distributed globally in just as many or more places. Given present conditions, the hypothetical compensation called for in Kaldor-Hicks efficiency could only occur in a very piecemeal fashion, with great variations in implementation from one country to the next—sorting all of this out falls to the very contested domain of global development economics. Needless to say, the proponents of the value maximization approach have never proffered a programmatic and coherent

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Hicks criterion leads to wealth concentration, rather than averaging. See Hackinen, supra note 57.  
86 See Kaldor, supra note 61.
‘auxilliary hypothesis’ about how the logs should be rolled, even if the general prescriptions of ‘neoliberalism’ might fit the bill for some, though not for all.\(^{87}\)

What actually happens in the world? Around the globe, local tax and transfer mechanisms aimed at lifting up “all those who suffer” are highly idiosyncratic. To be sure, a global company’s subsidiaries are taxed in the ‘host’ country; but whether such revenues are used to compensate all those who suffer is another matter entirely. The impacts of global equalization efforts also figure in the overall equation. The combined impact of these transfers, including foreign direct investment, development finance (e.g. World Bank loans), family remittances, and direct foreign aid is very substantial in some countries and minimal in others; nonetheless, such efforts do not necessarily substitute for direct compensation of “all those who suffer” in particular circumstances for specific harms. They also do not substitute for an effective system of civil compensation for damages in tort or otherwise. How does Kaldor-Hicks efficiency apply when such compensation functions are inadequate or absent entirely? To consider a practical example, how is hypothetical compensation conceived when the aggrieved farmer faces eviction from her land without due process by a notoriously corrupt government to make way for an extractive project that is controlled by a multinational enterprise? What happens when a local subsidiary’s poorly trained private security forces overreact to protests causing bodily harm and/or death, with no reasonable prospect of a remedy for the victims? By some accounts, global economic transfers and equalization efforts lift many boats on a slowly rising tide. But what safety net exists for those whose boats are sunk, even

\(^{87}\) On multiple applications of Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocations as ‘log-rolling’ see Michelman, *supra* note 84. *See also* Hackinen *supra* note 85.
incidentally? The theorized long run increase in social welfare that is attributed to a foreign investment-led mega project (such as a mine, oil pipeline or dam) does not, in and of itself, compensate our aggrieved farmer who is harmed directly by that project today. To some, such incidental harms may seem to be unfortunate though minor details in overall welfare-enhancing projects. But they will not feel the same way when the aggrieved farmers organize themselves and launch a constitutional challenge that threatens to derail the entire project. After all, the mere prospect of potential compensation at some point in the future through long-run national development brings the aggrieved farmers little satisfaction today.

**Part II - From Culmination Outcomes to Comprehensive Outcomes**

In this Part, I apply Amartya Sen’s analytical distinction between culmination and comprehensive outcomes in ethical and economic reasoning to differentiate shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory. The distinction between such outcomes, Sen argues, “can be very central to certain problems in economics, politics, [and in] sociology.” To illustrate how these concerns differ, he gives the following example: “…if a presidential candidate in an election were to argue that what is really important for him or her is not just to win the forthcoming election, but ‘to win the election fairly’, then the outcome sought must be something of a comprehensive outcome.” A concern for comprehensive

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89 See Sen, supra note 41, 492.

outcomes includes some aspects of the process and agency, “not just the culmination outcome of winning the election—no matter how.”91

As we shall see, Sen’s distinction maps very closely onto the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory of corporate governance; it helps us to understand just why the two main contending theories of corporate governance are regarded often as two poles apart. The map may be drawn in the following way: shareholder value maximization reflects a mode of ethical and economic reasoning that is concerned with maximal culmination outcomes; while stakeholder theory is concerned with the appraisal of broader comprehensive outcomes. Very importantly, concern over comprehensive outcomes includes paying attention to culmination outcomes, but the comprehensive approach does not end with them. In contrast, the value maximization approach is concerned solely with maximizing the desired “score,” with maximal shareholder value regarded generally as the desired outcome. Value maximization’s concern with culmination outcomes finds its intellectual origins in utilitarianism, as is common to all welfarist frameworks. Stakeholder theory’s concern with comprehensive outcomes is common to a heterogenous and evolving family of approaches to corporate governance that includes the “New Paradigm” advocated by Martin Lipton92 as well as Colin Mayer’s program for a renewal of “corporate purpose.”93 The growing stakeholder family includes corporate

91 See Sen supra note 41, at 492.
92 In Lipton’s New Paradigm, “shareholder value is realized by (rather than at the expense of) a thoughtful balancing of the stakeholder interests that are critical to the success of the corporation, and corporations are animated by a sense of purpose that extends well beyond a myopic focus on profits.” See Lipton et al. supra note 10, at 2-3.
93 Mayer argues that, corporate governance “is not just about aligning managerial with shareholder interests; it is about achieving the purpose of corporations where those purposes include everything from purely positive benefits for customers to the attainment of normative welfare enhancing outcomes for society at large. See COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY 223 (2018).
sustainability, corporate citizenship, and “human rights due diligence” as it is articulated in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and its many derivatives.⁹⁴ The Business Roundtable’s statement of August 2019 falls generally within the stakeholder family, evincing concern for a range of comprehensive outcomes that are not so easily quantified, scored, and ranked; including “a life of meaning,” “dignity,” and a “healthy environment.”⁹⁵

Culmination outcomes are those that can be measured, counted, ranked and compared to other values that have been measured and counted in the same way. Using a single dimensional “score,” the state of affairs that scores higher or at least as high any other alternative is regarded as the most desirable one. In the value maximizing approach, the desired culmination outcome is an increase in shareholder value as reflected in the company’s stock price and shareholder earnings.⁹⁶ By this mode of reasoning, an efficient system of corporate law will mandate or promote an approach to corporate decision making that tends to maximize the desired culmination score. The battle over the heart and soul of corporate governance is, I contend, a battle between two these two poles; it is a battle over what framework of rules and policies ought to be in place to drive the corporate system as a whole. The shareholder primacy approach prioritizes rules that promote efficiency in maximizing the desired culmination outcome; while the alternative

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⁹⁵ See Business Roundtable, supra note 2.

⁹⁶ There is some ambiguity over what time horizon should apply, whether short term or long term, with Jensen specifying ‘long term’ value on the one hand; while Bebchuk seems to be more agnostic about whether long term value is the appropriate goal.
view calls for a systemic\textsuperscript{97} approach that gives broader latitude to corporate decision makers to consider a plurality of values, some not at all reducible to ranked culmination scores.

The quintessential expression of priority concern for culmination outcomes is found in classical utilitarianism. In utilitarianism, all utility values in a given domain are summed together to produce an aggregate score that can be compared to the score of alternative states of affairs.\textsuperscript{98} By its strictest and most reductive formulation, the utilitarian decision-maker will choose the state of affairs that realizes the highest utility (or at least as high as any other) without regard to how the utility value is distributed among the individuals concerned.\textsuperscript{99} Along with its many variants, including welfarism,\textsuperscript{100} the utilitarian mode is concerned generally with choosing states of affairs with the best scores. As noted earlier, the relevant terminology that is used in the corporate governance context varies to some extent and includes shareholder value maximization, shareholder wealth maximization,

\textsuperscript{97} On systems theory, corporate governance and corporate law, see Edward J. Waitzer, “Rethinking the Purpose of the Corporation,” J. of APPL. CORP. FIN. 30:2, 2018, at 20.

\textsuperscript{98} By Sen’s definition, “utilitarian reasoning is an amalgam of three distinct axioms: (1) consequentialism, (2) welfarism, and (3) sum-ranking (the last stands for the requirement that utilities of different people must simply be added up to assess the state of affairs, paying no attention to, say, inequalities).” See Sen, supra note 90, at 219.

\textsuperscript{99} Sen and Williams’ criticisms of utilitarianism as a “criterion of public action” holds that such an approach, “must assume a public agent, some supreme body which chooses general states of affairs for the society as a whole.” See UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 18 (Amartya K. Sen & Bernard Williams, eds., 1982), at 2.

\textsuperscript{100} Kornhauser’s description of “welfarist” appraisals aligns, in my view, with Sen’s notion of culmination-outcome oriented reasoning. Kornhauser writes that: “[w]elfarist evaluations rank states of the worlds solely in terms of the well-being of the individuals in the states of the world under consideration. No other information about the states is relevant. One need not ask how those states arose or how (or with what intentions) individuals acted.” Kornhauser, supra note 48, at 680. In contrast to welfarist appraisals which focus on aggregating ‘what we end up with,’ \textit{comprehensive}-outcome oriented reasoning seeks to appraise, ‘what we end up with, and \textit{how} we end up with it.’ In Sen’s words, “[w]elfarism is the view that the only things of intrinsic value for ethical calculation and evaluation of states of affairs are individual utilities… ‘utility’ is used as a short hand for ‘well-being’.” See AMARTYA K. SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 40 (1999).
shareholder primacy, and simply ‘value maximization.’ Adopting Sen’s distinction, such modes of appraisals are concerned with maximal culmination outcomes. For example, Richard Posner’s notion of “wealth maximization” reflects overarching priority for the culmination outcome measured in terms of “wealth.”

In comprehensive-outcome oriented reasoning, it is not enough to look at the final scores; one must also look at the processes and agencies involved (i.e. people making reflective choices about processes) which lead to such outcomes. Comprehensive outcomes “include actions undertaken, agencies involved, processes used, etc. along with the [culmination] outcomes” [italics in original]. In the comprehensive mode, the process that leads to an outcome is regarded to be part of its consequence (this idea shall be explored further below). It bears emphasizing that the appraisal of comprehensive outcomes includes consideration of consequentialist-style culmination outcomes--it does not exclude such outcomes or stand entirely apart from them.

The “act of choice” and the choice maker’s agency are relevant to a full appraisal of comprehensive outcomes. Unlike “nonvolitional maximization” that occurs in physics and the natural sciences, the “maximizing behavior” of business decision-makers involves volitional decisions made by reflective agents. In the comprehensive

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102 On the distinction between the use of the term “agent” in principal-agent theory and Sen’s term “agency-goals”, see supra note 49.
103 See SEN, supra note 90, at 215.
104 SEN, supra note 90, at 23.
outcome-oriented approach to corporate governance, the “choice act” and the chooser’s agency matter for the simple reason that no business decision is ever made by a maximizing automaton. Indeed, the inescapable centrality of the business decision maker’s personal agency is captured in the corporate law concept of the fiduciary duty, which cannot be entirely stripped of its discretionary and reflective aspects (so I contend). Business decisions involve an “act of choice” by a reflective agent who is constrained and liberated by the demands of the fiduciary duty as well as other normative constraints, including regulations, codes of conduct, customs and personal beliefs. Of course, the decision maker is also constrained by external economic, social and political conditions. The value maximization approach seeks to diminish the volitional aspect of corporate decision-making such that allocations are regarded as merely technical operations for seeking maximal outcomes; on the other hand, the stakeholder approach regards the processes involved and the “choice act” in business decision making as having an inescapable reflective ethical component. In the stakeholder approach, managerial discretion is prioritized because judgment cannot and does not involve merely technical allocations for maximal outcomes. Stakeholder theory is more in line with a strong volitional theory of decision-making within a corporate governance framework.

In the stakeholder approach, decision makers are called on to exercise their discretion in making judgments among and between a plurality of values. This approach, I contend, reflects the reality, as Sen puts it, that, “all appraisals undertaken as part of normal living involve prioritization and weighing of distinct concerns” [emphasis added]. Such

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106 See SEN, supra note 90, at 395.
distinct concerns touch on mixed quantitatively and qualitatively appraised outcomes. The appraisal of comprehensive outcomes in decision-making requires reflective judgments to be made from among the many incompletely ranked alternatives that we are faced with in our daily lives. In other words, not everything that matters in the business decision maker’s choice act can be counted, scored, ranked, coded, and processed algorithmically. This is why businesses are run by reflective decision makers rather than machines. Acknowledging the role of fuzzier appraisals, as Sen argues, does not amount to “abandoning reason.” Rather, it reflects “as much as reasoning can deliver, given what is known and what valuational priorities have been sorted out” by the choice-maker.107 Indeed, the making of reasoned judgments between distinct concerns might well be regarded as the fullest expression of human capacity for responsible and reflective reasoning.

A. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and Value Maximization are Concerned with Culmination Outcomes

As discussed above, value maximization is thought to promote Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcomes in terms of shareholder value, utility, social welfare, wealth, or some other criterion that can be scored and ranked. A Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocation is thought to increase the overall size of the pie, where the “size of the pie” is a term of art for whatever value is measured, summed and ranked. The overall size of the pie is roughly analogous to aggregate utility, though aggregate wealth is also used frequently as a

criterion. Within the law and economics school of thought, it is generally regarded that allocations that increase the overall size of the pie are a social good, so long as such increases are Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Increasing overall growth, however such growth may be distributed, is the goal. In seeking to maximize culmination outcomes, the proponent of value maximization aggregates all values into a single score (into a complete resolution) and compares that score to the scores of alternative states of affairs. Jensen’s theory of management calls on the decision maker to choose the outcome with the highest score or at least as high as any available alternative. As we saw earlier, he argues that the best way to grow the pie is for all individual firms, as directed by their managers, to coolly seek to maximize value for their shareholders. This, he contends, is a “rational” and “purposeful” approach; stakeholder theory, he argues, is neither. This use of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion in appraising corporate decision making (and corporate law) is highly representative of priority concern given to culmination outcomes.

B. Stakeholder Theory is Concerned with Comprehensive Outcomes

In his foundational work on the stakeholder approach, Edward Freeman defines a stakeholder as, “any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a corporation’s purpose.” His principal list of stakeholders includes,

108 Robert Frank puts it in the following way: “Rich and poor alike have an interest in making the economic pie as large as possible. Any policy that passes the cost-benefit test makes the economic pie larger. And when the pie is larger, everyone can have a larger slice.” See Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-benefit Analysis so Controversial?, 29(S2) JOUR. OF LEG. STUD. 913-930, 917 (2000).

109 Nien-hê Hsieh argues that Jensen’s notion of maximization is better regarded as optimization. See Nien-hê Hsieh, Maximization, Incomparability, and Managerial Choice, 17(3) BUS. ETHICS Q., 497-513 (2007).

“employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, environmentalists, government, and other groups who can help or hurt the corporation.”  

Broadly speaking, Freeman advocates an approach to strategic management that is highly responsive to the firm’s relationship to its external environment (in all of its economic, social, and political dimensions). “If you want to be an effective manager,” he says, “then you must take stakeholders into account.”  

By bringing social concerns, including concerns about social responsibility, within the manager’s purview, Freeman blurs the boundary line drawn between the economist’s labor and the politician’s authority (this distinction was inscribed by Kaldor). Going against the grain, Freeman argues that, “[i]solating ‘social issues’ as separate from the economic impact which they have, and conversely isolating economic issues as if they had no social effect, misses the mark both managerially and intellectually.”  

The essential role of stakeholder theory, he concludes, is to “help managers to formulate processes for routinely addressing the concerns of stakeholders at a number of organizational levels, from grand strategy to product development.”  

It’s not enough for managers to concern themselves solely with making money for stockholders; they must also concern themselves with what they make and how they make it, all while taking into account stakeholder concerns. In other words, they must concern themselves with the processes and agencies involved in arriving at desired outcomes. Freeman acknowledges outright that this is no straightforward task by any means (the

111 Ibid.
112 Id. at 45.
113 See Kaldor supra note 60.
114 Freeman, supra note 111, at 40.
115 Freeman, supra note 111, at 247.
“sledding is rough” he says), and that ultimately these issues, “must be resolved in the arena of ‘distributive justice’.”

Freeman’s comprehensive and context sensitive approach is a dramatic contrast from the laser-focus on *culmination* outcomes that Jensen’s maximizing approach represents. Many variations of stakeholder theory have been developed since the 1980s, including some by corporate law theorists who propose alternatives to principal-agent theory and shareholder primacy.117 In this paper, I am putting forth the proposition that the family of approaches to corporate governance that fall under the rubric of stakeholder theory are roughly aligned with concern for *comprehensive* outcomes.

**C. From Ranked Scores to Judgment Between Distinct Concerns**

The sum ranking of final scores between states of affairs is central to the method of both classical utilitarianism and welfarism; it also lies at the core of value maximization. In utilitarianism, sum ranking comprises, “the requirement that utilities of different people must simply be added up to assess the state of affairs, paying no attention to, say, inequalities.”118 The problem that arises in applying a sum ranking method to business decision making (as in Jensen’s ‘single-dimensional’ value maximization approach) is that it is not possible to completely rank one state of affairs as compared to another, except in extremely narrow circumstances. This problem arises because, as noted above,

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116 Freeman, *supra* note 111, at 249.
118 See Sen, *supra* note 41, at footnote 2, 479.
the business decision maker must make judgments among and between an array of
distinct concerns. At best, decision makers might be able to discern a partial ordering of
the various states of affairs that will result from different decisions taken. When it is
impossible to completely rank the projected outcomes of a business decision vis-à-vis the
available alternatives, it is inconsistent to call upon the decision maker to “maximize” as
between those options.\textsuperscript{119} In other words, the maximization approach calls on decision
makers to do something that they are not actually able to do. This may go some distance
towards explaining why, as noted earlier, Jamie Dimon suggested that the stakeholder
approach, “more accurately reflects how our CEOs and their companies operate.”\textsuperscript{120} In
other words, business decision makers do not go about “maximizing value.” Why not?
Because the judgments that they are called on routinely to make involve choosing among
and between distinct concerns rather than selecting from sum-ranked complete ‘scores.’

Sen argues that, “any serious problem of social judgment can hardly escape
accommodating pluralities of values…. We cannot reduce all the things we have reason
to value into one homogenous magnitude.”\textsuperscript{121} He suggest that, “[i]n many-dimensional
moral conflicts the presumption of completeness of ranking [of scores] may well be quite
artificial.”\textsuperscript{122} Similarly, in business decision making, it may be rather artificial to assume
that decision makers are generally able to come up with a complete ranking of alternative
outcomes. What rankings they do come up with are partial rankings. Indeed, as Frank H.

\textsuperscript{119} See generally Sen, supra note 41, at 483.
\textsuperscript{120} As quoted in the Wall Street Journal, “The Business Roundtable’s Model of Capitalism Does Pay
\textsuperscript{121} See Sen supra note 90, at 239.
\textsuperscript{122} SEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 18
Knight observed a century ago, “making decisions in practical life is a rather inscrutable or ‘intuitive’ formation of ‘estimates,’ subject to a wide margin of error or uncertainty.”123 Typical business judgments, he contended, involve “opinions” derived from estimates rather than certain calculations.124 Sen surmises that, “[t]hose who are insistent that human beings cannot cope with determining what to do unless all values are somehow reduced to no more than one, are evidently comfortable with counting (‘is it more or is it less?’) but not with judgment (‘is this more important than the other?’”).125 Such anxiety is reflected in Bebchuk and Tallarita’s recent critique of ‘stakeholderism,’ in which they fret over the prospect of widening the ambit of managerial discretion. Pluralistic stakeholderism, they say, “amounts to no more than hoping that corporate leaders would use their discretion to balance the interests of stakeholders and shareholders in a socially desirable way.”126 Indeed, there may be a sense of security for some people in the notion that “good” decisions can be made by counting and comparing single-dimensional values rather than having to contend with the many-dimensional morass that ‘stakeholderism’ appears to demand. Bebchuk and Tallarita’s worry about managerial discretion reflects the utilitarian’s suspicion about the “tractability of ‘judging’ combinations of many distinct good things.”127 For his part, Jensen invokes the “single valued objective function” (value maximization) as the only rational and purposive basis on which to make managerial decisions. His prescription is clearly aimed

124 See generally Ibid.
125 SEN, supra note 90, at 395. Elsewhere, Sen writes that the “needs of policy do require that something or other must be ultimately done [and yet] even institutional public decisions may have to be taken on the basis of partial justification… Rational public decisions have to come to terms with such partially justified choices.” See SEN (1999), supra note 100, at 67.
126 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 7, at 55.
127 Sen, supra note 212, at 239.
at maximizing his chosen *culmination outcome*, while neutralizing the morass of other criteria that might be brought to bear in appraising outcomes. Sen is critical of such narrow views of purposive reasoning, opining that, “if counting one set of real numbers is all we could do for reasoning about what to choose, then there would not be many choices that we could sensibly and intelligently make.”  

128 The scoring and ranking of a complete ordering of alternatives is not required for making reasonable, even rational, choices. A manager’s job is to make decisions; 129 and so, with or without complete rankings, judgments have to be made. The propriety and desirability of such judgments will be evaluated over time by corporate boards, shareholders, customers, clients, suppliers, proximate communities, legislative committees, regulatory bodies and the general public.

### Part III - Value Maximization’s Missing Moral Floor

We live in a world where respect for a moral ground floor of acceptable business practice cannot be taken for granted. At what point do managers stand firmly on the moral floor where they are able to proceed with ethically untainted value maximizing allocations? If normative priors are not completely satisfied, what should managers do? Within the confines of Kaldor-Hicks efficient allocations in the value maximization approach, it’s not at all clear what a manager *is able to* do other than to comply with positive law and to seek maximal value—this curious situation arises because the moral ground floor is

128 Sen, *supra* note 212, at 240.
treated as a stylized assumption that is already satisfied.\textsuperscript{130} I now consider how value maximization’s invocation of a “moral ground floor” leaves the problem of what to do about ethics and politics in a welfarist efficiency paradigm unsolved—it begs the question. Stakeholder governance, on the other hand, does not face this conundrum because its appraisals consider a plurality of values within an ongoing comprehensive outcome-oriented approach.

\textbf{A. Moral Ground Floors and the “Taint” of Politics}

Milton Friedman left no doubt about his distaste for managers who spend other people’s money on subjectively determined social objectives rather than on corporate ones.\textsuperscript{131} His enormous influence in the 1980s and 1990s, still holds sway today. Friedman, the capitalist idealist, wanted to purge business decision making of the taint of politics. Even so, he argued, a business must live up to a minimal standard of behavior. While managers should try to “make as much money as possible” for the shareholders, he thought, they must still conform to “the basic rules of the society, both those embodied \textit{in law and those embodied in ethical custom}” [emphasis added].\textsuperscript{132} These background conditions

\textsuperscript{130} Referring to Milton Friedman and others, Hsieh opines that, “most [libertarian] versions of the market value thesis [value maximization] recognize some set of moral constraints to the maximization of long-run market value.” In such approaches, “principles of fairness or human rights place constraints on what managers are permitted to do” in the pursuit of maximum profits. \textit{See} Hsieh, \textit{supra} note 109, at 503, 502.

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{See} Milton Friedman, \textit{The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits}, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, September 13, 1970. Elsewhere, Friedman writes that: “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subversive doctrine.” \textit{See} MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (2009).

\textsuperscript{132} Friedman (1970), \textit{supra} note 131.
comprise Friedman’s *ex ante* ground floor rules for a market-based economy. To this assertion, we must ask just where does the minimal ground floor of ethical acceptability lie? Friedman did not provide a fine-grained picture, preferring to leave that endeavor to others—though, in his style, anything that resembled “unadulterated socialism” clearly missed the mark.\(^\text{133}\) The vast and nebulous field of business ethics emerged in the 1980s and 1990s to address this gap.\(^\text{134}\)

Not surprisingly, Friedman took a minimalist approach to ground rules, settling on a few neutral-sounding constraints for businesses: acting lawfully, staying “within the rules of the game” (by which he meant engaging in “open and free competition without deception and fraud”), and respecting “ethical custom.” Today, his minimalist notion of “ethical custom” seems to underestimate the global *interdependence* of many culturally diverse players on a common and ever more crowded field of play. Where does the baseline lie? Einer Elhauge proposed that moral norms “make certain choices *unthinkable* regardless of how much they might benefit us” [emphasis added].\(^\text{135}\) Taking his cue, we might regard Friedman’s *ex ante* ground floor standard as excluding certain *unthinkable*

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\(^{133}\) Dennis Arnold argues that Friedman assumes that businesses operate in a democratic society, an assumption which does not hold in today’s world of multinational enterprises: Friedman demonstrates little concern with the ethical foundations of his view of the normative core of the corporation because he assumes the existence of a democratic system of government. He regards a democratic form of government as preferable to others because he views it as the form of government most compatible with political freedom. He appears to assume that all citizens have an equal ability to regulate corporate behavior through the legislative process. *See* Denis G. Arnold, *Libertarian Theories of the Corporate and Global Capitalism*, 48(2) JOUR. BUS. ETHICS 155-173 (2003). For an analysis of the shortcomings in Friedman’s approach, see also Jonathan B. Wight & Martin Calkins, *The Ethical Lacunae in Friedman’s Concept of the Manager*, 11(2) JOUR. OF MKTS. & MOR. (2008).

\(^{134}\) For a contemporaneous account of the rising interest in business ethics in the 1980s and 1990s, see Andrew Stark, *What’s The Matter With Business Ethics?*, 71(3) HARV. BUS. REV. 38-40 (1993).

\(^{135}\) Elhauge, *supra* note 27, at 19.
choices, such as the use of child labor or engaging in human trafficking. But, as we might expect, the hardest cases to evaluate often inhabit the grey-space between acceptable and unacceptable choices. One generally agreed upon *unthinkable* option is slavery, and yet modern-day-slavery is very real. Around the world, unthinkable options are exercised where they are least likely to be detected; while sometimes they carry on in plain sight—the tragic collapse of the defectively constructed Rana Plaza garment factory in Bangladesh, killing thousands of workers, serves as a grim example. In a world where unthinkable options are all too commonly exercised, Friedman’s minimal-sounding constraints of “ethical custom” and the “basic rules of society” are sorely needed in the foreground, and not merely as side notes to the dominant shareholder value-maximizing credo.

Simply positing an *ex-ante* moral ground floor does not provide the ‘fix’ that its proponents hope for; indeed, such a move begs the question. This is because we ought not to define the moral ground floor of acceptable behavior of businesses as standing apart from the complex and urgent multidimensional problem of evaluating stakeholder tradeoffs in day to day decision making. As I argued earlier, every managerial decision involves making tradeoffs against the background of economic, social, environmental,

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138 See Jason Motlagh & Atish Saha, *The Ghosts of Rana Plaza*, 90(2) VIRG. QUART. REV. 44-89 (2014)(finding that, “one year after the worst accident in the history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way to go”).
and political conditions in which the firm operates. And yet, much of what is thought to be ethically acceptable or not acceptable depends on the cultural and political context in which one operates. Tradeoffs that would be “unthinkable” in one country are considered to be business as usual in another. In a global firm, the board members of a parent company may well wake up one day to find that the company’s variously located subsidiaries are operating at both ends of the spectrum of acceptable and unacceptable behavior.

The *unthinkable* example of modern-day slavery provides a good illustration of how treating decisions about stakeholder tradeoffs as though they stand apart from the “basic rules of society” and “ethical custom” is something of a fallacy. An action that is legal and customary in one jurisdiction might still be regarded as wrong by the decision-maker, who may decide that avoiding that action is the right thing to do in any event. To give an example, a multinational enterprise may operate in a country where the use of bonded labor is both legal and customary; and yet, in evaluating stakeholder tradeoffs, the global business decision-maker may elect not to make use of such labor. The appraisal of a vast range of stakeholder tradeoffs is an inevitable part of managerial decision-making that does not stand entirely apart from some hypothetical baseline constraint of ethical custom—globalization and its extremes have brought the ethical dimensions of day to day tradeoffs into sharper focus.

139 It is highly positivistic and formalistic to view conformity with legal norms and minimalist ‘ethical custom’ as entirely distinct from the day-to-day normative evaluation of stakeholder tradeoffs in business decision-making.
In today’s global corporate system, satisfying the “basic rules of society” and “ethical custom” as *ex ante* constraints on otherwise unbridled value maximization (within “the rules of the game”) is a goal to strive for mightily. It is, however, a goal that is never fully achieved. Why not? Because there is always something more one could do to make a better world for workers, customers, and communities, and we should strive always to do the best we can. The task grows ever more complex as business expands globally and opportunities for regulatory arbitrage and strategic gaming proliferate. The problem here goes beyond the familiar one of the moving goal-post, it lies in the multiplication of fields of play. For global corporate groups, the rules of the game in one jurisdiction might be played against the rules in another, while overarching global *rules about rules* are vague, ineffectual, or simply nonexistent. If value maximization has any moral floor at all, it is a constantly shifting one. With rising inequality, climate disruption, ocean pollution, species extinction, global pandemics, and a host of other “wicked problems” facing future generations, the basic rules of society from a century ago need a substantial overhaul.\(^\text{140}\) Certainly, there is no straight-forward checklist for how the basic rules of the society should be fixed in the globe. Having said that, international human rights norms *do* provide an extremely useful framework because of their global uptake and institutional context. We shall consider the human rights as an ethical framework more deeply below.

B. Value-Maximization does not Avoid Trade-offs, it Occludes Them

Bebchuk and Tallarita worry that stakeholderism “would make corporate leaders freer in their decision-making.”\textsuperscript{141} The problem, they say, is that, “there is no reason to expect that expanding the freedom of corporate leaders to pursue their own preferences would systematically operate to the benefit of the company’s stakeholders.”\textsuperscript{142} Years ago, Jensen lamented that the stakeholder approach “politicizes the corporation” and empowers managers “to exercise their own preferences in spending the firm’s resources.”\textsuperscript{143} Yet Jensen’s proposed alternative (value maximization) does not succeed in removing politics; indeed, it merely occludes the role that politics plays in the background. The reflective “choice act” is an ineluctable part of managerial decision-making.

That stakeholders do matter is not at issue in either the shareholder or stakeholder approach. The real issue is about why they matter and how they matter. Jensen acknowledges plainly that, “[a] firm cannot maximize value if it ignores the interests of its stakeholders.”\textsuperscript{144} Even so, he rejects the stakeholder approach to corporate governance because, as he charges, it does not advance its own theory of how to evaluate the pros and cons of making “tradeoffs among stakeholders.” He takes the purported absence of a

\textsuperscript{141} Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 7, at 49.
\textsuperscript{142} Id. at 51.
\textsuperscript{143} For the classic statement of this concern about managerial agency costs, see Jensen, supra note 38, at 237.
\textsuperscript{144} Id. at 246. Bebchuck and Tallarita emphasize this point as well, stating that, “it is undeniable that, to effectively serve the goal of enhancing long-term shareholder value, corporate leaders should take into account stakeholder effects—as they should consider any other relevant factors.” See Bebchuck & Tallarita, supra note 7, at 11.
theory of stakeholder tradeoffs within stakeholder theory\textsuperscript{145} as a point in favor of his value maximization approach. And yet, Jensen declines to advance a theory of his own about \textit{how not to ignore the interests of stakeholders}—interests that he nonetheless recognizes are critically important. Instead, Jensen proposes that managers take stakeholder concerns into consideration to the extent that they advance the ultimate goal of value maximization. Value maximizers, he says, can learn from stakeholder theory as a way to maximize value!\textsuperscript{146} Here, Jensen proffers an ‘enlightened’ version of shareholder value maximization that draws on the experience and insights of stakeholder theory while remaining faithful to his “single-valued objective function.” But, without a theory of its own about how not to ignore the critically important matter of stakeholders, how exactly is Jensen’s single-dimensional prescription superior to the stakeholder approach? What are we left with? Reading the tealeaves? There is no clear answer.

Michael Jensen’s approach has been and continues to be enormously influential.\textsuperscript{147} To be fair, he recognizes that that the world “may be governed by complex dynamic systems

\textsuperscript{145} In 1976, Jensen claimed that no such theory existed. In contend that no such theory has since been developed because it would have to be so capacious as to contain all of politics, ethics, and economics—the idea of such a theory comprises the entire realm of “political economy.” Nevertheless, some alternatives to the value maximization approach have been advanced, the most influential one being Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramers’ \textit{shared value} approach, with \textit{corporate citizenship, sustainability}, and \textit{triple bottom line} having much influence also; See Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, \textit{The Big Idea: Creating Shared Value}, HARV. BUS. REV. (2011); \textit{see also} COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT (2013); and most recently, COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY (2018).

\textsuperscript{146} See Jensen, supra note 38, at 246-247.

\textsuperscript{147} For instance, in a 2018 report commissioned by the National Association of Manufacturers, the authors concluded that political, social and environmental shareholder resolutions raise the specter of “agency costs” exactly as Jensen and Meckling defined them in 1976. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, \textit{Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure}, 3(4) JOUR. OF FIN. ECON. 305-360 (1976). The National Association of Manufacturers’ study concludes that social and environmentally-oriented shareholder resolutions have no measurable impact on shareholder value; nevertheless, they stress that such resolutions are risky because they may lead managers to “seek other goals besides maximizing shareholder wealth”:
that are difficult to optimize in the usual sense” and he suggests that, “[t]o create value we need not know exactly where and what maximum value is, but only how to seek it, that is how to institute changes and strategies that cause value to rise.” And so, with complexity and dynamism in mind, he settles on the rather loose notion of “value seeking” as the appropriate goal.\textsuperscript{148} And with this move, we enter the realm of best guesstimates with a view to maximizing shareholder value over the long run.\textsuperscript{149} How this approach is normatively superior to the unabashed messiness of stakeholder theory is not entirely clear. After all, a critical question remains for the value maximizing approach: what criteria and concerns should managers give priority to in their formation of such guesstimates? In other words, how exactly and how deeply should managers treat the critically important matter of stakeholder concerns? In the value maximization approach, managers should only consider stakeholder concerns insofar as consideration of those concerns serves the goal of maximizing the desired culmination outcome: long-term value for shareholders. What if a specific stakeholder concern does not serve long-term value for shareholders. What if a specific stakeholder concern does not serve long-term

\begin{quote}
Creating incentives for managers to act in ways that focus more on environmental and social goals instead of strictly maximizing shareholder wealth may simultaneously license managers to seek other goals besides maximizing shareholder wealth, such as maximizing personal wealth or popularity, which will be more difficult to discipline appropriately. [at 51]
\end{quote}

Like Jensen and Friedman before them, the authors refer (erroneously) to the shareholders as “owners.” See KALT ET AL., supra note 70.

\textsuperscript{148} Jensen says, “I know of no other scorecard that will score the game as well as this one. It is not perfect, but that is the nature of the world.” See Jensen, supra note 38, at 247.

\textsuperscript{149} On “guesstimates” in cost-benefit analysis, see John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 891-896 (2014). Referring to the findings of a study by Credit Suisse, Steve Denning argues that, “most key investment decisions are based on the reputation of the executive making the investment proposal and the CEO’s ‘gut feel’ about shareholder value” [emphasis added]. See Denning, supra note 11. The report by Credit Suisse concludes that, “few senior executives are versed or trained in methods to allocate capital most effectively,” and that, “incentive programs frequently encourage behaviors that are not in the best interests of long-term shareholders.” See Michael J. Mauboussin & Dan Callahan, Credit Suisse, Capital Allocation – Updated: Evidence, Analytical Methods, and Assessment Guidance, June 2, 2015.
value? Then it should not be considered unless not considering it turns out to have a detrimental rebound effect, then it should be considered after all. The apparent inconsistency in rejecting stakeholder theory, yet also using its insights to seek value is worthy of further critical reflection, though this problem goes beyond the scope of this paper.

For today’s critical challenges, such as climate disruption and ocean pollution, one company’s stakeholders might include almost any person on the globe. Today’s “super wicked” global problems affect everyone, including the long run viability of business itself.\(^{150}\) If Jensen’s intent is to avoid politicized management, his turn to the laser-focused pursuit of the “single valued objective function” does not succeed. To the contrary, value maximization, represents a powerful political project dressed in technical garb. Its legitimacy and appeal are derived, in part, from its apparently authoritatively technocratic origins—and by its “Hippocratic” zest, as Jensen himself proclaims.\(^ {151}\) In presenting “value maximization” as the business decision maker’s solemn promise to shareholders in the style of an oath, Jensen shows himself to be a most effusive “norm entrepreneur.”\(^ {152}\)

\(^{150}\) On “super wicked” problems, see Lazarus, supra note 140.

\(^{151}\) By his own self-assessment, value-maximization does no less than “provide the business equivalent to the medical profession’s Hippocratic Oath.” Jensen, supra note 38, at 236.

\(^{152}\) Jensen is one of the most widely cited authors in the social sciences. On “norm entrepreneurs,” “norm bandwagons,” and “norm cascades,” see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96(4) COLUM. L.R. 903-968, 909 (1996).
C. Value Maximization’s Human Rights Problem

This discussion would not be complete without a treatment of value maximization’s human rights problem. With the unanimous adoption by the U.N. Human Rights Council of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in 2011, the “corporate responsibility to respect human rights” was institutionalized globally as a normative ground floor of its own. Unlike stocks, human rights violations do not have a readily discernable market price. How are the values of human rights assessed under the rubric of efficiency within the value maximization approach? It is not so easily done. And yet, business leaders from around the world readily confess that their companies respect human rights. What then accounts for this apparent disjunct between value maximization’s sole focus on culmination outcomes and the business leader’s apparent concern for the value of human rights? Should we take this as further evidence that the stakeholder approach, as Dimon says, “more accurately reflects how our CEOs and their companies operate.” With the importance given to human rights around the globe, this question deserves further scrutiny.

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154 When the U.N. Special Representative on Business and Human Rights (John G. Ruggie) consulted with business leaders from major firms from around the world, he found that all of them claimed, quite readily, that their companies respected human rights. See Ruggie, John Gerard. Just Business: Multinational Corporations and Human Rights (Norton Global Ethics Series). WW Norton & Company, 2013, at pp. 92-93.
One would be hard pressed to deny that an individual whose human rights are violated in connection with a business activity is left worse off. Consider the case of the aggrieved subsistence farmer who, without due process, is forced off her land to make way for the extraction of conflict minerals. Imagine that her children are forced to work in the mining pits and that members of her family go missing after a protest at the mine site. The minerals sought beneath her farmland are essential for building smartphones, laptop computers, and the glass cockpits of commercial passenger airliners. How might we appraise this scenario overall by value maximization’s efficiency criteria? On one side of the cost-benefit ledger, consumers and shareholders might do very well (especially when they are subjectively unaware of the farmer’s plight); on the other side, we must reserve an entry for great misery, if not atrocity. The difficult question that arises is whether it is even possible to characterize human rights violations within a welfarist framework by utility, well-being, wealth, social welfare or by some other criterion that is amenable to counting and ranking. Human rights impacts are limitlessly varied in texture; they range from violent and egregious impacts to procedural and conceptual ones (such as denials of legal personhood, due process, and equality before the law). As Sen’s distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive outcomes makes clear,

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156 Two notable lawsuits from Canada involving similar factual scenarios are: Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc. 2013 ONSC 1414 (Ontario)(allegations of violent attacks by company security); and Garcia v. Tahoe Resources Inc., 2017 BCCA 39 (British Columbia)(settled in 2019)( allegations of violent repression of protesters by company security).
157 I defer to another day further argument about whether to define “worse off” in terms of value, wealth, utility, dignity or some other criterion of appraisal. On incorporating qualitative assessments of impact on dignity in cost benefit analysis, see Rachel Bayefsky, Dignity as a Value in Agency Cost-benefit Analysis, 123 YALE L.J. 1732 (2013).
158 Article 6 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states, “Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law;” Article 7 states that, “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law.” See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. General Assembly (10 December, 1948).
adverse human rights impacts tend to involve a combination of: i) unmeasurable social and political processes that lead to adverse outcomes or that prevent positive outcomes from being realized; and ii) measurable material and physical outcomes that are the result of such processes as well as the “choice acts” of agents. It is manifestly unclear how the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation criterion would account for all manner of such processes, agencies, and outcomes in counting and ranking costs and benefits.\textsuperscript{159} The consequentialist argument for value maximization discussed earlier is severely impaired by this methodological shortcoming.

Concerns for human rights, Sen argues, are accommodated within the framework of comprehensive outcomes, but not culmination outcomes alone.\textsuperscript{160} The problem for the efficiency approach is that the very notion of a “market price” in relation to human rights is anathema. The cost of human rights harm (in terms of utility, wealth, wellbeing, social welfare or some other criterion) may well be fully indeterminate.\textsuperscript{161} If we regard such harms or losses to be priceless or indeterminate social costs, we introduce an

\textsuperscript{159} On related valuation questions, see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 103 VA. L. REV. 1809 (2017); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29(S2) JOUR. OF LEG. STUD. 1005-1036, 1005, 1014-17 (2000). Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams argue that the “impersonal metric of utility” neglects personal autonomy and personal integrity. Their critique rings very true when procedural human rights are affected, such as equality before the law and non-discrimination. In their critique of utilitarianism, they point out that, “[i]n many-dimensional moral conflicts the presumption of completeness of ranking may well be quite artificial.” Given so, they are critical of the notion that a maximum overall utility value can be counted and compared to other states of affairs (as a style of culmination outcome). See SEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 99, at 18..

\textsuperscript{160} See Sen supra note 41, at 492.

\textsuperscript{161} In his critique of wealth maximization, Kornhauser highlights the “problem of ‘untraded goods’ such as those implicated in personal injury cases and in other policies that alter the risks to life and limb... [in which] compensation after death or injury may always prove to be inadequate.” Further, he notes that, “many goods, such as environmental goods and rights to bodily integrity, do not trade on well-developed markets if they trade at all. Consequently, one cannot rely on insurance and other markets to solve all the problems.” See Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 679-84, 680, 682 (1998).
inconsistency that renders the Kaldor-Hicks compensation criterion inoperable. The assertion of pricelessness of human rights impacts has intuitive appeal especially with regards to egregious human rights violations such as disappearances, torture, kidnappings, prolonged arbitrary detention; as well as those that relate to basic political freedoms, such as democratic participation, freedom of association, and due process rights. The idea that one might calculate whether an increase in shareholder gain in one domain (as a ‘proxy’ for social welfare) is adequate to potentially compensate human rights victims in another domain verges on nonsensical. The presence or risk of such priceless social costs, I contend, negates the operability of the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation criterion, at least for that instance of harm.

As we saw in the discussion above, the value-maximizing approach is often informally predicated on the notion that a prior normative ‘moral ground floor’ is satisfied in the background. By this thinking, cost-benefit analysis and value-maximization may be undertaken after a ground floor moral standard has been satisfied. This means also that, at

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162 On the problem of pricelessness in cost benefit analysis, see Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, *Pricing the Priceless: Cost-benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection*, 150(5) U. PENN. L. R., 1553-1584 (2002). Amartya Sen argues that existence values in environmental cost benefit analysis pose a similar problem. See Amartya K. Sen, *The Discipline of Cost-benefit Analysis*, 29(S2) JOUR. OF LEG. STUD., 931-952, 951 (2000). In a similar vein, Penz et al. conclude that cost-benefit analysis, “does not readily accommodate preferences for social justice or the shape of society at large, or the environmental conditions of the planet” [emphasis added]. See PENZ ET AL., *supra* note 80, at 68.

163 A summary of “[p]rocedural rights of project-affected people” is given by Penz et al.. Such rights include: “[t]he right to refusal by those to be evicted until overruled by judicial (not administrative) action,” and, “[t]he right of access to competent, timely and uncorrupted dispute resolution, including adjudication.” See PENZ ET AL., *supra* note 80, at 241.

164 On the other hand, we might attempt to fix a value on “dignity” by conducting surveys on “willingness to accept” compensation and by other means (I do not endorse this approach, but one might try). For further discussion on this tricky valuational problem, see Bayefsky, *supra* note 157, at 1732; See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, *VALUING LIFE* (2014); Posner & Sunstein, *supra* note 159, at 1809; and Cass R. Sunstein, *Manipulation, Welfare, and Dignity: A Reply*, 1 J. MARKETING. BEHAV. 351 (2016).
a minimum, business decision makers should not trade-off human rights for shareholder gain. This is regarded sometimes as a matter of common sense; as something so fundamental that it need not be formally incorporated into economic analysis. But this informal ‘fix,’ as I have already contended, reveals the fundamental flaw of the value maximization approach: it is too idealistic. Value maximization is a normative economic prescription for a world that does not actually exist. As shown above, adhering to the ‘moral ground floor’ in the global corporate system is much easier said than done. As the growing practice of corporate human rights impact assessment shows, appraising the human rights risks to business and risks to people of global business activity is a very complex and labor-intensive task. Much depends on the point of view from which impacts are assessed. Different people see problems in a different light. It also costs money to do this work. Where the moral ground floor lies at any given time and place is impossible to pinpoint, though we should do our best at all times. The challenge grows when global firms are networked and trade across dramatically different local contexts. The moral ground floor is never fixed, only estimated; sometimes very roughly.

It is fair to surmise that “all those who suffer” from human rights abuses today are not interested in waiting to be compensated by the future “summing up” of social welfare that is promised by efficiency theory. Overall growth does little to assuage those individuals whose livelihoods are turned upside down today through human rights

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165 On the complexities of “knowing and showing” corporate respect for human rights, see e.g., SHIFT, Human Rights Reporting Framework (2015), www.shiftproject.org (last visited July 12, 2019).

166 Indeed, Chief Justice Leo Strine asserts that this great “summing up” never actually happens — it’s a purely theoretical exercise. [Chief Justice Leo Strine, Lecture at Harvard Law School, 2016, notes on file with the author]
abuses, displacement,\textsuperscript{167} and environmental degradation.\textsuperscript{168} Kaldor’s invocation of hypothetical compensation within a self-contained political community is not fit for purpose in the global economy—a world in which business activity and regulatory arbitrage takes place over multiple and drastically uneven political communities and juridical spaces. For “those who suffer” human rights violations today, the \textit{mere prospect of compensation} given by Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-theory is no salve at all; it is all but worthless.\textsuperscript{169}

The matter of human rights in a globalized economy is a normative challenge that value maximization’s theory and method have no clear means to address.\textsuperscript{170} This problem, as I contend, cannot be avoided by positing an \textit{ex ante} moral constraint (i.e. respecting human

\textsuperscript{167} The tension is illustrated in reportage about the Coca Cola company’s pledge to review the land assembly and land tenure practices of its top sugar suppliers:

‘Land grabs’ are a controversial concept among development economists. Consolidating tracts of land into larger plantations to grow crops for export could leave a country better off, with the foreign exchange earnings allowing it to more than replace the lost production of food for local consumption. \textit{But Oxfam and other groups have documented cases over the years in which individual farmers or communities have been evicted without compensation, warning or knowledge of what was happening” [emphasis added].

\textit{See Coke, Pressed by Oxfam, Pledges Zero Tolerance for Land Grabs in Supply Chain, WASH. POST, November 8, 2013. See also Coke’s Zero Tolerance for Land Grabs Proves Difficult to Fulfill,” REUTERS, March 25, 2015.}

\textsuperscript{168} Using Sen’s approach, we can talk about the collateral negative impacts on individuals and communities of business activity in terms of a \textit{loss of freedom}. \textit{See AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2001).}

\textsuperscript{169} In his critique of wealth-maximization, Ronald Dworkin argues that the aggregation of wealth in the wealth-maximization approach does not consider adequately the consequences for individuals acting under uncertainty. In situations where individuals are left worse off while overall wealth is still considered to be maximized, he argues that: “\textit{No particular individual will, then, be concerned about social wealth (or, indeed, about Pareto efficiency). It makes no sense for him to trade off anything, let alone justice, for \textit{that}. He will be concerned with his individual fate...}” [italics in original]. \textit{See Ronald Dworkin, \textit{Is Wealth a Value?}, 9(2) JOUR. OF LEG. STUD. 203 (1980).}

\textsuperscript{170} Sen writes that, “Utilitarians do not include the realization of freedoms, or the fulfillment of rights or duties, among the valued objects at all, and so there is a fundamental gap here. Of course, rights or duties may be instrumentally valued by utilitarians for what they can do to promote utilities, but their fulfillment or violation does not, by itself, make the states better or worse in utilitarian accounting.” \textit{See Sen, supra note 41, at 493}
rights as a moral ground floor) and then choosing maximal outcomes for shareholders.

Why is this so? Because the proposed ex ante constraint is never fully defined nor satisfied, though we should always try our best to behave ethically. This means that even with the stylized ex-ante normative constraint in place, additional moral, ethical and political work always remains to be done. By whom? By business decision makers, including managers, board members and shareholders. This is why we seek wise and virtuous people to lead companies and institutions; it is why the shareholders of early corporations were empowered to elect a reflective “court of directors.”

What does this mean in practice? We might ask, for instance, whether Alphabet Inc. should cease to do business in countries where the government attacks journalists, political dissidents, and labor organizers. We might ask if a global mining company should exit a country where a military junta has toppled an elected government and announces plans to expand resource extraction aggressively. There are no straightforward deductive and computational answers to such questions; judgments need to be made. Very often, there is deep uncertainty about how to satisfy the minimal requirements of the moral ground floor; this does not mean that the ex-ante constraint can simply be ignored. The value maximizing approach cannot simply dispense with concern for background norms because they are too difficult to satisfy in any straightforward way. And yet, Jensen’s reasoning for rejecting stakeholder theory exudes such flavor: he dispenses with stakeholder theory because it makes things very difficult for managers—it

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171 See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 800 (1776).
requires them to make political-style judgments where Jensen would rather have them make scientific maximal value-seeking calculations.

Value maximization’s human rights problem is thus laid bare: the intractable valuation problems that arise in complex human rights controversies negate the formal operability of the value maximization approach. Indeed, to borrow Martha Nussbaum’s language, business decision-makers who are caught up in a human rights controversy must contend with “tragic dilemmas” where no option is facially acceptable. For instance, a simple-seeming solution like abandoning a project in a conflict zone may lead to even worse outcomes for people in the community affected. And so, business decision makers must address human rights and ethical concerns as they arise and are ongoing with reference to the very particular circumstances in each case. In such circumstances, decision makers must grapple with broad comprehensive outcomes, including processes and agencies involved as well as culmination outcomes.

PART IV - When Value Maximization ‘Runs Out’

Business decision-making has always had a reflective and ethical dimension that shareholder primacy’s technical prescription does not fully account for. Imperfect as it is, the stakeholder approach better reflects the real constraints and limitations (empirical,

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172 Nussbaum, supra note 159, at 1010.
173 Muchlinski opines that, “it is hard to see how the existence of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights can become a significant element in corporate action unless a more stakeholder oriented approach is adopted in corporate governance and regulatory developments.” See Peter Muchlinski, Implementing the New UN Corporate Human Rights Framework: Implications for Corporate Law, Governance, and Regulation, 22(1) BUS. ETHICS Q. 145-177, 163 (2012).
epistemic and normative) that decision makers actually have to contend with. Today’s managerial decision dilemmas that involve critical problems of “people and planet,” such as climate disruption, ocean pollution and pandemics, only serve to highlight this reality. All business decision making concerns simultaneously both value and values, the former cannot be entirely sliced away from the latter. In the global movement to abolish the slave trade of the 18th and 19th century, business decision makers faced their own critical problems of “people and planet.” There is no sense in which business decision-making is rightly regarded as an impersonal and technical exercise that takes place apart from the wider ethical and social issues of our time.

When the best way forward is discerned by instincts and deliberations over what is “the right thing to do” rather than by the comparison of ranked scores, the shareholder value maximization norm “runs out.” Outside of hypothetical Arcadian worlds (free of negative externalities and sundry imperfections), all business allocations involve some form of tradeoff among distinct concerns. It is my contention that no objective maximizing decision-making space exists that permits corporate agents to merely count up and allocate the residual that is thought to be due to investor principals, free of any non-computational judgment. Any slice, no matter how small, taken from the putatively

174 On problems of “people and planet,” see generally COLIN MAYER, PROSPERITY (2018).
175 H.L.A. Hart writes that in deductive maneuvers in the adjudication of ‘hard’ cases, “the law runs out.” See Herbert L. A. Hart & Leslie Green, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 200 (2012). In the corporate risk management context, Cristina Besio suggests that, “[i]n situations in which technical and managerial knowledge are called into question or completely lacking, instead of producing calculations or scientific arguments, it is often possible to refer to established moral values in order to find a common ground (at least temporarily and in a specific context) to continue operating. However, this strategy generates new risks, since moral communication can suppress other types of communication.” See Cristina Besio, Transforming Risks into Moral Issues in Organizations, in BUSINESS ETHICS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 72 (Christophe Luetge & Johanna Jauernig, eds., 2014).
“maximal” residual that is thought to be owed to the principal would have some potential value to other corporate constituents or to the world in general. Such value could take the form of increased wages or benefits for employees, a better quality product, improved worker health and safety, fewer people forced to relocate to make way for a project, less air pollution, more natural habitat protection, less plastic clogging up the oceans, and so on... Taking Jensen strictly, his prescription to maximize his preferred culmination outcome (shareholder value) to the exclusion of all else leaves aside the art of judgment and the reflective texture of human decision-making.\(^{176}\)

There is nothing particularly novel about managerial concern for comprehensive outcomes; indeed, the resurgence of stakeholder theory is just that—a resurgence.\(^{177}\) A notable historical example of a company explicitly adopting what can only be described as a *comprehensive* outcome approach occurred in the mid-1990s when the Royal Dutch/Shell Group faced overwhelming pressure to respond to the crisis in Nigeria’s Ogoniland. When the Nigerian military government executed Ogoni environmental activist Ken Saro Wiwa\(^{178}\) along with 8 other men, the company was condemned around the world for having failed to use its leverage with the Nigerian government to halt the killings. The Royal Dutch/Shell Group’s Chairman at the time, Cor Herkströter chose not

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\(^{176}\) Sen speaks of “deeply divisive dilemmas” and “decision problems in the context of ethical arguments and welfare-economic assessment.” See SEN (1999), supra note 100, at 69-70.


\(^{178}\) Ken Saro Wiwa was a Nigerian author, environmental activist, and leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). He was hanged by the Nigerian government along with eight other men in 1995. At the time, Royal Dutch/Shell had extensive operations in the region called Ogoniland as well as in other parts of Nigeria. On the death of Saro-Wiwa, see Frank Aigbogun, *It Took Five Times to Hang Saro-Wiwa*, ASSOCIATED PRESS LAGOS, November 13, 1995 (in THE INDEPENDENT).
to intervene publicly with the Nigerian government. In explaining his decision year later, Herkströter stated: “I cannot believe it is our proper role to see ourselves as moral arbiters of what is acceptable behaviour for sovereign states. That is a matter for governments and the international institutions empowered to do so.”

In a remarkable about-face two years after the hangings, the firm rewrote its major business policies and recognized its responsibility “to express support for fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business.”

Sir Mark Moody-Stuart was the Royal Dutch/Shell Group’s Managing Director when the company’s new policy was drafted. In his memoir, Moody-Stuart recounted that:

…[t]he combined changes in the principles on politics and human rights meant people were empowered to use their own judgment as to when it was likely to be constructive and helpful to speak in private or in public… Many people had in fact used their initiative before and raised issues of human rights with governments, but this codification led to wider understanding” [emphasis added].

With these policy changes, Royal Dutch/Shell Groups’s General Business Principles included both respect for human rights and protection of shareholders’ investment on the same plane. The decision makers’ new responsibilities were outlined as follows:

Principle 2: Responsibilities

i) “To protect shareholders’ investment, and provide an acceptable return” along with,

…

iii) “To respect the human rights of their employees” and,

…

v) “To conduct business as responsible corporate members of society, to observe the laws of the countries in which they operate, to express support for human rights in line with the legitimate role of business.”

179 See Cor Herkstroter, Dealing With Contradictory Expectations: Dilemmas Facing Multinationals, in 63(4) VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 100-105, 105.

fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business and to give proper regard to health, safety and the environment consistent with their commitment to contribute to sustainable development.” 181

These distinct responsibilities were regarded as “inseparable.” They included “the duty of management continuously to assess the priorities and discharge its responsibilities as best it can on the basis of that assessment” [emphasis added].182 At the same time, the firm’s economic principles stated unequivocally that, “[p]rofitability is essential to discharging these responsibilities and staying in business… Without profits and a strong financial foundation it would not be possible to fulfil the responsibilities outlined above.”183 It is especially noteworthy that the revised principles called for “an acceptable return” for investors, rather than shareholder value maximization.

We can interpret Shell’s revised principles as mandating a shift in thinking away from a culmination-oriented approach and towards a more comprehensive outcome-oriented approach. As shown earlier, the comprehensive approach is concerned with both shareholder value and a broader range of consequences, including the evaluation of processes that lead to outcomes. In what was likely the first global corporate policy on human rights ever implemented by a major multinational, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group acknowledged the role for individual reflection and judgment while recognizing that the firm’s economic responsibilities and human rights responsibilities overlap. This example of Royal Dutch/Shell Group’s experience in Nigeria, and its subsequent reaction, shows that circumstances do arise for business decision makers in which a culmination

181 Ibid. [three are listed here, out of five]
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid.
outcome-oriented logic “runs out” and a broader range of normative criteria enters the picture. My contention is that this is not an exceptional circumstance, but rather reflects what goes on generally and day to day in albeit less dramatic fashion.

We might also interpret the growing concern for acquiring the ‘social license to operate’ with concern for comprehensive outcomes. In the extractive industry today, much thinking about how not to ignore the interests of stakeholders relates to obtaining the highly prized social license. Here, an entire sub-field of literature has emerged on how companies should strive to acquire social license to operate and hold on to it. Another recent comprehensive outcome-oriented innovation in some large firms is to assess human rights risks to people (referred to as “salient risk”) as well as material risks to the business, combining both dimensions into a materiality and salience matrix. The rising concern among some major firms over “salient risk” (risk to people) and process-legitimacy (social license) evinces a shift from prioritizing culmination outcomes to a wider appraisal of comprehensive outcomes in decision-making.

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184 The problem of how not to ignore the interests of stakeholders was discussed above in connection with Jensen’s critique of the stakeholder approach. See Part III b).


186 For examples of the term ‘salient risk’ adopted by global firms, see UNILEVER, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: ENHANCING LIVELIHOODS, ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (2015); M&S, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 9 (2016); MICROSOFT, CITIZENSHIP REPORT 40; and for a recent example of the use of the term “salient human rights issues,” see Nestlé’s report on, NESTLÉ IN SOCIETY 59-61 (2017).
The present movement led by Lipton and Mayer calling for a renewal of “corporate purpose” within a “New Paradigm” evinces concern for goals that go beyond value maximization and culmination scores. By reimagining the corporation as having a social purpose as well as an economic one, the focus on culmination outcomes is deprioritized, though it remains a critically important consideration among many others. Again, such shifts in thinking are not entirely brand new; rather, they harken back to an earlier era in which the business corporation was regarded as a social entity rather than merely a ‘thing’ owned by its stockholders (it’s “principals”). A bold contemporary example of such a reordering of priorities took place in 2009, when newly appointed Unilever CEO Paul Polman announced that the company would no longer issue quarterly earnings statements. This move, he contended, was needed to pivot the company towards a long term “equitable” and “sustainable” business model. Applying Sen’s distinction, we might say that he sought to pivot the governance of the firm from a fixation on narrow culmination outcomes to embrace broader comprehensive outcomes.


189 On Unilever CEO Paul Polman’s decision to stop issuing quarterly earnings reports, see Andy Boynton, Unilever's Paul Polman: CEOs Can't Be 'Slaves' To Shareholders, FORBES, July 20, 2015.
When business leaders strive towards conduct befitting of a ‘corporate citizen,’ they go beyond culmination outcome-oriented score-keeping. Depending on the nature and severity of potential losses for “all those who suffer,” corporate decision-makers may find themselves looking for an adequate way to respond to heightened public scrutiny of their ostensibly private business affairs. As in the example of Royal Dutch/Shell Group above, such heightened public scrutiny may push the highest-level corporate decision makers to shift from culmination outcome-oriented logic to a more comprehensive approach. For global companies, such shifts might be induced by concerns about forced labor in the supply chain, conflict-driven violence, forced displacement, serious adverse environmental impacts, attacks on human rights defenders, and crack-downs.

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190 For example, in a case concerning alleged forced labor in Sudan, one corporate law theorist opined that, “firms choose not to operate in Sudan not because of reputational costs, but because managers think it is wrong.” See Summary of Discussion on Corporate Social Responsibility and Business in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS 203 (Bruce L. Hay, Robert N. Stavins, and Richard H.K. Vietor, eds., 2005) [this example attributed to Harvard Law Professor John Coates]. See also Steve Prokesch, The Right Thing to Do, HARV. BUS. REV., December 7, 2017; Alison Taylor, We Shouldn’t Always Need a ‘Business Case’ to do the Right Thing, HARV. BUS. REV.; September, 2017. Freeman et al. argue that for business decision-makers a “moral choice to act can arise in response to situations where not acting in the face of egregious human rights violations can signal acquiescence, or even tacit support for such violations.” See Bennett Freeman, et al., Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, International Service for Human Rights, SHARED SPACE UNDER PRESSURE: BUSINESS SUPPORT FOR CIVIC FREEDOMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 44 (2018).

191 In 2005, Mark Moody-Stuart (then Chair of Anglo-American Gold) identified “the resettlement of populations affected by the extractive sector” as one of the main human rights challenges for industry. See Mark Moody-Stuart as quoted in Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Sectoral Consultation Entitled “Human Rights and the Extractive Industry”, 10-11 November 2005, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/92 (19 December 2005), at 5-6. In their analysis of displacement and resettlement in the mining sector, Deanna Kemp et al. note that: “…displacement effects are well established. They are so well established in fact, that researchers can claim that these effects will arise out of any resettlement event, regardless of which industry or development has caused the displacement.” See Deanna Kemp et al., Global Perspectives on the State of Resettlement Practice in Mining, 35(1) IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT APPRAISAL 22-33, 30 (2017); see also John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, Mining-induced Displacement and Resettlement: a Critical Appraisal, 87 JOUR. OF CLEANER PROD. 478-488 (2015).

on labor organizers. In addressing such complex issues, managerial concern goes beyond philanthropic gift giving or instrumental risk mitigation. How do we know this? Because in situations like those faced by Royal Dutch/Shell Group in Nigeria, a legally available course of action may be assiduously avoided, notwithstanding that it would generate long run value for shareholders; and, on some criteria, a net gain in overall social welfare (i.e. it would generate a Kaldor-Hicks efficient result). Legally available options are, at times, avoided because they are ethically untenable, even if they might increase shareholder value.

The range of management and mixed public/private institutional processes that would support expanded comprehensive appraisals are vast. To give just a few examples from the global extractive industry, greater attention to processes might include: more rigorous and more participatory public consultation at the earliest stages of project conception and design; consultation processes that directly support the public’s right of access to

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193 For a case study of violations against labor organizers in Colombia, see International Federation for Human Rights, et al., The contribution of Chiquita Brands International Inc. corporate officials to crimes against humanity in Colombia (Article 15 Communication to the International Criminal Court, May 2017).

194 For instance, Sheldon Leader argues that in doing consultations for a mega extractive project, “…the equitable approach demands that consultation take place well before key decisions about projects, and indeed about policies are taken by the company. This mode of early and thorough consultation is precisely designed to impinge on a terrain that that strategic [i.e. the business case approach] often leads untouched: the terrain of basic decisions to pursue or to abandon, or to seriously modify the whole design and rationale of a project” [emphasis added]. See Sheldon Leader, Project
information and the freedom to impart information; the presence of a free and
independent press; the right of workers and affected community members to organize and
bargain collectively; open scrutiny of environmental impact assessments; independent
human rights impact assessments of mega development projects; and institutional
processes that support the indigenous right of “free, prior and informed consent”
(FPIC).195

Commenting in 2012 on the implementation by firms of the then recently adopted UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), Peter Muchlinski opined
that, “…it seems clear that any move towards operationalising the corporate
responsibility to respect human rights will involve a departure from a shareholder based
corporate governance model towards a more stakeholder based model.”196 We might say
that a firm that moves today to incorporate the UNGPs into its global policy framework
(and acts by it) would be taking a step towards the appraisal of comprehensive-oriented
outcomes in decision making.197

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196 See Muchlinski, supra note 173, at 167.

Conclusion

Value maximization as a lodestone for decision making is too idealistic, which is why the stakeholder approach, difficult as it may be, remains a vigorous contender in the battle over the heart and soul of corporate governance. The problems inherent in the maximization approach have been raised by others before me who have proffered alternative approaches to corporate decision making such as optimization\textsuperscript{198} and satisficing.\textsuperscript{199} My contribution to this long-running debate has been to draw on Sen’s distinction between culmination outcomes and comprehensive outcomes to articulate a more foundational aspect of the problem: the value maximization approach does not provide a rich and deep enough normative framework for actually making reasoned and ethically sound decisions.

The main findings of this paper are these: The shareholder value maximization approach reflects a style of ethical and economic reasoning that is concerned with maximizing the desired \emph{culmination} outcomes within a welfarist paradigm. In this approach, \emph{efficiency} is

\textsuperscript{198} In 2012, the Business Roundtable’s Principles of Corporate Governance described the “paramount” duty as one of optimization, rather than maximization:

Corporations are often said to have obligations to shareholders and other constituencies, including employees, the communities in which they do business and government, \textit{but these obligations are best viewed as part of the paramount duty to optimize long-term shareholder value}. Business Roundtable believes that shareholder value is enhanced when a corporation engages effectively with its long-term shareholders, treats its employees well, serves its customers well, fosters good relationships with and appropriately oversees its major suppliers, maintains an effective compliance program and strong corporate governance practices, and has a reputation for civic responsibility. \[emphasis added\]

\textit{See} BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2012), at 30 (Section IV. Relationships with Shareholders and Other Constituencies).

\textsuperscript{199} Choper et al., argue that managers “satisfice” rather than maximize (they seek to satisfy the shareholders rather than maximize shareholder value). \textit{See} Jesse H. Choper et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (2004).
construed as Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. I have argued that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion does not scale beyond a well-defined political and juridical community; and so, it is not operable in today’s global corporate system; and so it does not provide a sound normative basis for value maximization in a global context. Furthermore, in a global corporate system, maximizing shareholder value is not an adequate proxy for improving the lot of “all those who suffer” in the global economy. As with value maximization, the stakeholder approach is concerned with quantifiable outcomes that can be ranked and compared (e.g. earnings, stock prices, shareholder returns). However, the stakeholder approach differs from value maximization in a very critical respect: it is also concerned about the processes and agencies involved in realizing those outcomes—it is concerned with comprehensive outcomes. The stakeholder approach is directly amenable to concern with a broader range of values including the ‘dignity’ of employees and respecting human rights.

As legal obligation or social expectation, shareholder value maximization represents a powerful overarching norm in business culture around the world, but in recent years, it has begun to lose its luster. The problem with the shareholder primacy doctrine, as I see it, is this: if value maximization, or any of its close variants, is taken to be management’s only rational and purposeful “objective function” (i.e. if it is regarded as a technical matter\textsuperscript{200} in the style of a compliance obligation), this may lead managers to frame

\textsuperscript{200} Rendtorff argues that in hierarchical organizations the “goal-rationality” of an organization is received by its staff as a “technical” matter; that is to say, “[t]he manager, investor, business leader, or public administrator only follows orders and justifies his or her actions by reference to the technical goal-rationality of the organizational system,” and that, “the administrative obedience to realize the organizational aim becomes the central interest of the managers, investors or administrators of the organization.” See Jacob D. Rendtorff, Risk Management, Banality of Evil and Moral Blindness in
today’s decision-dilemmas as zero-sum tradeoffs between value seeking (maximizing the 
desired culmination outcome) and realizing other important values, such as 
environmental sustainability or corporate respect for human rights.\textsuperscript{201} For the corporate 
decision maker steeped in the value maximization credo, situations may arise when it 
may seem that the internally oriented expectation to maximize shareholder value 
(whether legally required or not) and the externally oriented demands of environmental 
sustainability, human rights, human dignity, and equity are in tension, if not outright 
conflict. Some will argue that the degree of tension depends, in part, on how we 
circumscribe the duty of corporate loyalty.\textsuperscript{202} The precise contours of fiduciary loyalty 
vary from one jurisdiction to another—the extent to which managers may consider (or 
should consider) such values and their relevance to non-shareholders is much contested. 
The opponents of stakeholder theory frequently raise the specter of breach of fiduciary 
duty; while the proponents of the “New Paradigm” argue forcefully that the stakeholder 
approach is fully consistent with the corporate fiduciary duty of loyalty.\textsuperscript{203} This paper

\textit{Organizations and Corporations, in} BUSINESS ETHICS AND RISK MANAGEMENT 45, 58-59 
(Christophe Luetge & Johanna Jauernig, eds., 2014).
\textsuperscript{201} Smith and Rönnengard note that the shareholder primacy norm is considered by some to be an 
“impediment” to corporate social responsibility: “[t]he shareholder primacy norm... has been treated 
as a major obstacle to corporate social responsibility (CSR) because it is said to hinder managers from 
considering the interests of other corporate stakeholders besides shareholders.” \textit{See} Smith & 
Rönnegard, \textit{supra} note 27, at 463.
\textsuperscript{202} Referring to the reformed 2006 U.K. Company Act, Peter Muchlinski argues that, “the 
‘enlightened shareholder value’ model of corporate governance can allow for some room to make 
human rights oriented decisions provided that they do not weaken the success of the company.” \textit{See} 
\textsuperscript{203} Lipton et al. argue that, “Delaware law does not enshrine a principle of shareholder primacy or 
preclude a board of directors from considering the interests of other stakeholders. Nor does the law of 
any other state. Although much attention has been given to the \textit{Revlon} doctrine, which suggests that 
the board must attempt to achieve the highest value reasonably available to shareholders, that doctrine 
is narrowly limited to situations where the board has determined to sell control of the company and 
either all or a preponderant percentage of the consideration being paid is cash or the transaction will 
result in a controlling shareholder. \textit{See} Lipton et al. “Stakeholder Governance and the Fiduciary 
provided a new lens for examining the long-running controversy over the demands of fiduciary duty. It makes clear that there can be no generalizable legal duty to maximize value because, except in the narrowest of circumstances, value maximization is too idealistic—it calls on decision-makers to do something that they are, in reality, unable to do. The stakeholder approach, on the other hand, is more down-to-earth and is more in accord with the natural plasticity and open-textured aspects of the fiduciary duty concept.

It is critical to recognize that the problems and alternatives addressed in this paper have a multifaceted and systemic character. At the same time that outside pressures may cause decision makers to consider broader comprehensive outcomes for “people and planet,” market forces push corporate decision-makers towards prioritizing straightforwardly measurable culmination outcomes (e.g. stock prices) for the sole reason that to survive in the market, it is felt that one must conform to its manifestly culmination-oriented logic. Managers are pulled in both directions at once: they may well believe that the long run success of any business depends, in part, on the realization of broader comprehensive outcomes for workers and communities; and yet, in making decisions today they may be highly constrained by market pressures that place overwhelming emphasis on final culmination scores. A more fulsome treatment of the economic and social constraints on business decision makers is beyond the scope of this paper and must be left for another day.

204 In their corporate law casebook, Allen et al., write that, “…control contests [i.e. takeover bids] are profoundly unpleasant for incumbent managers. But for this very reason, the threat of a takeover has the salutary effect of encouraging all managers to deliver shareholder value.” Allen et al., supra note 23, at 511. The classic work on the competitive “market for corporate control” is by Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73(2) JOUR. OF POL. ECON. 110-120 (1965).
The value maximization credo purports to purify the business decision maker’s choice act of its ethical and political dimensions. But the purity that it offers is illusory. No politics-free maximizing allocations occur except in unspoiled hypothetical worlds where the constraints of morality and custom are un-controversially and fully satisfied before earnings are declared. There is no sense in which the manager-as-agent merely gives the principal-as-owner her due without the taint of ethics or politics; there is no decision-making space where a “maximal” allocation is available in its merely technical sense. For the corporate decision maker, each unit of value that is allocated is as much an ethical property as an economic one.

In their August 2019 statement, the CEOs of Business Roundtable asserted that, “[w]e respect the people in our communities and protect the environment by embracing sustainable practices across our businesses” [emphasis added]. The economy, they say, should allow each person “to lead a life of meaning and dignity.”

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205 Jensen acknowledges that there are, “those who argue the world is too complex to maximize anything.” Jensen, supra note 38, at 247. Reflecting this sentiment, Damon A. Silvers argues that shareholder value maximization is a “mirage”; he speaks of the, “value maximization fantasy—it cannot be done.” In his view, maximization can’t be done because of failures in the predictive power of the firm as a “complex human institution,” and that, “as a going concern… the question [of value maximization] is so much about [ambivalent] time horizons.” See Silvers, Presentation at the Millstein Governance Forum panel on the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance, 2015. Columbia University, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XnY23qXb1Ec [last visited on July 29, 2019]. On the “cloak of science” in law and economics, Horwitz opines that, “it is only a short time before the main attraction of efficiency analysis-the promise of a single ‘scientific’ right answer-will begin to fade into a quaint and nostalgic past.” See Horwitz, supra note 70, at 905.

206 I borrow the term “merely technical” from Duncan Kennedy. Kennedy writes: “In discussing technical issues, legal scholars make arguments, and these arguments ‘resonate’ with, or are homologous with, or are mutually re-enforcing vis-à-vis arguments in domains conventionally thought to be political rather than ‘merely technical’.” See Duncan Kennedy, The Political Stakes in “Merely Technical” Issues of Contract Law 10 EURO. REV. OF PRIV. L. 7 (2002).

207 Business Roundtable, supra, note 1.

208 Ibid.
too much of the words chosen for a press release, and yet, it’s curious that the Business Roundtable’s 2019 statement explicitly references the values of dignity and respect. Similarly, the ‘Davos Manifesto’ of 2020 calls on companies to treat their people “with dignity and respect.” Do they mean to say that business decision makers, as a matter of fact, make non-computational judgements between and among the distinct concerns of dignity and profit? Probably not. Nonetheless, one might reasonably ask why they were moved to highlight the values of dignity and respect when they could have avoided such terms altogether. Of course, actions speak louder than words. Their 300-word statement did not indicate how their stakeholder-respecting goals should be realized. The world is still waiting to see what steps the CEO signatories will take to implement their stated commitment. They have a tall mountain to climb. The notion of ‘human dignity’ is widely thought to be the foundation that underlies human rights. The Corporate Human Rights Benchmark’s latest report shows that many of the firms run by these CEOs are failing the grade on the matter of corporate respect for human rights. It remains to be seen whether the prominent CEOs of the Business Roundtable will move to embed the corporate responsibility to respect human rights into their firms’ global policy frameworks. They have good reason for doing so, if only to make good on their pledge to treat all stakeholders with dignity.

In their salvo aimed at discrediting ‘stakeholderism,’ Bebchuk and Tallarita express deep concerns over expanding the breadth of ‘discretion’ given to business managers.

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209 Davos Manifesto, supra note 5.
Stakeholderism, they argue, “amounts to no more than hoping that corporate leaders would use their discretion to balance the interests of stakeholders and shareholders in a socially desirable way.”211 Their anxiety over expanded discretion is not unsurprising as it reflects the kind of nervousness over heterogeneity and incommensurability that so many normative economists feel. Nonetheless, this aspect of Bebchuck and Tallarita’s critique is one-sided. As Sen observes, “there is such a long tradition in parts of economics and political philosophy of treating one allegedly homogenous feature (such as income or utility) as the sole ‘good thing’ that could be effortlessly maximized (the more the merrier), that there is some nervousness in facing a problem of valuation involving heterogenous objects.”212 The business leader’s motivation today for exercising discretion in one way or the other might be influenced by wider concerns than a rational self-interest model of behavior admits. The fact is that individual motivations can change and will change over time, and motivations can be very mixed. As Bebchuck’s most vigorous opponent presently contends, we may well be living through a paradigm shift.213 We may well have entered an era in which the exercise of managerial discretion in dealing with critical problems of “people and planet” over the next decade will be essential for human survival.

In describing shareholder value maximization as one of the “goals” of corporate law, Kraakman et al. include a pointed caveat: “…to say that shareholder value is the principal objective toward which corporations should be managed is not to say that the corporation

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211 Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 55.
212 See SEN, supra note 90, at 239.
213 See Lipton supra note 10; see Mayer, supra note 93.
should maximize pecuniary profits regardless of the means employed” [emphasis added].

In a similar vein, Elhauge argues that, “while shareholders expect profits and do not regard stock investments as tantamount to charitable contributions, they also do not expect unabashed profit seeking untempered by any sense of social responsibility.”

In any business, the residual value that remains at the end the day for its investors depends directly on how all of a firm’s relationships and multi-faceted obligations are attended to—from labor relations, to community relations, to government relations. As in private life, judgments about how to attend to such relationships and obligations are shaped by interests, convictions, cultural values, habit, and personal preferences. I propose that we embrace the view that corporate managers make social choices when they evaluate stakeholder tradeoffs and allocate each unit of value that the firm earns, invests and expends. In the imperfect and uncertain non-Arcadian world that we actually live in, business decision makers neither maximize nor optimize, but exercise non-computational judgment while choosing among incompletely ranked options. This exercise sometimes comes down to “rough guesswork” or “gut instinct” about the best way forward; that does not make it irrational, it means that difficult decisions have to be taken—to reiterate a point made earlier, this is precisely why we desire ways to select wise and virtuous people to run today’s corporations and other institutions.

214 Kraakman, et al. point to corporate lobbying efforts to relax rules as one “unappealing implication of the unrestrained pursuit of profit.” See Kraakman et al. supra note 47, at 23.
215 Elhauge, supra note 27, at 37-38.
216 Freeman concludes his reflection on stakeholder theory with the following words: “We cannot divorce the idea of a moral community or of a moral discourse from the ideas of value-creation activity of business. To do so, entails the acceptance of a principle, the Separation Thesis, which has for too long been used to close off discussion and to silence conversation.” See Freeman, supra note 51, at 419.
The proponents of value maximization are comfortable with counting shareholder value as a proxy for social welfare (an increase in shareholder value means that social welfare is up, a decrease means that it is down); yet they show aversion to the idea that managers make decisions that involve value judgments among and between concerns so distinct as profit, human dignity, economic inequality, environmental sustainability, and fundamental human rights. Stakeholder theorists are less nervous about the need to make judgments among and between a plurality of values. Stakeholder theory is more down-to-earth. In 2020, we need managers who strive to make wise reflective judgments among such mixed distinct concerns; they should not be constrained in their role by the formalistic construct of ‘maximization.’ A world comprised of business decision makers who fixate on counting and scoring, and more counting and scoring, is not a purposeful one, nor is it a humane one.