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Regulating Multinationals:  
The UN Guiding Principles, Civil Society, and International Legalization  

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Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning)

Calls to regulate transnational corporations (TNCs) through a single overarching international treaty instrument go back to the 1970s. Over time, pressure for such a treaty has come most persistently from activists, and more intermittently from developing countries.¹ A recent civil society assessment sums up the record to date: “All these efforts met with vigorous opposition from TNCs and their business associations, and they ultimately failed.”²

In contrast, in June 2011 the Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs), which I developed over the course of a six year mandate as Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights, through nearly fifty international consultations in all regions of the world.³ The GPs are the first authoritative guidance that the Council and its predecessor body, the Commission on Human Rights, have issued for states and business enterprises on their respective obligations in relation to business and human rights; and it marked the first time that either body “endorsed” a normative text on any subject that governments did not negotiate themselves. In comparison with normative and policy developments in other difficult domains, such as climate change, uptake of the GPs has been relatively swift and widespread.

The chapter by Rodríguez and Andia in this volume addresses several key issues concerning how to build on the foundations established by the GPs to keep advancing the business and human rights agenda. I appreciate their understanding the GPs’ as a dynamic process, rather than assessing them purely as a static document. I also find myself in agreement with much of their argument regarding the desirability of continuing to pursue a “polycentric approach,” identifying ways of dealing with the attendant “orchestration” problems; the challenge of institutionalizing what they call “accountability politics” in order to “ratchet up” the internalization and compliance by

business with human rights standards; and their conclusion that any move toward further international legalization in this space is no substitute for continuing to address ongoing needs in the here and now, and that it should focus as a matter of priority on gross human rights abuses.

In what follows, I elaborate on two of these issues. The first is the criticism by Rodríguez and Andia as well as others that the GPs don’t do enough to ensure what they call “the empowered participation of civil society.” The second is the role and forms of international law that would reinforce and build on the GPs rather than positioning the two in opposition and thereby threatening to repeat past failures yet again. I begin with a reprise of the GPs and the logic behind them.

Start an Evolution

The business and human rights agenda involves regulating corporate conduct. As noted at the outset, past efforts to aim a single silver bullet at this challenge had failed. The most recent, the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, led directly to the creation of my mandate. With that history in mind, the GPs set out to generate a new and different regulatory dynamic. It is based on the observation that corporate conduct at the global level is shaped by three distinct governance systems. The first is the system of public law and governance, domestic and international. The second is a civil governance system involving stakeholders affected by business enterprises and employing various social compliance mechanisms such as advocacy campaigns and other forms of pressure. The third is corporate governance, which internalizes elements of the other two (unevenly, to be sure). Lacking was an authoritative basis whereby these governance systems become better aligned in relation to business and human rights, compensate for one another’s weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles — out of which cumulative change can evolve over time.

To foster that alignment, the GPs draw on the different discourses and rationales that reflect the different social roles these governance systems play in regulating corporate conduct. Thus, for states the emphasis is on the legal obligations they have under the international human rights regime to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business, as well as policy rationales that are consistent with, and supportive of, meeting those obligations. For businesses, beyond compliance with

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4 The text is contained in UN Document E/CN.4/Sub2/2003/12/Rev. 2 (26 August 2003). At its 2004 session, the Commission on Human Rights (the Council’s predecessor) pointedly noted in a resolution that the document “has not been requested by the Commission and, as a draft proposal, has no legal standing.” UN Document E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116 (20 April 2004).
5 For an interesting discourse analysis of the development of the GPs, see Karin Buhman, “Navigating from ‘train wreck’ to being ‘welcomed’: negotiation strategies and argumentative patterns in the development of the UN Framework,” in Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights Obligations of Business (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
legal obligations, the GPs focus on the need to manage the risk of involvement in human rights abuses, which requires that companies act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and address harm where it does occur. For affected individuals and communities, the GPs stipulate ways for their further empowerment to realize a right to remedy. I described this approach as principled pragmatism.

Drawing these foundational elements together, the GPs rest on three pillars:

1. The state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business, through appropriate policies, regulation, and adjudication;
2. An independent corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are involved;
3. Greater access by victims to effective remedy, judicial and non-judicial.

The GPs comprise thirty-one principles, each with commentary elaborating its meaning and implications for law, policy, and practice. They encompass all internationally recognized rights, and apply to all states and all business enterprises. They do not by themselves create new legally binding obligations for business but derive their normative force through the recognition of social expectations by states and other key actors, including business itself.

Elements of the GPs are being implemented by individual governments (through national action plans, their role as national contact points under the revised OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which recapitulate the GPs’ formulation of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights virtually verbatim, and in the form of discrete legal and policy measures); by the European Union (for example, through the Commission’s corporate social responsibility policy, and the Union’s new mandatory non-financial reporting requirements); the International Finance Corporation (through its revised sustainability framework and some performance standards); ASEAN (where the Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights is drawing on the GPs in its own work); the African Union (in relation to the Africa Mining Vision); the International Organization for Standardization (through the new ISO 26000); and the Equator Principles Banks (covering three-fourths of all international project financing). The General Assembly of the Organization of American States has formally endorsed the GPs. Ever-increasing numbers of companies report that they are bringing internal management and oversight systems into greater alignment with the GPs. Workers organizations and a number of global NGOs are using the GPs as legal and policy advocacy tools. The International Bar Association, U.K. Law Society, and American Bar Association are promoting the GPs’ incorporation into the legal profession, including
through law firms’ client advisory work. These are but the major and most visible examples; others undoubtedly exist.⁶

On the ground, the two component elements of the GPs that have enjoyed the most rapid uptake are human rights due diligence requirements for companies, and expanding the role of non-judicial grievance mechanisms, including at the operational or site level established by or otherwise involving companies. The reason is simple. At least in principle, each of the three main stakeholder groups has an interest in making these work, even though their rationales for doing so may differ. For states, promoting or requiring human rights due diligence and grievance mechanisms serves the duty to protect; for businesses, they are a means to manage stakeholder-related risk; and for affected individuals and communities, they offer the promise of reducing the overall incidence of corporate-related harm while also serving as one possible source of remedy where harm occurs. I expect this kind of dynamic interaction to continue to drive change.

As a long-time scholar and practitioner of such things, I am hard pressed to identify an international treaty addressing a comparably complex and controversial subject that has generated as much activity in so short a span of time—though I am the first to stress that much more needs to be done. Hence my Churchillian remarks when I presented the GPs to the Human Rights Council in 2011: “I am under no illusion that the conclusion of my mandate will bring all business and human rights challenges to an end. But Council endorsement of the Guiding Principles will mark the end of the beginning.”

Civil Society in the GPs

The GPs were developed through a “polycentric” process, involving representatives of states, business, and civil society.⁷ With regard to civil society specifically, I held numerous bilateral meetings with NGOs as well as with individuals and communities adversely affected by business operations. Civil society groups typically accounted for the largest single number of participants in the multi-stakeholder consultations I convened, many of which were held in the global South. But still the question is sometimes asked: where is civil society in the GPs? Rodríguez and Andia argue that the future success of the GPs depends in no small measure on the “empowered participation of civil society,” and they find that the GPs fall short in this respect. Tara Melish and Errol Meidinger have suggested that the GPs should have had

⁶ Awareness of these developments is limited by the fact that no entity has the job of tracking and reporting on them. The closest we come is through self-reporting on the website of the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, a London-based nonprofit. http://www.business-humanrights.org/

a fourth pillar, officially recognizing civil society’s critical role. Melish, in her chapter in this volume, repeats that proposal and argues that there are insufficient “expressive commitments” to civil society participation in the GPs, as a result of which NGOs are unable to use of the GPs sufficiently to press for changes in state and corporate conduct.

I certainly agree with the proposition that civil society participation is critical, and from the start conceptualized and articulated the GPs with that in mind: hence their very foundation in the idea of polycentric governance. But there are also several logical, practical, and empirical issues in play here that require clarification.

For starters, Rodríguez and Andia take their concept of “empowered participation” from an important study by Archon Fung and Erik Olin Wright on institutional innovations in democratic countries that are intended to achieve more direct citizen involvement in devising and implementing public policies affecting their daily lives. There is much to be learned from the cases on which that study’s conclusions and generalizations are based. But let us also recall the cases themselves and their settings: neighborhood councils in Chicago, addressing issues related to policing and public schools; habitat conservation planning under the U.S. Endangered Species Act; participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil; and certain steps toward administrative and fiscal devolution from the states of West Bengal and Kerala, India, to villages. Fung and Wright believe these innovations to be transferable and scalable in some contexts. Indeed, the GPs provisions for non-judicial grievance mechanisms involving companies and affected individuals and communities embody some of Fung and Wright’s insights. But there are strict limits to the applicability of the institutional innovations they identify to the level of the global polity itself, including (or perhaps above all) to the state-based United Nations system.

What about a “Participate” pillar, as recommended by Melish and Meidinger? There are two problems with that idea in this context. First, it might have made sense if the GPs were a discrete multi-stakeholder membership initiative like the Kimberley Process to stem the trade in conflict diamonds or the Forest Stewardship Council. But

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8 Tara J. Melish and Errol Meidinger, “Protect, Respect, Remedy and Participate: ‘New Governance’ Lessons for the Ruggie Framework,” in Radu Mares (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012). Curiously, the authors claim that even the third pillar was a victory “hard-fought by the human rights community” (p. 314). The claim is incorrect. The “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework was developed and presented as one piece from the outset.


10 One of the most successful such efforts with which I am familiar is the creation of eight Regional Development Councils under a Global Memorandum of Understanding established between Chevron Nigeria Limited and communities in Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, Ondo, and Imo States, Nigeria. My UN mandate produced a short and award-winning documentary on this initiative, which is available at http://shiftproject.org/video/only-government-we-see-building-company-community-dialogue-nigeria. The documentary was funded by a grant from the government of Norway.
they are not. They are a soft-law instrument that prescribes minimum standards of conduct for all states and all businesses in relation to all human rights. There is no central governing institution as such. Moreover, Rodríguez and Andia suggest that introducing such a fourth pillar into the GPs might have required including standards for civil society actors as well – which would have delighted some states and many businesses, but I suspect would have been resisted by civil society.

Second, and in a more practical vein, I seriously doubt that a “Participate” pillar would have survived the UN political process of getting the GPs approved. To illustrate, as part of the follow-up to my mandate, I recommended the creation of a capacity building fund to assist developing countries and small- and medium-sized enterprises with GPs implementation. I proposed that it be governed by a multi-stakeholder board. One core state sponsor of the mandate (from the global South) objected to the multi-stakeholder idea on the grounds that it would put other social actors on an equal footing with governments. At the same time, another core sponsor was shutting down domestic human rights organizations and requiring international NGOs to register with the government as foreign agents. And so it went. In short, a “Participate” pillar would have been a non-starter politically, even if I had thought it a good idea. No core sponsors, no endorsement, no Guiding Principles.

But if not a pillar, what about more extensive “expressive commitments” in the GPs text in support of civil society participation? Melish references the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as a precedent, contending that the GPs are weaker in this regard and don’t give civil society enough hooks.11 Indeed, Article 4.3 of that Convention provides that “States Parties shall closely consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations.”12 Here I would make two points.

First, I did in fact embed affected individuals and communities, together with civil society actors that may represent them, within the three pillars. There are specific references to the need to engage with, consult, and report to affected persons and communities as part of the GPs human rights due diligence requirements. Moreover, detailed legitimacy and effectiveness criteria are laid out for non-judicial grievance mechanisms, state-based and private, on the premise that “a grievance mechanism can only serve its purpose if the people it is intended to serve know about it, trust it and are able to use it” (Commentary to GP 31). Finally, the GPs as a whole do provide (and are being used as) a public and judicial advocacy tool, an authoritative basis for making demands on states and businesses. This includes leading global human rights and workers organizations, as well as legal advocacy groups.13 None of this may be enough,

11 See Melish and Meidinger, supra note 9, and Melish in this volume.
13 The International Corporate Accountability Roundtable (ICAR) has done impressive work using the GPs as a platform to further advance corporate accountability, including through national regulation.
as Melish and Meidinger and to a lesser extent Rodríguez and Andia contend. But it reached the limits of my imagination of what was achievable—not as a theoretical exercise, but in actual practice—regarding civil society empowerment within the GPs’ provisions.

My second point again concerns inappropriate (and therefore misleading) analogizing from one setting to another. There are substantial differences in scope, scale and political dynamics between the disabilities convention and attempts to regulate multinational corporations. The former addresses one group of persons and enumerates the rights relevant to their being able to lead lives of dignity. As is true of other economic, social and cultural rights treaties, states’ undertakings are subject to “progressive realization,” linked to state capacity. Moreover, broad consensus exists on the underlying aims. In contrast, business and human rights deals with all rights of all people, with all states, and with all businesses. It is characterized by extensive problem diversity, significant institutional variations, and conflicting interests across and within states. Not least are the interests and influence of multinationals themselves. Consequently, straight analogizing from the disabilities convention to business and human rights is questionable on both substantive and methodological grounds.

Ultimately, my main concern with the line of criticism contending that the GPs do not provide enough hooks for civil society is its potential risk of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Rodriguez and Andia note that many human rights organizations in developing countries lack the capacity to fully track and engage in global governance processes, such as the evolving GPs. Therefore, they look for cues to opinion leaders whose views and preferences broadly reflect their own. It would be far more helpful, not only to the GPs but more importantly to those suffering corporate-related human right harm, if those opinion leaders provided further guidance on how such organizations can use and build on the GPs, instead of relitigating the question of whether the GPs text adopted in 2011 says enough regarding the role of civil society.

International Legalization

As the business and human rights agenda continues to evolve, further legalization is an inevitable and necessary component of future developments. But in light of the failure of past treaty efforts in this domain, we need to ask ourselves what

form legalization should take at the international level. What approach does experience tell us would yield the most benefit for affected individuals and communities? This is no mere academic question. In September 2013 Ecuador proposed that the UN Human Rights Council establish an intergovernmental working group to negotiate just such a treaty instrument, and some 600 NGOs formed a “treaty alliance” to support it.\textsuperscript{14} In a sharply divided vote, the Council adopted the proposal on June 26, 2014. Negotiations are expected to convene sometime in 2015.

Will this latest attempt to impose binding international law obligations on transnational corporations turn out to be another instance of the classic dysfunction of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result? Or might the negotiations come to reflect more deeply on the reasons for this prior record and move in a productive direction? In the heat of the moment, treaty advocates and opponents seem to be on a collision course. Going forward, the answer hinges on whether the initiative’s supporters are more interested in making a difference than in making a point, and whether its opponents can accept that some form of further international legalization in business and human rights is both necessary and desirable. I elaborate on these scenarios below.

Let’s begin with the Ecuador resolution and the vote on it. The resolution calls for the establishment of an open-ended (no time limit) intergovernmental working group within the Human Rights Council, “the mandate of which shall be to elaborate an international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises.”\textsuperscript{15} Thus, the resolution is not addressed to any specific human rights abuses. Rather, it seeks to establish an overarching international legal framework—a global constitution of sorts—governing business conduct in relation to human rights. It then goes on to define “other business enterprises” in a way that is intended to exclude national companies, so that the new legal framework would apply only to transnational corporations.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, to illustrate, the language of the proposed treaty would have covered international brands sourcing garments from the factories housed in the collapsed Rana Plaza building, but not the local factory owners.

In addition to Ecuador, the resolution was co-sponsored by Bolivia, Cuba, South Africa, and Venezuela. The vote in the Council was twenty in favor, fourteen against,\textsuperscript{14} \url{http://www.treatymovement.com/}. It is noteworthy that the major global human rights organizations, such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, did not join the alliance, reflecting doubts about the timing and efficacy of the Ecuador proposal.

\textsuperscript{15}UN Document A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev. 1 (24 June 2014).

\textsuperscript{16}A footnote in the resolution states the following: “‘Other business enterprises’ denotes all business enterprises that have a transnational character in their operational activities, and does not apply to local businesses registered in terms of relevant domestic law.’ The resolution is silent on the subject of joint ventures with domestic partners, including state-owned enterprises, and on other forms of host state involvement with transnational corporations.
with thirteen abstentions. A majority of African members voted for it, as did China, India, and Russia. Apart than the sponsors, all other Latin American countries, notably Brazil, abstained. The European Union and the United States voted against the resolution, which they thought counter-productive and polarizing; both stated that they would not participate in the treaty negotiating process.\textsuperscript{17} Japan and South Korea also voted no. Representatives of the civil society coalition were euphoric, though several NGOs criticized the exclusion of national companies.\textsuperscript{18} China’s explanation of its vote was no rousing endorsement. China’s delegate stated that the vote was based on the following “understanding”: that the issue of a business and human rights treaty is complex; that differences exist among countries in terms of their economic, judicial, and enterprise systems, as well as their historical and cultural backgrounds; and that it will be necessary, therefore, to carry out “detailed and in-depth” studies, and for the treaty process itself to be “gradual, inclusive, and open.”\textsuperscript{19} China, of course, is no more likely than the United States to impose human rights standards on its multinationals that it has not accepted for itself as a state.\textsuperscript{20}

In short, a sizeable majority of Council members did not vote in favor of the Ecuador resolution. The home countries of the vast majority of the world’s transnational corporations opposed and are boycotting the proposed treaty negotiations, abstained, or in China’s case signaled significant conditionality. Thus, as of now this latest treaty effort looks very much like a case of dysfunction redux. But is there nothing to be learned from forty years of history—indeed, from international lawmaking generally—that could ensure additional remedy to victims of corporate-related human rights harm? I believe there is, but it would require key doctrinal preferences to yield to practical reality. I briefly flag three.

The first is for treaty supporters, states and NGOs, to recognize that no treaty of any kind will emerge in the near future. Ecuador itself, in informal consultations

\textsuperscript{17}The U.S. statement is posted at \url{https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/06/26/proposed-working-group-would-undermine-efforts-to-implement-guiding-principles-on-business-and-human-rights/}.


\textsuperscript{20}This raises a fundamental point that civil society treaty advocates and their academic supporters have ignored when criticizing what they consider to be the “weakness” of Pillar 2. All Council members in 2011 were able to endorse the corporate responsibility to respect all human rights because within the GPs' framework that responsibility is based in a global social norm, not a legal obligation. In contrast, if the corporate responsibility to respect human rights were turned into an international treaty obligation, its applicability and the range of human rights to which it would apply would be determined by individual instances of state treaty ratification—not only involving the proposed new treaty, but also the variable human rights standards that individual states recognize as international legal obligations.
leading up to the vote, estimated that it could take a decade or more. Indeed, if the current impasse is not bridged we may well witness a replay of the 1970s TNCs Code of Conduct negotiations, which drifted on for years until they were finally abandoned in 1992. Recall that even the non-binding Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples took twenty-six years from conception to adoption. That’s not a reason to delay. But it does raise an obvious question for treaty supporters: what do they propose to do between now and then—whenever the then may be? The obvious answer should be to implement and build on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (GPs). But this poses a dilemma for many treaty proponents. Let me explain.

Virtually every country that spoke during the Council debate stressed the importance of implementing the GPs. Indeed, the day after the deeply divided vote on the Ecuador proposal the Council adopted a second resolution, introduced by Argentina, Ghana, Norway, and Russia along with forty additional co-sponsors from all regions of the world. It extends the mandate of the expert working group the Council established in 2011 to promote and build on the GPs, and requests the High Commissioner for Human Rights to facilitate a consultative process with states, experts, and other stakeholders exploring “the full range of legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuses.” It also asks the expert working group to report on GPs implementation—lack of awareness of what is actually happening being a main reason for the belief by many that not much is. This resolution was adopted by consensus, requiring no vote.

But here is the problem: many of the countries supporting the treaty process have done little if anything to act on the GPs. Similarly, many of the NGOs in the treaty alliance have done little to promote them—some even campaigned against their endorsement by the Human Rights Council in 2011. Both groups all along have simply held to the doctrinal position that only international legal measures can produce significant change, and since the GPs do not by themselves create new international law obligations, a treaty is necessary. But given Ecuador’s own conjecture that a business and human rights treaty may be a decade or more away, will treaty proponents now take implementing the GPs more seriously—as an interim measure, if nothing else? If not, what will they say to victims, in whose name these battles are waged?

A second doctrinal position stands in the way of progress: the very scale of the proposed treaty. The idea of establishing an overarching international legal framework through a single treaty instrument governing all aspects of transnational corporations in relation to human rights may seem like a reasonable aspiration and simple task. But neither the international political or legal order is capable of achieving it in practice. The crux of the challenge is that business and human rights is not so discrete an issue-area as to lend itself to a single set of detailed treaty obligations. Politically, the problem

21UN Document A/HRC/26/L.1, Rev.1.
diversity, institutional variation, and conflicting interests across states only increases as the number of TNC home countries grows (note, for instance, China’s remarks above). On the legal side, the International Law Commission documented nearly a decade ago that the predominant trend in international legalization is the fragmentation of international law into separate and increasingly autonomous spheres. Its report to the UN General Assembly concludes that “no homogenous hierarchical meta-system is realistically available” within the international legal order to resolve detailed differences among the separate spheres, that this would have to be left to the realm of practice.\textsuperscript{22} The category of business and human rights is a case in point: it encompasses too many complex areas of national and international law for a single treaty instrument to resolve across the full range of human rights.\textsuperscript{23} Any attempt to do so would have to be pitched at such a high level of abstraction that it would be devoid of substance, of little practical use to real people in real places, and with high potential for generating serious backlash against any form of further international legalization in this domain—as we already began to witness in the recent Council debate.

This brings me to a third doctrinal impediment. Treaty opponents need to face up to the reality that international law in this domain cannot and will not remain frozen in place forever. If some of the arguments by Ecuador and the treaty alliance sounded like a blast from the past, so too did some rejoinders from the other side. For example, the delegate of the United Kingdom stated that “this issue is one of the rule of law, the national rule of law in individual states.”\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, the International Chamber of Commerce stated in a press release that “no initiative or standard with regard to business and human rights can replace the primary role of the state and national laws in this area.”\textsuperscript{25} Both statements are absolutely correct as far as they go. But if national law and domestic courts sufficed, then why do TNCs not rely on them to resolve investment disputes with states? Why is binding international arbitration necessary, enabled by 3,000 bilateral investment treaties and investment chapters in free trade agreements? The justification for this has always been that national laws and domestic courts are not adequate and need to be supplemented by international instruments.

\textsuperscript{22}See International Law Commission, “Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,” UN Document A/CN.4/L.682 (13 April 2006). Of course, there is the category of \textit{jus cogens}, the name given to norms of general international law that permit no derogation under any circumstances. But even leaving aside various doctrinal and practical challenges, \textit{jus cogens} norms do not encompass the broad spectrum of human rights harms with which businesses may be involved.

\textsuperscript{23}For starters, I count human rights law, labor law, anti-discrimination law, health and safety law, privacy law, consumer protection law, environmental law, anti-corruption law, humanitarian law, criminal law, investment law, trade law, tax law, property law and, not least, corporate and securities law.


In their response to Ecuador’s resolution, the U.K. and ICC both expressed strong support for the Guiding Principles. Indeed, both have actively promoted and contributed to their implementation—the U.K. being the first country to adopt a National Action Plan. But we must remain clear about what the GPs are and do. The GPs established an evidence- and consensus-based foundation. They have generated new national and international policy requirements as well as some new legal requirements. Where they are being acted upon and developed further, they help reduce the overall incidence of corporate-related human rights harm and also provide for sources of non-judicial remedy that did not exist before. But they were never intended to foreclose other necessary or desirable future paths.

Early on in my mandate I identified an approach to international legalization in business and human rights consistent with the principled pragmatism that brought us the Guiding Principles. Principled pragmatism views international law as a tool for collective problem solving, not an end in itself. It recognizes that the development of any international legal instrument requires a certain degree of consensus among states. And it holds that before launching a treaty process its aims should be clear, there ought to be reasonable expectations that it can and will be enforced by the relevant parties, and that it will turn out to be effective in addressing the particular problem(s) at hand. This suggests narrowly crafted international legal instruments for business and human rights—“precision tools” I called them—focused on specific governance gaps that other means are not reaching.

One obvious candidate would be the worst of the worst: business involvement in gross human rights abuses, including those that may rise to the level of international crimes, such as genocide, extrajudicial killings, and slavery as well as forced labor. I made a proposal to this effect in a note I sent to all UN member states in February 2011, conveying my recommendations for follow-up measures to my mandate. In the case of natural persons, broad consensus exists on the underlying prohibitions, which generally enjoy greater extraterritorial application in practice than other human rights standards. But further specificity is required as to what steps states should take with regard to business enterprises—legal persons—and about the role that international cooperation could play in helping states to take those steps. A legal instrument with this focus would have the secondary effect of heightening state and corporate awareness of the need for businesses to more broadly avoid human rights harm, much as the Alien Tort

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27 I am well aware of what some call the “expressive” function of law, in contrast to its regulative role. But the field of international human rights does not lack for expressive legal instruments; what is in short supply are actionable paths to cumulative change.
Statute did before the U.S. Supreme Court restricted its extraterritorial applicability in the recent *Kiobel* case.²⁹

In short, the issue for me has never been about international legalization as such; it is about carefully weighing what forms of international legalization are necessary, achievable, and capable of yielding practical results, all the while building on the GPs’ foundation.

This discussion leads to several conclusions. First, if Ecuador and its supporters hold fast to the terms and intent of their resolution, there are only two possible outcomes. Either the negotiations drag on for a decade or more and follow the path of the 1970s Code of Conduct negotiations; or they manage to persuade enough developing countries to adopt such a treaty text, but which home countries of most TNCs do not ratify and by which they will not be bound. Whatever outcome prevails, it would represent another dead end, delivering nothing to individuals and communities adversely affected by corporate conduct.

Second, if treaty opponents hold fast to their position that national law and voluntary initiatives suffice, and that no further legalization of any kind is acceptable now or in the future, they will contribute to the resurgent polarization that we have witnessed over the past year, and in the process undermine the Guiding Principles—not because the GPs lack value, but because discounting or dismissing their value is politically expedient for treaty proponents.

Third, the resolution introduced by Argentina, Ghana, Norway, and Russia—currently overshadowed by Ecuador’s resolution—will play an important role going forward. In the short run, the consultations it calls for on “the full range of legal options and practical measures to improve access to remedy,” led by the Office of the High Commissioner and involving all stakeholder groups, will contribute practical information, insights, and guidance as the treaty negotiations get under way. But if the treaty process ends up prizing doctrine over practical results, the consensus resolution might well generate a constructive parallel process in its own right.

However this plays out, governments, businesses, and NGOs need to redouble (or in many cases, begin) efforts to implement and further develop the Guiding Principles, including through National Action Plans that set out clear expectations for governments and all types of business enterprises.³⁰ No future treaty, real or imagined,

²⁹In *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company* the Supreme Court held that a presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the statute, and “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.”

can substitute for the need to achieve further progress in the here and now. Indeed, the more that is accomplished by building on this widely supported foundation, the less politicized and polarized the debate about international legalization will become. Principled pragmatism may yet continue to prevail.

Conclusion

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights have succeeded in generating the beginnings of a new global regulatory dynamic in the area of business and human rights. Their success—modest thus far, except when compared to the alternatives—is due to the fact that the development of the GPs consciously reflected on and was informed by the reasons for past failures. It sought explicitly to devise a different approach, as described briefly earlier in this chapter. Thus, one of the great ironies for me from the very start of my UN mandate has been the desire by many human rights activists and some academic human rights lawyers to continually try to push the agenda back into the conventional mould. Why? Because that’s simply how human rights is done and must be done.31 The chapter by Rodríguez and Andia courageously recognizes not only the limits of the conventional posture, but also its potentially harmful consequences for impacted individuals and communities, particularly in the institutional contexts of the global South.


31 An academic exemplar is David Bilchitz, “A chasm between ‘is’ and ‘ought’? A critique of the normative foundations of the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding Principles,” in Deva and Bilchitz, supra note 5.
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