The Social Construction of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

John Gerard Ruggie
Corporate Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School

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Corporate Responsibility Initiative

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For Further Information

Further information on the Corporate Responsibility Initiative can be obtained from the Program Coordinator, Corporate Responsibility Initiative, Harvard Kennedy School, 79 JFK Street, Mailbox 82, Cambridge, MA 02138, email mrcbg@hks.harvard.edu.

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The United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in June 2011. To date, they constitute the only official guidance the Council and its predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, have issued for states and business enterprises on their respective obligations in relation to business and human rights. And it was the first time that either body had “endorsed” a normative text on any subject that governments did not negotiate themselves. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, describes the UNGPs as “the global authoritative standard, providing a blueprint for the steps all states and businesses should take to uphold human rights.” According to Arvind Ganesan, who directs business and human rights at Human Rights Watch, as recently as the late 1990s “there was no recognition that companies had human rights responsibilities.” Needless to say, many factors contributed to this shift, particularly escalating pressure from civil society and adversely affected populations. But in terms of putting a global standard in place, The Economist Intelligence Unit has judged Council endorsement of the UNGPs to be the “watershed event.”

The UNGPs are built on a three-pillar “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework: (1) states have a duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business, through policies, regulation, legislation and effective enforcement; (2) business enterprises have an independent responsibility to respect human rights: that is, to avoid people’s human rights being harmed through their activities or business relationships, and to address harms that do occur; (3) where individuals’ human rights are harmed, they should have access to effective remedy, and both states and enterprises have a role to play in enabling this to occur. The UNGPs comprise thirty-one principles, each with commentary elaborating its meaning and implications for law, policy, and practice. They encompass all internationally recognized rights, and apply to all states and all business enterprises. They do not by themselves create new legally binding obligations but derive their normative force through their endorsement by states and support

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4 Ibid.
from other key stakeholders, including business itself. Yet elements of them have already been incorporated into binding regulation and law.

As the author of the UNGPs, I naturally take some pride in their achievement. Yet when I presented the UNGPs to the UN Human Rights Council for its consideration I stated frankly that they do not mark the end of business and human rights challenges, or even the beginning of the end. “But Council endorsement of the Guiding Principles will mark the end of the beginning, by establishing a common global platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments.”

Academic proponents and opponents of the UNGPs have generated a bourgeoning literature. And by now there are several years of practical experience to inform the debate. But the conceptual and theoretical understanding of global rulemaking that informed my development of the UNGPs, and to which I have contributed as a scholar, have not been fully articulated and debated. This chapter aims to close that gap, on the supposition that those ideas might have contributed to the UNGPs’ relative success where previous efforts failed, and that in some measure they may be applicable in other complex and contested global policy domains.

The chapter is organized into five parts. The first highlights some of the broad systemic factors that shaped the global economy and polity from the 1990s into the mid-2000s, the peak of the most recent wave of globalization. Section II summarizes the key features of two very different UN-based initiatives proposed around the turn of the century, both seeking to better protect human rights from corporate harm: the “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (Norms), and the UN Global Compact. Section III outlines and illustrates the conceptual constructs underlying the development of the UNGPs, while Section IV does the same for their dissemination and implementation. Section V, the conclusion, offers some reflections on the UNGPs’ experience for this and possibly other complex and contested domains of global rulemaking.

I. THE CONTEXT

This section highlights three broad systemic factors that I saw shaping global rulemaking in the early 21st century, including business and human rights.

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5 From 2005 to 2011 I served as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Business and Human Rights.
In 1982 I published a scholarly article that introduced the concept of embedded liberalism into the field of international political economy. It explained how the capitalist countries learned to reconcile the efficiency and joint gains of markets with broader social norms and institutional practices that markets themselves require in order to thrive and survive. I adapted the term from Karl Polanyi’s magisterial work, *The Great Transformation*, published in 1944. The transformation was a long and painful journey.

In stylized form, this was the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: after World War II the commitment to international liberalization was institutionally coupled with norms and practices protecting national social communities. Governments played a key role in enacting and sustaining it: on the one side, re-establishing a multilateral monetary and trade regime and progressively removing barriers to trade; and, on the other side, providing domestic social investments and safety nets, while moderating the volatility of cross-border transaction flows by, for example requiring capital controls to prevent destabilizing flows of “hot money,” and allowing for temporary safeguards against sudden surges in imports. Reconciling these two competing policy objectives—open international markets and domestic economic and social stability—required delicate national and international balancing acts, which took different forms in different countries: social democracy, the social market economy, and the New Deal state. In the industrialized world, this grand bargain formed the basis of one of the longest and most equitable periods of economic expansion in history.

At the time I wrote the article the “new protectionism” was all the rage among political economists: the belief that the interventionist and social protection component of the embedded liberalism compromise was eroding international economic openness. The alleged decline of American hegemony was the favored explanation. Permanent U.S. balance of payments deficits could no longer sustain the link between the dollar and monetary gold backing it, thereby forcing the world onto a U.S. paper standard, while the United States vigorously “encouraged” countries

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like Japan to adopt “voluntary” export controls, hoping to slow the rate of increase of imports into the U.S. of consumer electronic products, steel and automobiles in particular.

However, my article concluded on a strikingly different note: “the foremost force for discontinuity at present is not ‘the new protectionism’ in money and trade but the resurgent ethos of liberal capitalism.”13 Apart from believing that reports of America’s economic decline were greatly exaggerated, as Mark Twain said of his death, my theoretical argument suggested that the embedded liberalism compromise was most likely to unravel as a result of a shift in the social purpose of the state, from the domestic compensatory role it had played vis-à-vis international openness, toward some newer form of more unrestrained liberalism. As if on cue, the elections of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 promised to embark on just such a shift.

The phenomenon whose rise I had predicted subsequently came to be known as neoliberalism, which in important respects evolved into the dominant ideational and institutional template of economic governance in the 1990s.14 The literature on neoliberalism is vast, and the phenomenon itself remains highly contested. It is not my aim to rehearse or assess the debate here, but merely to note several factors relevant to our discussion.

Raymond Vernon, a pioneer in the study of multinational enterprises going back to the 1970s, published a book in 1998 entitled In the Hurricane’s Eye: The Troubled Prospects of Multinational Enterprises. His decision to write the book, he states in the preface:

“…grew out of a sense that the world was slipping into a period in which the inescapable clashes between multinational enterprises and nation-states might be growing in frequency and intensity, evoking responses from both the public and the private sectors that would substantially impair their performance.15

Yet today the multinational enterprise is the standard mode of organizing economic activities across countries.16 From 1991 to 2001, some 94% of all national regulations related to foreign investment that were modified across the world were intended to further facilitate it.17 Nike was one of the first U.S. manufacturing companies to completely offshore production: starting in Japan in the 1970s, shifting to South Korea and Taiwan in the early 1980s, and when the cost model there came under pressure convincing its Korean and Taiwanese suppliers to set up shop elsewhere in Asia, including Indonesia.

China entered the World Trade Organization in December 2001, and soon became a leading global manufacturing platform. China launched its “going out”—or foreign investment—policy in 2001, and subsequently became a major home country of multinational enterprises, as

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13 Ruggie, “International Regimes,” 413.
14 Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism (Polity 2011).
to a lesser extent did Brazil, India and South Africa. Complex value chains linked increasingly dispersed production as well as the delivery of professional and other services. Extractive firms sought new sources of oil, gas and minerals in ever more challenging operating contexts. Saskia Sassen observed in 2006 that a fundamental transformation had taken place in the social purpose of national economic policy: “In earlier periods, including Bretton Woods, [the organizing logic of economic policymaking] was geared toward building national states; in today’s phase, it is geared toward building global systems.”¹⁸ Yet at the global level, unlike the national, shared values and institutional procedures to embed economic forces and actors ranged from weak to non-existent.

**Legal and Institutional Fragmentation**

The fragmentation of global policy- and law-making was becoming equally clear in the late 1990s. In a study of what they call the “stagnation” of public international law, Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters make this observation:

The 1990s may represent the apex of formal and legalized international law and organization: end of the cold war; reactivation of the UN Security Council; 1992 Rio Conference; entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention; creation of the WTO and the Energy Charter in 1994; unlimited extension in time of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995; 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 1998 Rome Statute. The turn of the century, in contrast, represents a breaking point.¹⁹

The number of multilateral treaties has since declined precipitously; none has been deposited with the United Nations since 2010.²⁰ Even the number of new investment treaties has declined. Similar trends exist at regional levels.

Of the many factors that lay behind this trend, three are particularly pertinent to the present discussion. The first is that geo-economic changes were accompanied by geopolitical shifts, which often are felt first in consensus-based international organizations like the United Nations. Emerging powers, with diverse national interests and reflecting different domestic economic, legal and political systems, began to project greater influence in multilateral forums, making coalition building and consensus seeking more difficult.

A second factor was what some have called the rise of networked governance: essentially self-constituting transnational public or private governance arrangements, focused on specific problems.²¹ Typically these were begun by a limited number of countries or private standard

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²⁰ The 2015 Paris Accord on climate change is not considered to be a treaty.

²¹ For example, Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton UP 2004), Thomas Hale and David Held (eds), *Handbook of Transnational Governance* (Polity 2011), and Tim Büthe
setting bodies with the highest stakes in a particular issue, but in many cases grew to include others over time. Examples include the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Financial Action Task Force, Financial Stability Board, International Accounting Standards Board, and Proliferation Security Initiative, among many others. Moreover, even as the domain of public international law languished, private international law was expanding rapidly, generating a new *lex mercatoria*.\(^{22}\) One example is commercial arbitration, and the adaptation of this model to investor/state disputes under bilateral investment treaties and host-government agreements.

A third factor is the sheer substantive complexity of global issues, coupled with the extensive interest diversity across and even within states that many exhibit. Climate change is an archetype of the growing number of “wicked problems.” These are defined as “large scale social challenges caught in causal webs of interlinking variables spanning national boundaries that complicate both their diagnosis and prognosis.”\(^{23}\) When we do see collective responses by states to such problems they tend to take the form, not of a single comprehensive governing regime for an entire issue-area, but separate fragments of what are called “regime complexes.”\(^{24}\) In the area of global environmental policy, Keohane and Victor conclude that “it is prohibitively difficult to arrange all couplings [among the individual fragments] ex ante into a single comprehensive regime.”\(^{25}\)

**Scale Mismatches**

The case of climate change illustrates one type of scale mismatch: the effects are global, but the authority to deal with them remains largely in the hands of national governments. We see a different kind of scale mismatch in the case of business and human rights. Even as the realm of global public rulemaking has trended to fragmentation, multinational enterprises are a major global economic integrative force. One striking consequence is that “about 80% of global trade (in terms of gross exports) has become linked to international production networks of TNCs

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And perhaps as many as one out of seven jobs in the world is in the supply chains of multinationals, not counting informal work. Thus, as national economies have become more open, an ever-greater share of production and trade has become internalized within the networks of 80,000 or so multinationals and parties related to them through equity ties or contracts.

In the every-day world multinationals like Nike, Google, Coca-Cola, Toyota, Novartis and Sinopec, are known to be one enterprise, with unity of command, operating under a single global vision and strategy, optimizing worldwide operations for efficiencies, market share and profits. But they are not generally recognized as such in public law. National law, with some exceptions, governs whatever separate legal entity may be incorporated within a particular national jurisdiction, not the multinational enterprise as a whole. International law may “contemplate” multinational enterprises, as Knox has put it, and in some instances even “specify” appropriate conduct, as ILO labor conventions for example clearly do. But it generally imposes correlative duties on states, not on companies directly. Thus, a parent company enjoys separate legal personality and limited liability for harm caused by its subsidiaries even if it is their sole owner.

These factors—geoeconomic/geopolitical shifts, the fragmentation of international law and governance arrangements, and scale mismatches—continue to shape and reshape both the context and outputs of global rulemaking. They have made advancing the business and human rights agenda both more pressing and yet also more difficult to achieve through the formal intergovernmental governance system.

II. LAW AND LEARNING

Nike was an early mover in offshoring production. It was also an early target of campaigns against abusive workplace practices in the overseas factories that produced its athletic footwear and apparel. Indeed, a perfect storm of bad publicity enveloped Nike throughout much of the 1990s. In response, Nike established a Corporate Responsibility Department and adopted a supplier code of conduct and factory audits. Shell followed a comparable trajectory in Nigeria. Years of destructive environmental practices, including massive oil spills and permanent gas flaring that affected people’s health and their ability to sustain their livelihoods from farming and fishing generated mounting protests by the Ogoni people in the Niger Delta. As protests escalated and some became violent, Shell temporarily withdrew from its concession in

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Ogoniland. The Nigerian military junta then began a massive crackdown against the Ogoni, reportedly killing some 2,000.\textsuperscript{30} Shell ultimately lost its concession in Ogoniland. In 1995, a military tribunal in a sham trial sentenced Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Ogoni movement, and eight of his colleagues to hang. Political leaders in Africa and elsewhere called for clemency and pressured Shell to use its leverage. Shell merely issued a meek statement that it was not its role to get involved with governments. Following what Mark Moody-Stuart, who later became Shell’s Chairman, describes as its \textit{annus horribilis} in 1995, Shell revised its business principles. The new principles included “the right and the responsibility” for Shell companies to make their positions known to governments “on any matter which affects themselves, their employees, their customers, or their shareholders [as well as] on matters affecting the community where they have a contribution to make.” Also included was the responsibility “to express support for fundamental human rights in line with the legitimate role of business.” In short, both firms discovered that having a legal license to operate by itself was insufficient to ensure the social sustainability of their operations.

Major multinationals across a broad array of sectors adopted codes of conduct in the 1990s, together with supply chain audits and other forms of monitoring. A corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement and industry was born. Nike and Shell became the CSR leaders of that period. According to an academic handbook on CSR, its “phenomenal rise” reflects a journey “that is almost unique in the pantheon of ideas in the management literature” (Crane \textit{et al.} 2008, p. 3). Two quite different UN-based initiatives entered the fray in 1999: the drafting of the ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ and the UN Global Compact. They developed independently, and at the outset with limited awareness of one another.

The Norms

The initiative to develop the Norms, a treaty-like text, reflected a deeply held belief in much of the human rights community that legally binding instruments are the most—if not the only—effective tool to regulate business conduct. They view CSR as little more than self-interested self-regulation, designed to burnish the reputation of companies, limit external pressure, and thereby diminish the prospects of “hard” regulatory measures without providing adequate accountability and remedy.

The Norms were drafted in the then UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, a subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights, comprised of twenty-six experts nominated by governments but serving in their personal capacity. The Norms’ most far-reaching feature was their intent to impose human rights obligations on business enterprises directly under international law, thereby holding them to single global standards. Moreover, within enterprises’ “sphere of influence” the Norms attributed to them essentially the same general obligations that states have under human rights treaties they have ratified: “to promote, secure the fulfillment of,
respect, ensure respect of and protect” human rights.” The specific standards enumerated in the text were drawn from existing international human rights and humanitarian law, supplemented by others that the drafters thought to be particularly relevant to business, such as consumer and environmental protection. Under the Norms, businesses would be monitored, required to report, and pay reparations to victims.

Of course, for the Norms to take legal effect states would have to adopt them as a treaty or otherwise widely incorporate them into national law. While human rights groups were strongly supportive, the Norms had no champions among governments and were vehemently opposed by the international business community. In 2004, when the text was presented for adoption to the Commission, comprised of governmental representatives, the Commission reacted coolly. It thanked the Sub-Commission for its “work” but not the product. It granted that the text contained “useful elements and ideas” but added that the Commission had not requested it, that it had no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission not undertake any monitoring of corporate conduct. This outcome undoubtedly suited business interests. But the Norms also had serious foundational flaws, such as intermingling state and corporate obligations while providing no boundaries for the latter, which concerned states as well as businesses.

The Global Compact

The other UN initiative to address corporate conduct begun in 1999, the Global Compact (GC), followed a different script. Initially it was intended to be merely a challenge by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the global business community, delivered in a keynote speech at the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos. Promoting business support for UN norms in the area of human rights, labor standards and the environment he stated: “you can use these universal values as the cement binding together your global corporations, since they are values people all over the world will recognize as their own.” Moreover, he added, UN agencies active in those areas stand ready to help in return.

As Annan’s Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, he tasked me, along with Georg Kell, a mid-level staff member with a background in international investment issues, to draft the Davos speech. The overall framing of the initiative was loosely drawn from the embedded liberalism concept. As Annan stated at Davos:

Globalization is a fact of life. But I believe we have underestimated its fragility. The problem is this. The spread of markets outpaces the ability of societies and their political systems to adjust to them, let alone to guide the course they take. History teaches us that

33 Ruggie, Just Business 47-55.
35 Ruggie, Just Business, chap. 2.
such an imbalance between the economic, social and political realms can never be sustained for very long...The industrialized countries learned that lesson in their bitter and costly encounter with the Great Depression...Our challenge today is to devise a similar compact on the global scale, to underpin the new global economy.\footnote{Ibid.}

No one has gained as much from globalization, or has so much to lose, Annan continued, than global business. “Don’t wait for every country to introduce laws,” he added. “You can uphold human rights and decent labor and environmental standards directly, by your own conduct of your own business.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The reaction to the speech was so positive that Annan felt obliged to create a program. Kell and I were tasked with its design; he subsequently became the Compact’s Executive Director. Although the GC has been criticized virtually from the outset for being a weak regulatory instrument, it was never intended to regulate.\footnote{For a literature review and contrary view, see Andreas Rasche, “‘A Necessary Supplement’: What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not’ (2009) Business & Society 511; also Andreas Rasche and Dirk Ulrich Gilbert, ‘Institutionalizing global governance: the role of the United Nations Global Compact’ (2012) Business Ethics 100.}

Moreover, as a personal initiative of the Secretary-General, initially established without General Assembly approval, it could not have been a regulatory instrument even if Annan had been so inclined. Instead, the GC was designed as a norms-based learning forum and engagement mechanism, which we saw as a necessary complement to other approaches, including business initiatives and lawmaker. As a guide to responsible business conduct the GC promoted ten principles inspired by UN declarations in the areas of human rights, labor and the environment, with anti-corruption added once that UN convention was in place.\footnote{See, for example, John Gerard Ruggie, ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge’ (1998) International Organization 855; and Michael Barnett, ‘Social Constructivism,’ in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics (3rd edn, Oxford UP 2005).}

The ten principles were intended to provide a public focal point to help inform proliferating private corporate codes. As an integrity measure, the GC subsequently adopted the requirement that participants submit annual progress reports; those failing to do so two years running are “delisted.”

In terms of its method of inducing long-term change in corporate conduct, the GC reflects a broadly “social constructivist” approach.\footnote{Ibid. That means taking seriously the role of ideas, norms, identities, human agency and institutional learning—in addition to appreciating such standard factors of power and interests. The GC agenda has been to consolidate and disseminate the meta-norm of responsible business conduct, as well as to support and expand the community of practice in this domain. Its modalities include conducting learning forums and identifying best practices; generating public/private partnerships around the UN “people and planet” agenda;
serving as an incubator for innovative initiatives across different business sectors that are then spun off, such as the Principles for Responsible Investment with nearly 1,700 signatory institutions from over 50 countries, representing $62 trillion under management; and establishing national GC networks, including in emerging market countries such as Brazil, China and India, as well as in developing countries. As early as 2005, the GC convened a CSR summit in China, then the largest such event in that country, which included representatives from business, government, major international NGOs including Amnesty and Transparency International, and international labor federations.\textsuperscript{42} The GC Network in China includes many of the best-known Chinese firms, such as PetroChina, China Mobile, Baidu, Lenovo, China Minmentals and Sinopec, as well as the China Development Bank, which is a major source of funding for overseas investments by Chinese companies.\textsuperscript{43}

Could the Global Compact have done better at what it was intended to do? Undoubtedly. Nevertheless, today it is by far the world’s largest corporate responsibility initiative (it now prefers the term “sustainability”), with more than 12,000 institutional participants—including companies, civil society and workers organizations, investor groups, business schools, local networks, and even cities—from 170 countries.\textsuperscript{44} The fact that it has more participants from emerging market countries than from North America suggests that it has made inroads where they were most needed. Finally, a survey of corporate participants conducted by a Norwegian consultancy on the eve of the GC’s fifteenth anniversary found that 60% reported being “motivated to advance broader UN goals and issues (e.g., poverty, health, education)”; two-thirds reported that the GC is “driving our implementation of sustainability policies and practices”; and nearly 50% said it is “shaping our company’s vision.”

Law and learning are complements. Where law exists, learning is necessary to understand it and act accordingly. Where law does not exist, is weak or not enforced, learning is necessary to attenuate the adverse effects and help inform its possible future formation.

III. POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE

Having declined to approve the Norms, in 2005 the Commission on Human Rights established a mandate for a “special procedure,” meaning an independent expert, and asked the UN Secretary-General to select the mandate holder. That is how I came to be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights.\textsuperscript{45} The mandate was modest: to identify and clarify standards and best practices in the area of business and human rights, for both states and business enterprises; to clarify such concepts as “corporate complicity” in human rights abuses committed by a related party, as well as “corporate sphere of influence;” and to develop materials for human rights impact assessments. Due to controversies surrounding the issue, the initial mandate was for two years, not the normal three; it was later extended to a


\textsuperscript{43} See \url{https://www.unglobalcompact.org/engage-locally/asia/china, accessed 8 June 2017.}

\textsuperscript{44} The following data is reported in DNV-GL Group, \textit{Impact. Transforming Business, Changing the World: The United Nations Global Compact} (Oslo 2015).

\textsuperscript{45} UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/69 (20 April 2005).
full term, and then for a second full term, the limit. No Guiding Principles were called for or anticipated at the outset. I was required to deliver reports annually to the Commission and then the Human Rights Council that replaced it in 2006, as well as to the UN General Assembly.

While I certainly drew lessons from the GC experience, this mandate was different. To begin with, it was a mandate from an intergovernmental body, not a personal initiative of a Secretary-General. Moreover, it involved an in-depth examination of business and human rights. As such, it included the role of states and the question of remedy, neither of which the GC addressed. I recapitulate briefly the core concepts that informed the development of the UNGPs.

**Multiperspectival Framing**

Social scientists who study the role of ideational factors, including norms, in promoting policy change have long understood the importance of framing. Successful framing often results from simplicity and hard-to-argue with principles. For example, in the Access to Essential Medicines campaign concerning the price of HIV/AIDS treatment drugs in developing countries, “patients before patents” and “patents kill” were highly successful tag lines that evoked deep underlying moral norms. But that campaign, coordinated by Médecins Sans Frontières, was aimed at one party: the pharmaceutical industry. And it had one overarching aim: to drive down the price of drugs. My mandate was multidimensional, thus requiring multiperspectival framing.

The UNGPs rest on the observation that corporate conduct at the global level is shaped by three distinct governance systems. The first is the traditional system of public law and governance, domestic and international. Important as this is, by itself it has been unable to do all the heavy lifting on many global policy challenges, from poverty eradication to combating climate change. The second is a system of civil governance involving stakeholders concerned about adverse effects of business conduct and employing various social compliance mechanisms, such as advocacy campaigns, law suits and other forms of pressure, but also partnering with companies to induce positive change. The third is corporate governance, which internalizes elements of the other two (unevenly to be sure), and shapes enterprise-wide strategy and policies, including risk management. The challenge was to try and formulate a normative platform on which the three governance systems could be better aligned in relation to business and human rights, compensate for their respective shortcomings, and begin to play mutually reinforcing roles out of which significant cumulative change can evolve over time.

To foster that alignment, the UNGPs draw on the different discourses and rationales that reflect the different social roles each governance system plays in regulating corporate conduct. Thus, for states the emphasis is on the legal obligations they have under the international human rights regime to protect against human rights abuses by third parties within their jurisdiction, including business, as well as policy rationales that are consistent with, and supportive of, meeting those obligations—when they do business with business, for example. For businesses, beyond compliance with legal obligations, the UNGPs focus on the need to manage the risk of involvement in human rights abuses, which requires that companies employ due diligence to

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avoid infringing on the rights of others and address harm where it does occur. For adversely affected individuals and communities, the UNGPs stipulate ways for their further empowerment through meaningful dialogue and engagement throughout the due diligence cycle and other means to realize their rights to remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. These perspectives are combined within the common but differentiated “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framing, and spelled out in the UNGPs.

For the traditional human rights community perhaps the most controversial aspect of the UNGPs has been the foundation of the second pillar—the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. I turn to it next.

Social Norms

International human rights lawyers and advocates informed by that discipline tend to differentiate between two types of norms: legal and moral. From moral norms many then try to derive and drive lex feranda: law as it should be. Social scientists and sociologically-minded legal scholars also place great weight on the role of social norms. The UNGPs reaffirm that business enterprises must comply with all applicable laws. Beyond legal compliance, they also stipulate that enterprises have the responsibility to respect human rights, irrespective of a state’s willingness or ability to enforce the law. This responsibility is based in a social norm. How does that work at the global level, where social norms vary across different countries and cultures?

Social norms are shared expectations of how particular actors are to conduct themselves in given circumstances. They hold within spheres of structured social interaction. The corporate responsibility to respect human rights enjoys near-universal recognition as a social norm in what I have elsewhere termed “the global public domain.” To illustrate this concept, when Oxfam America funds community activists in Cajamarca, Peru, who organize protests against the local operations of an American mining company, and when it also brings community leaders to the company’s annual shareholder meetings or to a UN business and human rights forum in Geneva to make their case to the assembled audience, and to the world beyond through the press and social media, those actions unfold in transnational space, not simply in separate locales. Similarly, when Zambian or Andean communities lodge complaints against Chinese companies based on social norms that the communities had previously established with Western companies in the same or nearby locales, and the Chinese managers request guidance from Beijing, and Beijing’s guidance in turn draws on the GC, UNGPs or the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, those acts unfold in transnational space. Similar examples can be drawn from virtually any sector of transnational business activity. The totality of such transnational spaces

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constitutes the global public domain—which functions much like a domestic civic or public sphere.

The global public domain has become an increasingly densely interconnected arena of discourse, contestation and action involving both private and public actors, focused around the creation or defense of social norms and policy preferences regarding global public goods. In human rights discourse, respecting rights means to not infringe on the rights of others. We know that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is a transnational social norm because the relevant actors acknowledge it as such, including businesses themselves in their corporate responsibility commitments. Enterprises of course are free to undertake additional commitments, and governments to encourage or require them to do so. But respect is the baseline expectation.

Inserting the category of social norm between legal and moral norms enables the UNGPs to take the important additional step to specify not only that business enterprises should respect human rights, but also how. The logic is straightforward: in order for an enterprise to demonstrate to itself, let alone anyone else, that it respects human rights it must have systems in place whereby it can know and show that it does. Accordingly, the UNGPs outline a four-step human rights due diligence process: assessing actual and potential human rights impacts, integrating and acting on the findings, tracking responses, and communicating how impacts are addressed. Moreover, where enterprises have caused or contributed to adverse impacts, they should provide for or cooperate in their remediation; where they have neither caused nor contributed to harm but are directly linked to it through a business relationship they should exercise leverage to prevent or mitigate the harm, and where harm has already occurred to use leverage in incentivizing those partners who have caused/contributed to it.

As for which human rights the corporate responsibility to respect encompasses, the answer the UNGPs provide is all internationally recognized rights that an enterprise impacts. The long-standing doctrinal debate about whether business enterprises can be duty bearers under international human rights law is avoided because the UNGPs state that businesses should look to current internationally recognized rights for an authoritative enumeration, not of human rights laws that might apply to them, but of human rights they should respect. That formulation also made it possible for countries that have not ratified key international human rights conventions, including China and the United States, to endorse the UNGPs, which reference such conventions.

Finally, the way enterprises discover which rights they might adversely impact is through their human rights due diligence process. Wherever possible, this should include engagement with potentially affected stakeholders or their representatives.

Social norms do not inevitably lead to changes in lex lata: law as it is. But where new hard law is not immediately in the offing, creating, consolidating, disseminating and embedding social norms is an indispensable tool for inducing changes in conduct. Besides, in Amartya Sen’s felicitous words, viewing human rights solely as “parents” or “progeny” of law would “unduly constrict”—Sen even uses the term incarcerate—the social logics and processes other than law that drive enduring public recognition of human rights.49 Human rights are better seen more

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broadly: as mediators of social relations, especially relations that involve significant power asymmetries, in which hard law is but one part of a larger ecosystem of instruments.50

**Reflexive Dynamics**

The UNGPs are a text, to be sure. But as César Rodríguez-Garavito has stated, they should be evaluated not only as a static text “but also in their dynamic dimension (such as their capacity to push the development of new norms and practices that go beyond the initial content...)”.51 Indeed, my hope was that they would trigger an iterative process of interaction among the three global governance systems, producing cumulative change over time. No top-down command-and-control regulation could possibly create such a process at the international level—even if the political will and institutional capacity existed. But neither would entirely unrelated actions by the three governance system. A different path needed to be identified. Elements of so-called reflexive regulation and reflexive law were suggestive.

Günther Teubner, a leading German legal scholar and sociologist, introduced the concept of reflexive law in a seminal paper published in 1983.52 Teubner argued that the idea that major social and environmental problems in modern society could be “steered” from one central site had become anachronistic, given its complexity and the pace of change. But giving free rein to self-regulation would continue to generate mounting social and environmental externalities. Thus Teubner proposed a more procedurally-oriented approach that avoids the regulate/deregulate, mandatory/voluntary, and hard/soft law dichotomies. His is not so much a middle ground as it is different in concept and practice: “The role of reflexive law is to...create the structural premises for decentralized integration of society by supporting integrative mechanisms within autonomous social subsystems.”53 Put simply, reflexive law prescribes a framework of institutionalized procedures and organizational norms. Within that framework, it seeks to have the entities that are targeted for regulation to acquire the capacity needed to more effectively address their social and environmental externalities. And the framework itself is subject to adjustment based on experiential feedback. From this line of thinking emerged the idea of “regulating self-regulation,” which has had particular uptake in U.S. national environmental law and regulation, among other areas.54

Of course, at the national level a central authority can step in more readily to make adjustments or create new mechanism. That is far more difficult at the international level, which lacks a central authority.55 Nevertheless, the underlying ideas were useful in thinking about building iterative interactions among the three pillars into the UNGPs. Consider these examples.

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53 Ibid., 255.
With regard to companies, risk management includes assessing risk to people, not simply to the company; human rights due diligence should be ongoing and requires meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society and workers organizations; and operational-level grievance mechanisms must be based on engagement and dialogue with the people they are intended to serve, as well as be rights-compatible. As for states, their core legal obligations include protecting human rights from abuse by business within their jurisdiction. Under the UNGPs, where states provide financial and other support to business enterprises states should require the enterprises to conduct human rights due diligence if the nature of the business or operating context pose significant human rights risks. They should promote respect for human rights by enterprises with which they conduct commercial transactions. States should also ensure that they retain adequate domestic policy space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing other policy objectives, for example in the areas of trade and foreign investment agreements. Through the UNGPs, rights holders who are harmed by business activities and those who represent or speak for them, gain a new authoritative advocacy tool and basis for participation that can be invoked in relation to business enterprises and states.

In short, the three pillars of the Protect, Respect and Remedy framework are interrelated. They reflect three critical functions that need to be performed better, and they seek to engage the three global governance systems—public, civil and corporate—individually and interactively to advance that aim. Within this framework, further international legalization has a role to play through carefully crafted precision tools intended to reinforce this dynamic, not by means of some overarching treaty that tries to encompass the entirety of the complex, diverse and contested issues that make up business and human rights as a subject of concern and action.\(^{56}\)

**Process Legitimacy**

Karin Buhmann attributes at least part of the UNGPs success to what she calls the “process legitimacy” whereby they were developed.\(^ {57}\) The subject of legitimacy features in any international process, particularly one conducted by a single independent expert. Nevertheless, Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters suggest that what they call “thick stakeholder consensus” behind an informal governance arrangement can be normatively superior to the “thin state consent” on which many treaties rely. “The actors involved are more diverse and expert. The output…is elaborated more carefully and coherently, supported by a broader consensus, both \textit{ex ante}, when the norm is developed, and \textit{ex post}, when the norm is accepted because it works.”\(^ {58}\) Process legitimacy is critical to “thick stakeholder consensus.”

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\(^{58}\) Pauwelyn, Wessel and Wouters, op.cit. 749.
In developing and gaining Human Rights Council endorsement for the UNGPs I sought to achieve process legitimacy largely through four means, described in detail elsewhere. The first was to establish a common factual baseline in the attempt to move beyond the anecdotal evidence on all sides that had dominated previous debates. This involved mapping patterns of corporate-related human rights abuse; identifying prevailing standards and best practices; analyzing the cost to business of failing to respect human rights; examining how corporate and securities law may aid or constrain responsible business practices; documenting the effects of international investment agreements on the state duty to protect; surveying human rights treaty bodies’ commentaries on relevant subjects; and exploring the permissible grounds for extraterritorial jurisdiction across a number of different regulatory domains.

The second was convening nearly 50 international consultations on all continents, most being multistakeholder in makeup. These examined the human rights situations in different industries and operating environments, for different groups of people, and explored the viability of various ways of responding to ongoing human rights challenges. Third, I made site visits to the operations of companies in different sectors and countries, ranging from agriculture to manufacturing and mining. Where possible I combined site visits with discussions with local community leaders or workers representatives, arranged through NGOs or international labor federations. Lastly, we conducted pilot projects in several sectors and countries to inform the UNGPs’ provisions for human rights due diligence and grievance mechanisms. Throughout, I regularly briefed governments in Geneva, New York and in national capitals. A draft text of the UNGPs was posted online, eliciting comments from individuals and institutions in 120 countries.

By the time the Human Rights Council considered the UNGPs they enjoyed strong support from governments and business, as well as general but not enthusiastic support from the major human rights organizations, which would have wished for a legally binding outcome. Council approval came in two stages. It first “welcomed” the Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework in 2008, and asked me to serve another term in order to “operationalize” it. The UNGPs, which the Council endorsed in 2011, are that operationalization.

IV. DISTRIBUTED NETWORKS

Work on the implementation of the Guiding Principles began even before they were formally endorsed. If governments believe that a follow up to a mandate is warranted, the typical UN procedure is to create a new one. Thus, the HRC established an expert Working Group with one member from each of the five recognized regions, tasked with disseminating the UNGPs and promote their implementation. I welcomed this development while also realizing that much more would be required beyond UN precincts. Borrowing a term from computer science, I focused on identifying a handful of actors involved in some central aspect of business and human

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59 Ruggie, *Just Business*, chap. 4. Financial support for the mandate was provided by voluntary contributions from governments. I also benefited from pro bono assistance provided by academics, NGOs and law firms. Research results and summaries of consultations and pilot projects remain posted on the Business and Human Rights Centre website: https://business-humanrights.org/en/un-secretary-generals-special-representative-on-business-human-rights.

rights who might be willing to play a role in a larger distributed network. In some cases, the actor adopted core elements of the UNGPs outright; others did so in part; still others modified aspects of their mission. Some took the UNGPs into entirely new domains. A few examples follow.

The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (GLs) date back to 1976. They have been revised over time, but continued to lack a human rights chapter. A draft text of the UNGPs was ready as the OECD began the GLs latest revision in 2011. All parties agreed that the two should be closely aligned so as not to issue competing or incompatible guidance to business. As a result, the new human rights chapter of the GLs is taken virtually verbatim from Pillar II of the UNGPs (the corporate responsibility to respect human rights). The GLs matter not least because they provide the only international complaints mechanisms under which anyone can bring a “specific instance” of harm committed by a multinational to a designated office in an adhering country, whether the harmful conduct occurred in an adhering country or the multinational is based in such a country. The designated national office attempts to mediate the dispute and issues a final statement on whether and how it was resolved. Human rights cases spiked after 2011. ISO26000, a guidance on social responsibility developed by the International Organization for Standardization, was running in parallel with the UNGP mandate; here too we sought to ensure that the human rights provisions were closely aligned. ISO matters to this issue because its other standards and guidance, for instance in quality management and environmental management, tend to have significant business uptake including in Asia.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank, has performance standards built into its lending and investment policies. Through close collaboration, the IFC incorporated such key elements of the UNGPs as the requirement for clients to respect human rights, and that in certain high risk circumstances may need to add human rights due diligence. The IFC matters because it affects clients’ access to its capital, and because its criteria are tracked by private sector banks that account for three-quarters of all project lending in the world. The European Union not only endorsed the UNGPs. The European Commission also changed its own official definition of CSR in response to the UNGPs and requested that all member states develop National Action Plans for their implementation. (The UN Working Group subsequently recommended to all UN member states that they produce National Action Plans.) The EU went on to adopt non-financial reporting requirements, the provisions of which

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Moreover, the UNGPs due diligence provisions found their way into both U.S. and EU law concerning conflict minerals, U.S. regulations on investment by American firms in Myanmar, the UK’s Modern Slavery Act, and a new French law that imposes a human rights due diligence-like requirement on companies, enforceable by tort liability where injuries result from the failure to have an effective plan.

Leading companies have been a major source of direct uptake. Indeed, several had written to the Human Rights Council recommending that it endorse the UNGPs. Some have gone on to issue stand-alone human rights reports using the UNGPs Reporting Framework developed by Mazars, the international audit, accounting and consulting firm, together with Shift, a non-profit founded by members of my former UN team in 2011, which I chair. Shift and others have found that while company uptake of the UNGPs is becoming more widespread, it remains partial is not yet deep enough. However, uptake is not limited to Western firms or governments. A dozen developing countries already have issued or are in the process of developing National Action Plans. And regulatory authorities in China are drawing on international standards like the UNGPs and OECD GLs to advise their own companies on appropriate human rights practices in overseas operations—including the recommendation that Chinese mining companies should “observe the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights during the entire life-cycle of the mining project.”

It took time for some of the major human rights organization to realize the full potential of the UNGPs as an advocacy tool. But workers organizations were supportive right from the start, recognizing the limits of relying only on a long history of legal conventions through the International Labor Organization, which often don’t drive change absent other types of incentives and actions. A bonus of having corporate lawyers participating in mandate

consultations is that law societies in several countries became interested. The International Bar Association went so far as to issue official guidance on what the UNGPs mean for law firms as businesses in their own right, and in their role as wise counsel to clients. \(^{71}\)

Possibly the most unusual development for a UN-based initiative has been endorsement of the UNGPs by FIFA, the governing body of international football. FIFA’s reach into countries and people’s lives is impressive. FIFA has 211 national member associations and six regional confederations. According to its former president, there are 300 million active participants in football, and 1.6 billion people around the world are involved directly or indirectly in the game. \(^{72}\)

After awarding successive World Cups to Russia and Qatar, FIFA was under escalating pressure in 2014 not only on matters of corruption but also human rights. Problems in Russia included its anti-LGBTQ law and the manner of land acquisition by the authorities for tournament purposes. In Qatar the core issue is migrant workers who essentially become bonded labor, exploited by recruitment firms and contractors (and even more so by subcontractors) building stadiums and other infrastructure. Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and former UN High Commissioner for Human rights, and I sent a letter to FIFA’s president on behalf of the Institute for Human Rights and Business, with which we were both associated. \(^{73}\) We referenced these challenges and recommended that FIFA align its policies and practices with the UNGPs. FIFA subsequently asked me to produce a report and make recommendations. I agreed on the condition that I would have full control over the report’s content and that it would be published by Harvard University. \(^{74}\) My effort was welcomed by several FIFA sponsors, leading NGOs and workers organizations, including the players union. In response to the report, FIFA to date has added a statutory provision committing it to respect all internationally recognized rights. It has adopted a human rights policy and established a Human Rights Advisory Board that includes sponsors and representatives from NGOs, labor, and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Perhaps most important for the people in host countries, FIFA is including

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human rights criteria in bidding requirements for future World Cups—the most popular tournament of the world’s most popular sport.\textsuperscript{75}

In 2017, as a result of FIFA’s move, the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA), one of FIFA’s regional confederations, adopted human rights criteria for its Euro 2024 tournament. The new bidding requirements state that successful bidders are expected to adhere to the UNGPs, including “proactively assessing human rights risks,” “culturally embedding human rights,” and “implementing means of reporting and accountability” by engaging with relevant stakeholders.\textsuperscript{76} The International Olympic Committee is moving along a similar path but at a more tentative pace.

In short, the advantages of dissemination and implementation of norms and standards through distributed networks are clear: they spread much faster and more widely than they would otherwise. The disadvantage is that, unlike in computer systems, the various entities in the distributed networks remain independent of one another and have their own missions and priorities, so it is rarely the identical standard that is enacted. But this “orchestration problem,” as Abbott and Snidal describe it, is endemic at the international level.\textsuperscript{77} Both the Working Group and OHCHR can and do serve a limited interpretive function. By now there is also some evidence of interpretive “crowd sourcing” involved. For example, a white paper issued by a group of major investment banks in early 2017 generated widespread push-back against its premise, which claimed that under the UNGPs investment banks have very limited responsibility for what their clients do with loans or advice the banks provide to them.\textsuperscript{78} Thus, for the UNGPs the distributed network approach has turned out to be superior to relying only on UN processes and happenstance uptake by other relevant parties. And it has triggered what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) call “norm cascading,” well beyond their institutional sphere of origin.

\textsuperscript{75} FIFA, \textit{FIFA’s Human Rights Policy} (2017 ed.) available at http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/89/33/12/fifashumanrightspolicy_neutral.pdf, accessed 8 June 2017,
V. CONCLUSION

It is widely understood that the balance of power among states is shifting. But so too is the organizational ecology of global governance79 (Abbott, Green and Keohane 2016). The two are related, but only in part. As noted earlier, power shifts make it more difficult to reach strong agreements in large consensus-based forums because the number and diversity of interests has increased significantly. At the same time, informal mechanisms are flourishing, be they private, public or a combination of the two. Factors other than, or in addition to, power balances play a role in producing this pattern. Among them are the proliferation of so-called wicked problems and scale mismatches; the creation at the international level of limited membership club-like arrangements among domestic regulatory agencies and professional bodies as a byproduct of globalization; greater ease in establishing various types of informal mechanisms as well as flexibility in changing them; and lower costs of entry as well as exit.

The UNGPs straddled these two worlds: a formal mandate established by an intergovernmental body; an informal and polycentric process of development; a formal endorsement; and a combination of ongoing implementation, both formal and informal. It may not be possible to replicate this process in any other complex and contested global regulatory domains. But the underlying dynamics need to be better understood because they are not unique to business and human rights.

A prime example is climate change. At the intergovernmental level, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, a global binding instrument that included strict emission targets and timetables, is widely described as a failure by scholars of climate governance.80 Building on a phrase used by Olmstead and Stavins, it was too little, too fast, too binding and too asymmetrical in its obligations between past and emerging emitters. In contrast, the 2015 Paris Agreement has been hailed as a success that draws on lessons of the past and a deeper understanding of climate governance challenges.81 Yet it rests on national pledges, which are not binding, coupled with a periodic review process, which relies on national self-reporting. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the Paris Agreement by itself will not meet the aspirational target of limiting global temperature rise to 2˚ Celsius, let alone 1.5. The following questions may be moot for climate change but they may be relevant for other global policy domains: what if governments in 1997 had moved from the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, not to Kyoto, but to a Paris-like pledge-and-review arrangement? Where would we be today? Could it have avoided the

extreme polarization of climate change politics in the United States? Indeed, might we be closer now to what Kyoto hoped to achieve?

The idea of human rights is both simple and powerful. The operation and effectiveness of the global human rights regime is neither. The simplicity and power of human rights reside in the idea that every person is endowed with inherent dignity and equal rights. But the fundamental challenge remains “how a political project framed by the discourse of rights can be made to ‘stick’ as our interests widen…while familiar communities lose their unquestioned standing and their integrating force.”

Political, in this context, does not mean tactical maneuvering or scoring partisan victories. Politics in its deeper sense “lies at the intersection of instrumental and ethical deliberation and action,” where ideas and norms have the opportunity to inform and shape social constructs of the common good.

There is a long way to go before we can speak of business enterprises being “embedded” in transnational social norms and institutional practices. Bearing witness to abuse and enduring commitments to realizing rights are critical elements. But so too are evidence-based insights into such matters as social capacity building, process sequencing and institutional design. Scholarly debates must learn to understand better how these two dimensions are and could be combined in order to make the business and human rights project stick.

82 Kratochwil, op.cit., 229.