

Chapter 9

Location, location, location: party competition

Previous chapters have established that the share of the national vote gained by radical right parties is not directly linked with structural trends in aggregate levels of immigration, multiculturalism, and ethnic diversity. Instead, supply-side theories suggest that parties play a critical role as active agents connecting social developments and political attitudes with voting behavior. What we have not yet had the opportunity to analyze is direct evidence for the role of party strategy. This includes (i) the ideological space created on the far right of the political spectrum by the location of the mainstream parties, (ii) where the radical right parties choose to place themselves in the same space, and also, the subject of the next chapter, (iii) how effectively these parties build and consolidate their organizational base. Observers have commonly noted that some radical right parties emphasize core hard-right ideological values, while by contrast others characteristically prioritize vaguer populist appeals. We can see whether these strategies are an important predictor of their success. Moreover so far we have been unable to compare whether the broader institutional context, particularly the electoral rules, affects party strategies in their choice of ideological locations. The analysis of relevant radical right parties contained in the European Social Survey 2002 has also limited the comparative analysis in another important regard, because nearly all are based in nations using proportional representation electoral systems in national contests.

To consider these issues, after setting out the theoretical framework and evidence, Part I of this chapter analyzes the relationship between radical right support and mainstream patterns of party competition, utilizing the Lubbers 'expert' estimates for the location of parties. Part II then examines patterns of voting behavior in the broader range of parties and electoral systems contained in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). To consider the impact of majoritarian and proportional rules, Part III focuses upon analyzing voting support for the radical right in four selected case studies: Canada and France, selected as nations exemplifying majoritarian electoral systems, compared with Norway and Switzerland, illustrating elections under proportional representation. The conclusion considers the implications for how parties behave strategically as agents, and how voters react, under different rule-based constraints.

I: The ideological space generated by mainstream party competition

Parties can be seen as competing by arraying themselves across an ideological space, conventionally from left to right on a ten-point scale. The supply-side thesis developed by Herbert Kitschelt suggests that support for radical right parties is fuelled by a broader unhappiness with the electoral choices offered by the established mainstream parties, especially where there has been closure of the gap between the center-left and center-right on many major social and economic policy issues¹. In post-industrial societies, any convergence of social democrat and moderate conservative major parties, he argues, coupled in particular with an extended period of government by the center-right, creates the most opportune electoral opening for the radical right. In Britain, for example, the new Labour party under Blair's leadership has adopted liberal free-market economic policies on trade, taxation, welfare reform, and labor mobility. In periods when the Conservatives have hedged back towards the center ground on Europe and the welfare state, to try to recapture middle-of-the-road support under Michael Howard, then this leaves parties such as the BNP and the UK Independence Party maximum room to expand their support on the far right by banging the nationalist anti-foreigner, anti-Brussels drum. A middle-of-the-road consensus at elite-level, for example a tacit agreement by major parties to avoid playing 'the race card', may lead voters, unhappy with the mainstream electoral choices, to opt increasingly for alternative extremist parties who provide 'a choice not an echo'. Radical right parties do particularly well under these conditions, Kitschelt argues, as exemplified by Denmark, France, and Norway, if they offer a 'winning formula' combining neo-liberal pro-market policies on economic issues with an authoritarian stance on social issues concerning citizenship, lifestyle, or cultural politics.

As well as evidence presented by Kitschelt, support for this thesis has been found in some other studies. Abedi, for example, classifies party positions based on 'expert' judgments

and compares the proportion of votes cast for 'anti-establishment' parties since 1945 in 16 post-industrial societies. He concludes that the closure of the mainstream parties on the left-right dimension generated greater opportunities for the electoral success of anti-establishment parties (including, although not confined to, those of the radical right)². Following a similar line of reasoning, Van der Brug et al also suggest that radical right parties are more successful when the largest mainstream rightwing competitor, in particular, occupies a centrist moderate position. This is thought to facilitate an opening for radical right contenders, who can thereby pick up far right voters who would otherwise lack a home³. The study reported that the left-right position of the main rightwing competitor party was a significant predictor of the share of the vote won by more than two dozen radical right parties in EU nations, indeed this was the strongest factor in their models.

Nevertheless this interpretation needs to be re-examined since the evidence has been disputed. For example, Lubber et al reported that, contrary to Kitschelt and Abedi, support for radical right parties was not larger where there was greater space in party competition on the issue of immigration⁴. Another question concerns periodicity: Ignazi has argued that the specific timing of ideological shifts in party competition fails to support Kitschelt's claims. He points out that historically the mainstream center-right moved in a neo-conservative direction following the rise of Reaganism and Thatcherism during the late-1970s and early 1980s, well before the ascendancy of the radical right occurred in the early-1990s⁵. We can reexamine the evidence for the Kitschelt thesis using the Lubbers expert scales monitoring the ideological position of parties, as discussed earlier. The normative implications of this theory are also important to consider. If support for radical right parties does indeed represent an alternative outlet of expression for those unhappy with the choices offered by the existing party system, for example frustration with the overwhelming predominance of the Republicans and Democrats in the United States, then the radical right could still function as a healthy part of political competition, by widening democratic choices at the ballot box, the scope of deliberative debate in public affairs, and the political agenda in legislatures. Classical liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill would disagree deeply with the xenophobic attitudes, intolerant sentiments, and the politics of hatred expressed by the radical right, but so long as parties acted non-violently within the confines of the law, classical liberals would defend their rights to articulate these views and stand for elected office⁶.

There are two hypotheses to examine. The Kitschelt thesis suggests that the closure of the ideological space between the major parties on the center-left and center-right provide opportunities for electoral advance by radical right parties. If correct, then we should expect to find that the smaller the ideological gap between the center parties, then the greater the popularity of the radical right. The alternative van der Brug version of this thesis claims that it is the location of the mainstream rightwing party in each nation, in particular, which is vital: the more centrist the rightwing party, the larger the spatial opportunity for radical right challengers. Evidence to test these two claims can be derived from the Lubbers 'expert' ideological 10-point scales, used and discussed earlier, monitoring the position of all electoral parties located from extreme left (0) to extreme right (10)⁷.

[Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1 about here]

Table 9.1 and Figure 9.1 present the results in sixteen European societies, without any prior controls for the type of electoral system, which might also be expected to influence patterns of party and ideological competition. All these nations are established democracies and postindustrial economies, to facilitate comparison of similar societies. The table identifies the ideological location of the major rightist and major leftist party in each nation, and then calculates the size of the 'left-right' gap (the difference between the two locations). To consider first the evidence concerning the Kitschelt claim, the comparison of the mean ideological gap between center left and center right was 3.24 in countries which contained a relevant radical right electoral party, compared with 2.84 in countries with a fringe radical right electoral party, and 2.96 where there were no successful electoral radical right contenders. This evidence therefore fails to support the Kitschelt prediction that the radical right will flourish most successfully where the ideological gap between the main parties was smallest. Figure 9.1 illustrates the correlations graphically; a cluster of countries, notably Italy, Belgium, Norway and Denmark, exhibit high

ideological polarization among the mainstream parties and also a flourishing share of the vote for the radical right, the antithesis of the Kitschelt claim. At the same time, there are many countries ranging across levels of party ideological competition, from low (Ireland) to high (Sweden), with minimal voting support for contemporary radical right parties. In these sixteen societies, no significant correlation existed between the size of the major party left-right gap and the mean share of the radical right vote or seats (whether calculated by the average vote or seats for these parties in elections held from 1990-2004, or during the most recent period from 2000-2004).

The van der Brug variant of this thesis claims that it is the ideological location of the mainstream *rightwing* party which is critical for maximizing or minimizing opportunities for the radical right. The size of the 'right-wing' gap is calculated in each society by simply subtracting the position of the major rightwing party from the maximum score (10) on the ideological scale. Table 9.1 shows that the right-wing gap on the right was slightly greater in nations where there was a relevant radical right party (3.24) than in those countries where there were fringe party (2.84), or no radical right party (2.96), as expected, but this was only a very modest difference. Of course there are a limited number of cases under comparison, and this restricts the analysis, nevertheless again there was also an insignificant correlation between the size of the right-wing gap and the vote or seat share of the radical right (using the same periods as described above). It appears that there are grounds for skepticism surrounding the claim that the ideological positions of the mainstream parties provide automatic opportunities for radical right parties. What might matter, instead, might be the ideological strategies radical right parties adopt to maximize their support, within the constraints of the electoral rules and the distribution of public opinion.

II: The constraints on party competition

Most supply-side rational choice theories treat parties as largely autonomous agents, deciding where to locate themselves across the ideological spectrum in pursuit of popular support, assuming conditions of perfect competition. By contrast, the account offered here suggests that the electoral rules serve to regulate both 'demand' and 'supply' factors, especially the electoral strategies that parties follow. As discussed in the book's introduction, 'proximity' or 'spatial' theories of voting behavior start from the traditional Downsian rational choice axiom that both voters and parties are located at ideal points on the classic left-right ideological dimension⁸. The proximity model used here follows this tradition by assuming that voters can position themselves at a point in this continuum reflecting their ideal preference. The ideological position of each party can also be represented by a point in the same continuum. Building upon this foundation, the strategic agency theory developed in this book makes certain important claims about how:

- (i) The electoral system generates incentives for either centripetal or centrifugal patterns of party competition, and, as a result;
- (ii) The rules influence where rational parties decide to locate themselves on the left-right ideological spectrum; and, in turn,
- (iii) Patterns of party competition shape how citizens respond to the available electoral choices, and the importance of ideological or populist appeals in voting behavior.

Proximity models of voting behavior assume that the distribution of public opinion on the left-right ideological spectrum usually follows a unimodal normal curve with a single peak in the center of the distribution. Public opinion commonly reflects this pattern on most major values, such as preferences for tax cuts over public spending, for free market liberalism over state planned economies, or for stricter or liberal regulation of refugee entry. In this ideological space, as discussed in the introduction, the theory assumes that some policy options are located too far left for the public's acceptance (such as allowing all refugees who apply into a country), some are located too far right (such as denying asylum even to refugees from bloody civil wars or victims of human right abuses), and there is an asymmetrical zone of acquiescence between these poles with a range of intermediate policy choices (allowing some, but not all) that are broadly acceptable to the general public⁹. A broad consensus exists about valance issues found within

this zone. Given the normal distribution of public opinion around most values, support for extremist values on the far right or far left usually remains confined to a minority of the electorate.

In this context, standard Downsian rational choice models assume that most parties have a strategic incentive to compete by emphasizing similar values in the middle-ground of the ideological spectrum, since that is where most voters cluster¹⁰. If public opinion is normally distributed, rational vote-maximizing parties will try to position themselves within the left-right ideological space to maximize their appeal among as many citizens as possible. Under most circumstances, parties are therefore subject to strong centripetal pressures to emphasize values where there is widespread agreement, for example to suggest that they offer an experienced leadership team capable of managing economic growth, providing effective security, and maintaining a basic welfare safety-net offering social protection against the problems of old-age, unemployment, and ill-health. Party policies and platforms are expected to converge with the position of the median voter on these issues. This account provides a logic consistent with predictions made in the mid-1960s about 'the end of ideology' (Bell) and the growth of 'catch-all' parties (Kirchheimer)¹¹. Simple proximity models provide a potential explanation for why major parties usually cluster in the center-ground of politics, given the normal distribution of public opinion.

Yet standard proximity theories are less good at explaining why rational vote-maximizing and seat-maximizing radical right parties do not simply moderate their policy positions and tone-down their heated rhetoric in the pursuit of popular support clustered in the center-right ground of the political spectrum. To go further, building upon arguments developed by Cox, we assume that the strategic incentives facing rational parties vary systematically according to the institutional context of the electoral system¹². In particular, as already observed, the electoral threshold determines the number of parties elected to the legislature, and thus, as Cox suggests, it may shape the incentives for either centripetal patterns of party competition (where most parties and candidates advocate moderate policies clustered in the middle of the zone of acquiescence) and centrifugal patterns (where parties adopt more extreme positions ranged across the full ideological spectrum).

Earlier chapters have demonstrated how PR electoral systems with low thresholds allow minor parties to gain office even if they gain only a modest share of the popular vote. Under these rules, we theorize that radical right minor parties have a strategic incentive to win seats by adopting 'bonding' strategies which they can use to mobilize and activate niche cleavages within the electorate. Such appeals stress signature issues and hardline values characteristic of the far right of the ideological spectrum, notably xenophobic, anti-immigrant, and anti-establishment rhetoric. Such values distinguish radical right parties most clearly from their mainstream competitors, thereby generating support among their hardcore base. The theory assumes that it is easier for minor parties to mobilize certain distinct segments of the electorate, for example, for Green parties in Western Europe to attract the younger generation on environmental issues, or for reformed communist parties to mobilize older voters in Central Europe by emphasizing the importance of maintaining welfare services and social security. By contrast, it is more difficult for minor parties to compete in the center ground of party politics, such as on consensual or valence issues of national security and competent management of the economy, where party competition is most crowded, and where many minor radical right parties lack the credibility derived from the experience of government office. By helping to mobilize supporters, raise funds, attract volunteers, and therefore contribute ultimately towards their electoral success, minor radical right parties can gain many benefits from prioritizing clear ideological principles; distinctive programmatic party platforms reflecting these goals; and a sense of one-of-us belonging to a clan with boundaries demarcating 'them' and 'us'.

By contrast, in contests under majoritarian rules, and/or with higher effective electoral thresholds, radical right parties will fail to surmount the barriers to elected office (and thus the rewards of status, power and legitimacy that flow from office) unless they adopt broader populist, 'bridging' or 'catch-all' strategies. In this context, radical right vote-seeking parties are forced to expand their ideological and social appeals beyond far-right anti-foreigner cultural protectionism to encompass a broader range of issues and populist appeals, based on vague rhetoric,

leadership popularity, and simple slogans largely devoid of substantive policy content, designed to attract a more diverse sector of the electorate. Leadership popularity should be particularly important in this context, for example attracting popular support through charismatic appeals, effective rhetoric, and modern communication skills. Of course radical right parties fighting in majoritarian electoral systems, such as the British National Front and the British National Party, may still decide to focus hard-line anti-immigrant and racist appeals upon narrow segments of the electorate, opting for ideological purity over electoral popularity. But, in this case, the theory predicts that such parties will remain stranded on the fringes of public life, and they may even die out over time, as they will attract too few votes to surmount the higher threshold for elected office characteristic of majoritarian elections. As discussed in the next chapter, radical right parties may make sporadic gains under these circumstances, especially through protest politics in second-order elections such as regional or European contests, but they will fail to consolidate their position.

Evidence for ideological competition

Following Cox, a growing body of literature has theorized about the effects of electoral systems on patterns of centrifugal and centripetal party competition, but few have attempted to evaluate the empirical evidence for this relationship across many types of electoral systems. Empirical support for this theory has been found by Dow, however, who compared the location of parties, measured by voter evaluations in national election surveys, in two majoritarian systems (Canada and France) and in two proportional systems (the Netherlands and Israel). The study reported that, as expected, parties were generally located closer to the median voter in majoritarian than PR systems¹³. In majoritarian elections, the radical right parties under comparison (the French *Front National* and the Canadian Reform parties) remained the furthest away from the median voter, while the winning parties were most centrally-located.

To see whether these findings remain robust under different circumstances, the conclusions deserve re-examining in a wider range of national and electoral contexts. Evidence to test these propositions can be derived from the CSES allowing comparison of party ideological competition in elections held in thirty nations, includes both West European and post-Communist societies, as well as in majoritarian, combined, and PR electoral systems¹⁴. In the CSES survey, people in each country were asked to place the six largest parties on a ten-point left-right ideological scale ranging from left (0) to right (10)¹⁵. This data can be used to explore whether the perceived pattern of party competition on this standard scale varied according to the basic type of electoral system. The estimate of degree of left-right party competition is calculated as the difference between the mean position of the most leftist party in each country and the mean position of the most rightist party in each country, as described in Table 9.2. The fact that we are comparing the six largest and most relevant parties in each nation standardizes the comparison and it means that the degree of ideological competition is not merely a reflection of the number of parties elected in each nation, for example the inclusion more fringe and minor parties in PR systems with low thresholds, such as in Belgium.

[Table 9.2 and Figure 9.2 about here]

The results, illustrated visually in Figure 9.2, generally confirm that party competition proves more centrifugal under PR electoral systems and more centripetal under majoritarian systems, with combined electoral systems falling into the middle of the distribution. The ideological distance between the most left and most right party was 3.29 points on the 10-point scale in majoritarian electoral systems, 4.28 points in combined systems, but ranged across 5.18 points in proportional systems. Figure 9.2 shows that not all the countries under comparison fell exactly where predicted; in particular, the Peruvian presidential election, although a proportional system, showed the smallest ideological left-right gap among parties, which probably reflects the clientelistic and personalistic nature of presidential contests in this country¹⁶. A similar lack of ideological polarization was also evident in Taiwan, using the combined electoral system. By contrast, although using the majoritarian Second Ballot electoral system, French party competition displayed considerable polarization between the Workers Struggle on the far left and the Front National on the far right. This pattern may be generated by the Second Ballot system

which allows multiple parties to compete in the first round elections, where people can traditionally express a vote 'with their heart', before finally casting a ballot 'with their head' for the major center-left and center-right contenders, although further comparisons would be necessary to confirm this pattern further¹⁷. Despite these exceptions, the broad pattern found in most countries does confirm the expectation that the electoral system has 'psychological' effects by influencing the ideological strategies which parties adopt, as well as having mechanical effects which determine the effective number of political parties elected in any country (as documented in chapter 5). Ideological competition is usually more centripetal under majoritarian rules and more centrifugal under proportional electoral rules.

III: Radical right ideological or populist appeals

So how does the pattern of party competition influence voting behavior? One of the most basic propositions in proximity theories of electoral behavior is that rational voters are expected to maximize their utility by voting for the party closest to their own preferences while shunning parties furthest away¹⁸. Many accounts focus upon *issue* proximity, on the assumption that voters match their attitudes towards a series of specific public policies, such as on education, health-care, and defense, with the policy platforms offered by parties. Yet it is widely recognized that issue voting makes considerable information demands upon citizens when assessing where parties stand on each policy that voters care about. Issue voting also requires judgments about whether parties are likely to deliver upon their promises, based upon their past performance and their record in office, a matter that is particularly difficult to evaluate for new parties. In line with many other accounts, the theory tested here suggests that when deciding how to vote, citizens commonly use a variety of 'cognitive shortcuts' through general left-right ideological cues (understood to represent a running tally of the past performance and an assessment of future actions taken by each party), as effective ways of reducing information demands in each election, while yet matching general policy preferences, at least in a rough approximation, to the party and candidate choices available¹⁹. The left-right scale is the most common summary measure for evaluating parties and candidates, widely used in the literature comparing party competition and electoral behavior, so it provides a standard test of how far ideological cues guide voting choices²⁰. Evidence for the basic claim about ideological voting can be tested using the CSES survey which asked people in each country to place themselves on a ten-point left-right ideological scale ranging from left (0) to right (10)²¹. This allows us to analyze whether citizens do indeed support the radical right party if they locate themselves on the far right of the ideological spectrum.

The relative impact of left-right ideology on voting behavior needs to be compared against alternative factors commonly thought to determine support for the radical right. Much of the literature emphasizes the role of populist appeals, which can be regarded as affective orientations based on how far people like a particular party and the party leader, drawing upon general party images and broad rhetorical appeals, but largely devoid of references to substantive policy content or issue positions. Although rarely analyzed with systematic evidence, and with only loose reference to the original Weberian notion of 'charisma', historical national case-studies often claim that 'charismatic' leaders such as Umberto Bossi, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Pauline Hanson, Ross Perot, Mogens Glistrup, Anders Lange, and Pim Fortuyn have played a decisive role through founding and organizing new parties, as well as acting as the figure-head for media attention and controlling the party organization²². In some cases, subsequent problems of leadership succession are believed to have undermined support for radical right parties, perhaps best exemplified by the difficulties in establishing a viable Reform Party candidate in the 2000 presidential election, after Ross Perot retired. Similar problems of continuity were evident in the Danish Progress Party after Mogens Glistrup was imprisoned for tax fraud. One Nation faced a parallel sharp fall in the Australian polls after Pauline Hanson was convicted of electoral irregularities. Leadership effects are also exemplified in cases when new leaders such as Jörg Haider and Christoph Blocher have risen to power within the internal hierarchy of established parties. Both Haider and Blocher moved their parties sharply hard-right, especially on race and immigration, thereby driving out more moderate factions. Followed the change of leadership, the substantial rise registered in party support for the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* after

1986, and in the Swiss *Schweizerische Volkspartei* after 1999, certainly suggests that their role may have been decisive, although it remains unclear whether this surge was due to their personal appeal among the public or their ideological shift in party policy and rhetoric²³. The strategic agency theory suggests that populist appeals by leaders will be particularly important in generating support for radical right parties within majoritarian electoral systems, for example for Ross Perot's Reform party and for the Canadian Reform/Alliance/Conservative party.

Radical right voters may also be swayed by other affective considerations, in particular by their general sense of partisan attachment. The classic Michigan model of voting behavior gives primacy to the importance of an affective sense of party identification as one of the core factors driving electoral support²⁴. Party identification, regarded as a long-standing anchor for voting behavior, is seen in this account as the best single predictor of the vote, modified by changing circumstances, such as economic conditions and the personality of the leaders, that influence short-run and medium-term electoral forces. A substantial literature suggests that strong loyalties have gradually eroded over the years through partisan dealignment in many established democracies²⁵. Nevertheless partisan identities may continue to play an important role in voting choice, especially when considering whether to support fringe and minor parties which have no record in government and which stand little chance of actually implementing any policy proposals in office.

[Table 9.3 about here]

The institutional context, particularly the electoral system, is therefore expected to influence the relative importance of ideological cues and populist appeals. This generates certain testable propositions, summarized in Table 9.3. In proportional representation electoral systems, minor radical right parties are expected to target core supporters through advocating strong ideological appeals on core issues and values. Hence, in this context, it is predicted that in PR systems (exemplified here by Denmark and Switzerland), votes cast for radical right parties will be strongly predicted by the perceived ideological proximity of citizens to parties. By contrast, in majoritarian electoral systems (exemplified by Canada and France), radical right parties are expected to emphasize more diffuse populist appeals, so that votes cast for these parties will be more strongly predicted by party popularity. The ideological profile of radical right supporters in combined (otherwise known as 'mixed' or 'dual') electoral systems, which incorporate elements from both PR and majoritarian systems, are predicted to fall into an intermediate position.

Based on these considerations, the regression models presented in Table 9.3 first examine which factors prove to be the strongest predictors of voting choices for radical right parties in the pooled sample of 13-nations contained in the CSES with a relevant radical right party. The models compare left-right ideology, affective orientations towards leaders, general party popularity, and partisan identification on voting for the radical right. Using on a series of standard 10-point scales, respondents in each country were asked to locate their own position on the left-right ideological spectrum, as well as to indicate how far they liked the party leader and the party in general²⁶. This allows us to analyze whether leadership popularity lagged, or led, overall levels of party popularity. The survey also monitored the direction and strength of partisan identification, measured by the party that respondents felt closest towards.²⁷ The multivariate models control for most of the factors already established as important in previous chapters, notably the demographic and social characteristic of radical right voters, as well as their greater disaffection with government. Omission of factors already found to predict support for the radical right may result in misspecified models that systematically over-state the importance of ideological values²⁸. Replication of the logit (binomial logistic regression) models already used with the ESS also allows us to double-check the robustness and reliability of some of the core findings, although identical results would not be expected given some important methodological differences in each survey.²⁹

[Table 9.4 about here]

Table 9.4 demonstrates the results in logit models predicting voting for relevant radical right parties in the pooled CSES 13-nation sample of countries containing a relevant radical right party in national legislative elections. Model A enters the social and demographic factors, and

political disaffection, where radical right support proved to be greatest among men, younger voters, ethnic majorities, and the less educated, as well as those least satisfied with the democratic process. These results generally reflected the demographic profile of radical right voters found earlier in chapters 6 and 7, with replication lending greater confidence to the results derived from two independent surveys. The Goldthorpe-Heath measure of social class showed a similar pattern to that found earlier, with support for the radical right slightly lower among the salariat while being strongest among the petit bourgeoisie and the unskilled working class, although the beta coefficients failed to prove statistically significant. Model A also explained little variance in radical right voting. Further exploration of the data suggested that this difference in the results was probably due to the inclusion of a broader range of nations contained in the pooled sample in the CSES survey, including post-Communist societies such as Poland, Russia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic with a distinctive class structure and historical traditions.

Model B maintained these demographic, socioeconomic and attitudinal factors as controls, and then added the additional indicators of the respondent's ideological position, affective orientations towards parties and party leaders, and partisan identification. The model was tested and confirmed to be free of problems of multicollinearity. The results of Model B indicate that, even with prior controls, the measures of left-right ideology, leadership popularity, party popularity, and partisan identification all proved significant predictors of voting for the radical right. Moreover once these factors were entered, most of the social and demographic characteristics (with the exception of ethnicity and education) became insignificant. The overall fit of the model improved dramatically (indicated by the final Nagelkerke R^2 of .668), confirming that political attitudes predicted support for the radical right far more strongly than social characteristics. The results suggest that social background does affect the propensity to vote for these parties, and the effect works *indirectly*, though shaping political ideology and affective orientations towards the radical right.

The impact of the electoral system on party competition and voting behavior

But does the electoral system also influence this process, so that populist appeals are stronger predictors of radical right support in majoritarian systems while ideological cues prove more important in PR systems, as theorized earlier? This claim can be most clearly illustrated by analyzing voting behavior in four case-studies in France, Canada, Norway and Switzerland, selected to represent comparable affluent post-industrial societies and established democracies, and all containing a relevant radical right party, but varying in their electoral systems.

We can compare support for the Reform Party in the 1997 Canadian election and votes for the *Front National* in the 2002 French Presidential election, both of which exemplify majoritarian electoral systems³⁰. Canadian parliamentary elections are fought using single-member plurality districts (First-past-the-post), requiring that the winning candidate gains a simple plurality of votes in each riding. The French presidential elections use the 2nd Ballot system ('runoff' elections), where the first round of the contest determines if any candidate gets an absolute majority of votes (50%+). If none do, then the top two candidates with the highest share of the vote go further into the second round election two weeks later. The 2002 elections were particularly appropriate to test the basis of *Front National* support; in the first round Jean-Marie Le Pen unexpectedly came second, with 17% of the vote, his best ever result, shocking commentators and generating massive waves of street protests by those who had been expecting that the second round would be a traditional left-right contest between Jacques Chirac and Lionel Jospin, the *Partie Socialist* candidate and French premier who won only 16.2% of the vote.³¹ The case studies also allow us to examine further the important differences we have already noted between Canada and France in the degree of party ideological competition.

These contests are compared with support for radical right parties in two European countries which exemplify PR systems with far lower effective thresholds. The Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* (FrP) almost tripled its vote, from 6.3% in 1993 to 15.3% in the 1997 parliamentary election, led by Carl I. Hagen. One critical factor which seems to have played a role is the salience of the issue of immigration in the election, which was linked by the Progress party to problems of juvenile delinquency, unemployment, and dependence on social security, along

with a broader anti-tax movement. In the 1999 election the Swiss *Schweizerische Volkspartei* (SVP) also saw a substantial advance in voting support, from 14.9% in 1995 to 23.3%, under the more radical ultra-nationalist, anti-EU, and isolationist rhetoric of its leader, the billionaire industrialist Christoph Blocher.³² Both the Norwegian and Swiss elections are highly proportional in their ratio of votes to seats, (the Rose standardized version of the Loosemore-Hanby index of proportionality is 95 and 93% respectively). Norway employs closed party lists for the 165 members of the Storting, a 4% legal threshold, and a St. Laguë formulae. Switzerland elects 200 members to the Federal Assembly using the D' Hondt formula of votes to seats, panachage lists, and no formal legal minimal voting threshold³³. The societies also differ substantially in the nature of their electoral cleavages, with Norway relatively homogeneous and divided primarily by a traditional class cleavage, as well as an urban-rural pattern, while Switzerland exemplifies a deeply plural society strongly divided by language, region, and class.

[Table 9.5 about here]

The result of the logit (binomial logistic regression) analysis are presented in Table 9.5, which first entered the standard social characteristics and satisfaction with democracy measures as controls. The models then entered the respondent's left-right self-placement on the 10-point scale (as an indicator of their ideological position) and the scale measuring affective orientations towards radical right parties (as an indicator of populist appeal)³⁴. The models in Table 9.4 demonstrate that affective party popularity proved significant in all systems, suggesting that populist appeals generating a positive affective orientation towards the radical right represent an important part of their support. By contrast, political ideology proved a significant predictor of voting for the radical right only in the two countries using proportional representation electoral systems, when generating support for the Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* and the Swiss *Schweizerische Volkspartei*. By contrast, the ideological cues were not significant predictors of radical right voting in the cases of the Canadian Reform Party and the French *Front National*, in elections held under majoritarian rules. Of course the number of case-studies remains limited; in particular, ideally it would have been desirable to test these patterns in a broader range of countries using majoritarian electoral systems. One important reason why few such nations currently contain a relevant radical right party is due to the 'mechanical' effects of electoral systems that were already noted. But despite these limitations, the results of the selected cases are consistent with the basic theory that the type of electoral rules has certain 'psychological' effects by influencing the choice of party ideological strategy, and that, in turn, the appeals that radical right parties emphasize shape patterns of voting behavior. Populism appears to play an important role in all the case-studies, with a very strong association with radical right voting behavior, but ideological cues are also relatively strong cues in Norway and Switzerland, yet insignificant in the cases using majoritarian electoral systems. Overall the full models in each country, containing social background, political trust, and the measures of ideology and party popularity, successfully explained a considerable amount of the variance in radical right voting (as measured by the Nagelkerke R^2 , ranging from 47% of the variance in France and Switzerland to 61% in Canada).

[Figure 9.3 about here]

Among specific factors, many accounts emphasize that leadership plays a particularly important role in radical right popularity, where studies stress the importance of figures such as Haider, Le Pen and Zhirinovskiy in generating support for their parties. The analysis of the survey evidence available in the CSES showed that leadership and party popularity were closely associated in each country; the strong correlation ($R=.804$) is illustrated in Figure 9.3. The leader was slightly ahead of levels of party popularity in a few countries, notably in Israel, as well as in the *Fremskrittspartiet* in Norway, the latter perhaps because the leader's long-standing control was such that it was sometimes described as 'Hagen's party'³⁵. By contrast, despite his high-profile and long-standing role, support for Christoph Blocher fell slightly behind the general popularity of the Swiss People's Party. From this cross-sectional evidence, however, it remains difficult to determine any independent effect from party leaders per se. Clearly contingent factors will play a role in any particular election, such as the media coverage which the parties receive, the appeal of specific party leaders, or the salience of immigration on the issue agenda. Specific

events will also help to flesh out explanations of specific results, exemplified by the assassination of Pym Fortuna before polling day, the unexpected success of Le Pen in coming second ahead of Jospin in May 2002, and the merger of the Reform/Alliance/ Conservative parties in Canada. But a large part of the reason why people vote for the radical right can be explained fairly successfully by similar factors to those which also explain support for other types of parties, namely the ideological location of parties and voters (within institutional contexts) and the affective partisan orientations of voters, as well as the usual socio-demographic cleavages in the electorate.

Conclusions

Previous supply-side accounts suggest that variations in the success of the radical right can be attributed in large part to the ideological position of the mainstream parties and the opportunities this provides for the radical right. The argument developed in this study suggests that party competition is indeed an important aspect of the explanation for radical right success, but that what is more important is how far the ideological location of radical right parties works within the context of electoral rules and the distribution of public opinion. The core thesis of this book is that the broader institutional context, particularly the electoral rules, affects the electoral strategies that radical right parties adopt to maximize their appeal, and hence that the role of ideological cues and populist appeals vary in generating voting support for these parties. This account emphasizes the role of electoral incentives for spatial patterns of party competition. Three conclusions can be drawn from the available expert and mass survey evidence considered in this chapter.

The analysis based on a comparison of how the electorate perceived the ideological position of parties in thirty nations supports the thesis that party competition is clustered more closely around the median voter in most majoritarian systems, while being dispersed more centrifugally across the whole ideological spectrum from far left to far right in most PR systems. This provides consistent support for the institutionally-constrained proximity model of party behavior presented in this study.

It is more difficult to test the proximity model of voting behavior for the radical right. Nevertheless the available evidence in the CSES survey in the pooled 13-nation models indicates that both ideological and populist appeals are part of the explanation for the attraction of radical right parties; indeed once these factors were entered into the pooled-sample models, ideological values and affective orientations towards parties reduced the significance of almost all of the social-demographic variables.

Lastly the illustrative case-studies of Canada, France, Switzerland and Norway serve to support the broader claim that the electoral system also plays a role in party strategies and voting behavior; while ideology and partisanship are both important in predicting voting support for the Swiss People's Party and the Norwegian Progress Party, only the indicators of partisanship (not ideology) proved significant in the elections concerning the Canadian Reform Party and the French *Front National*, held under majoritarian rules.

The theory that we have presented concerning the incentives facing vote-maximizing parties therefore goes some way further down the path of explaining the success of the radical right in some countries, and not others. Electoral rules are understood to generate certain important mechanical and psychological effects. First, if challengers do not believe that they stand any chance of being elected in majoritarian systems, the existence of strong electoral thresholds may deter any radical right activists from channeling their energies into political parties; instead they may prefer to mobilize through other organizations, such as social movements and interest groups. If activists do decide to challenge elections through working within party organizations, the mechanical effects of the higher vote thresholds found in majoritarian electoral systems means that most will fail to gain elected office, with the status, visibility, and resources that entails. Without such resources, radical right parties remain poorly institutionalized extra-parliamentary bodies which have problems in maintaining any continuity, becoming subject to internal party factionalization and fragmentation. And if they fight elections, over a succession of elections, majoritarian systems are likely to generate rational vote-

maximizing incentives for successful radical right parties to focus upon populist strategies and more moderate ideological appeals, which are necessary for them to get elected.

What we have not yet had a chance to consider are the conditions for radical right parties, not just to make sporadic gains, but also to sustain their success over a series of elections, and in particular how far organizational development and consolidation are necessary. To consider these issues, the next chapter goes on to compare a series of case-studies, including Britain, where the radical right has failed to make headway despite secular dealignment, the Netherlands and the United States where there have been occasional 'deviating' elections with temporary sudden advances but equally sudden falls, and Austria, France and Canada, where radical right parties have consolidated their position after experiencing an initial break-through.

Table 9.1: Party competition and radical right parties

	(i) <i>Major rightist party</i>		(ii) <i>Major leftist party</i>		(iii) <i>Left-right gap</i>	(iv) <i>Right-wing gap</i>	<i>Type of radical right party</i>
France	7.50	RPR	3.36	PS	4.14	2.50	Relevant
Sweden	7.96	M	4.00	SAP	3.96	2.04	Fringe
Portugal	5.96	PSD	2.16	PCP	3.80	4.04	None
Italy	6.65	FI	3.00	PCI	3.65	3.35	Relevant
Norway	7.41	H	4.00	DNA	3.41	2.59	Relevant
Belgium-Francophone	6.61	PRL	3.26	PS	3.35	3.39	Relevant
Denmark	7.20	KF	3.97	SD	3.23	2.80	Relevant
Finland	6.43	KOK	3.21	FPDL	3.22	3.57	None
Belgium-Flemish	6.76	PVV	3.58	SP	3.18	3.24	Relevant
Netherlands	6.71	VVD	3.69	PvDA	3.02	3.29	Relevant
Spain	6.85	PP	3.96	PSOE	2.89	3.15	Fringe
Britain	7.07	Con	4.43	Lab	2.64	2.93	Fringe
Germany	6.36	CDU	3.96	SPD	2.40	3.64	Fringe
Greece	7.38	ND	5.08	Pasok	2.30	2.62	Fringe
Austria	6.25	OVP	4.31	SPO	1.94	3.75	Relevant
Ireland	5.93	FG	4.06	Lab	1.87	4.07	None
Mean relevant	6.89		3.65		3.24	2.88	
Mean fringe	7.12		4.29		2.84	3.89	
Mean none	6.11		3.14		2.96	3.11	

Notes:

(iii) The 'left-right' gap is calculated as the difference between the major rightist and major leftist party in each nation, to examine Kitschelt's claim that it is the closure of this gap which creates the greatest opportunities for radical right success.

(iv) The 'rightwing' gap is calculated by subtracting the position of the major rightist party from 10, the maximum point on the left-right scale, to examine ven der Brug et al's thesis that the radical right get most votes in countries where the major rightist parties is most centrist.

Source: The position of each party is calculated from Marcel Lubbers. 2000. [principal investigator] *Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000* [machine readable data set]. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.

Table 9.2: Public perceptions of ideological dispersion in each nation

	Year	<i>Most leftist party</i>		<i>Most rightist party</i>		<i>Difference</i>	<i>Median voter</i>
Australia	1996	3.84	Green Party	6.50	National (Country)	2.66	5.45
Belarus	2001	2.66	Communist Party	5.30	Liberal-Democrat	2.64	5.74
Belgium	1999	3.60	Anders Gaan Leven	7.00	Vlaams Blok	3.40	4.91
Britain	1997	3.90	Labour Party	7.19	Conservative Party	3.29	5.04
Canada	1997	3.40	Bloc Quebecois	5.94	Reform Party	2.54	5.36
Czech Rep	1996	0.59	Communist Party	8.93	Civic Democratic	8.34	5.77
Denmark	1998	2.52	Socialist People's Party	8.64	Danish People's Party	6.12	5.56
France	2002	2.30	Worker's Struggle	7.85	Front National	5.55	5.11
Germany	1998	2.40	Party of Democratic Socialism	6.32	CSU Bavaria	3.92	4.29
Hungary	1998	2.93	Socialist Party	7.91	Justice and Life (MIEP)	4.98	4.87
Iceland	1999	2.39	Left Greens	8.41	Independence Party	6.02	5.55
Israel	1996	1.51	Meretz	7.46	Likud	5.95	5.16
Korea	2000	4.21	Democratic Liberal Party	6.56	United Liberal Democrats	2.35	4.89
Lithuania	1997	2.71		8.06	Homeland Union	5.35	5.66
Mexico	1997	2.73	Cardenista Party	6.20	Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)	3.47	6.37
Netherlands	1998	2.85	Green Left	7.38	People's Party for Freedom & Democracy	4.53	5.38
New Zealand	1996	2.67	Alliance	8.03	ACT New Zealand	5.36	5.62
Norway	1997	2.41	Socialist Left	8.30	Progress Party	5.89	5.18
Peru	2001	4.29	Solucion Popular	5.76	Peru Possible	1.47	5.76
Poland	1997	1.69	Democratic Left Alliance	8.11	Solidarity Election Action	6.42	5.60
Portugal	1997	1.72	Left Block	7.72	Popular Party	6.00	5.34
Romania	1996	3.84	Social Democrats	6.78	National Peasant & Christian Democratic	2.94	6.10
Russia	1999	1.89	Communist Party	8.09	Union of Right Forces	6.20	5.15
Slovenia	1996	3.44	Social Democrats	6.57	Christian Democrats	3.13	4.94
Spain	1996	2.26	United Life	7.47	Partido Popular	5.21	4.55

Sweden	1998	1.24	Left Party	9.02	Moderate Rally	7.78	4.96
Switzerland	1999	3.00	Green Party	7.65	Swiss People's Party	4.65	5.17
Taiwan	1996	4.44	Democratic Progressives	5.80	Nationalist Party	1.36	5.38
Ukraine	1998	1.80	Communist Party	7.32	People's Rukh	5.52	5.38
United States	1996						5.64
Mean Majoritarian						3.29	5.34
Mean combined						4.28	5.29
Mean PR						5.18	5.33

Note: The public's perceived location of the six largest parties in each country, and the location of the median voter, on the left-right ideological scale, where 0= most left and 10 = most right. **Source:** Calculated from CSES Module 1 1996-2001 all nations except France, which draws upon Module II.

Table 9.3: Hypotheses about the impact of electoral systems on radical right support

	<i>Type of electoral system</i>		
	PR	Combined	Majoritarian
Ideological location (R's position on 10-point left-right scale)	Stronger	Moderate	Weaker
Affective party popularity (10-point like/dislike scale)	Weaker	Moderate	Stronger
<i>Exemplar cases</i>	<i>Norway</i> <i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Hungary</i> <i>Russia</i>	<i>Canada</i> <i>France</i>

Table 9.4: Ideological and partisan attitudes and the radical right vote, pooled CSES 13-nation sample

	<i>MODEL A: Social background and political trust</i>			<i>MODEL B: Social background, political trust, and partisan attitudes</i>		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)	-1.86			-9.169		
SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL TRUST						
Age (In years)	-.008	.003	***	.000	.004	N/s
Sex (Male=1, Female=0)	.483	.098	***	.199	.151	N/s
Ethnic majority (Ethnic majority=1, else=0)	1.06	.112	***	.742	.164	***
Education (Highest level attained on a 3-point scale from low to high)	-.161	.066	**	.586	.106	***
Salariat (professional and managerial employees)	-.030	.122	N/s	-.203	.183	N/s
Petit bourgeoisie (self-employed)	.244	.160	N/s	-.013	.250	N/s
Skilled manual working class	.136	.145	N/s	-.323	.228	N/s
Unskilled manual working class	.304	.178	N/s	.266	.288	N/s
Currently unemployed (1)	-.048	.279	N/s	-.761	.416	N/s
Satisfaction with democratic process (4-point scale)	-.286	.056	***	.073	.088	N/s
PARTISAN ATTITUDES						
Ideological left-right self-placement (10-point scale)				.064	.030	**
Liking of radical right party leader (10-point scale)				.156	.039	***
Liking of radical right party (10-point scale)				.466	.043	***
Partisan identification (feels closest to a radical right party)				3.04	.165	***
Nagelkerke R ²	.064			.668		
Percentage correctly predicted	91%			96%		

Notes: The table presents the results of binomial logit regression analysis models where the dependent variable is whether the respondent reported voting for the relevant radical right party in each country in the pooled 13-nation CSES sample. The table includes the unstandardized beta coefficients (B), the standard errors, and their significance. See footnotes for Table 6.1. Ethnicity is defined by the linguistic majority in each country (1), or the linguistic minority (0), based on the primary language spoken at home. For the construction of the ideological and attitudinal scales, all standardized to 10-points, see text. The countries include the 13 nations with a relevant radical right party in legislative elections contained in the CSES (Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Switzerland). Sig.001=***; Sig .01=**; Sig .05 =*

Source: Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Module 1 1996-2001.


Table 9.5: The ideological basis of radical right votes, selected cases

	Majoritarian electoral systems						PR electoral systems					
	Canada 1997 (Reform Party)			France 2002 (Front National)			Norway 1997 (Progress Party)			Switzerland 1999 (People's Party)		
	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.	B	Std. Error	Sig.
(Constant)	-5.96	1.03		-7.09	1.18		-8.24	1.79		-8.44	.764	
MODEL A: CONTROLS FOR SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND TRUST												
Age (years)	.024	.007	***	.024	.011	*	.008	.007	N/s	.015	.006	***
Sex (Male=1)	.399	.225	N/s	.723	.369	*	.314	.236	N/s	.393	.185	*
Ethnicity	1.33	.433	***				-.534	1.45	N/s	2.01	.330	***
Education (3 category scale)	-.031	.198	N/s	.592	.233	**	.117	.112	N/s	.117	.112	N/s
Currently unemployed (yes=1)	-.119	.602	N/s				-2.33	1.44	N/s	-2.33	1.44	N/s
Satisfaction with democracy (4-point scale)	-.393	.165	**	-.365	.212	N/s	-.176	.174	N/s	-.093	.153	N/s
MODEL B: IDEOLOGY AND PARTY POPULARITY WITH PRIOR CONTROLS												
Left-right ideological self-placement (10-pt scale)	-.050	.066	N/s	-.009	.075	N/s	.206	.065	***	.142	.052	***
Like the radical right party (10-point scale)	.761	.057	***	.596	.067	***	.797	.066	***	.552	.046	***
Model A: Nagelkerke R ²	.169			.089			.024			.121		
Model B: Nagelkerke R ²	.613			.470			.517			.477		
Model B: Percentage correctly predicted	88%			95%			92%			88%		
Number of cases per nation	817			913			1,537			1,219		

Notes: The table presents the results of binomial logit analysis models where the dependent variable is whether the respondent reported voting for the relevant radical right party in each country. See footnotes for Table 6.1. Ethnicity is defined by the linguistic majority in each country (1), or the linguistic minority (0), based on the primary language spoken at home. Note that since self-employment was not included in Module II of the CSES, the Goldthorpe-Heath class classification could not be constructed, so this was dropped from the analysis for consistent comparison across the countries.

Sources: Canada, Norway, and Switzerland – The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module I 1996-2001. France - The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, Module II 2001-5.


Figure 9.1: Party competition and radical right parties



Notes: For the estimates of the size of the ideological gap between major parties, see Table 7.4. For the classification of parties, and the percentage share of the vote for the radical right, see Table 3.1.

Source: The size of the ideological gap between major parties is calculated from Marcel Lubbers. 2000. [principal investigator] *Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000* [machine readable data set]. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.


Figure 9.2: Public perceptions of the maximum distance in party locations on the 10-point left-right ideology scale, six largest parties in each nation.



Note: The graph shows the maximum distance in the ideological location of the most leftwing and the most right-wing of the six largest parties in each country, on the 10-point left-right ideological scale, as placed by all respondents in each nation. See Table 9.1.

Source: Calculated from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001 Module I, with France from CSES Module II.

Figure 9.3: Comparing leadership and party popularity



Note: Leadership popularity and party popularity for the six largest parties were both estimated by respondents in each country using 10-point scales, ranging from dislike (0) to like (10).

Source: Calculated from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, 1996-2001.

¹ Herbert Kitschelt, with Anthony J. McGann. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. P.17.

² Amit Abedi. 2002. 'Challenges to established parties: The effects of party system features on the electoral fortunes of anti-political-establishment parties.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (4): 551-583.

³ Wouter Van der Brug, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie. 2005. 'Why some anti-immigrant parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support.' *Comparative Political Studies*.

⁴ Marcel Lubbers, Mérove Gijsberts, and Peer Scheepers, 2002. 'Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe.' *European Journal of Political Research* 41 (3): 345-378.

⁵ Piero Ignazi. 2003. *Extreme right parties in Western Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press. P. 208.

⁶ For a discussion of these issues see Patrick Hossay and Aristide Zolberg. 2002. 'Democracy in peril?' In *Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Eds. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan

⁷ Marcel Lubbers. 2000. [principal investigator] *Expert Judgment Survey of Western-European Political Parties 2000* [machine readable data set]. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: NWO, Department of Sociology, University of Nijmegen.

⁸ The classic account is presented in Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row. For a discussion of the extensive literature flowing from this account, see, for example, James M. Enelow and Melvin Hinich. Eds. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting*. New York: Cambridge University Press; Samuel Merrill III. 1993. 'Voting behavior under the directional spatial model of electoral competition.' *Public Choice* 77: 739-56; Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman. 1999. *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

⁹ Anthony Downs. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row. The modified version of the theory presented here has been influenced by the account developed by James A. Stimson. 1991. *Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles and Swings*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

¹⁰ See the classic discussion in Donald E. Stokes. 1966. 'Spatial models of party competition.' In *Elections and the Political Order*. Ed. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes. New York: Wiley.

¹¹ Daniel Bell. 1962. *The End of Ideology*. New York: Random House; Otto Kirchheimer. 1966. 'The transformation of Western European party systems.' In *Political Parties and Political Development*. Eds. Joseph Lapalombara and Myron Weiner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

¹² See, Gary W. Cox. 1987. 'Electoral equilibrium under alternative voting institutions.' *American Journal of Political Science* 31, pp. 82–108; Gary Cox. 1990. 'Centripetal and centrifugal incentives in electoral systems.' *American Journal of Political Science*. 34: 903-35; Gary W. Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹³ Jay K. Dow. 2001. 'A comparative spatial analysis of majoritarian and proportional elections.' *Electoral Studies* 20: 109-125.

¹⁴ For details about the classification and typology of electoral systems, see Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge university Press.

¹⁵ CSES question A3031 “*In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*” It should be noted that Module I of the CSES did not include issue scales, so we cannot use this dataset to test the directional theory of voting.

¹⁶ Michael Coppedge. 1998. ‘The dynamic diversity of Latin American party systems.’ *Party Politics* 4 (4): 547-568.

¹⁷ Peter Davis. 2002. *The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From De Maistre to Le Pen* London: Routledge.

¹⁸ The ‘proximity model’ based on left-right political ideology, also known as the ‘least-distance’ model, is adopted for the study. The proximity model of issue voting and the Rabinowitz and McDonald directional model of issue voting were not able to be tested as neither the ESS nor Module I of the CSES incorporated suitable issue voting scales. The directional account suggests that people will vote for a party that is most likely to change policies in a way that will leave them most satisfied, depending upon a neutral point from which to judge the expected direction of change. See, George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine MacDonald. 1989. ‘A directional theory of voting.’ *American Political Science Review*. 83: 93-121. For a discussion and comparison of these models, and the extensive literature flowing from these theories, see Samuel Merrill III and Bernard Grofman. 1999. *A Unified Theory of Voting: Directional and Proximity Spatial Models*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁹ See, for example, Morris P. Fiorina. 1979. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press; Samuel L. Popkin. 1994. *The Reasoning Voter*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

²⁰ For a discussion, see Ian Budge and Derek Farlie. 1977. *Voicing and Party Competition*. London: Wiley; Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek J. Hearl. 1987. *Ideology, strategy and Party Change: Spatial analysis of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard I. Hofferbert, and Ian Budge. 1994. *Parties, Policies and Democracy*. Boulder, CO: Westview; Hee Min Kim and Richard C. Fording. 2003. ‘Voter ideology in Western democracies: An update.’ *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (1): 95-105.

²¹ CSES question A3031 “*In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*” It should be noted that Module I of the CSES did not include issue scales, so we are unable to use this dataset to test the directional theory of voting.

²² See, for example, R. Barraclough. 1998. ‘Umberto Bossi: Charisma, Personality, and Leadership.’ *Modern Italy* 3(2).

²³ Max Riedisperge. 1992. ‘Heil Haider! The revitalization of the Austrian Freedom Party since 1986.’ *Politics and Society in Germany, Austria and Switzerland*. 4(3): 18-47; Richard Rose. 2000. ‘The end of consensus in Austria and Switzerland.’ *Journal of Democracy* 11(2): 26-40.

²⁴ For the classic account see Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley; Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes. 1966. *Elections and the Political Order*. New York: Wiley.

²⁵ For cross-national accounts of partisan dealignment, see Russell J. Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, Eds. 1984. *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* Princeton: Princeton University Press; Russell J. Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, Ed. 2001. *Parties without Partisans*. New York: Oxford University Press.

²⁶ CSES A3020 “*I’d like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party.*” A3021 “*And now, using the same scale, I’d like to ask you how much you like or dislike some political leaders.*” Note that in

some nations up to nine parties were coded on these scales, but the comparison in this study is restricted to the first six parties, defined in terms of those with the greatest share of the vote in the election under comparison, in order to standardize results across all nations.

²⁷ The *direction* of party identification was measured in the CSES by the following questions: Q: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” (If ‘yes’) “Which party is that?” The first party mentioned by the respondent was coded. The *strength* of party identification was measured as well by the following: “Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?”

²⁸ For a discussion, see James Adams. 2001. ‘A theory of spatial competition with biased voters: Party policies viewed temporally and comparatively.’ *British Journal of Political Science* 31: 121-158.

²⁹ In particular, the ESS and CSES surveys differed in their detailed occupational codings, and in their classification of self-employment and religion, as well in their timing. It should also be noted that we cannot provide direct comparison with previous chapters concerning attitudes towards cultural protectionism, such as negative feelings towards immigrants and refugees, since these were not monitored in the CSES survey.

³⁰ The data for the French 2002 presidential election is derived from the second module of the CSES, released May 2003.

³¹ For more details of the French contests, see D.S. Bell and Byron Criddle. 2002. ‘Presidentialism restored: The French elections of April-May and June 2002.’ *Parliamentary Affairs* 55 (4): 643+; Arnauld Miguët. 2002. ‘The French elections of 2002: After the earthquake, the deluge.’ *West European Politics* 25 (4): 207-220; Yves Bitrin. 2003. *Vote Le Pen et psychologie des foules: 21 avril 2002, “un coup de tonnerre dans un ciel bleu”* Paris: Harmattan; Patrick Cohen and Jean-Marc Salmon. 2003. *21 avril 2002: Contre-enquête sur le choc Le Pen*. Paris: Denoël.

On the Canadian elections, see Elizabeth Gidengil, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 1999. ‘Making sense of regional voting in the 1997 Canadian federal election: Liberal and Reform support outside Quebec.’ *Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique*. 32(2): 247-272.

³² See C. H. Church. 2000. ‘The Swiss elections of October 1999: Learning to live in more interesting times.’ *West European Politics* 23 (3): 215-230; A. Ladner. 2001. ‘Swiss political parties: Between persistence and change.’ *West European Politics* 24 (2): 123-+; Richard Rose. 2000. ‘The end of consensus in Austria and Switzerland.’ *Journal of Democracy* 11(2): 26-40; W. M. Downs. 2001. ‘Pariahs in their midst: Belgian and Norwegian parties react to extremist threats.’ *West European Politics* 24 (3): 23-42.

³³ For details, see Pippa Norris. 2004. *Electoral Engineering*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Table 2.1.

³⁴ To maintain consistency among the countries under comparison, as the case studies were drawn from module I and II of the CSES, affective orientations towards the party leadership and party identification were dropped from the models, as these were not carried across both modules. Moreover it should be noted that certain socioeconomic and demographic variables were also not consistently coded across all the four case studies, so these items were also dropped from the comparison.

³⁵ Tor Bjørklund and Jørgen Goul Andersen. 2002. ‘Anti-immigration parties in Denmark and Norway.’ In *Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Eds. Martin Schain, Aristide Zolberg and Patrick Hossay. Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan.